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Abstract
The Russian legitimation formula contains the arguments the Russian leadership 
advanced to promote its state-building project between 1991 and 2000. The period of 
investigation coincides with Yeltsin’s presidency. The focus is on how the legitimation 
rhetoric was adjusted both to changing circumstances over time and to three main 
audiences: the Russian domestic population, the Russian domestic elites and the 
international community.
In order to analyse the contents of the legitimation formula a framework was 
developed which divided the different arguments used by the Russian leadership into 
six main categories (democratic, national, charismatic, eudaemonic, external and 
negative arguments). The material selected for analysis had to relate to basic features 
of statehood. Firstly, how did the Russian leadership seek to legitimate the new borders 
of the Russian Federation? Secondly, how did it legitimate the new constitution of 
1993 and the way the constitution was introduced? Finally, the arguments used to 
introduce, abolish and remodel state rituals and symbols were examined.
The main conclusion is that the Russian leadership did not change its core legitimation 
rhetoric over time or across audiences. Democratic arguments, centring on elections 
and a popular mandate as prerequisites for legitimate authority, dominated the 
legitimation formula both over time and for all the main audiences. Instead, the 
Russian leadership used subtle nuances and historic references to adapt its legitimation 
formula to changing circumstances over time and to the expectations of different 
audiences. Overall, the absence of national arguments was striking, as was the strong 
tendency to rely on negative arguments. The threat of Russian disintegration and civil 
war was frequently invoked, which suggests that the Russian leadership perceived this 
as a resounding argument among all the audiences it directed its legitimation formula 
at.
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Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and ‘KPRF’ for the Communist Party of the 
Russian Federation. Furthermore, acronyms appear in some of the quotes I have 
included in the text and it was therefore practical to use them in the body text as well. 
That is also the reason why I have used the acronym derived from the Russian 
expression in question (i.e., KPRF instead of CPRF). Two exceptions are the acronyms 
used for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the CPSU) and that for the Soviet 
Union itself (the USSR) since these acronyms are widely used. Words like ‘president’ 
and ‘constitution’ have all been spelled with small initials letters except in quotes 
where the original text used initial capitals (‘President’ and ‘Constitution’).
A short note is called for on an institution, which developed into somewhat of a 
Nemesis for Boris Yeltsin -  the Russian parliament. In 1991, the Russian parliament 
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was the highest decision-making body and met only a few times a year, and the 
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, which was the working parliament and consisted of 
deputies elected from the Congress of People’s Deputies. These institutions are 
sometimes referred to as ‘the Congress’ or ‘the Supreme Soviet’. (There were 
corresponding bodies that existed on the Soviet level as well, but it is usually the 
RSFSR assemblies that feature in the text. The Congress of People’s Deputies of the 
USSR is mentioned once in chapter five.) When the new constitution was adopted in 
1993, both the Congress of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviet ceased to exist. 
Instead, the parliament was called the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and 
consisted of two chambers: the upper house -  the Federation Council of the Russian 
Federation (which consisted of two representatives from each of the 89 constituent
parts of the Russian Federation), and the lower house -  the State Duma of the Russian 
Federation (which consisted of elected deputies). These two chambers are usually 
referred to as ‘the Council of the Federation’ and ‘the State Duma’ or simply ‘the 
Duma’, respectively. (There are also Dumas at the different regional levels of the 
Russian Federation. However, these do not appear in the text.)
Throughout the thesis Russian words and names have been transliterated using the 
Library of Congress transliteration. I have, however, omitted ‘ and “ for the Russian 
soft and hard signs. Exceptions have also been made for names that begin with e, e, u, 
to or r . Then the letter ‘y’ starts the name as in the case of Yeltsin (rather than Eltsin). 
Furthermore, I have conformed to the spelling most commonly used in the case of 
geographical and personal names such as Chechnya (rather than Chechnia) and 
Dudayev (rather than Dudaev). I have likewise opted for the western Nicholas II rather 
than the Russian Nikolai II when I write of the last Russian tsar.
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1 The Quest for the Russian Legitimation Formula
The focus of this thesis is how the Russian leadership has sought to legitimate its state 
building project between 1991 and 2000. Because the political conditions changed during 
the 1990s, it would be reasonable to expect that the legitimation formula needed to be 
adjusted. Since the success of nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskii in the parliamentary 
election in 1993, there had been widespread concerns of an emerging Russian 
nationalism.1 Consequently, one of the two main hypotheses that I had when I started my 
research was that the Russian legitimation formula initially had relied foremost on 
democratic arguments, but that these had to give way to a legitimation formula dominated 
by national arguments. Furthermore, I believed that as it constructed its legitimation 
formula during the 1990s, the Russian leadership had to adjust itself to changing 
circumstances and to the primary audience to which it was directing its legitimation 
formula. The second hypothesis that I set out with was thus that the Russian leadership 
during the 1990s became increasingly squeezed between the expectations of the 
international community and the domestic audience. I expected the legitimation formula 
that was directed at the international community to be more ‘democratic’ and the one that 
was directed at the domestic audience to be more ‘national’.
My research frustrated both of these hypotheses. Neither the difference over time nor the 
difference between the external and domestic audience was as clear-cut as I had expected. 
Instead, I found that the Russian leadership had stayed faithful to its main legitimating 
theme: using democratic arguments and pointing to dangerous alternatives. The difference 
both over time and between audiences was rather to be found in the fine-tuning of the 
legitimation formula that took place in the 1990s. Indeed, the Russian leadership could 
never afford to abandon democratic legitimation, where elections and popular mandates 
formed the core of its arguments. The main strategy of the Russian leadership for 
adjusting to changing circumstances instead became one of fine-tuning its rhetoric and
1 By 1999, Anatol Lieven observed that this fear had been largely unfounded. Lieven (1999) 'The Weakness 
of Russian Nationalism', Survival, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 53-70.
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using nuances. The other recurrent theme was the Russian leadership’s dependence upon 
negative arguments throughout the period. It frequently invoked the risk of Russia 
disintegrating along the lines of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia and warnings of civil war 
and chaos loomed large. Outright nationalist arguments, however, were rare.
In spite of the fact that the legitimation formula is composed in a complicated manner -  
perhaps even subconsciously as politicians do other things rather than as a result of a 
distinct legitimation effort -  its ingredients are of essence for the political system in which 
it operates. A growing legitimation crisis was suggested as an explanation of the fall of the 
Soviet Union. The importance of bringing the legitimation formula into accord with 
reality increased rather than decreased in Russia after 1991. Democratic elections made it 
a pressing issue for the Kremlin at the same time as serious attention had to be payed to 
the message sent to the international community. The Russian legitimation formula also 
provides a background against which to continue, for example, research on Russian public 
opinion.
The decade on which I am concentrating my investigation, 1991-2000, coincides with 
Yeltsin’s time in office and with the first decade of the Russian Federation as an 
independent state. The period of formation of a new statehood provides a perfect 
opportunity to study efforts at legitimation since it is precisely when the legitimacy of a 
system is in doubt or ‘under construction’ that these attempts at fine-tuning will be readily 
observable. When legitimacy is firmly entrenched fewer attempts at inventing rituals, 
traditions, myths, symbols, propaganda etc. are visible. Furthermore, an acute need for 
finding a new legitimation formula -  a need for ‘fine tuning’ between leadership and 
society -  often arises together with a need for fine-tuning with the international 
community. At the turn of the twentieth century Laurent Murawiec called the Russian 
Federation the ‘sick man of Eurasia’ just as the Ottoman Empire had been regarded as the
2 See, for example, Dallin (1992) 'Causes of Collapse of the USSR', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 
and Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press).
3 Barker (1990) Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, Clarendon), pp. 29-33, Deringil (1998) The 
Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation o f Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 
(London, LB.Tauris and Co.), pp. 9-10 and Hobsbawm (1983) 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in: 
Hobsbawm and Ranger (Eds.) The invention o f tradition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 5.
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sick man of Europe a hundred years earlier.4 Indeed, the Russian political leadership 
found itself in a precarious situation from the very start. Throughout the 1990s it was 
compelled to promote its state building project in adverse circumstances.
1.1 Arriving at a Definition of the Legitimation Formula
There is a considerable difference between claims to legitimacy and granted legitimacy.5
This thesis only looks at the first part of the legitimacy equation empirically -  how the
£
Russian leadership sought to cultivate legitimacy. In other words, I will not produce a 
judgement on whether the Russian state is legitimate -  a judgement that would be difficult 
to substantiate empirically.7 Neither do I claim that the promoted legitimation formula 
inevitably will show up in the attitudes and opinions of the Russian public. Legitimation 
formulas can backfire. Indeed, the fact that a certain legitimation claim reoccurs may be 
evidence of failure rather than of success. However, I hope to demonstrate that the 
production of a legitimation formula is far from being merely a manipulative exercise in 
public relations. A potent legitimation formula will have to take into account the
o
expectations and norms of its audiences in order to achieve any degree of influence. The 
legitimation formula will thus offer insights into which expectations the Russian 
leadership (correctly or not) perceived were present in the audiences it sought to 
influence.
4 Murawiec (2002) L'Esprit des nations: Cultures et geopolitique (Paris, Editions Odile Jacob), p. 237. See 
also Deringil (1998) The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation o f Power in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London, LB.Tauris and Co.), pp. 9-10.
5 Pakulski (1986) Legitimacy and Mass Compliance: Reflections on Max Weber and Soviet Type Societies',
British Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 45.
6 This comes closer to what Peter Burke has called ‘fabrication’, Burke (1992) The Fabrication of Louis XIV
(New Haven, Yale University Press), pp. 10-11.
7 Reddaway (2001) The Tragedy o f Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington
D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press), pp. 42-43. Attempts made to measure legitimacy will often 
concentrate on opinion polls or voters preferences. (See for example Weatherford (1992) 'Measuring 
Political Legitimacy', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 149-166.) However, it is 
by no means certain that support of a majority of the population is the critical factor at a given time. 
Certain states may be relying more on elite consensus and belief in the state rather than on public opinion. 
Moreover, the supposition that presence of ‘support’ as expressed in opinion polls equals ‘legitimacy’ is 
open to questioning, Barker (2001) Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations o f Rulers and Subjects 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), pp. 9-11.
8 Atkinson (1984) Our Masters' Voices: The Language and Body Language o f Politics (London, Meuthen),
p. 122-123.
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In the broadest terms, the legitimation formula consists of the values or sets of values that 
a state leadership seeks to promote. However, two further qualifications of the definition 
of a legitimation formula are called for before embarking on an analysis of the Russian 
legitimation formula. These qualifications are necessary when selecting the most relevant 
material for the analysis of the legitimation formula of the Russian leadership. Firstly, it is 
necessary to determine who is the producer of this legitimation formula. So far I have 
referred rather loftily to the Russian leadership as the producer of the legitimation 
formula, without defining which actors qualify for this description. In other words, who 
must have issued the statement or written the memoir in order for it to be relevant to the 
thesis? Secondly, it is necessary to define when the defined legitimator is legitimating the 
Russian state. Which statements, issued decrees etc. pertain to legitimation of the Russian 
state and which do not?
The legitimator is ‘the Russian leadership’ and is defined as the president, the presidential 
administration and the government. This circle around Yeltsin will be treated as part of his 
apparatus -  as his extended reach. ‘The Russian leadership’ will be used throughout the 
thesis to indicate the president at the helm and his immediate circle of appointees - the 
presidential administration and the government in power at the time. In practice, this will 
be synonymous with Boris Yeltsin and his entourage since the period of investigation 
equals his term in office.9 His entourage has, however, varied over time and his once 
faithful appointees have been known to switch sides with considerable ease. I wish to 
make a further distinction here between his entourage at a specific time and the elites such 
as regional governors and Duma deputies. Undoubtedly, there exists a fuzzy zone between 
being a part of the Russian leadership and part of the elites, but there are differences that 
set them apart from each other. The elites, although often loyal to Yeltsin, are in 
possession of a certain degree of independent power. They are usually elected rather than 
appointed by Yeltsin. This is also what makes them attractive as potential co-optees from 
Yeltsin’s point of view in the first place. However, when a member of an elite formally 
joins the government or presidential administration then he becomes a representative of
9 Exceptions have been made in chapter five, where both Putin’s inauguration ceremony and the final 
decision on state symbols took place after 1999. However, failure to include these events would have 
made it impossible to fully investigate the symbols and rituals involved.
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the Russian leadership. In other words, an actor might -  at a given point -  be a member of 
a Russian elite, for example a regional governor, and -  at a later point -  a be member of 
the Yeltsin apparatus and vice versa.
The example of Aleksandr Rutskoi is illustrative. Rutskoi started his career as Yeltsin’s 
running mate in the presidential election in 1991 and became the Russian vice-president. 
However, after 1991 Yeltsin and Rutskoi became increasingly hostile towards one another 
and by 1993 Rutskoi sided with the Supreme Soviet in the ongoing power struggle 
between Yeltsin and the parliament. In his case, it is valid to treat him as part of Yeltsin’s 
entourage during the August Coup, but certainly not during the October Events. Another 
case in point would be Sergei Filatov who started as a member and deputy chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet, became the head of the Presidential Administration in 1993 and then was 
replaced by Anatolii Chubais in 1996. In Filatov’s case, his statements after January 1993 
and before July 1996 are of interest for the thesis.10 In other words, it was the office that a 
poltician occupied when he making a particular statement that determined whether that 
statement was to be included in the material for the thesis.
Against my definition of the Russian leadership it could be argued that before the 
introduction of the 1993 constitution, Yeltsin did not formally possess all the levers of 
power. Before 1992, Gorbachev was president of the Soviet Union while Yeltsin was but 
one of fifteen leaders of Soviet republics. Furthermore, during the first two years of 
Russian independence, the Congress of People’s Deputies was the highest decision­
making institution according to the constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic (RSFSR) that was still in force. The broadened powers that Yeltsin received in 
November 1991 could be withdrawn by a simple decision of the Congress. However, my 
research focuses on the Russian state as it emerged -  the Russian state that Yeltsin 
bequeathed to his heir on New Year’s Eve in 1999. Yeltsin initiated this state building 
project in 1990. In other words, I regard Yeltsin’s rhetoric in 1991 as formulated to
10 A number of memoirs written by former members of Yeltsin’s entourage have supplied interesting 
insights into the unfolding of events during the period. The different statements that are made in these 
memoirs have, however, never been included into the legitimation formula since it is in the very nature of 
politics that memoirs are written after the author has left the political scene. Examples of such authors are 
Viacheslav Kostikov, Sergei Filatov and Yegor Gaidar.
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support a state building project even though Yeltsin was still in opposition.11 It was, 
therefore, natural to focus on Yeltsin and his circle of associates throughout the period.
Another objection to my definition might be that the Supreme Soviet, and later the State 
Duma, were institutions of the Russian state and therefore active in state building. 
However, the parliament was in opposition to Yeltsin during the entire period of 
investigation. If I had included the parliament in my definition, the legitimation formula 
received would not have mirrored the legitimation formula of the Russian leadership 
exclusively. This is not to say that an investigation of the dominating opinions expressed 
in the State Duma is unimportant. Neither do I claim that legitimation is a homogeneous 
activity that never contains contradictions. On occasion, the Russian leadership chose to 
adopt and use legitimation claims of its opponents. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
thesis, the elite located in the Russian parliament was interesting mainly as a source of 
challenges that prompted legitimation statements by the Russian leadership. Some of the 
most potent challenges to Yeltsin’s state building project emerged from this political elite. 
My main objective was thus to investigate the legitimation formula of the Russian 
leadership. Furthermore, I wanted to examine whether the legitimation formula that was 
directed at certain elites, among which the political elite, differed from the one that was 
directed at the population as a whole. This would have been impossible if the definition of 
the legitimator was allowed to become too broad and to include the entire political elite.
While excluding the Russian parliament from my definition of the Russian leadership, I 
do not deny that the political elite in the Russian parliament had a vested interest in state 
building during the period of investigation. Indeed, the need for self-legitimation among 
the political class as a whole ought not to be disregarded. One reason why democratic 
arguments dominated throughout the period was no doubt that democracy was able to 
provide benefits even for the political adversaries of the Russian leadership. However, the
11 I am, moreover, not alone in focusing on Yeltsin and his entourage as chief agents in Russian state- 
building. See for example, Breslauer and Dale (1997) Boris Yel'tsin and the Invention of a Russian 
Nation-State', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 313-329, and Smith (1999) 'State-Building in die 
New Russia: Assessing the Yeltsin Record', in: Smith (Ed.) State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy 
and the Challenge o f the Future (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe), p. 15.
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parliament’s powers were limited -  especially after October 1993. It above all possessed
10the ‘power to frustrate’, to prevent legislation as in the case of the Russian state symbols.
In other words, I consider Yeltsin and his entourage to be the chief agents and senders of 
the legitimation formula in their capacity as the chief architects of the Russian state 
building process during the 1990s. I have largely treated the Russian leadership as a 
cohesive actor. This is undoubtedly a simplification since the Russian leadership, as most 
leaderships, was ridden with inner tensions and power struggles. Different factions within 
the leadership were ever jockeying for position -  something that was especially evident 
during the war in Chechnya. The situation was further complicated by Yeltsin’s tendency 
to play off his advisors and ministers against each other. Nevertheless, treating the 
Russian leadership as one actor turned out to be the best way of proceeding, while keeping 
in mind that inner tensions could play an important role at times. Restricting the study to 
only Yeltsin’s statements and memoirs would, for example, not have solved the problem 
since a faction enjoying temporary favour within the Kremlin could just as easily as 
Yeltsin himself have penned a certain presidential statement.
At this point, the question whether it is the Russian state or the Russian leadership itself
that is legitimated ought also to be addressed. It is in the very nature of state building
1 ^projects that they tend to be strongly identified with the chief agents behind the project. 
To separate the two is at times impossible. Thus, Yeltsin personified many of the hopes of 
a better future that were present in 1991. The early attempts at reform and a radical break 
with the Soviet past were closely attached to him personally (although he was later to 
distance himself from Russia’s first acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar’s economic shock 
therapy). In such circumstances, a distinction between legitimation of leadership and 
legitimation of a political system is especially difficult to make. Furthermore, Rodney 
Barker has convincingly argued recently that legitimation is first and foremost an 
observable activity of government that rulers engage in ‘to insist or demonstrate, as much
12 Merritt (1998) 'If Checks Won't Balance: Parliamentary Review of Ministerial Appointments', in: Gill 
(Ed.) Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics (London, Macmillan), p. 19.
13 Crook (1987) 'Legitimacy, Authority and the Transfer of Power in Ghana', Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 
2, p.571.
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to themselves as to others, that they are justified in the pattern of actions that they 
follow’.14 In his view, it is thus primarily ‘persons not systems, rulers not regimes’ that are 
legitimated.15 Does this then signify that the Russian legitimation formula in the 1990s 
legitimated Yeltsin rather than the Russian state?
Undoubtedly, Yeltsin’s persona was intimately associated with the state building project 
that he initiated in 1991 -  in his own mind and in the eyes of the public and international 
community. In my view, neither the Russian leadership nor its audience was always 
certain whether the statements were a justification of Yeltsin’s right to rule or a 
justification of the Russian state building process. When legitimation of person and state 
proved impossible to disentangle I found solace in the fact that the legitimation formula 
pertained to the state building project as well. In an effort to separate legitimation of 
Yeltsin personally and legitimation of his state building project, I did not include the 
presidential election in 1996 as a prime target of investigation. I limited myself to the 
foundations of Russian state building in the 1990s. Furthermore, whether the intention of 
the leadership was to legitimate itself primarily, the legitimation formula it produced 
would have consequences for the Russian state. There is every reason to assume that the 
legitimation formula influenced the expectations of its audiences and thus changed the 
legitimation conditions. It would have been difficult for the heir of Yeltsin’s state building 
project to radically break with earlier legitimation rhetoric. There were no alternative 
ideologies available that the Russian leadership could have hoped to mobilise mass 
support in favour of. This makes it pertinent to investigate the legitimation formula for the 
state building project.
Having determined whose statements, televised addresses and decrees are relevant, it is 
still necessary to make a selection and, thus, to make a further qualification of my 
definition of the Russian legitimation formula. On the one hand, a political leadership only 
rarely states explicitly that it is performing the act of legitimating. If this were the criterion 
for selecting material for analysing the Russian legitimation formula the number of
14 Barker (2001) Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations o f  Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press), p. 30.
15 Ibid., p. 32.
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speeches etc. forming the empirical basis for this thesis would be infinitely small. On the 
other hand, it is possible to claim that all the material emanating from the Kremlin has a 
legitimating dimension. Considering that this would include all laws, statements by 
officials and politicians plus all official communiques to foreign governments and 
international organisations, a method for selecting relevant material was needed.
First of all, material relating to two fundamental aspects of the Russian state was selected. 
These two aspects of state building were Russia’s new borders and its constitution.16 In 
his seminal article, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, Dankwart Rustow singled out national 
unity as a necessary background condition for any successful democratisation. Rustow 
went as far as stating that national unity was ‘best fulfilled when national unity is accepted 
unthinkingly, is silently taken for granted. Any vocal consensus about national unity, in
1 7fact, should make us wary.’ In fact, many states, which are usually considered 
democracies, would fall short if this criterion is accepted as a fundamental condition for 
establishing democracy. For example, Canada is usually considered an established 
democracy, but contains several ethnic communities that have voiced revisionist demands. 
Probably, ‘national unity’ ought not to be interpreted as an absolute, but rather as an ideal 
condition reached in different degrees by different states. If there is substantial confusion 
about the borders of a state, which is simultaneously attempting democratisation, this 
might complicate the transition process considerably.
If the borders of a state define its territorial space, then the constitution lays down the 
basic rules of the game -  the inner workings as it were. The constitution thus became the 
second aspect of Russian state building, which I focused on. Apart from being 
fundamental questions for each state, investigating the borders and constitution of the 
Russian Federation fulfilled two further criteria that were important. Firstly, since both the 
borders and the constitution were established in an ambiguous manner, the criticism that
16 The borders and constitution of the Russian state were singled out as two dilemmas of state-building in 
Breslauer and Dale (1997) Boris Yel'tsin and the Invention of a Russian Nation-State', Post-Soviet Affairs, 
Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 305-306.
17 Rustow (1970) 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', Journal o f  Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 351.
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1 Rarose prompted reactions and legitimation efforts from the Russian leadership. Secondly, 
both the borders and the constitution were issues of contention within Russia during the 
entire period, which would allow me to examine the development of the legitimation 
formula over time.19
Apart from this two-fold approach of selecting relevant legitimation messages for the 
Russian state, I have chosen to study the symbols and rituals of the new Russian state -  in 
other words, the introduction of state symbols and the selection of holidays and 
ceremonies. Studying symbols and rituals does not often receive much attention in 
political science and tends to be treated as something other than hard politics. However, if 
it is unimportant, then why did Yeltsin fail to achieve legislation for the state symbols he 
wished to introduce? It was certainly not for want of trying. He attempted to push through 
a law on state symbols and the Duma answered by offering a bill on alternative state 
symbols based on the Soviet legacy. Furthermore, there are plenty of indications both in 
Yeltsin’s memoirs and memoirs written by those who worked close to him that Yeltsin 
displayed a keen interest in the symbols and rituals of the state. The very fact that some of 
the main institutions responsible for these questions are located within the Presidential
91Administration is a further indication of Yeltsin’s interest in such questions.
18 For many Russians, not least Yeltsin’s political adversaries, the fall of the Soviet Union signified 
‘territorial amputation’. Theen (1999) 'Quo Vadis, Russia? The Problem of National Identity and State- 
Building', in: Smith (Ed.) State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge o f the Future 
(Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe), p. 43.
19 The culmination of the controversy around these questions came when the Russian State Duma started 
impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin in 1998-1999. In the end, the Duma commission in charge of 
preparing the impeachment proceedings decided to accuse Yeltsin on three accounts: the signing of the 
Belovezha Accords on 8 December 1991, the storming of the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 and the 
war in Chechnya.
20 David Kertzer made a similar point in his book on the Italian Communist Party, Kertzer (1996) Politics 
and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall o f Communism (New Haven, Yale University 
Press), p. 170.
21 Examples of such institutions are the Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation for State 
Decorations, the Protocol Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation, the Organisational 
Directorate of the President o f the Russian Federation and the President’s State Heraldry. See also 
Yeltsin’s statement on his decision to move into the Kremlin. ‘In politics (and for me personally) a new 
sharp turn had occurred. ... The Kremlin had become the symbol of this turn.’, Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski 
prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 162 (see also Yeltsin (1994a) The View from 
the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 123).
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The symbols and rituals not only attracted a good deal of attention from Russian 
politicians and constituted a political battle zone in their own right. They further shared 
two important features with the questions of Russia’s borders and constitution. Firstly, 
symbols and rituals allowed me to study changes over time. The question of state symbols 
kept re-entering the political agenda throughout the 1990s and holidays reoccurred each 
year -  if they did not, then their very absence was interesting. Secondly, both questions 
prompted action and legitimation rhetoric from the Russian leadership. Each state needs 
state symbols -  not least in the international arena. Each seat in the United Nations is 
represented by that state’s flag; each winner in the Olympic Games is honoured by 
playing his or her country’s national anthem etc. Neither could the Russian leadership 
escape the question of holidays. It inherited a set of Soviet holidays, which it had to 
decide whether to abolish (never a popular decision since it means robbing the population 
of a day off from work) or to claim, by redesigning them, to become more appropriate to 
the new Russian state.
An alternative approach might have been to select a shorter time span and to study the 
entire flow of statements and documents emanating from the Kremlin during that period. 
This would, however, exclude giving a firm answer to my first hypothesis; whether the 
legitimation formula had changed over time. Another approach would have been to 
concentrate on a specific type of material; namely, the presidential decrees or Yeltsin’s 
televised addresses. This would, in turn, have made it impossible to state any firm verdict 
on my second hypothesis; whether there is a difference in the legitimation formulas sent to 
different audiences. Strictly speaking, my method for selecting material only allows me to 
examine the legitimation formula for each of the questions I have chosen as fundamental 
aspects of the new Russian state. Nevertheless, I believe that -  taken together -  they do 
provide a good understanding of the Russian legitimation formula for the state building 
project during the 1990s.
Criticism may be levelled at the method for selecting my material. The aspects of state 
building I chose might bias the answer I get to my main hypotheses. However, any aspect 
I might have chosen would have been open to this criticism. I believe that the questions I 
have chosen will provide me with a good basis for determining the main elements of the 
legitimation formula of the Russian leadership. The time and resources available put
- 2 0 -
1 T h e  Q u e s t  f o r  t h e  R u s s ia n  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a
constraints on the amount of material that could be included. However, even had I studied 
all the material emanating from the Kremlin over the period, it is doubtful that the 
legitimation formula I would have received would have been more accurate. All 
legitimation messages are not equally important. The legitimation message issued by 
Yeltsin, for example, during the August Coup ought to be awarded more weight than a
•  O')routine statement by his aides on public spending or a decree on pensions. By being 
explicit in how I have gone about selecting my material I will, furthermore, have a better 
chance to detect the possible bias involved and to discuss this.
Finally, I would like also to stress that the focus of analysis is on the content in the 
legitimation messages of the Russian leadership. This amounts to studying the rhetoric 
and texts that the Kremlin produced during the 1990s. In other words, I do not look 
primarily at how the Russian leadership might have contradicted its own legitimation 
formula through actions that it took. I do discuss the dilemmas that such actions involved 
for the Russian leadership, but the emphasis is on the legitimation rhetoric employed by 
the Russian leadership. This is an important qualification and, no doubt, explains why the 
overall image received here of the Russian leadership might differ from that of other 
studies. Furthermore, I will not analyse rhetorical tricks, which settings the Russian 
leadership chose for its legitimation formula or the body language involved. Although 
this might have yielded interesting insights into the craft of putting together a potent 
legitimation message,24 it would have brought me far from my main focus of research. In 
sum, the subject of analysis is the Russian legitimation formula, which promoted value
22 Not least the fact that statements by aides often were used to probe the possible reaction to a policy or 
statement before the Russian leadership definitely committed itself made this important. See Kostikov 
(1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes o f the Press 
Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 219-220.
23 A study of, for example, the clothes chosen at different occasions would undoubtedly be of interest. 
Yeltsin never appeared in military uniform, but did introduce a less formal form of meetings with other 
state leaders: the ‘meetings without ties’, which even received a separate section in a book on Russian 
protocol. Shevchenko (Ed.) (2000) Protokol Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Protocol o f  the Russian Federation] 
(Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 87-90. Yeltsin devoted an entire chapter to meetings ‘without ties’, Yeltsin (2000) 
Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential Marathon: 
Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 126-148 (‘Meetings in 
Shirtsleeves’ in the English edition, Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 145-164) and 
clearly regarded such meetings as important. To him, these meetings confirmed an informal friendship and 
thus equal status between him and other state leaders like Jacques Chirac, Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl.
24 For a study on this craft see Atkinson (1984) Our Masters' Voices: The Language and Body Language of 
Politics (London, Meuthen).
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arguments, pertained to central issues of state building and emanated from the Russian 
leadership between 1991 and 2000.
1.2 The Audiences for the Legitimation Formula
It is not always easy to distinguish which audience received which legitimation formula. 
The Russian leadership was certainly aware that a statement made at home might be 
translated and relayed to an international audience by foreign journalists based in Russia 
or by the foreign embassies in Moscow. Similarly, Russian media was bound to at least 
summarise to a Russian home audience a speech made by Yeltsin while abroad. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that when Yeltsin delivered a speech in, for 
example, the General Assembly in the United Nations, his primary concern was the 
impression he made on the audience closest at hand, the international community. In a 
similar vein, Yeltsin was probably most concerned about the reaction of the Russian 
population when he made a televised address on 6 October 1993 explaining his decision to 
storm the White House. Addresses to the Russian armed forces on Victory Day were 
probably composed with the reaction of the military elite foremost in mind while 
statements by Yeltsin’s representative in the Duma during a Duma debate were directed 
primarily at a domestic political elite. In other words, it is usually possible to distinguish 
at least to which audience a legitimation was directed primarily.
I have distinguished between three main audiences: the international community, the 
Russian population and Russian elites. This choice was dictated, firstly, by my hypothesis, 
that there might be a difference in the legitimation formula sent internationally and the one 
sent to a domestic audience. Secondly, while perusing the material I realised that there 
were significant differences between the legitimation formula directed at the entire 
Russian population and the legitimation formulas that targeted specific elites. The thesis
25 An indication of this is the account by Yeltsin’s former press secretary, Viacheslav Kostikov, of the 
personal concern Yeltsin displayed in the effect his speech before the American Congress was to produce 
in 1992, pp. 51-52.
26 Again according to Kostikov, Yeltsin’s advisors persuaded him to address the Russian population after he 
had had a good sleep after the storming of the White House. They were concerned that the sight o f a 
haggard Yeltsin might undermine public confidence in him. Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: 
zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes o f the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), 
pp. 255-260.
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would have been poorer without an analysis of the differences between different elites and 
the population. Indeed, it would have been misleading not to relate these differences since 
some of the more clear-cut variations were found in legitimation messages directed at 
specific elites.
In order to determine which audience was primarily targeted by a specific legitimation 
message, a number of factors were of importance. The forum where the legitimation 
message was delivered gave essential clues. Thus, a speech delivered in the General 
Assembly was analysed as primarily directed at the international community, an address 
on national Russian television as directed primarily at the Russian population and a 
speech before gathered military personnel and reproduced in Krasnaia zvezda (the 
newspaper of the Russian armed forces) as directed primarily at the military elite. 
Nevertheless, the actual situation at the time of the legitimation message also sometimes 
proved to be of importance. Thus, when Yeltsin delivered a speech in the Supreme Soviet 
calling for a referendum in December 1992, but made sure that national television (much 
to the surprise of the parliamentarians) relayed the speech, it constituted a legitimation 
message primarily directed at the Russian population.27 Finally, the form of the message 
and the actual wording it contains give important insights into which audience was 
targeted. Thus, international treaties, decrees and laws are usually written in a legal 
language and are hardly intended to legitimate something in the eyes of the population.
The legitimation imperative vis-a-vis the population constituted one of the main 
differences when the situation in the Soviet Union is compared to that in Russia during the 
1990s. This is not to suggest that the USSR leadership was entirely uninterested in mass 
legitimation. Nevertheless, it was less concerned with the effect of its legitimation efforts 
or with acquiring a popular mandate than is the Kremlin today. The Russian leadership in 
the 1990s had to compete with challenges coming from political opponents inside the
27 Indeed, Yeltsin started his speech “Citizens of Russia, people’s deputies”. Indirectly, of course, the effect 
was intended to emphasise Yeltsin’s popular mandate to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet as well. See 
Rossiiskie vesti, 11 December 1992, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1561 (11 December 1992), Cl/13 and 
chapter three, p. 100.
28 Compare how ‘different modes of communication appeared to exist for political agents depending upon 
the context’ in the Soviet era, Schull (1992) 'What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from 
Soviet-Type Societies', Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, p. 734.
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Russian Federation as well as those from abroad -  something the USSR leadership did not 
have to do to the same extent. Ultimately, the Russian leadership subjected itself to free 
elections. The necessity that the Russian leadership felt for directing their messages to the 
population was vividly illustrated in their efforts to get their message across at the time of 
the referendums in 1993. That Yeltsin chose to put the constitution at the mercy of the 
people suggests that a popular mandate was an important legitimation argument -  in 
Russia as well as internationally. Not to mention the fact that Yeltsin decided to hold
29 rpipresidential elections in 1996 in spite of his one-digit ratings at the start of the year. The 
‘rise of legitimation by popular election’ has radically changed the manner in which a 
political leadership is able to cultivate its legitimacy.
Compared to the Soviet era, the way in which the Russian leadership could reach the 
population with its legitimation formula had also changed by 1991. In the 1990s Yeltsin 
could no longer control society the way Soviet leaders had. Many of the new newspapers 
and television channels remained dependent either on the government or financial 
networks for their existence, but the Russian leadership was certainly not in complete 
control of the media or for that matter other sectors of opinion making. The conviction 
among politicians that the media, and especially television, was a crucial weapon in 
politics did remain from the Soviet era and the Russian leadership proved deeply reluctant 
in granting the opposition wide access to television.31 However, it found itself in a 
position that more resembled that of western governments. It could not dictate the 
contents of news programmes. Instead, the Russian political leadership had to construct 
‘political spectacles’ such as press conferences, official speeches etc in order to reach their 
citizens.32
29 Yeltsin admitted in his memoirs that he seriously considered cancelling the presidential election in 1996 
and even prepared the necessary documents, Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii mara/on: razmyshleniia, 
vospominaniia, vpechatleniia... [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] 
(Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 31-33. (Also in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 
24-25.)
30 Burke (1992) The Fabrication o f Louis XIV (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 201. Compare also 
Soviet ‘ideological discourse’ as a means of legitimating claims within the elite whereas propaganda was 
directed at the population at large, Schull (1992) 'What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons 
from Soviet-Type Societies', Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, p. 737.
31 Mickiewicz (1997) Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia (New York, 
Oxford University Press), pp. 265-266.
32 Edelman (1988) Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago; London, University of Chicago Press).
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The Russian situation differed from that in the West in that Russia lacked a developed 
party system. This increased the role of the media since it provided the most important 
link between politicians and the population. Broadcasting media, and especially 
television, occupied a central position. The newspapers had not recovered from the crisis 
in which they found themselves after the withdrawal of government subsidies and even 
the most widely read newspapers were primarily read in major cities. Thus, in times of 
crisis, the television was put ‘squarely at the centre of appeals to the nation and 
legitimisation of leaders’. Therefore, translations of television and radio broadcasts 
compiled by the BBC form an important source of material for investigating the Russian 
legitimation formula.34 I used the original text in Russian -  especially for key speeches 
and documents -  when possible. To disregard the legitimation formula that emanated 
through broadcasting media would, in my view, have been more fatal for the analysis of 
the Russian legitimation formula than occasionally relying on translations.
A way for the Russian leadership to inculcate its legitimation formula in a long-term 
perspective would have been to try to influence the curriculum and the textbooks used in 
the education system. This has been true for all governments across the centuries and 
across cultures for as long as schooling has been a concern of the state. There was every
33 Mickiewicz (1995) 'The Political Economy of Media Democratisation’, in: Lane (Ed) Russia in 
Transition: Politics Privatisation and Inequality (Harlow, Longman), p. 173.
34 The government newspapers Pravitelstvennnyi vestnik, Rossiiskie vesti and Rossiiskaia gazeta were 
important sources for finding original texts in Russian as well as other statements and documents 
emanating from the Russian leadership. Pravitelstvennyi vestnik and Rossiiskie vesti were merged into one 
newspaper, Rossiiskie vesti, in the spring o f 1992. Rossiiskie vesti became the organ of the presidential 
administration in 1995. Li 1995, the newspaper started to carry the presidential banner on its first page and 
in early January 1996 the newspaper carried a greeting from the president to its readers on the first page 
(Rossiiskie vesti, 4 and 6 January 1996, p. 1). Rossiiskaia gazeta started as a newspaper of the Supreme 
Soviet. During the latter part of the 1990s, it became the Russian government’s main newspaper and 
regularly published material from the executive branch.
35 See for example Deringil (1998) The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation o f Power in 
the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London, LB.Tauris and Co.), p. 107, for an account of how education 
was used in the Ottoman Empire. The guidelines for the Swedish curriculum state that: ‘The public 
educational system is based on democracy’. Skolverket (2001) Styrdokument: Laroplan for det 
obligatoriska skolvasendet, forskoleklassen och fritidshemmet (Lpo 94), Last accessed: 29 November 
2001, Address: http://www.skolverket.se/styr/laroplaner/lpo94/vardegrund.shtml. Similarly, the British 
curriculum will include education in citizenship from September 2001. ‘Education in citizenship and 
democracy will provide coherence in the way in which all pupils are helped to develop a full 
understanding of their roles and responsibilities as citizens in a modem democracy.’ The National 
Curriculum Online (2001) What Is the National Curriculum for England?, Last accessed: 29 November 
2001, Address: http://www.nc.uk.net/what_is.html.
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reason to suspect that the Russian government also would seek to influence how Russian 
and Soviet history were portrayed and how the new political system was described in 
textbooks. Through the school system, the Russian leadership was in possession of a 
unique opportunity to influence its population at an early and impressionable age. During 
the years that Russian citizens spend in school, they may receive the legitimation formula 
propagated by the state. Only military service can in any way measure up with the school 
years, when it comes to exerting influence over the population -  and then only a 
diminishing portion of the male population are concerned. (As discussed below, 
legitimation messages propagated in schools and during military service might backfire -  
as might other legitimation efforts. Legitimation success is, in other words, far from 
guaranteed.) Only textbooks have been analysed in this thesis. Gaining access to the 
educational material used during Russian military service would have been difficult, 
whereas the textbooks used in Russian schools were easy to access.
The area of interest is first and foremost how the history of the new Russian state in the 
1990s was portrayed in textbooks. The first textbooks issued in the early 1990s had 
managed to include very little material on this. Therefore, the focus has been on books 
published later. Only the books with a link to the Russian leadership have been of interest 
for this thesis. The books included in this study are all on the list of the komplekt and thus 
given official approval by the Ministry of Education. These had all gone through a 
complicated procedure before the Russian Ministry of Education approved them for use in 
Russian schools. By the mid-1990s a plethora of approved textbooks existed. However, 
only a minority of these actually constituted books recommended by the Ministry of 
Education and only those few were included in the komplekt. Although schools were free 
to use other material, they were obliged to supply their pupils with a selection of the books
included in the komplekt. A perusal of the komplekty for 1999 and 2001 suggested that
• •  •approximately twenty history and social science textbooks were of interest. Because of
36 Many of the textbooks in the two komplekty were the same or later editions bringing the account of events 
up to date. Ministry of General and Professional Education of the Russian Federation (1999) Perechen 
uchebnikov i uchebnykh posobii, rekommendovcmnykh Ministerstvom obshchego i professionalnogo 
obrazovaniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii na 1998/99 uchebnyi god, Last accessed: 13 May 1999, Address: 
http://www.informika.ru/text/school/book8-9/ and Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation (2001) 
Perechen uchebnykh izdanii, rekommendovcmnykh Ministerstvom obrazovaniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii na
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the scarce resources available to Russian schools, these were usually the only books (if 
even these) available to Russian pupils.37 It would thus seem that the Russian leadership 
had the opportunity to influence the content of textbooks.
Tailoring the curriculum, however, proved more difficult than might have been expected. 
A too strongly propagated legitimation formula might have alienated the pupils rather than 
convinced them. The Soviet experience certainly played a role in this context. During the 
Soviet era, the school system was used to inculcate Marxism-Leninism in Soviet 
schoolchildren to the point where it would have been difficult for Yeltsin to re-introduce 
anything that resembled curriculum based on obvious ideological tenets. The Soviet 
leadership made extensive use of the school system in its project of forming “Soviet Man” 
from the very beginning. Great emphasis was placed on ideological training and Marxism- 
Leninism was a compulsory component in the Soviet curriculum. Furthermore, political 
organisations (the Pioneers for the youngest and the Komsomol for older pupils) were
10
important instruments of socialisation. There were calls for a re-introduction of ‘moral 
education’ during the 1990s since the de-politicisation of schools together with the
banning of political organisations like the Komsomol and Pioneers was perceived as
<20 _
having left a vacuum. This would, however, have been difficult for the Russian 
leadership to achieve.
Any attempt to reintroduce ideological schooling into the school system would have 
become an issue of contention between the presidency and the State Duma. Furthermore, 
the Russian law on education explicitly stated that educational institutions should be
2000/2001 uchebnyi god, Last accessed: 17 May 2001, Address:
http://www.infonnika.ru/text/school/bookl-2/.
37 The pupils of the more affluent private schools, of course, had better material possibilities. However, these 
constituted a minority of Russian schoolchildren. Mendeloff (1996) Demystifying Textbooks in Post- 
Soviet Russia', ISRE Newsletter (Institute for the Study o f  Russian Education, Indiana University), Vol. 5, 
No. 2, pp. 16-20.
38 Sutherland (1998) Schooling in the New Russia: Innovation and Change, 1984-95 (New York, St. 
Martin's Press), pp. 17-18, Eklof (1993) Democracy in the Russian School: Educational Reform Since 
1984', in: Eklof and Dneprov (Eds.) Democracy in the Russian school: The Reform Movement in 
Education Since 1984 (Boulder, Westview Press), p. 4, Matthews (1982) Education in the Soviet Union: 
Policies and Institutions Since Stalin (London, Allen & Unwin), pp. 201-202.
39 Sutherland (1998) Schooling in the New Russia: Innovation and Change, 1984-95 (New York, St. 
Martin's Press), p. 80. For an example of calls for moral education see the political programme of General 
Lev Rokhlin’s political movement published in Sovetskaia Rossiia, 27 September 1997, pp.
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guaranteed ‘independence from ideological directives’.40 As the Russian Federation took 
the first steps towards claiming sovereignty vis-a-vis the Soviet government, the newly 
appointed Russian minister of education, Edward Dneprov, introduced radical changes in 
the sphere of education. In particular, Dneprov as early as 1990 introduced measures to 
de-militarise and depoliticise Russian education.41 This commitment to de-politicisation of 
the school system remained high on the political agenda immediately after 1991. De­
politicisation of education soon ran into difficulties -  among them a severe lack of 
resources. This made it difficult to print new textbooks at the desired rate. Furthermore, 
haste in the early 1990s resulted in a number of low quality or only partly revised 
textbooks in history being included in the curriculum together with translated western 
material and pre-revolutionary texts. Only by the mid-1990s did newly written textbooks 
in history start to appear.42
The importance of gaining control of the educational system seems to have remained 
ingrained in the post-Soviet leadership as well. After Yeltsin was elected president of the 
Russian republic in June 1991, his first presidential decree concerned education and stated 
that educational governance should be directly subordinated to the office of the President 
of the RSFSR.43 Yeltsin never tried to re-introduce ideological directives, but he certainly 
tried to achieve a thorough study and respect of the Russian constitution by influencing 
the Russian curriculum. On 29 November 1994, one year after the adoption of the 
constitution, Boris Yeltsin issued a decree, which instructed all schools to study the 
Russian constitution.44 By necessity, it was a balancing act for the Russian leadership to
40 The Law of the Russian Federation on Education (Draft)', in: Eklof and Dneprov (Eds.) Democracy in the 
Russian School: The Reform Movement in Education Since 1984 (Boulder, 1993, Westview Press), p. 
240.
41 Eklof (1993) Democracy in the Russian School: Educational Reform Since 1984', in: Eklof and Dneprov 
(Eds.) Democracy in the Russian school: The Reform Movement in Education Since 1984 (Boulder, 
Westview Press), pp. 17-18.
42 Vaillant (1996) 'Textbooks in Post-Soviet Russia', ISRE Newsletter (Institute for the Study o f Russian 
Education, Indiana University), Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 141-168 and Weeks (1999) 'Russia Goes Back to 
School', Transition, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 62-66.
43 'Decree No. 1 of the President of the Russian Federation: On Priority Measures to Promote Education', in: 
Eklof and Dneprov (Eds.) Democracy in the Russian School: The Reform Movement in Education Since 
1984 (Boulder, 1993, Westview Press), p. 139.
44 Presidential Decree No. 2131, published in Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1994, No. 32, 
p. 4802.
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try and influence the curriculum. What the Russian leadership saw as encouraging the 
study of universal democratic principles was ideological propaganda to its opponents. In 
other words, the Russian leadership ran the risk of exposing itself to accusations of 
reintroducing ideological directives. There was also evidence of a growing frustration 
among the Russian political leadership with the way history and politics were taught in 
Russian schools. Old habits proved tenacious within the school system.45 In line with this, 
the investigation made here of the Russian textbooks published in the 1990s suggests that 
the control that the Russian leadership was able to exercise over the curriculum was 
limited.
The second domestic audience, the Russian elites, was in possession of certain strategic 
resources such as military capability, political clout and/or moral prestige. At the same 
time, the elites usually desired benefits and prestige that only the leadership could bestow 
upon them. In other words, there existed a kind of quid pro quo relationship or symbiosis 
between the Russian leadership and the elites. An additional reason for devoting this 
relationship special attention is the fact that earlier studies of legitimacy in the Soviet 
Union put the focus mainly on the study of legitimacy within the elites 46 Indeed, a 
number of explanations of the fall of the Soviet Union have concentrated on the erosion of 
‘the rulers’ self-confidence concerning their right to rule’.47 During the 1990s, it was 
evident -  not least from the efforts that rulers directed at legitimating themselves to the 
elites -  that the relationship between the leadership and the elites continued to be one of 
key importance.
In order to influence the elites, the Russian leadership not only sought to formulate a 
potent legitimation message, it also relied on co-option. Although this thesis is not
45 Dragunsky (2001) 'Naphtalene in a Textbook', New Times, No. 10 (October 2001), pp. 45-46 and 
Tumanov (2001) 'Lessons of Communism', New Times, No. 10 (October 2001), p. 46.
46 See for example, Feher and Arato (1989) Gorbachev: The Debate (Oxford, Polity in association with 
Basil Blackwell), p. 137 and Remington (1988) The Truth o f Authority: Ideology and Communication in 
the Soviet Union (Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press), p. 8.
47 Dallin (1992) 'Causes of Collapse of the USSR', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 4, p. 287. See also 
Galeotti (1995) The Age o f Anxiety : Security and Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (London, 
Longman), p. 60, Hollander (1999) Political Will and Personal Belief: The Decline and Fall o f Soviet 
Communism (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 14 and Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An 
Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), pp. 53-54.
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primarily concerned with how the Russian leadership sought to co-opt the elites, co-coption 
undoubtedly played a role when it came to creating a favourable environment for the 
legitimation formula. For example, military personnel often received decorations on 
Victory Day while the Russian Orthodox Church occupied a prominent role at many state 
ceremonies. Like the military, the representatives of the Russian intelligentsia received 
decorations. Other ways of winning over elites were to promise them material benefits. 
Not only did the Russian leadership co-opt the elites through various privileges. By 
granting a special role in society to a specific elite, the Russian leadership also conferred a 
status on this elite, while at the same time attempting to enhance the legitimacy o f  the 
Russian state. Regional elites, which often have gained a popular mandate through 
elections, were thus co-opted by the Kremlin recognising their status and negotiating 
privileges for the individual regional units. The leadership in Moscow, on the other hand, 
enhanced its own status by gaining recognition by the regional leaders as a federal centre.
Another way of influencing the elites was through symbols and rituals. Contrary to 
general assumptions, many of the rituals and symbols are directed at the elites rather than 
at the population. The fact that the Russian Orthodox Church was always present at 
major state ceremonies such as the presidential inauguration ceremony marked its implicit 
support for the order of things as well as endowed a special status on the Orthodox Church 
within the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Rodney Barker has directed our attention to 
the fact that these rituals take place even when hidden from the public gaze.49 Thus, when 
the Russian elites participated in official state rituals, they not only engaged in an act of 
support of the state leadership. The prestige and self-confidence of the elites themselves 
were strengthened by the fact that they were acknowledged participants in rituals of the 
state. The legitimation that took place between the Russian leadership and the elites was 
thus most intricate. To understand how the elites were targeted, it was important to take 
into account this quid pro quo relationship.
48 Kertzer (1988) Rituals, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 178. See also 
Wortman (1995) Scenarios o f Power: Myth and Ceremony> in Russian Monarchy (Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press.), p. 406.
49 Barker (2001) Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations o f Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press), p. 44.
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The relationship between the Kremlin and the Russian opposition was especially 
interesting. The opposition, led by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(KPRF), was a stout critic of Yeltsin throughout the period. Nevertheless, it did recognise 
some of the fundamentals of Yeltsin’s state building effort. A crucial turning point was the 
decision of the KPRF to take part in the Duma elections in December 1993 after Yeltsin 
had dissolved the previous parliament by force. Few in Russia, even among the political 
opposition, would today challenge the axiom that the state leadership ought to be selected 
through election.50 In the process, the Russian elites have acquired an interest in 
supporting at least certain aspects of the state building project. Furthermore, it must be 
kept in mind that the political leadership strengthened its hold over the elites by acquiring 
a popular mandate, which further compounded the distinction between audiences.
A somewhat different relationship existed between the Russian leadership and the 
international community. Thomas Franck directed attention to the fact that ‘some, indeed 
many, international rules of conduct are habitually obeyed by states’, even the most 
powerful ones, in spite of the absence of a ’’world police”.51 I would suggest that this 
could be accounted for to a considerable degree by the legitimacy gains that the leadership 
of states perceive they obtain from formal and/or informal recognition. This is an 
important condition for being accepted as a member into international organisations and 
as an equal trading partner. A state leadership may, furthermore, use international 
recognition and prestige in order to boost its legitimacy at home, vis-a-vis the domestic 
audience. Beginning in 1991, during the August Coup and later that same year when the 
Soviet Union was dismantled, the Russian leadership intensely struggled to gain 
legitimacy within the international community. At first, the Russian leadership sought 
formal recognition as an independent state. As time progressed, it sought both prestige and 
recognition as a member of a community of democratic states and as a great power.
50 Higley, et al. (1996) 'The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites', Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 
144-145.
51 Franck (1990) The Power o f Legitimacy Among Nations (New York, Oxford University Press), p. 20 
[italics in the original].
52 Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 45.
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The recognition that states gain internationally stems not only from the fact that they abide 
by international law but also from their adapting to international norms -  for Russia this 
international norm took on the form of liberal democracy. In the case of certain 
international organisations, adherence to democracy and human rights is an explicit 
demand on the states that wish to join. For example, membership in the Council of 
Europe soon became a coveted prize by the Russian leadership. However, the explicit 
conditions for membership (pluralistic democracy, rule of law and respect for human 
rights) came into conflict with the Russian campaign in Chechnya. By abiding by these 
dominating rules and seeking recognition, the individual state, furthermore, grants 
legitimacy to the international community it has sought legitimacy within. In other words, 
as Russia sought to become accepted as a liberal democratic state internationally, it 
implicitly recognised the legitimacy of, as it were, Fukuyama’s End of History. Therefore, 
in the case of the international community, the focus was on the legitimation formula 
directed at the sections of the community, which represented the dominating international 
norm. In other words, statements made by the Russian leadership in its contacts with 
Western states and international organisations such as the United Nations and the Council 
of Europe constituted the main material for investigating the legitimation formula sent 
abroad by the Russian leadership.54
This was the international audience whose recognition and respect the Russian leadership 
was most eager to win. It was, then, hardly surprising that the Russian leadership 
repudiated its Soviet past and rejected ‘imperialistic tendencies’ with emphasis in the 
early legitimation formula it directed at the international community.55 During the 
twentieth century, empires increasingly came to be regarded as antique -  as a construction 
of the past.56 Any state describing itself or being described as an imperial entity was
53 See also Di Palma (1990) To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Oxford, 
University of California Press), p. 187.
54 The United Nations occupies a central position as a formal repository of the dominating principles of the 
international community as formulated in UN charters etc. Barnett (1997) 'Bringing in the New World 
Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations', World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 540-541.
55 See Kozyrev’s first speech at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, UN General Assembly
(1992) General Assembly 47th session, provisional verbatim record o f the 6th meeting, 22 September 
1992,10 a.m., New York, UN General Assembly, 29 September 1992, A/47/PV.6, p. 59.
56 Lieven (2000) Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (London, John Murray), pp. 3-4. See also 
Beissinger (1995) 'The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 149-184.
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bound to experience a certain amount of scepticism from the international community. 
However, early on Russia had an ambiguous relationship to its past. It tried to redefine its 
international status but still wished to be regarded as a great power (derzhava), something 
that had always been an important way of claiming legitimacy first in imperial Russia and 
later in the Soviet Union -  not least among the domestic elites. The Russian claims for a 
special role within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) did not intermingle 
easily with Russia’s claim to have repudiated its Soviet past. How Russia decided to 
portray its relationship to the USSR was therefore of interest. It was bound to create 
tensions between the legitimation messages sent to the home audience and those sent to 
the international community.
13 Framework of Analysis
The framework of analysis of the Russian legitimation formula was developed both by 
way of browsing through the material and by relying on theories of legitimacy as well as 
historical and political-anthropological literature on legitimation. A number of historical 
studies have been made on how rulers have sought to legitimate their power. Peter 
Burke’s account of how Louis XIV was portrayed in his lifetime was an important source 
of inspiration. Although the conditions in 18th century France differed substantially from 
those encountered by the Russian leadership in the 1990s, many of Burke’s observations 
on the difficulties in legitimating even a successful leader proved valuable. I owe not least 
to Burke the observation that legitimation is a precarious task.57 Political anthropology 
became a starting-point when it came to analysing the arguments on rituals and symbols -  
an area that has been studied less often within the field of political science. Nevertheless,
For an account of how the Ottoman Empire tried to tackle its image problem internationally, see Deringil 
(1998) The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology cmd the Legitimation o f Power in the Ottoman Empire, 
1876-1909 (London, LB.Tauris and Co.), pp. 135-149.
57 Burke (1992) The Fabrication o f Louis XTV (New Haven, Yale University Press). See also Wortman
(1995) Scenarios o f Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy (Princeton, N.J, Princeton 
University Press.) on how considerable resources were spent by Russian tsars ‘to impress Western 
governments and public opinion with the taste and resplendence of the Russian monarchy’, p. 3, and 
Deringil (1998) The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1876-1909 (London, LB.Tauris and Co.). See also Sakwa (1995) 'Subjectivity, Politics, and Order 
in Russian Political Evolution', Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 943-964, on the need for congruence 
between political order and ‘subjectivities’.
58 Especially, David Kertzer’s books on symbols and ritual provide useful insights, Kertzer (1988) Rituals, 
Politics, and Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), Kertzer (1996) Politics and Symbols: The 
Italian Communist Party and the Fall o f Communism (New Haven, Yale University Press).
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a few words on how the analytical framework relates to the literature that exists on 
legitimacy are warranted.
Weber’s three modes of legitimate domination were a natural point of departure when it 
came to theories on legitimacy proper. According to Weber, authority could be based on 
the belief in the legality of the system -  legal-rational legitimacy; it might rest on the 
belief that the ruler(s) had a right to rule by sanction of tradition -  traditional legitimacy; 
or it could be granted because the ruler(s) were perceived to possess exceptional 
charismatic qualities -  charismatic legitimacy.59 When it came to analysing the Soviet 
System, T.H. Rigby started from Weber’s framework but concluded that it was necessaiy 
to introduce an additional mode when it came to discussing legitimacy within the Soviet 
system. He identified the dominant mode of legitimation within Soviet society as ‘goal- 
rational’. The actions taken by party leadership were legitimised in terms of leading 
towards a goal rather than by virtue of having been taken in accordance with legal-rational 
rules.60 Leslie Holmes elaborated Weber’s three modes of legitimation and Rigby’s ‘goal- 
rational’ legitimation into ten modes of legitimation in his analysis of ‘post-communism’ 
and its legitimation crisis.61 As will become evident, I benefited from all of these theories 
on legitimacy when I developed my framework of analysis of the Russian legitimation 
formula.
Since my investigation is empirical and the material consists of statements etc. made by 
the Russian leadership, it was necessary to develop a framework that matched the 
material. I had to look for tangible arguments and keywords that I could connect to modes 
of legitimation. By arranging the most frequent and strongest arguments that occurred in 
the material into clusters, I developed a framework which consisted of six modes of 
legitimation: (1) democratic legitimation, (2) national legitimation, (3) charismatic 
legitimation (4) eudaemonic legitimation, (5) external legitimation and (6) negative
59 Weber, et al. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, University of 
California Press), p. 215.
60 Rigby (1980) 'A Conceptual Approach to Authority', in: Rigby, et al. (Eds.) Authority, Power and Policy 
in the USSR (New York, St. Martin's Press), p. 19 and Rigby (1982) 'Introduction: Political Legitimacy, 
Weber and Communist Monoorganisational Systems', in: Rigby and Feher (Eds.) Political Legitimation in 
Communist States (Oxford, Macmillan in association with St Antony's College), pp. 1-26.
61 Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), pp. 42-58.
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legitimation. By this stage, however, it is worth pointing out that -  in line with Weber’s 
emphasis that his modes of authority are ideal types -  none of these modes will be found 
in their pure forms. The Russian leadership will invariably mix legitimation modes -  
usually in the same statement.
1.3.1 Democratic Legitimation
The most important way in which the Russian leadership sought to legitimate its state 
building project was to argue in favour of democracy, pointing to elections or referendum 
results, constitutionality or protection of human rights and freedoms. Today, this way of 
arguing comes close to Weber’s legal-rational legitimacy in that there is a firm rule for 
how the leadership ought to be appointed, by election, and that ‘rule-of-law’ is closely 
connected to the democratic model. Although Weber regarded democracy to be based on 
charismatic legitimacy primarily, he did discuss the possibility of charismatic legitimation 
developing into democratic legitimacy. This would happen when ‘the charismatic 
organization undergoes progressive rationalization, it is readily possible that, instead of 
recognition being treated as a consequence of legitimacy, it is treated as the basis of 
legitimacy: democratic legitimacy,’63 Democratic legitimation will here refer both to 
arguments of legality, arguments that maintain that the overarching rule is that leaders are 
appointed through election and to references to democratic and liberal values.
Democratic legitimation in Russia during the 1990s thus occurred in three basic forms. 
Firstly, there were arguments that concentrated on legality and constitutionality. These are 
the arguments that are most closely related to Weber’s legal-rational mode of authority in 
that the argument states that it claims adherence to a ‘legally established impersonal 
order’.64 Arguments of this sort constitute formal democratic arguments (although the 
Russian leadership often used them in connection with arguments referring to elections
62 Barker (1990) Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, Clarendon), p. 70 and Holmes (1997) Post- 
Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 43. See also Achkasov, et al. (1996) 
Legitimatsiia vlasti v postsotsialisticheskom rossiiskom obshchestve [Legitimation o f Power in the Post- 
Socialist Russian Society] (Moskva, Aspekt Press), pp. 81-82, who talk o f ‘legal-rational-democratic 
legitimation’.
63 Weber, et al. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, University of 
California Press), pp. 266-267.
64 Ibid., pp. 216-217.
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and human rights). Secondly, the Russian leadership often pointed to results in elections 
or referendums to strengthen its legitimation message. Indeed, the arguments of the 
Russian leadership often bordered on populist appeals where ‘the will of the people’ 
played a central role. Nevertheless, the frequency with which these arguments were 
employed, demonstrated how crucial a popular mandate had become. General democratic 
arguments, referring to ‘democracy’ and ‘elections’, thus constituted the core of 
democratic legitimation. Finally, a third subcategory of democratic legitimation arguments 
consisted of arguments that relied on liberal values such as human rights, freedom of the 
press etc. This has been referred to as liberal democratic legitimation.
It proved important to divide the Russian democratic legitimation formula into these 
subcategories -  not least as the differences both over time and between different audiences 
were to be found in nuances in the legitimation formula of the Russian leadership. It 
would also have been possible to imagine a development where Yeltsin had relied entirely 
on populist-democratic arguments and discarded constitutional as well as liberal- 
democratic arguments altogether. However, this did not happen. Although Yeltsin 
dissolved the parliament in 1993 and legitimated this by pointing to his own popular 
mandate, he did decide to go ahead with new elections to both a new parliament and, later, 
to the presidency. Nevertheless, the different democratic arguments proved closely related 
both ideologically (it would, for example, be difficult to imagine a democratic state which 
did not adhere to constitutionality) and in practice, since the Russian leadership itself 
connected the different categories.
1.3.2 National Legitimation
The second of Weber’s ideal types of authority rested on traditional grounds. According to 
Weber, traditional authority implied that the ‘masters are designated according to 
traditional rules and are obeyed because of their traditional status’.65 Holmes designated 
this mode of legitimacy ‘old-traditional’ in his typology and introduced the category 
‘new-traditional, where the latter referred to attempts by Soviet leaders to portray
65 Ibid., pp. 226.
- 3 6 -
1 T h e  Q u e s t  f o r  t h e  R u ssia n  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a
themselves as followers and heirs to earlier respected leaders.66 Holmes, furthermore, 
introduced an additional mode, an ‘official nationalist’ mode of legitimation. This 
involved ‘political activism that focuses on and privileges the nation above other 
allegiances’ carried out by the state.
Here, traditionalism and official nationalism will be merged into one cluster of arguments 
-  national legitimation. It would be difficult to use Weber’s traditional mode of authority 
without adapting it to suit modem conditions. However, in my view new traditional 
legitimation, in Holmes’ typology, comes close to using instances or role models in 
history to legitimate the state building project. Nationalist legitimation, on the other hand, 
might also use history and tradition to reinforce national unity. Furthermore, it was 
evident from the material that there were a number of nuances available within the sphere 
of national arguments, which made it an interesting category. I have, therefore, chosen to 
merge new traditional and nationalist arguments into one category: national legitimation. 
Justifications which rested on national legitimation, thus contained arguments referring to 
Russian history and traditions, to patriotism and to Russia as a great power. National 
legitimation is integral to most states today and there is a close linkage between 
democratic and national appeals in that ‘the people’ play a central role. In other words, 
legitimation messages appealing to national sentiments are not necessarily dangerous 
nationalist appeals. Indeed, one of the findings was that the Russian legitimation formula 
hardly contained any references to ethnic national arguments. Instead of playing the ethnic 
Russian card, the Russian leadership attempted to promote a national identity that was 
inclusive of all the nationalities in the Russian Federation.
The Russian Federation did not have a clear-cut national tradition to fall back upon. In 
fact, the Russian national traditions that did exist were in the Russian case closely
66 Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 44.
67 Anderson (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread o f Nationalism (London, 
Verso), pp. 2-3 and Barker (1990) Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, Clarendon), p. 210.
68 This point has been stressed by other authors, especially as concerns Yeltsin’s constant use of ‘rossiiskii’ 
rather than ‘russkii’. See for example, Bamer-Berry (1999) 'Nation Building and the Russian Federation', 
in: Glad and Shiraev (Eds.) The Russian Transformation: Political, Sociological and Psychological 
Aspects (New York, St. Martin's Press), pp. 103-104, Breslauer and Dale (1997) 'Boris Yel'tsin and the
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connected to an imperial identity. There was very little in the way of democratic tradition 
in Russia and only a weakly formed Russian nationhood -  something that did exist to a 
certain degree in other post-communist countries as the Baltic states and Poland. Strictly 
speaking, the Russian leadership stood before a choice. There were three main sources of 
tradition available in the case of the Russian Federation: the imperial, tsarist Russian 
tradition, the Soviet tradition and that of the democratic movement during the last years of 
the existence of the Soviet Union. Each one carried with it its own difficulties.
To have embraced the tsarist tradition without reservations would have alienated large 
sections of the Russian public and infuriated the political opposition. The Soviet heritage, 
on the other hand, represented a period that Yeltsin had repudiated. Embracing it would 
have alienated another substantial section of the Russian population and elites and would 
have created problems in relations in the international arena. Both the tsarist and the 
Soviet heritage represented an imperial tradition -  not least to countries like the Baltic 
States and Poland. Finally, not all Russians embraced the young tradition of Russian 
opposition to the Soviet centre and struggle for democracy. Yeltsin was soon accused of 
having betrayed Russia when he signed the Belovezha Accords, which signalled the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
An argument that was advanced around the fall of the Soviet Union was that Russia had, 
in fact, bom the main burden of the Soviet empire. Left to pursue its own destiny, Russia 
was bound to flourish both economically and culturally.69 However, this argument 
disappeared almost altogether. As time wore on, it became obvious that the promises in 
1991 of a radically better future for an independent, democratic Russia were far from 
fulfilled and the halo around the resistance to the August Coup faded. All in all, the 
Russian leadership had to choose carefully which legacy or which aspects of a certain 
legacy it promoted and which aspects it should condemn or ignore. It solved this dilemma
Invention of a Russian Nation-State', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 315 and Tolz (2001) Russia 
(London, Arnold), pp. 267-268.
69 See also eudeamonic legitimation, pp. 40-42
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by using elements of all legacies while at the same time using sweeping references to
# 70‘Russian history’ and ‘Russian traditions’.
1.3.3 Charismatic Legitimation
Weber’s third ideal type of authority was that which rested on charisma. In the words of 
Weber this authority relationship is characterised by the presence of a ‘charismatically 
qualified leader ... obeyed by virtue of personal trust in his revelation, his heroism or his 
exemplary qualities’.71 Apart from the ‘magician and the prophet’, Max Weber gave the 
‘war lord’ or condottierre as examples of charismatic leaders. In his view the ‘free 
demagogue’ and the ‘parliamentary party leader’ in democracies were other examples of 
charismatic leadership, which had developed in the West -  a political system, which he 
doubted could be efficient.72 It is in the very essence of charismatic authority that it is of a 
passing nature. ‘Indeed, in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist only in 
statu nascendi. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, 
or a combination of both.’73 Not only is charismatic authority unstable by its very nature, 
it is also inherently opposed to systematic activity. This does not imply that charisma does 
not have a social structure and administrative staff.74
Charismatic legitimacy is the mode of Weber’s that is most easy to translate to modem 
conditions and to examining a legitimation formula rather than legitimacy. The way I 
will present arguments of charismatic legitimation will be closely related to Weber’s 
classification of charismatic authority. The identification of the state with a person is often 
found in newly independent states where this leader is connected with resistance,
70 The use of history is discussed further, below, pp. 53ff.
71 Weber, et cd. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, University of 
California Press), p. 216.
72 Weber, et al. (1991) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London, Routledge), p. 80. See also Breiner 
(1996) Max Weber and Democratic Politics (London, Cornell University Press), p. 158-159.
73 Weber, et al. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, University of 
California Press), p. 246.
74 Ibid., pp. 1111-1120.
75 See also Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 43.
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1f\revolution and promises of radical reforms. I would argue that rather than being 
associated with democratic systems exclusively, charismatic authority is present in 
systems undergoing turbulent change. When Yeltsin first came to power, he did possess a
7 7  •certain degree of charisma. In Yeltsin’s case, he was strongly connected to Russian
70
statehood and to reforms, but his charisma declined after the first couple of years, as did 
the use made of Yeltsin’s personality in the efforts to legitimate the Russian state building 
project. This is very much in line with Weber’s predictions on the inconstant nature of 
charismatic authority. During the first years Yeltsin was portrayed as a guarantor of 
Russian statehood. As Yeltsin’s popularity faded, references to the president usually 
referred to the office rather than to the person. Yeltsin never turned into a father of the 
people. At best he managed to present himself as a bulwark against an unknown abyss.
1.3.4 Eudaemonic Legitimation
Another mode of legitimacy introduced by Holmes was that of eudaemonic legitimacy. 
Holmes’ definition was that eudaemonic legitimacy referred to ‘attempts by political 
leaders to legitimate their rule in terms of the political order’s performance, especially in 
the economic sphere’.79 This mode needs to be examined a bit more closely in order to 
determine what constitutes attempts at eudaemonic legitimation and -  maybe more 
importantly -  what eudeamonic legitimation is not. Clearly, a leadership that enjoys 
success in providing economic growth and improving the quality of life of its elites and 
population will find legitimation easier than a leadership that is accompanied by inflation, 
plummeting standards of living and a negative growth record. Nevertheless, there are 
good grounds for not simply equating economic performance and efficiency with
76 Bensman (1979) 'Max Weber's Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation', in: Vidich and Glassman (Eds.) 
Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy o f Modem Governments (Beverly Hills, California, Sage 
Publications), p. 25. See also Crook (1987) 'Legitimacy, Authority and the Transfer of Power in Ghana', 
Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, p. 571 on how new leaders in Ghana were connected to promises of 
development.
77 Achkasov, et al. (1996) Legitimatsiia vlasti v postsotsialisticheskom rossiiskom obshchestve [Legitimation 
o f Power in the Post-Socialist Russian Society] (Moskva, Aspekt Press), pp. 59-60, 83-85 and Mitchell
(1993) Leadership, Legitimacy, and Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia', Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 4, 
No. 2, p. 95.
78 Robinson (2002) Russia: A State o f Uncertainty (London, Routledge), p. 73-74.
79 Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 44.
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ROlegitimacy. A fervent ideological or religious commitment could often overshadow 
economic hardships -  history abounds with such examples. Neither is the connection
• 01between success in democratisation and economic performance self-evident.
In the case of Russia, however, democratic and economic reforms were initiated in tandem 
and were intimately connected to each other both in the minds of the Russian leadership 
and its audiences. As it turned out, the Russian leadership could not rely on economic 
success for legitimation purposes. Instead, it had to find alternative ways of legitimating 
its state building project. In a way, this made the Russian legitimation formula in the 
1990s all the more intriguing to analyse since it meant the Russian leadership had to focus 
on other legitimation arguments than purely economic ones. The Kremlin was also faced 
with the task of promoting democratic arguments in spite of the unsuccessful fate of its 
economic reforms.
Another clarification is also called for when it comes to eudaemonic arguments. Promises 
of material benefits or simply pointing to success in combating inflation would, in my 
view, not qualify as attempts at eudaemonic legitimation of the state building project but 
rather as justification of specific policy issues or attempts at co-option. Weber was explicit 
in stating that legitimacy was something other than ‘ [pjurely material interests and 
calculations of advantage’. Weber discussed this in connection with the authority 
relationship between the ruler and his administrative staff. Short-term, specific promises 
of, for example, tax reductions for pensioners, or a salary raise for officers delivered on 
Victory Day did not qualify as eudaemonic legitimation. Such promises were interesting 
rather as attempts to co-opt specific groups in society. When eudaemonic legitimation 
occurred, the keywords were rather, for example, promises of a higher standard of living 
as economic and democratic reforms progressed.
80 See Barry’s critique of Lipset’s definition and discussion of legitimacy, Barry (1978) Sociologists, 
Economists and Democracy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), pp. 70-71.
81 Di Palma (1990) To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Oxford, University of 
California Press), pp. 150-151 and Przeworski (1995) Democracy and the Market: Political and 
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 
33.
82 Weber, et al. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline o f  Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, University of 
California Press), p. 212.
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Promises of future prosperity when connected to a specific system were also a form of 
legitimation -  not least when a role model was pointed to. In that case, eudaemonic 
legitimation bordered on external legitimation. As mentioned above, the argument that 
Russia would come to blossom when it left the Soviet Union was advanced from time to 
time in the early 1990s. This argument was closely connected to national legitimation, but 
soon faded from the rhetoric of the Russian leadership. All in all, eudaemonic arguments 
occurred during the first year or possibly first few years of the existence of the Russian 
state, but became ever more rare as the failure of the economic reforms became obvious. It 
was impossible for the Russian leadership to hide from the public eye the fact that 
standards of living were falling rather than rising. Attempts to portray the state as 
economically successful were thus bound to backfire. As a rule, eudaemonic legitimation 
played, at most, a subsidiary role in the efforts of the Russian leadership to legitimate its 
state building project.
1.3.5 External Legitimation
Leslie Holmes identified three external modes of legitimation: (1) formal recognition by 
other states, (2) informal support for ‘a regime and its policies by external agents’, and (3) 
the ‘existence of an external role model’. In Holmes’ view, these modes were less
O A
important and ‘secondary to the domestic modes in most instances’. However, I would 
argue that although external legitimation might play a subsidiary role once formal 
recognition is gained, it is of crucial importance for a new state to gain international 
recognition swiftly. Gaining recognition internationally for Russia as a new independent 
state was of major importance to the Russian leadership in the early 1990s. This could, in 
turn, be used to argue in favour of the legitimacy of the Russian state vis-a-vis the 
domestic audience. Furthermore, as a state that wished to obtain favourable trade terms, 
Russia was well advised to seek recognition as a member of the informal club of liberal 
democratic states, which set the conditions for international trade etc. The dominant
83 Vidich (1979) 'Legitimation of Regimes in World Perspective', in: Vidich and Glassman (Eds.) Conflict 
and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy of Modem Governments (Beverly Hills, California, Sage 
Publications), p. 274.
84 Holmes (1997) Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 44.
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external role model available to the Russian leadership was that of liberal democracy. 
Both formal and informal recognition in the international community was intimately
or
connected to embracing liberal democratic values.
At this point it is important to stress the distinction that I make between the use of external 
legitimation and seeking legitimation in the international community. In the first instance, 
recognition by the international community is used in the legitimation efforts of the 
Russian leadership whereas in the second instance recognition by the international 
community is sought through adhering to the dominating rules of international relations. 
Although the two are connected, the distinction is of importance not least with reference 
to the discussion earlier in this chapter concerning different audiences for the legitimation 
message. The Russian leadership used the argument that the Russian Federation had been 
recognised by certain states vis-a-vis the domestic audience. However, it also used this 
argument to induce additional states to recognise Russia.
The distinction, moreover, highlights the dilemma between gaining recognition 
internationally and internal legitimacy that the Russian leadership faced. For example, on 
24 December 1991 the Russian Federation assumed the seat of the Soviet Union in the 
United Nations and its place on the Security Council. This was linked to the image of the 
Russian Federation as heir of the Soviet Union. However, this image did not fit altogether 
well with the image that the Russian leadership was then trying to create of itself as 
breaking with the imperial past of the Soviet Union. To a considerable degree, this image 
fitted within the framework of the liberal idea, which Francis Fukuyama has proclaimed
or
’’the global victor”. For the Russian Federation the role as heir within the sphere of the 
former Soviet Union also entailed taking upon itself the lion’s share of the Soviet foreign
R7debt. Later on, the Kremlin's attempts to legitimise itself internally in terms of being a 
great power and to defend compatriots living in former Soviet republics became
85 Compare the role that international sanctions played in the case of South Africa, Black and Klotz (1995) 
International Legitimation and Domestic Political Change: Implications for South African Foreign 
Relations (Bellville, University of the Western Cape), p. 9.
86 Fukuyama (1992) The End o f History and the Last Man (London, Hamish Hamilton), p. 42.
87 Mullerson (1994) International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS 
(London; New York, Routledge), pp. 137-145.
- 4 3 -
1 T h e  Q u e st  f o r  t h e  R u ssia n  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a
problematic. These efforts clashed with the imperative to conform to the global ideals of 
liberal democratic values and the rejection of anything that might smack of imperial 
practices.
1.3.6 Negative Legitimation
To the more accepted modes of legitimation described above, I have considered it valid 
for the examination of legitimation in Russia to add that of ‘negative legitimation’. This is 
a mode which involves emphasising the value of the present system in terms of its relative 
value compared to ‘worse’ regimes rather than primarily stressing the system’s inherent
on
value or invoking nationalist sentiments a priori. Another way of using negative 
legitimation consisted in the political leadership’s efforts at representing themselves as 
bulwarks against a perceived or real enemy. This is a classic way of mobilising a
o n
population and encouraging militancy against the perceived enemy. It is also closely 
connected to identity since it tends to strengthen the identity of “we” as opposed to 
“them”.90 Negative legitimation was often used as an auxiliary mode of legitimation in 
conjunction with other modes. However, its frequent use raises the possibility that the 
Russian leadership perceived that the legitimation arguments it sought to promote were 
somehow not potent enough on their own.
In spite of the auxiliary nature of negative legitimation, I believe that its prevalent use by 
the Soviet regime justifies discussing it as a cogent mode of legitimation in the Soviet 
Union. This mode was frequently used in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Just as did the Provisional Government in 1917, the new Russian leadership enjoyed 
something of a honeymoon after coming to power not primarily because of its own
88 Shlapentokh (1986) Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction (New 
York, Praeger), pp. 15-16.
89 Edelman (1971) Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago, Markham 
Publishing Company), p. 160.
90 Finlay, et al. (1967) Enemies in Politics (Chicago, Illinois, Rand McNally Company), pp. 19-20 and 
Tomquist-Plewa (2001) Vitryssland och nationalism i ett kulturellt gransland [Belarus and Nationalism 
in a Cultural Borderland] (Lund, Studentlitteratur), p. 10. See also Tarifa (1997) 'The Quest for 
Legitimacy and the Withering Away of Utopia', Social Forces, Vol. 76, No. 2, p. 459-460, for an account 
of how the image of an ‘imperialist-revisionist encirclement’ was used to mobilise the population in 
Albania.
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qualities, but rather as the ‘over thrower’ of a highly unpopular regime.91 This honeymoon 
was bound to be of a passing nature. In the absence of a clearly defined external enemy,
Q9the Russian leadership chose to demonise its communist opposition. At first the 
communist opposition was tantamount to the Soviet centre and the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, the CPSU. Later, when the CPSU had disappeared from the scene, the 
new Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the KPRF, assumed the role of political 
enemy.
Negative legitimation remained prominent throughout the period, although the emphasis 
changed somewhat. In particular, the enemy that the Russian leadership invoked changed 
character markedly after the first couple of years. Whereas the Soviet centre had been a 
powerful enemy before Russia became independent and continued to function in that 
capacity during much 1992 and 1993, this happened less often during the rest of the 
period.93 By the end of the 1990s, the enemy was ‘international terrorism’ instead. When 
it came to dangerous alternatives, the Russian leadership invoked the spectre of 
disintegration along the lines of a Yugoslav or Soviet scenario and closely related 
warnings of chaos and civil. These threats were employed as legitimation arguments 
throughout the period. Early on, Yeltsin was occasionally portrayed as a bulwark against 
chaos -  a kind of negative and charismatic legitimation in tandem, in other words.94 This 
became less frequent in the latter half of the 1990s.
91 Achkasov, et al. (1996) Legitimatsiia vlasti v postsotsialisticheskom rossiiskom obshchestve [Legitimation 
o f Power in the Post-Socialist Russian Society] (Moskva, Aspekt Press), pp. 59-60.
92 According to Gordon B. Smith, Russia ‘most clearly defines itself in terms of negatives’ as ‘Russians 
conceptualize their political alternative futures as a single binary choice’. Smith (1999) 'State-Building in 
the New Russia: Assessing the Yeltsin Record', in: Smith (Ed.) State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin 
Legacy and the Challenge o f the Future (Armonk, New York, ME. Sharpe), p. 8.
93 See also Davies (1997) Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era (Basingstoke, Macmillan), p. 38-39, 48. Also 
compare how the Bolsheviks presented themselves as a break with the past. The future that they said they 
would provide had the advantage over the past that it was unknown, whereas the conditions that prevailed 
under tsarism were well-known. Heller (1982) Thases of Legitimation in Soviet-type Societies', in: Rigby 
(Ed.) Political Legitimation in Communist States (Oxford, Macmillan in association with St. Antony's 
College), p. 57.
94 Compare Gutorov (1995) 'Sotsialnaia utopiia kak sposob legitimazatsii politicheskoi vlasti v Rossii (k 
postanovke voprosa) [Social Utopia as a Means o f Legitimating Political Power in Russia (Towards 
Formulating the Question)]', Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta Seriia 6., No. 2, p. 6.
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It is probably impossible to understand the role that the threat of chaos, civil war and 
disintegration played in the Russian legitimation formula without taking Russian political 
culture and Russian historical experience on board. Russian political culture has usually 
been discussed in terms of a democratic versus an authoritarian (Russian) culture.95 Often, 
it has been argued that there is a Russian tendency to embrace an authoritarian regime.961 
would claim that Russian political culture contains a vivid fear of chaos and civil war 
rather than an instinct towards authoritarianism and absolutism. In fact, the Russian 
leadership seldom pointed to a Russian tradition of a strong man to legitimate the strong 
presidential system. Instead, warnings of chaos and civil war were used. The appeal of a 
Leviathan power rather than ‘a warre, as if of every man, against every man’ was 
infinitely more relevant in Russia in the 1990s (much as it was in 17 century England) 
than in stable Western societies that have been spared the horrors of civil war for
07centuries. However, it does not imply that there was a Russian genetic code that 
predestined Russia for authoritarianism. Rather, this explained why the Russian 
leadership’s appeal for a strengthening of the state (gosudartstvo) or of the ‘power 
vertical’ (vlastnyi vertical) resounded in Russia in a way that would be unthinkable in 
most Western states.98
In a way, negative legitimation is a mirror image of certain positive, minimum 
requirements that a state ought to fulfil. A state leadership should be able to furnish the 
state’s citizens with at least a degree of domestic stability and be able to protect its
95 Lowenhardt (1995) The Reincarnation o f Russia: Struggling with the Legacy o f Communism, 1990-1994 
(London, Longman), pp. 61-68. Stephen White concluded that democratic culture is still lacking. White 
(2000) Russia's New Politics: The Management o f  a Postcommunist Society (New York, Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 269-275, while Jeffrey Halm concluded from a local study in Yaroslav that 
economic hardships had not caused democratic culture to erode to the degree that could have been 
expected, Hahn (1995) 'Changes in Contemporary Russian Political Culture', in: Dawisha and Parrott 
(Eds.) Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States o f Eurasia New York), pp. 112- 
136. See also Ljubin (2002) 'Autoritarismus oder Demokratie? Zur politischen Kultur im heutigen 
Russland', Osteuropa, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 180-200 and Sakwa (1995) 'Subjectivity, Politics, and Order in 
Russian Political Evolution', Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 957-961.
96 See for example, Brovkin (1996) 'The Emperor's New Clothes: Continuity o f Soviet Political Culture in 
Contemporary Russia', Problems o f Post-Communism, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 21-28.
97 Hobbes and Tuck (2001) Leviathan (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 88.
98 Samuel Huntington stated that ‘authority has to exist before it can be limited’. Although he was primarily 
concerned with modersnising societies, his point is, in my view, highly relevant in Russia in the 1990s. 
Huntington (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven; London, Yale University Press),
p. 8.
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territorial integrity. In other words, the negative arguments that the Russian leadership 
used were, in fact, statements to the effect that they were defending these minimum 
requirements." In connection with this, it is necessary to discuss an additional mode of 
legitimation -  that of habitual legitimation. The Russian Federation could be seen as the 
continuing state of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, in which case an argument 
could be made that habits would have had time to form. It could further be argued that this 
mode was prevalent within the elites where relatively little turnover of personnel has taken 
place.100 However, the key features of the political system after 1991 were entirely new 
and a radical break with tradition. Although habitual legitimation could undoubtedly be 
regarded as one of the more important modes in most stable societies, I would not agree 
that it is applicable to the Russian case.101 Moreover, it lies in the very nature of habitual
1fi9legitimation that it is inherently difficult to examine. Furthermore, legitimation may 
take place when all alternatives are held out as worse than the present situation.103 I 
believe that negative legitimation is a more rewarding way of examining legitimation 
messages, which rest on arguments concerning the lack of alternatives.
1.4 Overlapping Legitimation Categories
A closer scrutiny of the categories discussed above reveals that certain categories run the 
risk of overlapping with each other. First of all, stating that something is in accordance 
with international law could be regarded as external legitimation if the international 
community is regarded as a role model that the Russian leadership is trying to emulate.
99 See also Nicolai Petro, who in his analysis of Russian politics in the 1990s claims that ‘there was a strong 
desire for someone to “take charge”.’ However, ‘this was clearly not a desire for a new dictatorship’ but 
‘something that could be termed a modem version of a constrained autocracy’. Petro (1995) The Rebirth 
of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation o f Political Culture (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University 
Press), p. 151.
100 Higley, et al. (1996) 'The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites', Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 
133-147.
101 Few signs of a habituation phase, as defined by Dankwart Rustow, are present in Russia today. Rustow 
(1970) 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', Journal o f Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, 
No. 3, p. 360.
102 Barker (1990) Political Legitimacy and the State (Oxford, Clarendon), pp. 30-33.
103 Weber, et al. (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline o f Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, University of 
California Press), p. 214. See also Bensman (1979) Max Weber's Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation', 
in: Vidich and Glassman (Eds.) Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy o f Modem Governments 
(Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications), pp. 34-35.
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However, the same argument, that something is in accordance with international law, 
could also be regarded as formal democratic legitimation since it rests on the argument 
that it conforms to international democratic principles. Most often, the Russian leadership 
did not allude to democracy as an international role model but rather as a value in itself. 
Therefore, international law has been regarded as a primarily democratic argument -  
albeit with a strong connection to external arguments.
A second case of overlapping categories is that between national legitimation (which 
emphasises Russia as a great power (derzhava) and external legitimation (which relies on 
arguments of having achieved respect within the international community or from other 
states). Usually the Russian leadership used the great power (derzhava) argument at home 
and in an abstruse and general historic form to instil national pride. The Russian 
leadership tended to emphasise that Russia was respected as an equal by other states in the 
international community when Russia was accepted as a reliable partner in the 
international arena. This would constitute external legitimation. Efforts to portray Russia 
as a great power internationally often backfired. For example, Russia was forced to back 
down from its staunch position on NATO expansion and the bombings of Yugoslavia.
Finally, as noted earlier, negative legitimation that relies on images of an external threat or 
enemy, at times comes close to amounting to national legitimation. I have, however, 
treated projections of enemies and threats as negative legitimation since these arguments 
share a number of weaknesses with arguments that warned of Russian disintegration and 
civil war. The most important weakness of these negative arguments is that they project an 
alternative that is worse than the present. Negative legitimation thus runs the risk of being 
undermined if the invoked threat or enemy is suddenly perceived as less plausible. From a 
strictly methodological perspective, a system of categories that did not overlap with each 
other would have been preferable. However, in analyses of rhetoric, overlapping 
categories are inevitable if they are to take into account the nuances involved. Indeed, a 
non-overlapping system would be less useful. Its bluntness would run the risk of 
disregarding the intriguing linguistic nuances and historical references that existed in the 
Russian legitimation formula.
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1.5 Analysing Nuances and the Use of History
By the same token, something ought to be said about the difficulties and rewards involved 
in analysing rhetoric. As I started to analyse the material, it became increasingly clear that 
subtle nuances came out in the choice of specific words and in the use of history. The 
Russian leadership could -  by being abstruse and by using broad words that the receiver 
might interpret according to his or her own values -  produce a legitimation formula that 
appealed to many different groups.104 It was impossible to analyse this rhetoric without 
taking into consideration the ‘cultural milieu’ in which the Russian legitimation formula 
was produced.105 In the case of certain texts, it was important to find the Russian source 
rather than to rely on an English translation. This concerned, of course, the instances when 
it was of importance for the interpretation to know whether the word ‘msskii’ or 
‘rossiiskii' had been used for ‘Russian’. The former denotes an ethnic Russian whereas 
rossiiskii denotes civic citizenship and could be translated as ‘Russlandish’.106
In the case of words like ’democracy’, ’reform’ and ’balance of power’, it is necessary to 
note that the use of these keywords might imply different things for different senders and 
audiences. Thus, the word ’democracy’ might mean something entirely different to a 
deputy representing KPRF in the State Duma compared to what the Russian leadership 
wished to convey by using the term. Around the time of the fall of the Soviet Union 
‘democracy’ was virtually synonymous with anti-communism. In the words of Timothy J. 
Colton: ‘When the upshot was a legitimacy crisis for the CPSU, “democrat” was in 
essence a synonym for anyone opposed to single party rule, and from almost any 
ideological angle.’107 As time wore on, however, the word became increasingly linked to 
the failed economic reforms. At times it was interesting to know, for example, whether the 
word used for ‘democracy’ had been ‘demokratiia’ or ‘narodovlastie’. Although both 
words mean ‘democracy’, demokratiia gives a connotation that is more closely connected
104 Already the Soviet ideological rhetoric was abstruse, Meyer (1966) The Functions of Ideology in the 
Soviet Political System', Soviet Studies, Vol. 17,, pp. 278-279.
105 Urban (1998) 'Remythologising the Russian State1, Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6, p. 972.
106 See also footnote 68, p. 37.
107 Colton (1995) 'Boris Yeltsin: All-Thumbs Democrat, in: Colton and Tucker (Eds.) Patterns in Post- 
Soviet Leadership (Oxford, Westview Press), p. 49.
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to Western democracy. In Sergei Ozhegov’s dictionary, issued in the Soviet Union in
1988, this comes out as it gives the following definitions of demokratiia:
1. A political system, based on the recognition of the principle of popular 
power [narodovlastie], freedom and equality of the citizens. Socialist d. 
[demokratiia\ (the highest form of democracy [demokatiia], based on 
complete and actual popular power [narodovlastie]). Bourgeois d. 
\demokratiia\ (formally declared power of the people \vlast naroda] while the 
bourgeoisie really rules). 2. Principle for organisation of collective activity, in 
which the active and equal participation of all the members of the collective is 
guaranteed.108
Narodovlastie, on the other hand, translates literally to ‘people’s power’ (and is often 
translated that way) but means democracy albeit with a stronger Russian or Soviet 
connotation. Ozhegov gave the synonym demokratiia for narodovlastie, but with the 
example: ‘The Soviets are organs of narodovlastie. ’109 The word narodovlastie certainly 
appeals to Russian (or even Soviet) traditions while demokratiia is more linked to 
democracy along a western pattern.
‘Reforms’ was another word that the Russian leadership often used in a lofty manner 
without specifying which reforms it had in mind. Early on, ‘reform’ became a catch 
phrase for overall transition when used by the Russian leadership, while for many within 
the opposition it became synonymous with Yeltsin’s regime. The different uses of the 
word reform were pinpointed in an article in Rossiiskie vesti during the VII Congress of 
People’s Deputies in December 1992. ‘The word “reform” has probably never been used 
as often anywhere as at the Congress of People’s Deputies. ... Each understands the term 
“reform” in his own way’110 This use of the word reform, to signify the entire transition 
process, died out over the period as it became obvious that the economy would not 
recover as swiftly as first projected. This made the Russian leadership less eager to
108 Ozhegov (1988) Slovar russkogo yazyka [Dictionary o f the Russian Language] (Moscow, Russkii 
yazyk), p. 130 [italics in the original, except for the words given in square brackets].
109 Ibid., p. 313.
110 Rossiiskie vesti, 8 December 1992, p. 1. See also Reddaway (2001) The Tragedy o f Russia's Reforms: 
Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press), p. 18, 
on how the term ‘reforms’ became ‘a kind of magic fetish both in Russian and Western debate.
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connect democratic reforms to the transition to a market economy since it undermined the 
democratic arguments.
In much the same vein, different actors used ‘constitutionality’ to signify different things. 
Yeltsin lamented what he considered the wrong use of the word “constitutionality” by the 
Supreme Soviet. In a statement addressed to the Supreme Soviet in March 1993, he wrote 
that: ‘The words “constitutionality”, “constitutional legality” or “constitutional control” 
have only approximate content and they are being increasingly often interpreted 
depending on the political situation.’111 He went on to argue that the true ‘constitutional 
message’ had been forgotten and that the current ‘constitutional basis is contradictory
119already at the level of constitutional axioms’. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that 
words like ‘democracy’, ‘constitutionality’ and ‘reforms’ invoked different connotations 
for different groups in society and that these connotations sometimes changed over the 
period. Furthermore, different political actors sought to appropriate words as their own.
Another set of words which deserves special attention are those used to denote the native 
land: the motherland {rodina) and fatherland (<otechestvo or otchizna). These are words 
that the Russian leadership resorted to quite frequently when it wished to evoke 
patriotism. All three words carry strong, emotional baggage but they also have the 
advantage of not denoting a specific ethnic community. They are thus vague, but might be 
given a very specific interpretation by the audience at hand. The words are synonyms but 
have slightly different connotations. Of the three words, otechestvo and otchizna have a 
closer connotation to a patriotic duty towards the native land whereas rodina is more
1 1 -j
loftily connected to the place of birth, a ‘Mother Russia’. Again, Ozhegov’s dictionary 
provides clues as to which connotations are linked to the individual words.
111 BBC SWB, SU/1647 (26 March 1993), Cl/5.
112 Ibid.
113 Irina Sandomirskaia has made a thorough study of the connotations and origins of the notion of ‘rodina’. 
Sandomirskaia (2001) Kniga o rodine: Opyt cmcdiza diskursivnykh praktik [A Book About the 
Motherland: Experiences from Analysis o f Discourse Practice] (Vienna, Wiener slawistischer Almanach). 
See also Lane (1981) The Rites o f Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 140-141.
-51 -
1 T h e  Q u e st  f o r  t h e  R u s s ia n  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a
Otechestvo (elevated style [yysokii stil]) Country where a certain person was 
bom and the citizen of which he is. Socialist fatherland [Sotsialisticheskoe 
otechestvo]. Love for the fatherland [Liubov k otechestve]. Defence of one’s 
fatherland [Zashchita svoego otechestvo].114
Otchizna (elevated style [vysokii stil]) Fatherland [Otechestvo], motherland 
[rodina]. Love for the fatherland [Liubov k otchizne]. Selfless devotion to the 
fatherland [Bezzavetnaiapredannost otchizne]}15
Rodina 1. Fatherland [otechestvo], native land [rodnaia strana]. Defence of 
the socialist Motherland [Zashchita sotsialisticheskoi Rodiny]. 2. Place of 
birth, origin of someone or something, the beginning of something. Come to 
the place of birth [Priekhat na rodinu]. The Soviet Union is the motherland of 
the socialist revolution [Sovetskii Soiuz -  rodina sotsialisticheskoi 
revoliutsii].116
Finally, in the case of Otechestvo, the role of the Second World War in Russian history 
ought to be mentioned. Before the Second World War, the ‘Patriotic War’ 
{Otechestvennaia voina) to Russians denoted Russia’s war against Napoleon in the early 
nineteenth century -  a war that played an important role in instilling Russian pride. After 
1945, the Second World War increasingly filled this role and became the Great Patriotic 
War (Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina) to all Russians. It is difficult to overestimate the 
role that the Great Patriotic War plays in Russian history. Although this is not the place 
for a thorough examination of all the meanings of Otechestvo in Russia, the word’s 
linkages are certainly worth keeping in mind.
Often, the words chosen for a specific legitimation effort are remarkable for their 
abstruseness rather than for their specificity. A typical example of such a word is the 
Russian expression ‘derzhava’, which is usually translated to ‘power’ or ‘great power’. 
Strictly speaking, there is no English translation that does justice to the word since 
derzhava means both less and more to a Russian. A derzhava is a ‘power’ or ‘state’ in the 
system of states. Indeed the Oxford Russian dictionary suggests that ‘velikaia derzhava ’ is 
a ‘great power’. Again, Ozhegov’s dictionary gives us an insight into the Russian use of 
the word. It gives the synonym ‘gosudarstvo’ for derzhava and adds that it is used in
114 Ozhegov (1988) Slovar russkogo yazyka [Dictionary o f the Russian Language] (Moscow, Russkii 
yazyk), p. 379 [italics in the original, except for the words given in square brackets].
115 Ibid., p. 390 [italics in the original, except for the words given in square brackets].
116 Ibid., p. 556 [italics in the original, except for the words given in square brackets].
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‘elevated style’ (vysokii stil). However, Ozhegov also lists a second meaning for the word:
117‘a round globe with a cross on top as a symbol of the power of the monarch’. Derzhava 
certainly carries with it connotations of great victories and of a prominent position in the 
international system of states. Thus, the word is full of meanings and allows the audience 
at hand to chose the meaning and connotations that best suit its needs and expectations.
Change of regime, crisis and radical transformations of the political system inevitably lead
11 Q
to revisions of history and to a battle over history. The Russian polity after 1991 was no 
exception to this rule. Rapid transformations of societies are times of inventions of myths 
and are connected with nation building in newly independent states.119 Thus, the choice of 
historical incidents used in a legitimation message was far from coincidental. For 
example, references to Peter the Great conveyed a certain set of images and associations 
to a Russian audience. As in the case of analysing certain words, the importance of 
looking closely at the text manifested itself, for example, when Yeltsin (in 1993) referred
170 •to his political nemesis, Ruslan Khasbulatov, as a ‘false pretender’. Even for a Russian 
who was only vaguely familiar with his country’s history this conveyed an image of 
Khasbulatov as an impostor from outside of Russia who wished to create chaos and civil 
war. The reference to false or ‘self-proclaimed’ pretenders (samozvantsy) harked back to
tlithe ‘Time of Troubles’ (Smuta) in the 17 century when Russia was thrown into a period 
of political chaos and different foreign powers attempted to take control of Russia. A 
pretender to the throne, the false Dmitrii, claimed to be the dead tsarevich Dmitrii and was 
supported in his claim by Catholic Poland.121 In his memoirs, Yeltsin later used a well- 
known Pushkin quote to invoke the historic memory of another well-known pretender,
117 Ibid., p. 131.
118 Davies (1997) Soviet History in the Yeltsin Era (Basingstoke, Macmillan), pp. 216-217 and Kertzer
(1996) Politics and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall o f Communism (New Haven, 
Yale University Press), p. 158.
119 See, for example, Fatton (1986) 'Gramsci and the Legitimation of the State: The Case o f the Senegalese 
Passive Revolution', Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 729-750.
120 This statement is treated in more detail in chapter three, p. 108. See also Kostikov statement, p. 107.
121 See also chapter three, p. 107. For the connotations that ‘pretenders’ such as the False Dmitrii has for 
Russians, see Billington (1970) The Icon and the Axe (New York, Vintage Books), pp. 105-106. See also 
Petersson (2001) National Self-Images and Regional Identities in Russia (Aldershot, Ashgate), pp. 78-79 
on the use of this era in history by other politicians.
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•  • 1 •  •Yemilian Pugachev, and the terrible consequences of his rebellion. These were a vivid
example of negative legitimation.
Nor did Yeltsin dismiss the entire Soviet legacy. The victory in the Second World War 
was pointed to as a ‘patriotic achievement’. Thus, the use that the Russian leadership 
made of history was very much one of taking the best plums by pointing to specific eras or 
historic persons rather than chosing the entire tsarist or Soviet legacy in its rhetoric. For 
example, it did point to Peter the Great’s achievements but never to tsarism as such as 
incidents in history to emulate. Likewise, the Russian leadership pointed to the Great 
Patriotic War as an example of the Russian ability to withstand trials, but repudiated most 
of the Soviet communist past. Depending on how the historic legacy was pointed to, it 
constituted different legitimation arguments. Usually, the use of great historic events 
amounted to national legitimation in a broad sense. There were examples of when the 
Russian leadership used history to score democratic points. However, in this, the Russian 
leadership was hampered by the fact that it had to refer to historical events that were well 
known. Thus, referring to little-known events, no matter how democratic they might be, 
was hardly effective (the audience at hand might even misunderstand the message).
1.6 Situating the Russian Legitimation Formula
The fall of the Soviet Union sparked a flow of studies of Russian public opinion and 
electoral behaviour. This new focus was understandable in that the necessary material for 
performing such research had formerly been unavailable. However, by 1998 Michael 
Urban observed that ‘the production side of the equation’ had become neglected when it 
came to studying political communication in Russian society. Indeed, the .few 
exceptions to this observation often focused on the role played by the personality of 
individual leaders.124 By the late 1990s, however, articles started to appear, which
122 See chapter three, p. 117.
123 Urban (1998) 'Remythologising the Russian State', Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6, pp. 969-970.
124 See, for example, Colton and Tucker (Eds.) (1995) Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Oxford, 
Westview Press) and Shevtsova (1999) Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace). Eugene Huskey also observed that it was high time to focus on the 
activities of the state again when he introduced his book on the Russian presidency (rather than on 
Yeltsin’s personality), Huskey (1999) Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe), 
pp. 4-7.
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discussed the state building efforts of the Russian leadership and I profited greatly from 
the insights of these. This is, however, the first empirical study investigating the 
leadership’s arguments to promote its state building project during the 1990s. As such, it 
contributes to the understanding of the political development of the Russian Federation 
after the fall of the Soviet Union -  especially of the role that leadership rhetoric played.
As previously stated, I produce neither a normative nor an empirical final verdict on 
whether the Russian leadership was successful in its legitimation efforts. Instead, my 
thesis is linked to an emerging literature on legitimation as an observable government
1 9A  •activity. First and foremost, it is an empirical study and as such examines the arguments 
that the Russian leadership advanced in favour of its state building project. I profited 
greatly from historical studies on legitimation. Many of these focused on visual aspects of
197legitimation. A study of the visual representation of Yeltsin and his entourage in the 
1990s would have been intriguing to make. The legitimation conditions may have 
changed radically since the days of Louis XTV, but the choice of pictures in Yeltsin’s 
memoirs or the architectural style of new buildings undoubtedly yields interesting insights 
into how the Russian leadership legitimated itself. However, disentangling which 
photographs and buildings pertained to the Russian state building project and how 
different audience were targeted might have proved difficult.128 This made me focus on 
the arguments advanced in public statements pertaining to the borders, the constitution 
and state symbols. Furthermore, my focus on the legitimation formula advanced in 
rhetoric tied into earlier studies made of the Soviet Union.
125 Apart from Michael Urban’s article above (footnote 123), the articles of Breslauer and Dale (1997) Boris 
Yel'tsin and the Invention of a Russian Nation-State', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 303-332 and 
of Smith (1999) 'State-Building in the New Russia: Assessing the Yeltsin Record', in: Smith (Ed.) State- 
Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge o f the Future (Armonk, New York, ME. 
Sharpe), pp. 3-16 both focused on the state leadership as an agent in the state building process.
126 Barker (2001) Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations o f Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 7-15.
127 For example, Peter Burke focused on the representation of Louis XTV in paintings and on medals. Burke 
(1992) The Fabrication o f Louis XIV (New Haven, Yale University Press). See also the Olin (2000) Det 
karolinska portrattet: Ideologi, ikonografi, identitet [The Caroline Portrait: Ideology, Iconography, 
Identity] (Stockholm, Raster forlag).
128 The majority of the building projects that were started in Moscow in the 1990s bore the signature of 
Moscow mayor, Yurii Luzhkov. Yeltsin usually gave his wholehearted support to these new projects, but 
chose to retreat behind the traditional Kremlin walls himself. Instead, major corporations like Lukoil and 
Gazprom built some of the most modem buildings in Moscow.
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Legitimacy and legitimation became the subject of many studies within the field of
‘sovietology’ before the fall of the Soviet Union. There were, for example, studies of how
100symbols and rituals were employed in legitimation efforts. The debate was, however, 
often confounded by a lack of distinction between the two concepts (legitimacy and 
legitimation). In turn, this led authors to focus on different authority relationships. For 
example, Victor Zaslavsky, concluded that ‘authority has always been viewed as
legitimate by most of the citizenry’ (although the character of regime legitimacy had
110changed in tandem with the class structure). Christel Lane, who studied the symbols 
and rituals in Soviet society, claimed that the authority relationship had become primarily
1 <31
traditional. Other studies claimed that legitimation in the Soviet Union took place 
primarily within the elite and came to the conclusion that charismatic or traditional 
legitimation was central in the Soviet Union.
Most common was the conclusion that Marxist-Leninist ideology was at the core of Soviet 
legitimation. Thus, T. H. Rigby, concluded that the authority relationship in Soviet society 
was goal-rational -  ‘the legitimacy claims of the political system, of those holding office 
under it, and of the latter’s commands, are validated in terms of the final goal 
(communism)’.133 The focus on the role of formulating an integrative ideology and on 
legitimation as an activity of making claims ties in with my investigation of the 
legitimation formula. Both the Soviet and the Russian leadership made statements to 
support or justify its state building efforts. However, I believe that the focus on ideology
129 See especially Lane (1981) The Rites o f Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) and Arvidsson and Blomqvist (Eds.) (1987) Symbols o f  Power: 
The Esthetics o f Political Legitimation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Stockholm, Almqvist & 
Wiksell International).
130 Zaslavsky (1979) 'The Problem of Legitimation in the Soviet Society', in: Vidich and Glassman (Eds.) 
Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy o f Modem Governments (Beverly Hills, California, Sage 
Publications), p. 193.
131 Lane (1984) 'Legitimacy and Power in the Soviet Union through Socialist Ritual', British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 219-232 and Rigby (1984) 'Dominant and Subsidiary Modes of 
Political Legitimation in the USSR: A Comment on Christel Lane's Article', British Journal o f Political 
Science, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.
132 See, for example, Feher, et al. (1983) Dictatorship over Needs (Oxford, Basil Blackwell), pp. 137-155.
133 Rigby (1982) 'Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Monoorganisational Systems', 
in: Rigby and Feher (Eds.) Political Legitimation in Communist States (Oxford, Macmillan in association 
with St Antony's College), p. 12.
- 5 6 -
1 T h e  Q u e st  f o r  t h e  R u s s ia n  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a
often led authors to disregard other arguments that the Soviet leadership advanced in 
tandem with Marxist-Leninist arguments.134 This was often the case when it came to 
negative arguments, which I would argue were present throughout the Soviet period.
Vladimir Shlapentokh discusses negative legitimation in his book on Soviet ideology,
1 ^published in 1986. His definition of ideology is wider than my definition of a
legitimation formula -  not least since he discusses whether legitimation through ideology
1 •  was successful or not. Nevertheless, he concludes that the main function of Soviet
1 37ideology was legitimation. He also makes a distinction between different objects of 
legitimation. The party, the current leadership and the main party institutions were all 
objects of ‘institutional legitimation’, which was based mainly on ritual. He concludes that 
the central underpinning of institutional legitimation changes ‘relatively slowly’. On the 
other hand, ‘pragmatic policy legitimation’, which legitimised specific policies changes 
more often.
In other words, his description of ‘official ideology’ comes closer to my legitimation
1 30formula. He views official ideology as something that is ‘both complex and flexible’. 
Consequently, he emphasises that official ideology is adjusted both over time and to 
different audiences. In his view this adaptation took place on two levels in the Soviet 
Union: The ‘mythological level’ of official ideology, which comprised the core values, 
rarely changed whereas the ‘pragmatic level’ was more flexible. Shlapentokh’s conclusion
134 However, such arguments were investigated in other contexts. For example, Frederich Barghoom 
examined the role of Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union, Barghoom (1972) Politics in the USSR 
(Boston, Little, Brown and Company).
135 Shlapentokh (1986) Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction 
(New York, Praeger), pp. 15-16.
136 Shlapentokh’s definition of ideology is of it as ‘a more or less cohesive system of values and beliefs that 
defines the primary needs and moral standards of behavior of a society that serves to justify or legitimate 
the existing order of society’. Ibid., p. 1. This is close to Neil Robinson’s view of ideology as ‘used for the 
legitimation of action, structures the way in which that legitimation takes place, has some effect upon, as 
well as being affected by, action taken, and is used again and again for the purpose of legitimating action’. 
Robinson (1995) Ideology and the Collapse o f the Soviet System: A Critical History o f Soviet Ideological 
Discourse (Aldershot, Edward Elgar), p. 20.
137 Shlapentokh (1986) Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction 
(New York, Praeger), pp. 10-11.
138 Ibid., p. 12.
139 Ibid., p. xi.
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on how official ideology in the Soviet Union was adjusted is in line with my finding that 
the Russian leadership used nuances to adjust its legitimation formula both to audiences 
and over time.
Certainly, examining the legitimation formula comes close to examining the official 
ideology or a state-promoted identity. State-promoted identity is close because it 
highlights the need to adjust to the expectations and values of the audience. A number of 
studies of Russian national identity have appeared recently, which testifies to the 
importance of this question.140 Indeed, nation building and state building are closely 
linked in a state where the sovereignty of the people (or the nation) is emphasised. 
Nevertheless, investigations into national identity tend to focus on questions of 
nationality, whereas my concern here is which arguments the Russian state leadership has 
used in its state building project.1411 wished to keep an open mind in order to detect also 
the integrative appeals that did not take their departure in official nationalism.
There is a multitude of ways of defining ideology. I am here referring to it as a state- 
promoted official ideology or doctrine used as a cohesive device to legitimate action. This 
definition comes close to the definitions made by, for example, Joseph Schull and Neil 
Robinson when discussing the role of Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union. Joseph 
Schull defined ideology as first and foremost a ‘form of discourse’.142 In Schull’s view, 
ideology should not be reduced ‘to the beliefs shared by its followers’ since that would be
140 Recent studies of Russian national identity include Petersson (2001) National Self-Images and Regional 
Identities in Russia (Aldershot, Ashgate), where Petersson examines self-images of members of the 
regional political elite, Tolz (2001) Russia (London, Arnold), where Tolz demonstrates how Russian state- 
building has hindered the development of a coherent Russian national identity and Rey (2002) Le dilemme 
russe: La Russie et VEurope occidentale d'lvan le Terrible a Boris Eltsine (Paris, Flammarion), where 
Russian identity and relationship with Europe through history is explored See also Suny (1999/2000) 
•Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Soviet Eurasia', International Security, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, pp. 139-178.
141 See for example, Akbarzadeh (1999) National Identity and Political Legitimacy in Turkmenistan', 
Nationalities Papers, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 271-290.
142 Schull (1992) 'What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies', 
Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, p. 728. See also Robinson (1995) Ideology and the Collapse o f the Soviet 
System: A Critical History o f Soviet Ideological Discourse (Aldershot, Edward Elgar), p. 20. It is possible 
to define ideology in a way which would include questions of identity. See for example Carol Gluck who 
uses the term ‘ideology’ in a much wider sense as ‘the interpretation of the political and social world as 
the articulate elite lived it -  or imagined they lived it’. Gluck (1985) Japan's Modem Myths: Ideology in 
the Late Meiji Period (Princeton, Princeton University Press), p. 7.
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to assume that all followers had a uniform belief. In other words, people with different 
belief systems could adhere to the same ideology. Schull also discarded the view that 
ideology could be analysed as ‘a comprehensive power to structure thought’.143 Instead, 
ideology was something that its adherents must contend and should be analysed as a 
political language.
Ideology is a set of resources, deployed by its adherents with varying 
intentions and a varying degree and pattern of belief, which nonetheless 
imposes certain commitments on them: it is an instrument with the power to 
influence the use that is made of it.144
This definition certainly comes close to my definition of a legitimation formula. The 
Russian legitimation formula both provided the Russian leadership with possibilities and 
constrained it. Nevertheless, I feared that investigating which official ideology the Russian 
leadership sought to promote in the 1990s might have made me pay less attention to, for 
example, identity-related arguments.145 Two further difficulties were involved in 
investigating an official state ideology when it came to post-Soviet Russia. The first 
objection was formal. Article 13:2 of the Russian constitution explicitly says that ‘No 
ideology may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory ideology’.146 Although 
constitutional paragraphs are by no means always adhered to, the difficulties that the 
Russian leadership encountered when trying to introduce anything similar to an official 
ideology were vividly illustrated in 1996, when Yeltsin called for a ‘Russian idea’. He 
was immediately charged with attempting to introduce a state-sponsored ideology and his 
associates were forced to deny that this was the case.147 The second objection stemmed 
from the way ideology was used during the Soviet period, when Marxism-Leninism was 
the official ideology, which all Soviet citizens were obliged to study in school. An explicit 
state-promoted ideology then served as the main tool of legitimation. The constitutional 
prohibition against a state ideology stemmed from this all-encompassing function that
143 Schull (1992) 'What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies', 
Political Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3, p. 729.
144 Ibid.
145 Lowenhardt (1995) The Reincarnation o f Russia: Struggling with the Legacy o f Communism, 1990-1994 
(London, Longman), p. 48.
146 Ludwikowski (1996) Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance (Durham, NC, 
Duke University Press), p. 554.
147 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 13 July 1996, p. 1.
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ideology had possessed earlier in the Soviet Union and in the 1990s, the word ‘ideology’ 
still held a pariah status for many Russians.
Finally, a word ought to be said on whether the experiences gained through the 
investigation of the Russian legitimation formula could be usefully applied to other states. 
I believe that it could serve as inspiration for similar studies. A change in the core 
arguments of the legitimation formula most probably signifies that a crisis might be in the 
offing. Similarly, the use of nuances offers insights into how the state leadership 
manoeuvres to bridge legitimation gaps it perceives exists. However, two caveats are 
called for. Firstly, my thesis investigates the rhetoric of a state building project. During the 
1990s, the Russian Federation was still very much in the process of forming as a state. Its 
main features, such as borders and constitution, were still an issue of debate and this 
prompted legitimation statements from the leadership. In other words, I believe that a 
study of a state that has left the initial state building period behind it would benefit from a
•  •  14Rmodified approach -  not least when it comes to selecting relevant material.
Secondly, even when applied to another state in transition or crisis, the historic experience 
of that state must be taken into account. In other words, the clusters of legitimation 
arguments that I found pertained to the Russian legitimation formula have to be somewhat 
modified when applied to prevailing conditions of other states. Indeed, one of the main 
conclusions of this thesis is that the Russian leadership used nuances originating in 
Russian cultural and historic experience to cope with expectations that changed over time 
or between audiences.
1.7 The Structure of the Thesis
The structure of this thesis is both chronological and thematic. The following three 
chapters, chapters two, three and four, are arranged in a chronological order and examine 
the legitimation formula for Russia’s borders and constitution. The question of how the 
Russian legitimation formula had changed over time prompted the chronological order.
148 In this connection, Shlapentokh’s observation that Soviet ‘institutional legitimation’ took place mainly in 
rituals is enlightening. When he wrote his book, the Soviet Union was still a relatively stable society and 
relatively few exhortations pertaining to state building were called for. Shlapentokh (1986) Soviet Public 
Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction (New York, Praeger), p. 12.
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Chapter five examines how the Russian leadership tackled the question of symbols and 
rituals of the new Russian state after 1991. The Russian state symbols and holidays are 
each investigated chronologically within the chapter. Chapter six analyses how the 
Russian leadership targeted different audiences and how the legitimation formula was 
adjusted for each audience while also adding to the empirical investigation. Chapter seven 
concludes the analysis of the Russian legitimation formula between 1991 and 2000.
More specifically, the second chapter examines the legitimation formula for the new 
borders of the Russian Federation, which came about as a result of the fall of the Soviet 
Union. It especially examines how the Belovezha Accords was legitimated since this 
document signalled the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and became a considerable 
political encumbrance for Boris Yeltsin during his entire term in office. Both the Russian 
leadership and the Russian population were ambiguous about whether Russia was an heir 
and continuation of the Soviet Union (in which case the new borders of Russia framed a 
considerably diminished territory) or whether the Russian Federation was a republic -  
equal with other former republics of the Soviet Union that had gained independence (in 
which case the RSFSR borders were legitimate). The Russian leadership never tried to 
claim more territory than that framed by RSFSR’s borders, but at the same time Russia 
became the formal heir of the Soviet Union in a number of contexts, not least the 
international, when it took over the seat of the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council.
These circumstances, together with the gradual definition that took place of Russia’s 
borders, explain why the Russian leadership early on legitimated the Belovezha Accords 
in negative terms. The main line of argument was that the alternative to the Accords 
would have been civil war and chaos and that the Soviet Union in practice had ceased to 
exist much earlier. Yeltsin often pinpointed the August Coup as the critical event which 
brought about the end of the Soviet Union. However, it is striking that the Russian 
leadership did not emphasise the legacy of the August Coup more. The resistance against 
and victory over the plotters of the August Coup would have been an ideal event to 
commemorate as a ‘democratic holiday’. One explanation for why this did not happen 
may be found in the fact that Yeltsin later shelled the Supreme Soviet in the White House 
in October 1993, which had been the centre of resistance during the August Coup. The 
“triumph of democracy” had become tarnished both by the October Events and by the
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failure of economic reforms. Another explanation could be that the Russian leadership 
increasingly realised that the fall of the Soviet Union had become a highly ambiguous 
event in the mind of most Russians.
Chapter three looks more closely at the legitimation formula for the Russian constitution 
and the events that surrounded its introduction, not least the October Events of 1993. The 
battle over the constitution took place between 1992 and 1993 and culminated when 
Yeltsin decided to storm the White House in October 1993. The Russian leadership relied 
mainly on democratic arguments -  not least on references to Yeltsin’s popular mandate. It 
eschewed arguments of legality when it became increasingly clear that the RSFSR 
constitution still in force seriously undermined the position of the president since it 
established the Congress of People’s Deputies as the highest decision-making institution. 
Therefore, the Russian leadership soon sought to convince its audiences that Yeltsin’s 
popular mandate overrode arguments of legality and constitutionality. The decision to 
storm the White House, furthermore, increased the degree to which the Russian leadership 
had to rely on negative arguments. It claimed that the alternative would have been chaos 
and possible civil war and it made every effort to demonise its political opponents in the 
White House. However, when it stormed the White House, the Russian leadership 
deprived itself of its most powerful symbol of the new democratic Russia that it was 
seeking to promote in its state building project.
The fourth chapter focuses on the war in Chechnya. This war was again a question of the 
borders of the Russian Federation. However, if the fall of the Soviet Union prompted the 
Russian leadership to explain why it was prepared to accept the borders of the RSFSR as 
the new (for many) contracted borders of the Russian Federation, the war in Chechnya 
forced the Kremlin to legitimate its refusal to contract the Russian borders further. Why 
were the demands for independence of the former Soviet republic of Ukraine or 
Turkmenistan legitimate but not those of the formerly autonomous Soviet republic of 
Chechnya?149 A fact that compounded this question was that Yeltsin was accused of 
having encouraged the republics’ aspirations to independence in his power struggle with
149 Up to 1991 Chechnya was part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
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Gorbachev in 1991. During the first war in Chechnya, the legitimation formula that 
emanated from the Kremlin was composed mainly of arguments pertaining to 
constitutionality and legality. The aim of the war was to re-establish the constitutional 
order and to guarantee the constitutional rights of all citizens; that is, of the residents of 
Chechnya as well. Furthermore, the Russian leadership invoked the risk of Russian 
disintegration along a Yugoslav and Soviet pattern.
During the second war in Chechnya the conditions had changed radically not least in view 
of the bombs that exploded in residential buildings in Moscow in September 1999. 
Furthermore, the stream of legitimation messages emanated mainly from the White 
House, from the Russian government, rather than from the Kremlin and the president. The 
legitimation formula warned of ‘international terrorism’ and maintained that the activities 
of Moscow’s adversaries in Chechnya threatened Russia with the help of foreign states. 
Describing its adversaries as terrorists was by no means an entirely new strategy of the 
Kremlin. The first time that the Russian leadership used ‘terrorists’ as a term for Chechen 
warriors on a wide basis was during the hostage crisis in Budennovsk in June 1995. When 
a group of Chechens took a hospital as hostage in Pervomaiskoe in February 1996, the 
Kremlin again denounced those responsible as terrorists. However, during the second war 
in Chechnya, Moscow’s description of its adversaries in Chechnya as terrorists appeared 
to be a premeditated strategy. Putin connected the bombs in Moscow to the situation in 
Chechnya before there was firm evidence of who the responsible parties were.
Chapter five first investigates how the Russian leadership argued in favour of the state 
symbols that it sought to introduce: the tricolour, the double-headed eagle and the national 
anthem by Glinka. In spite of the fact that the Russian leadership chose to fetch all these 
symbols from the pre-Soviet era and that they all had a clear connection to tsarist 
traditions, the legitimation formula sought to de-emphasise the tsarist element. The 
legitimation formula concentrated on arguments that focused on general historical 
references -  Peter the Great, certain military victories etc. -  and on establishing the 
legality of the way the symbols had been introduced.
In the case of Russian holidays, as discussed in the second section of chapter five, the 
Russian leadership adopted a mixed strategy of preservation and innovation. The Soviet
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holidays were really a challenge to the Kremlin only during the first years. Although 
Yeltsin made half-hearted attempts at claiming the Soviet holidays on the first of May and 
the seventh of November by renaming them, calmly tolerating or ignoring the 
demonstration of the opposition with time became the main strategy. One Soviet holiday 
that Yeltsin could not afford to lose to the opposition was Victory Day, which was 
celebrated on the ninth of May to commemorate victory in the Second World War. The 
Russian leadership attempted to introduce new Russian holidays, attempts that, at best, 
were only moderately successful. The Russian Day Of Sovereignty (or of Independence) 
on the twelfth of June and Constitution Day on the twelfth of December were noticed 
mainly by virtue of being days off and through government-sponsored pop concerts.
Finally, the fifth chapter examines the presidential inauguration ceremony and two 
political burials. The inauguration ceremony in many aspects built on the Russian pre- 
Soviet legacy. Elements of the Soviet era were largely absent both in 1996 and 2000. 
(However, the Soviet national anthem with its new lyrics will be included in the next 
inauguration ceremony.) The debate on two burials was also singled out for examination. 
The first debated burial pertained to whether or not to remove Lenin from his mausoleum 
on Red Square and inter him. The second one pertained to Nicholas II, whose remains had 
been exhumed in 1991. Although the remains of these two Russian rulers symbolically 
represented two ends of the political spectrum, it is intriguing that the Russian leadership 
largely abstained from politicising the issues. In the case of Lenin, the Russian leadership 
described a possible internment as an act of Christian decency rather than as ‘finally 
burying communism’. In the end, the Russian leadership chose to leave Lenin in his 
mausoleum in order not to stir up emotions. In the case of Nicholas n, the debate mainly 
focused on the authenticity of his remains and in which city he ought to be buried rather 
than on the historical legacy that he represented.
In chapter six the question of how different audiences were targeted with different 
legitimation formulas is examined. Firstly, I look at the legitimation formula directed at 
the international community. In this connection especially, references to human rights and 
freedoms are worth emphasising. They occurred more frequently in legitimation messages 
during state visits abroad or in speeches in international fora such as the UN and European 
Council. Secondly, the legitimation formula in Russian textbooks is examined. One of the
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main conclusions here is that the legitimation that occurred in Russian textbooks differed 
substantially from the legitimation formula emanating directly from the Kremlin in that 
they were more openly critical of Yeltsin, for example. Furthermore, the considerable 
variance between different textbooks is worth noting. Finally, in the case of the elites 
some of the more clear-cut differences occurred. Especially the military and the cultural 
elite and media received radically different legitimation formulas. In the case of the 
military, the Kremlin used national arguments whereas the intelligentsia received a 
legitimation formula that was very close to that sent to the international audience. Chapter 
seven, finally, summarises the main conclusions.
-65-
2 The New Borders of the Russian Federation
The birth of a state is seldom clear-cut and certain events in its genesis might not be 
able to withstand close scrutiny. The formation of the Russian Federation in 1991 is an 
example of a highly ambiguous genesis.150 The actual way in which Russia became a 
state in its own right was a delicate mix of grandeur and incidents best left forgotten if 
the formation of Russia was to retain any degree of radiance. The brave defence of the 
White House by Boris Yeltsin and his allies during the August Coup is an excellent 
example of the former while the haphazard signing of the Belovezha Accords is an 
example of the latter. This chapter explores how the Russian leadership sought to 
legitimate the outer contours of the Russian state, its diminished territory, during and 
after 1991.
The focus of this chapter is the Belovezha Accords, which signified the end of the 
Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian Federation as an independent state. On the 
first anniversary of the official end of the Soviet Union a rally -  albeit rather small -  
was arranged to protest against the dissolution.151 This small rally presaged how the 
Belovezha accords would haunt the Russian leadership. Throughout his term of office, 
Yeltsin had to defend himself against accusations of having signed away Russian 
territory light-headedly in the Belovezha Accords. Yeltsin’s appointed heir, Vladimir 
Putin, sought to put aside this issue by simply stating in his election platform in
1 OFebruary 2000 that ‘Russia is no longer a cut out piece of the Soviet Union’. He had 
a better chance of disassociating himself from the Belovezha Accords than did Yeltsin.
In the case of the Belovezha Accords, the Russian leadership had to legitimate a 
reduction of territory as a consequence of former Soviet republics becoming
150 The Russian Federation is far from unique in this respect. Most independence struggles, in fact, 
contained markedly unglorious events, which were forgotten in the subsequent independence myth.
151 BBC SWB, SU/1573 (29 December 1992), B/6.
152 Putin (2000) Otkrytoe pismo Vladimira Putina k rossiiskim izbirateliam, Last accessed: 25 Februaiy 
2000, Address: http://www.izvestia.ni/izvestia/article/210526?printable=yes.
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independent. The Russian leadership’s efforts to legitimate the territory of the Russian
• •  •  1 S3state are interesting since territory plays a key role in state building. Dankwart 
Rustow singled out national unity as a necessary precondition for successful 
democratisation. ‘It simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to- 
be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they 
belong.’154 In the Russian case, the definition of the Russian Federation was a difficult 
question that was often defined in negative terms -  what Russia is not rather than what 
it is.155 In practice, the borders of the Russian Federation were a Soviet construction 
since they were those of the RSFSR. The efforts to legitimate the territorial aspect of 
the Russian state will be examined by centring on crucial events during the period of 
investigation when the territory of the Russian state became open to questioning. In 
1990, however, Yeltsin and the rest of the leadership of the Russian Soviet Republic 
(RSFSR) did not have to worry about these issues. The struggle against the Soviet 
centre was all prevailing and an important measure taken in this struggle was the 
Russian declaration of sovereignty.
2.1 RSFSR Declares Its Sovereignty
On 12 June 1990, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR adopted a 
declaration of sovereignty. At the time, the declaration was more a claim for broadened 
self-determination than a first step towards independence. The preamble stated that the 
goal was to create a ‘democratic law-governed state within the framework of a 
renewed union of soviet republics’. In other words, there was no question of leaving 
the Soviet Union in 1990 although the declaration did reserve for RSFSR ‘the right to 
freely leave the USSR according to the rules established by the Union Treaty and 
legislation based upon it’. The declaration also claimed that the rights of autonomous
153 Indeed, Max Weber underlined that territory was ’one of the fundamental aspects of a state’ in his 
seminal definition o f a state as a ’human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
use of physical force within a given territory’. Weber, et al. (1991) From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology (London, Routledge), p. 78.
154 Rustow (1970) 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model', Journal o f Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 350. See also Breslauer and Dale (1997) 'Boris Yel'tsin and the Invention of 
a Russian Nation-State', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 305.
155 Smith (1999) 'State-Building in the New Russia: Assessing the Yeltsin Record', in: Smith (Ed.) State- 
Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge o f the Future (Armonk, New York, M.E. 
Sharpe), p. 8.
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republics, oblasts, okrugs and krais within the RSFSR ought to be ‘essentially 
broadened’.156 Yeltsin would later be criticised for having ‘played the national card’ by 
encouraging the national strivings of the different regions of the RSFSR in his power 
struggle with the Soviet centre.
The main ingredient of the legitimation message in the Russian declaration of
sovereignty was democratic. The wording is interesting since it used elements of the
rhetoric present in the Soviet and RSFSR constitution. For example, the second article
of the RSFSR constitution read:
All power in the RSFSR belongs to the people. The people implements 
state power though Soviets of People’s Deputies, which constitute the 
political basis of the RSFSR.
All other state organs are under the control of and answer to the Soviets of 
People’s Deputies.157
The third article in the declaration of sovereignty stated that ‘the multinational people’ 
of the RSFSR were the ‘carriers of the sovereignty and source of state power in the 
RSFSR’. ‘The people implements state power directly and through representative 
organs on the basis of the Constitution of the RSFSR.’ In other words, the 
declaration still stood with one foot in the Soviet legacy. Completely absent, however, 
were references to socialism and communism, which dominated the preamble of the 
RSFSR constitution.159 Furthermore, where the RSFSR constitution spoke of ‘granting 
workers genuinely democratic rights and freedoms’ the RSFSR declaration of 
independence ‘guarantees rights and freedoms, stipulated in the Constitution of the 
RSFSR, the Constitution of the USSR and generally norms of international law’ for all 
citizens on the territory of the RSFSR. These differences pointed forward to the future
156 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 14 June 1990, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/0789 (13 June 1990), B/l. The 
constituent parts of the Soviet Union, and later of the Russian Federation, were divided into republics, 
larger regions such as Sverdlovsk oblast (oblasti), and the smaller regions such as Yamalo-Nenetsfcii 
okrug and Primorskii krai (okrugi and kraia).
157 Konstitutsiia (osnovnoi zakon) Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki 
[Constitution (Basic Law) o f the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] (1989) (Moscow, 
Sovetskaia Rossiia), p. 4.
158 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 14 June 1990, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/0789 (13 June 1990), B /l.
159 Konstitutsiia (osnovnoi zakon) Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki 
[Constitution (Basic Law) o f the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] (1989) (Moscow, 
Sovetskaia Rossiia), pp. 3-4.
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constitution of the Russian Federation and the concluding paragraph stated that the 
declaration was to be ‘the basis for the development of a new Constitution of the 
RSFSR, the concluding of a Union Treaty and development of the republic’s 
legislation’.160
Almost as conspicuous as the predominance of democratic arguments in the 
declaration was the almost complete absence of national arguments. There were only a 
few general references to the history and fate of Russia. However, it was obvious from 
the declaration that Russia’s historic legacy included the imperial Russian history 
before 1917. The second article concluded that: ‘The sovereignty of the RSFSR is a 
natural and necessary condition for the existence of the Russia’s statehood, history, 
culture and developed traditions, which stretch over centuries.’161 Another indication 
that the declaration was not a declaration of independence is the fact that the 
declaration bore no evidence of directing itself to the international community. There 
were, for example, no claims for international recognition. Nevertheless, the 
declaration of sovereignty was important since Russia’s role in the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union was paramount.162
When Russia declared its sovereignty, Yeltsin was still ambivalent when it came to the 
future of the Soviet Union. The work to find new structures for a union of all the 
Soviet republics continued and in a Union-wide referendum in March 1991, the 
majority voted for a preserved Union. It soon became evident that the Baltic republics 
were not going to sign the treaty that was being negotiated under the supervision of 
Mikhail Gorbachev. In spite of this, Yeltsin was active in trying to find a solution that 
would have involved a new union treaty, albeit with a considerably weaker union 
centre. The intention was to sign a new union treaty on 20 August 1991 -  and this 
would probably have happened, had not the August Coup occurred.
160 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 14 June 1990, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/0789 (13 June 1990), B/l. See also the 
preamble of the Russian constitution of 1993.
161 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 14 June 1990, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/0789 (13 June 1990), B/l.
162 White, et al. (1993) The Politics o f Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future (Cambridge, England; 
New York, Cambridge University Press), p. 85.
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2.2 The August Coup
On 19 August 1991, the world woke up to the news that a “State Emergency
Committee” had taken power in Moscow. Gorbachev was on holiday at the time and
the State Emergency Committee, headed by his vice-president, Gennadii Yanaev,
claimed Gorbachev was too ill to continue in office. During three fateful days, Yeltsin
played a key role in quelling the August Coup. Immediately, the Coup became an issue
1of competing grounds for legitimacy. The State Committee of State of Emergency
stated that Gorbachev was unable to execute his office and that Yanaev, as vice-
president, was the legitimate leader. Yeltsin, on the other hand, stated that the State
Emergency Committee was illegal and claimed that he, as elected president in Russia -
in the absence of Gorbachev -  was the legitimate person in power on Russian territory.
By immediately questioning Yanaev’s grounds for legitimacy, Yeltsin forced all local
power wielders and -  perhaps the most important group right then -  the military, to
make a choice.164 In light of this, it is hardly surprising that the legitimation message
during the first days of the Coup was a war of words that was waged around what was
‘constitutional’ and ‘legal’ in the prevailing situation.165 This was also the first time
that the Russian leadership forcefully appealed to the international community166 and,
more importantly, received support, which Yeltsin subsequently used in his speech at a
victory rally after the Coup.
Contacts were maintained with the leaders of many states in the world. I 
sent a message to US President Bush. Most heads of state of the world 
yesterday and last night and this morning have telephoned and said a huge 
thank-you to all the peoples of Russia, to Russia itself, to the Russians, for
1A7the fact that Russia saved democracy, saved the union, saved peace.
163 Ahdieh (1997) Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to 
Democracy, 1985-1996 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 38-39.
164 Dunlop (1993) The Rise o f Russia and the Fcdl o f the Soviet Empire (Princeton, New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press), pp. 213-215.
165 See for example Yeltsin’s appeal to law and order bodies and the military in BBC SWB, SU/1156 (21 
August 1991), Cl/8-9, BBC SWB, SU/1157 (22 August 1991), Cl/3 and Yeltsin’s appeals to the 
Russian population in Sakwa (1999) The Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (London; New 
York, Routledge), pp. 484-485.
166 Kozyrev (1991) Stand By Us, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com and 
the resolution of the RSFSR Council of Ministers issued on 19 August 1991, BBC SWB, SU/1156 (21 
August 1991), Cl/9.
- 7 0 -
2 T h e  N e w  B o r d e r s  o f  t h e  R u s s ia n  Fe d e r a t io n
Yeltsin won the positional war between himself and the State Emergency Committee 
relatively swiftly. There are many reasons why the August Coup failed and this is
1A8hardly the place for a thorough investigation mto which were the decisive factors. 
However, Yeltsin’s popular mandate, which he had acquired in direct presidential 
elections, certainly played an important role. Interestingly, Yeltsin did not refer 
directly to his own popular mandate in the appeals issued during the August Coup. On 
20 August, the vice-president, Aleksandr Rutskoi, appealed to the military to ‘go over 
to the side of the bodies of power elected by the people: of the president of the Russian
Federation and of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation’, but Yeltsin only
1 60mentioned Gorbachev as the ‘legally elected president’. However, there were
frequent general references to democracy and Yeltsin became the symbol of the new
democratic Russia -  not least in Kozyrev’s article in the Washington Post.
This is no time for relaxation. With moral and political assistance from the 
democracies, we have a strong chance to defeat our adversaries. The 
democratic forces within Moscow and throughout the republics of the 
Soviet Union have rallied behind Boris Yeltsin’s leadership in demanding 
the restoration of Mikhail Gorbachev and the removal of the plotters.170
On 22 August, the Coup was over and Yeltsin spoke at the victory rally in Moscow. In 
his speech he used mainly democratic legitimation. He also encouraged his 
overwhelmingly Russian audience to feel pride in Russia’s role in the quelling of the 
Coup. This was a rare reference to national legitimation.171 The only appeals during the 
August Coup where national arguments occurred were those directed at the military
177 •and law and order bodies. The negative arguments used consisted mainly of
167 BBC SWB, SU/1159 (24 August 1991), B/15. See also Yeltsin’s appeal on 19 August Sakwa (1999) 
The Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (London; New York, Routledge), p. 483
168 For explanations pointing to the ineptitude and lack of determination of the leaders of the State 
Emergency Committee and to the popular support for, and charisma of, Boris Yeltsin as important 
factors, see for example Dunlop (1993) The Rise o f Russia and the Fall o f the Soviet Empire 
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press), pp. 254-255 and White (2000) Russia's New 
Politics: The Management o f a Postcommunist Society (New York, Cambridge University Press), p. 
29-30.
169 Ruskoi’s appeal in BBC SWB, SU/1156 (21 August 1991), Cl/9 and Yeltsin’s appeal in Sakwa 
(1999) The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (London; New York, Routledge), p. 483.
170 Kozyrev (1991) Stand By Us, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com.
171 BBC SWB, SU/1159 (24 August 1991), B/14-16. See also Yeltsin’s appeal in Krasnaia zvezda on 24 
August 1991, p. 1.
172 BBC SWB, SU/1156 (21 August 1991), Cl/8.
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denouncing the instigators of the Coup as ‘criminals’ and warnings of ‘civil war’ and
1 1 'X‘bloodshed’. In other words, the threat of disintegration did not loom large in the 
legitimation formula issued by the Russian leadership during the August Coup 
although it could be argued that civil war comes close to invoking the image of chaos 
leading to disintegration.
Immediately after the Coup, Gorbachev was reinstated and for a few months, two 
competing leaders, Gorbachev and Yeltsin -  representing two centres of power, the 
Soviet Union and Russia -  lived in an uneasy co-existence. In effect, Yeltsin had 
become the symbol of a new future for Russia, while Gorbachev had come to represent 
the old system.174 Even after the Coup, Gorbachev remained convinced of the 
possibility of preserving the union. In his book ‘Coup’, published in September 1991, 
Gorbachev wrote that he could not imagine Ukraine leaving the Soviet Union.175 It is 
easy to ridicule Gorbachev’s confidence in an altered but preserved union state. 
However, few observers were sure about where the Soviet Union was heading in 
September -  November 1991. Even Yeltsin must have had his doubts whether to try 
and preserve the union or to overthrow it altogether. In his memoirs, he describes -  on 
the one side -  the Coup as having resulted in a new era of democracy and the collapse
1 I f sof ‘the last empire’. On the other side, he seems to regret the break-up of the Soviet
Union and blames the plotters for it.
These [the instigators of the August Coup] people decided our fate for 
many years to come. They are the ones we ought to ’’thank” for the 
collapse (raspad) of the [Soviet] Union, and for the terrible tragedy for
1 77society that came with it.
173 Kozyrev (1991) Stand By Us, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com, 
Sakwa (1999) The Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (London; New York, Routledge), pp. 
483, 487, BBC SWB, SU/1156 (21 August 1991), Cl/8-9, Krasnaia zvezda, 24 August 1991, p. 1 and 
BBC SWB, SU/1159 (24 August 1991), B/14-16.
174 Carrere dTncausse (2000) La Russie inachevee [The Incomplete Russia] (Paris, Fayard), p. 20.
175 Gorbachev (1991) Avgustovskii putch: Prichiny i sledstviia [August Coup: Causes and 
Consequences] (Moscow, Novosti), pp. 48-52.
176 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 67. (Also in 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 41.)
177 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 78 (p. 52 in the 
English edition).
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One of the key events leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union was Ukraine’s 
declaration of independence after a plebiscite, which came down unequivocally on the 
side of independence. A Soviet Union without Ukraine was, as Gorbachev had stated, 
impossible to imagine and the Belovezha Accords were just around the comer.
2.3 The Belovezha Accords -  8 December 1991
On 8 December 1991, the three presidents (Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and 
Stanislav Shushkevich) of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, gathered outside Minsk in a 
small locality called Belovezhskaia Pushcha -  often simply referred to as “Belovezha”. 
The name of this place would become inexorably linked to the decision to dissolve the 
Soviet Union. The referendum in Ukraine had radically diminished the chances for a 
new union treaty. However, one should be careful not to overemphasise the 
predestination of the fall the Soviet Union and the rather obscure way in which it was 
to come about. Accordingly, the Belovezha Accords have been described as the ‘real 
coup’.178
A few days before going to Belovezha, Yeltsin was interviewed about his coming trip 
to Belarus. He claimed that the primary purpose of the trip was to sign a bilateral 
economic agreement with Belarus and, secondly, to discuss the situation that had 
arisen after the Ukrainian referendum on independence and ‘ask them some questions’. 
He firmly denied that there was an alternative plan if Ukraine refused to give up its 
claim to independence. Like Gorbachev, Yeltsin could not imagine a union without 
Ukraine.
But if Ukraine is going to insist on full state independence, in other words, 
if it does not sign that political treaty, well then we’ll have to look for other 
options. But what I say is that we have such a close bond with Ukraine that
178 Ahdieh (1997) Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to 
Democracy, 1985-1996 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 42-45, Yakovlev 
(1992) The Bear that Wouldn't Dance: Failed Attempts to Reform the Constitution o f the Soviet Union 
(Winnipeg, Man., Legal Research Institute of the University of Manitoba), pp. 273 and Daniels (1997) 
'Conclusion: Democracy and Federalism in the Former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation', in: 
Stavrakis, et al. (Eds.) Beyond the Monolith: The Emergence o f Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia 
(Washington, D.C. Baltimore, Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 
237.
- 7 3 -
2 T h e  N e w  B o r d e r s  o f  t h e  R u s s ia n  Fe d e r a t io n
I can’t imagine that we’ll be in some sort of different political systems, as 
it were: we in one union, and Ukraine - 1 can’t imagine that.179
Indeed, the meeting in Belovezha was largely improvised and it is most likely that no 
clear plan existed for the dismantling of the Soviet Union. This makes the Belovezha 
Accords an even more interesting component in the birth of the Russian Federation. 
There are a number of indicators that the participants in the meeting were unprepared. 
For example, there was no copying machine, which led to the agreement being 
photocopied by sending the text of the Accords between two different fax machines 
and -  according to Yegor Gaidar -  the Belovezha formula for dismantling the Soviet
1 finUnion was proposed by Sergei Shakhrai then and there. Furthermore, Aleksandr 
Korzhakov (Yeltsin’s bodyguard, at the time) claimed that the Ukrainian president had
1 SIset off hunting when Yeltsin and his entourage arrived. The Belovezha Accords 
were also questioned because the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, was 
not among the signatories. Territorially, Kazakhstan was the second largest republic in 
the Soviet Union and, in order to take the kind of decision that the Belovezha Accords 
required, it would have been natural to invite Nazarbaev. Afterwards, this omission 
was justified by referring to the fact that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were three of the 
four signatory states of the Union of the SSR in 1922. The fourth unit had been the
1 fiOTranscaucasian Federation, which no longer existed in 1991.
Although, Yeltsin had conducted negotiations with Kravchuk, Shushkevich and 
Nazarbayev before going to Belovezha, it is unlikely that anyone anticipated the 
imminent dissolution of the Soviet Union in quite in the way that it happened. 
According to Korzhakov, the realisation that Nazarbayev ought to be contacted did not 
occur to the three presidents until they were having dinner on the day after their arrival
179 BBC SWB, SU/1249 (7 December 1991), B/3. See also BBC SWB, SU/1850 (19 November 1993), 
B/4 and Burbulis (1999) Professiia politik [The Politician's Occupation] (Moscow, Strategiia), pp. 
192-193.
180 Gaidar (1997) Dni porazhenii i pobed [Days o f Defeats and Victories] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 148- 
149 and Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 150 (also 
in Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 112).
181 Korzhakov (1997) Boris Yeltsin: ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk] 
(Moskva, "Interbuk"), p. 127.
182 BBC SWB, SU/1253 (12 December 1991), Cl/2.
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in Belovezha. In any case, Nazarbayev was on his way to a meeting with Gorbachev
and it was difficult to establish contact. ‘But the troika [Yeltsin, Kravchuk and
Shushkevich], invigorated by “Belovezha”-drinks, insisted that it was necessary to
1confer with Nazarbayev and to invite him here to the [Belovezhskaia] Pushcha”. In 
the event, it proved impossible to include Nazarbayev in the negotiations at Belovezha. 
According to Yegor Gaidar, Nazarbayev initially promised to come to Belovezha, but
1R4later claimed that technical difficulties prevented him from doing so. Not until the 
signing of the Alma Ata Declaration on 21 December 1991, was the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) founded, in which Kazakhstan together with Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova were 
included. However, with the signing of the Belovezha Accords, the Soviet Union had 
been dealt a fateful blow.185
First to be published (on 8 December) was the Belovezha Declaration, where the 
solution was legitimated as being the only possible exit out of an economic and 
political crisis. In other words, the focus was on negative legitimation.
We, the heads of the republics of Belarus, RSFSR and Ukraine
- noting that the negotiations on preparing a new Union Treaty have 
gone into a blind alley, that the objective process of republics leaving 
the Union of SSR and forming independent states has become a reality;
- taking into account the growing social tension in many republics of the 
former Union of SSR, that has led to inter-ethnic conflicts with many 
human victims;
recognising [our] responsibility before our peoples and the world 
community and the growing necessity to implement political and 
economic reforms, declare that a Commonwealth of Independent 
States has been created, an agreement of which has been signed by the 
parties on 8 December 1991.186
183 Korzhakov (1997) Boris Yeltsin: ot rassveta do zakata [Boris Yeltsin: From Dawn to Dusk] 
(Moskva, "Interbuk"), p. 128.
184 Gaidar (1997) Dni porazhenii i pobed [Days o f Defeats and Victories] (Moscow, Vagrius), p. 150.
185 White, et al. (1993) The Politics o f Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet Future (Cambridge, England; 
New York, Cambridge University Press), p. 92.
186 The Belovezha Declaration in Krasnaia zvezda, 10 December 1991, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, 
SU/1251 (10 December 1991), Cl/2.
- 7 5 -
2 T h e  N e w  B o r d e r s  o f  t h e  R u ss ia n  Fe d e r a t io n
Furthermore, the signatories pledged to follow principles of international law and the
declaration was primarily directed at the international community. This much was
evident from the emphasis put on reassuring the international community that the new
entities would be able to secure international stability. The declaration firmly stated
that the CIS would respect the treaties entered by the Soviet Union and, one of the
more burning issues at the time, that the signatories would be able to guarantee full
control of nuclear arms within the territory of the Soviet Union.
The member states of the community intend to pursue a policy of 
strengthening international peace and security. They guarantee to honour 
international obligations ensuing from treaties and agreements of the 
former USSR, and to ensure unified control over, and non-proliferation of,1 97nuclear weapons.
On the following day a document referred to as the Minsk Agreement was published. 
(In this thesis, the Belovezha Accords denote the Belovezha Declaration and the Minsk 
Agreement, together.) In this text, democratic rather than negative arguments had come 
to the fore. In the preamble, the stated goal was to ‘build democratic law-governed 
states’ and to solve conflicts by means of ‘generally-recognized principles and norms 
of international law’. Apart from this, there were references to human rights and ‘the 
goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Act and other 
documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’. The document 
also appealed to sentiments of tradition and history as the preamble spoke of the CIS as
1 fiScreated on the basis of ‘the historic community of our peoples’.
As early as 10 December 1991, the main line of argument in favour of the Belovezha 
Accords seems to have crystallised. It was a delicate mix of democratic and negative 
legitimation. The decision was referred to as democratic primarily by virtue of the 
popular mandate of the three leaders of the signatory states. In other words, it was 
argued that the Belovezha Accords were reached through an entirely democratic 
process. However, in more or less the same breath, it was described as the only way 
out of an “impasse”, as the only possible solution to a crisis. At a press conference,
187 The Belovezha Declaration in Krasncda zvezda, 10 December 1991, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, 
SU/1251 (10 December 1991), Cl/2.
188 BBC SWB, SU/1252 (11 December 1991), Cl/1-2.
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then first deputy chairman of the RSFSR government, Gennadii Burbulis, was vexed
by a question from a journalist who suggested that the Accords were reached
“overnight” and ‘in violation of the will of the people expressed in the course of the
referendum’. Burbulis was reluctant to answer the question and, in a manner
reminiscent of the Soviet nomenklatura, asked only for respect for ‘the work of the
state leaders -  representatives of the great nations’. However, Sergei Shakhrai, state
counsellor, stepped in with an answer that was symptomatic of the general line of
legitimation at that point. He hinted that the alternative would have been bloodshed
and that the Accords, in fact, better reflected the will of the people. Furthermore, he
nurtured the hope that the CIS would turn into a revived union and possibly a
significant actor in its own right.
I personally am convinced that the only possible way to implement the will 
of the people to preserve the union was by reviving it. All the incantations 
to preserve it, and the attempts behind these incantations to use ... military
1 SQforce were exactly the things directed against the people.
On 11 December, Western states started to signal that they might be ready to recognise 
Russian independence. This was used immediately by Burbulis who reported to the 
Russian press that he would visit France and Belgium in the next couple of days. When 
there, he met with Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Delors. A meeting on this level 
was an important step on the road to international recognition for Russia -  something 
that the Russian leadership realised.190 At the same time, Yeltsin compared the CIS to 
the European community.191 On 16 December, Yeltsin met with an American 
delegation headed by the US Secretary of State, James Baker. In his statement after 
this meeting, Yeltsin could announce that ‘questions concerning the recognition of 
Russia by the USA as an independent state and Russia joining the UN’ had been 
among the issues discussed. Furthermore, the vacant seat in the UN’s Security Council
189 BBC SWB, SU/1253 (12 December 1991), Cl/2. For similar statements resting on democratic and 
negative legitimation see also BBC SWB, SU/1252 (11 December), Cl/7-9, BBC SWB, SU/1253, B /l- 
2, Cl/3-4, BBC SWB, SU/1254 (13 December 1991), Cl/1-3 and BBC SWB, SU/1255 (14 December 
1991), Cl/1-3, 7.
190 BBC SWB, SU/1254 (13 December 1991), B/15-16 and BBC SWB, SU/1256 (16 December 1991), 
Al/2.
191 BBC SWB, SU/1257 111 December 1991), B/2.
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1Q9would probably be taken over by Russia. After a meeting in Rome on 20 December, 
where the CIS had been discussed, Yeltsin could report to his home audience that in 
Rome ‘they regard it as a reality, and will start focusing on this commonwealth’.193 
This statement was made just before the signing of the Alma Ata Declaration. The 
legitimation message in the Alma Ata Declaration, signed on 21 December, was 
democratic with an emphasis on liberal democratic arguments. The signatory states 
declared that they were ‘striving to build democratic, law-governed states’ and to 
respect ‘the inalienable right to self-determination’ and ‘human rights and 
freedoms’.194
Gorbachev resigned on 25 December 1991. He gave a last address to the nation in 
which he stated regret that the Soviet Union had disintegrated. ‘A policy of splitting up 
the country and disassembling the state -  something with which I cannot agree -  has 
prevailed.’ He also stated that he believed that ‘decisions of such a magnitude should 
have been adopted on the basis of [a] show of [the] will of the people’.195 His speech 
pointed to allegations that Yeltsin would be forced to answer later on. In the evening, 
Gorbachev handed over the right to the use of nuclear weapons to Boris Yeltsin.196 
Gorbachev then ordered the Soviet flag at the Kremlin to be lowered. On the following 
day the Russian tricolour flew over the Kremlin and -  at a joint session of the deputies 
of Supreme Soviets of the republics and of the Soviet Union -  a resolution on the 
liquidation of the USSR was adopted. The very lack of ceremony with which the 
Russian Federation came into being and by which the USSR was dismantled is 
striking. There seems not to have been a clear view on how the occasion ought to be 
celebrated or indeed whether it was an “occasion” at all. The fall of the Soviet Union 
was not accompanied by boisterous celebrations of independence in any of the former
192 BBC SWB, SU/1258 (18 December 1991), Al/1.
193 BBC SWB, SU/1263 (24 December 1991), Cl/1. See also Burbulis’ statements BBC SWB, SU/1263 
(24 December 1991), Cl/3-4 and Yeltsin’s statements in Rome, BBC SWB, SU/1262 (23 December 
1991), Al/1-3.
194 The Alma-Ata Declaration in Krasnaia zvezda, 24 December 1991, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, 
SU/1262 (23 December 1991), Cl/6-7.
195 BBC SWB, SU/1264 (28 December 1991), Cl/3.
196 Ibid., Cl/8.
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Soviet republics. Rather, the Soviet Union petered out with a whimper in late 
December 1991 while the newly independent states focused on introducing economic 
reforms and chose to commemorate other dates in their history as independence 
days.197
2.4 Defending the Decision in Belovezhskaia Pushcha
In Yeltsin’s speech in parliament on the same day that the resolution on the liquidation 
of the USSR was adopted, negative legitimation dominated. For example, he claimed 
that at the time of the Belovezha Accords’ signing there had been ‘only two 
alternatives -  either to let everything go its own way, and observe the further 
uncontrolled decay of the union ... or to start building a commonwealth of independent
10Rstates’. He pointed to his own visit to Italy as a ‘confirmation of Russia’s status as a 
subject of international law’ and claimed that ‘Russia is being taken notice of, in 
Europe, America and elsewhere in the world’.199 Democratic arguments were present 
in this speech but they were few.200 In his first address to the nation on 29 December, 
Yeltsin also adopted a negative legitimation strategy. He claimed that the ‘Yugoslav 
variant’ had been avoided, but he also pointed to the official recognition of Russia’s 
independence.201
Yeltsin became more and more explicit in his statements when he met criticism against 
the Belovezha Accords by depicting it as the least detrimental solution while regretting 
the fall of the Soviet Union. Fierce criticism against the Belovezha Accords came first 
from his opponents in the Supreme Soviet and later from those in the State Duma. 
By the time of the Duma election in 1999, even the liberal Yabloko party criticised the
197 Only Kazakhstan celebrates its Day of Independence in December. They have chosen to 
commemorate the Law on Independence of the Kazakhstan Republic, which was adopted on 16 
December 1991 after the Belovezha Accords.
198 BBC SWB, SU/1264 (28 December 1991), C3/3.
199 Ibid., C3/4.
200 Ibid., C3/2-5.
201 BBC SWB, SU/1266 (31 December 1991), B/4-8.
202 See for example BBC SWB, SU/1354 (13 April 1992), Cl/2-3 and BBC SWB, SU/2331 (16 June 
1995), B/19.
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Belovezha Accords in sharp terms. Only a few days after the Belovezha Accords,
Yeltsin was faced with the question of why he supported independence of Soviet
republics but not of territories within Russia. On 17 December 1991, his answer was
still sketchy but he seemed to distinguish between a “good” will of the people and a
“bureaucratic” will disguised as the will of the people.
It is not a question of [Russia’s] disintegration, but of a new federation, 
one that is not coercive, but is created by the good will of the peoples. In 
other words, you have to be able to see clearly and accurately when you 
are looking at the people’s will and when you are looking at the 
bureaucrats’ well-disguised fear of losing their power and position. I try to 
distinguish between the two. And I act accordingly.204
This line of argument was followed later on as well. Clearly, the Russian leadership
realised early on that the break-up of the Soviet Union was an unpopular decision. To
connect the Belovezha Accords and the disintegration of the Soviet Union too closely
with democratic rhetoric might have undermined rather than fostered democratic
reforms. In those circumstances, negative legitimation provided the Russian leadership
with a viable route out of a quandary. In April 1992, Yeltsin addressed the sixth
Congress of People’s Deputies and launched the term ‘nomenklatura separatism’ to
designate strivings towards independence by territories within the Russian Federation.
We support and will continue to support the enhancement of the status of 
Russia’s republics and regions. ... But we will never pander to 
nomenklatura separatist initiatives of certain leaders who are trying to pass
AAf
off their personal interests as the interests of peoples.
He failed to provide an exact account of how ‘nomenklatura separatist initiatives’ were 
different from the independence initiatives of, for example, Leonid Kravchuk in 1991. 
Yeltsin’s critics would later describe the motives behind the Belovezha Accords as a 
wish of each president of the Soviet republics to have his own state, which would 
appear to fit the term “nomenklatura separatism” perfectly. Yeltsin himself was 
accused of having signed the Belovezha Accords out of personal ambition in his power
203 Yabloko (1999) Deklaratsiia partii "Yabloko", Last accessed: 17 January 2000, Address: 
http://www.yabloko.ni/Union/Program/decl-99.html.
204 BBC SWB, SU/1257 (17 December 1991), B/5.
205 BBC SWB, SU/1351 (9 April 1992), Cl/8.
206 Remnick (1998) Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York, Vintage Books), p. 25.
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struggle with Mikhail Gorbachev. In an interview broadcast on 16 November 1993, 
Yeltsin was asked whether the Belovezha Accords had been a way of settling the score 
with Gorbachev. Yeltsin claimed that he did not hate Gorbachev, but that he simply 
did not have any respect for him. In his view, Gorbachev had lost everything in the 
August Coup. Furthermore, ‘the union was destroyed all the same -  although at times 
people make the accusation that the Belovezhskaya Pushcha destroyed the union -  but 
at the end of the day, the union was destroyed by the putsch’.207
In spite of the Belovezha Accords, there was much confusion as to what role the CIS 
was to play and how Russia’s relations with the other former Soviet republics, such as 
the Baltic states, ought to develop. Russia’s ambivalence is made obvious by the fact
<^A O
that Russia waited until May 1992 to set up its own armed forces. By then, most 
other former republics of the Soviet Union had already formed their own armed forces 
and saw the defence co-operation within the CIS primarily as a liquidation process 209 
Yeltsin seems to have envisioned the CIS as a European Union in the offing. The 
ambivalence that characterised Russian relations with the other CIS states continued 
after Russia had created its own armed forces. Russia tried to make the CIS into a more 
formalised structure for integration of the former Soviet republics. The other members 
of the CIS were, at best, hesitant towards such proposals.
On 17 March 1994, the opposition organised a rally in Moscow to commemorate the 
March 1991 referendum, in which the majority had been for a preserved Soviet Union. 
On the eve of the rally, Aleksandr Rutskoi claimed that ‘the people have come to 
realize in full the price of the irresponsible and light-minded decision to dismantle the
A1 A
Soviet Union’. Yeltsin was on holiday when the rally was held and came home on
207 BBC SWB, SU/1850 (19 November 1993), B/4.
208 In the impeachment proceeding against Yeltsin initiated by the Duma in 1998, the presidential 
representative, Aleksandr Kotenkov, maintained that Yeltsin had sought to avoid the partition of the 
Soviet Armed Forces. State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 13 May 
1999 (1999) Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Dwny RF: 13 maia 1999, 
dnevnoe zasedanie, Last accessed: 14 November 2001, Address:
http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1999/sl3-05_d.htm.
209 Rossiiskie vesti, 8 May 1992, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1376 (9 May 1992), C2/2-3.
210 BBC SWB, SU/1950 (19 March 1994), B /l.
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27 March 1994 eager to deny rumours of his failing health. In an interview in Izvestiia, 
Yeltsin answered a question on whether reunification of the Soviet Union was possible 
along the lines of the demands presented by other politicians. He claimed that he 
believed in deep co-operation between the former republics but warned of the 
consequences of trying to revive the Soviet Union. He also recycled an argument that 
had been widely used in 1990-91 -  that Russia carried the main burden for supporting
• 9 i  1the union and that it would manage better on its own.
Whatever one might say today about the former Union, I cannot call it the 
most successful form of existence for our states and peoples. It was held up 
mainly by the potential of Russia, by its resources. ... Russia’s situation 
was most unsatisfactory. It did not have an identity or statehood of its own 
(ne imela sobstvennogo litsa, gosudarstvennosti). It had sort of been 
dissolved as Russia supported the former Union at the cost of its own 
wellbeing, at the cost of its problems being solved last. I am convinced that 
such a model of life has exhausted its potential entirely. It is impossible to 
return to it today.212
The Duma, dominated by the opposition between 1993 and 1999, became an important 
arena for the fierce critics of the Belovezha Accords. In 1994, the Duma turned down a 
proposal from a KPRF deputy, Aleksandr Michailov, to hold a joint session with the 
Ukrainian and Belarusan parliaments to discuss the consequences of the Belovezha 
Accords. The aim was to denounce the Belovezha Accords. During the Duma 
election in 1995, reunification of the Soviet Union was the proclaimed goal of the 
KPRF.214 Yeltsin rejected this demand as dangerous. ‘This is not the light at the end of 
the tunnel for Russia. Rather, it is the reflection of new, more terrible fires of civil
91 c
war.’ In his State of the Nation Address to the Federal Assembly following the 
Duma election, Yeltsin included a defence of the Russian declaration of independence 
since it had ‘paralysed the very possibility that the Russian Federation might be used as 
a base for a violent struggle with other republics. Instead, this paved the way for the
211 Bamer-Berry (1999) 'Nation Building and die Russian Federation', in: Glad and Shiraev (Eds.) The 
Russian Transformation: Political, Sociological and Psychological Aspects (New York, St. Martin's 
Press), p. 103.
212 Izvestiia, 26 March 1994, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1957 (28 March 1994), B/3.
213 BBC SWB, SU/1920 (12 February 1994), B/4.
214 The party programme of the KPRF was published in Sovetskaia Rossiia on 2 February 1995, pp. 1-2.
215 Rossiiskie vesti, 16 December 1995, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2489 (18 December 1995), A/2.
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91 f\preservation of the Soviet Union on fundamentally new bases.’ He also relied on
negative arguments when he defended the decision to form the CIS and claimed that -
with the August Coup -  the Soviet Union had, in effect, lost its viability.
The Novo-Ogarevo process constituted the belated answer from the Soviet 
Centre (soiuzrtyi Tsentr). But even this evoked a reaction in the form of the 
State Committee of Emergency (GKChP) -  a desperate attempt to 
strengthen the Union by force by re-establishing the old power structures.
The result of the actions taken by the putschists was that any possibility of 
preserving the USSR disappeared.
The country stood before either uncontrollable disintegration or military 
clashes during attempts to preserve the Union by force, which would have 
had consequences worse than those in Yugoslavia.
The Belovezha Accords put an end to this development. It strengthened the 
wish to preserve the traditional relations of friendship and co-operation. It 
mirrored a general understanding of the threat of an uncontrollable 
disintegration.217
In 1996, the Duma went as far as to adopt a resolution declaring invalid the earlier 
decision to dissolve the Soviet Union. Yeltsin answered this relying partly on 
arguments of legality and constitutionality, partly with negative arguments. He stated 
that the decision was legally groundless and that it contradicted the constitution. ‘As 
guarantor of the Constitution, I will not allow any attempts to undermine the bases of
91 8Russian statehood, to destabilise the situation in the country.’ In addition, he 
claimed that the decision of the Duma ‘in practice was intended to create a situation of
910a political and legal impasse in Russia’.
The regulations adopted by the Duma cannot resurrect the Soviet Union, it 
can only give birth to uncertainty concerning the legal status of the 
Russian Federation. Furthermore, their adoption can be seen as an attempt 
by the Duma to liquidate our statehood. They put into question the
9 9 0legitimacy of the state institutions, among them the present Duma.
216 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 February 1996, p. 3.
217 Ibid.
218 Rossiiskie vesti, 19 March 1996, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2563 (18 March 1996), A/1.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid. and Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marqfon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia... 
[Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 31 
(also in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 25.
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Between May 1998 and May 1999, Yeltsin came under heavy fire from the State 
Duma when a group of KPRF deputies decided to start impeachment proceedings 
against him. In June 1998, a special Duma commission was created to prepare the 
proceedings. One of the charges against Yeltsin was that he had betrayed the 
Motherland when he signed the Belovezha Accords. On 13 May 1999, the presidential 
representative to the Federal Assembly, Aleksandr Kotenkov, defended Yeltsin against 
these charges in the Duma. It became the most thoroughly constructed defence for 
Yeltsin and his role in signing the Belovezha Accords since Yeltsin had first come 
under criticism for taking that step. The accusation against Yeltsin on this point can be 
broken down into four main parts. Firstly, he was accused of having betrayed the 
country during the August Coup by planning to take over power. Kotenkov refuted this 
point. He claimed that the special commission had overstepped its authority when it 
included this point even though it had not been included in the original accusations 
carried forward by Duma deputies against the president. Kotenkov stated that this point 
had not been substantiated by any legal proofs whatsoever. Furthermore, the decrees 
issued by Yeltsin at the time were issued under a state of emergency introduced by the 
‘a group of state criminals who were trying to seize power in the country’.
The second point concerned the fact that a majority of the population of the USSR had 
expressed its will to remain in a renewed Union in the referendum on 17 March 1991. 
In other words, the Duma deputies claimed that Yeltsin had taken the decision to 
dissolve the Soviet Union in Belovezhskaia Pushcha against the will of the people. 
Kotenkov rejected this claim since the referendum had been of a consultative nature 
according to the then existing constitution. Furthermore, he pointed to the fact that 
only eight out of fifteen republics had held the referendum with the initial question of 
preservation of the union. ‘And so I underline, the referendum was consultative and 
took place only on the territory of eight republics of the USSR, and to consider it 
obligatory after this is impermissible.’222 The third point concerned whether the
221 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 13 May 1999 (1999) 
Stennogramma plenctmogo zasedcmiia Gosndarstvennoi Dirny RF: 13 maia 1999, dnevnoe 
zasedcmie, Last accessed: 14 November 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1999/sl3- 
05_d.htm.
222 Ibid.
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Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR had had the right to ratify the Accords. Kotenkov 
claimed that the ‘ratification and denunciation of international treaties of the RSFSR 
was the prerogative solely of the Supreme Soviet’.
Finally, the fourth point was a claim that a number of conflicts with human casualties 
had erupted as a result of the Belovezha Accords. Kotenkov’s answer to this 
accusation was to claim that most conflicts had started long before the Belovezha 
Accords was signed. Regarding those conflicts that had erupted after the Belovezha 
Accords, Kotenkov claimed that the source of these conflicts could be found during the 
Soviet era. On a more general note, Kotenkov’s main defence of the Belovezha 
Accords consisted in stating that the Soviet Union -  in reality -  had ceased to exist 
long before the Belovezha Accords. He underlined that Russia was the only republic 
not to have declared its independence (although Kazakhstan did so on 16 December 
1991, after the Belovezha Accords). ‘After the attempt at a state coup on 19 August 
1991 practically all union republics, except the RSFSR and Kazakhstan, as I have 
already said, took decisions on their state independence.’ The declarations of 
independence came about as a result of the August Coup and the failure of the Soviet 
centre to deal with the challenges in the late 1980s and not as a result of the Belovezha 
Accords.223
Kotenkov’s defence thus relied on arguments of legality in tandem with negative 
arguments. The stress on legality and constitutionality was to a considerable degree 
prompted by the situation in which the legitimation message was delivered. Kotenkov 
was countering a serious charge in the Duma and many of his interlocutors were well 
acquinted with the legalistic arguments. To go into such detail in a legitimation 
message directed at the public would be considerably less effective. Interestingly, the 
negative alternatives to the Belovezha Accords were less alarmist than those used 
earlier by the Russian leadership. Kotenkov mainly pointed to the lack of viable 
alternatives at the time of the Accords.
223 Ibid.
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2.5 Yeltsin and the Fall of the Soviet Union
Yeltsin did not appear to have decided whether or not he wanted to keep the Soviet 
Union in some form or other even after the August Coup and the Belovezha Accords. 
This was illustrated not least by an interview he gave in June 1992 on the anniversary 
of his election to the presidency. In the interview, he apparently wanted to put the 
‘blame’ of causing the fall of the Soviet Union on the plotters of the August Coup. The 
very fact that he was willing to discuss who was to blame gave the impression of a 
man who would have liked to become president of a reformed Soviet Union or a 
greater Russia. This even though he -  in the same interview -  spoke of the August 
Coup as a factor allowing Russia to become independent.224
In his memoirs (published in 1994) Yeltsin chose to depict the Belovezha Accords in a
romantic tone. His description of the event stands in sharp contrast to that given by
Aleksandr Korzhakov a few years later. Korzhakov describes the meeting in
Belovezha as confused and developing in a haphazard manner. Yeltsin puts the
emphasis on himself as a driving force -  as an energetic actor with a clear vision of
where he wanted to take Russia by creating the CIS.
As I stood among the Belovezha pine trees, I remembered the Tbilisi and 
Baku tragedies, the seizing of the television tower in Vilnius and the 
OMON provocation in Riga.
All this had happened recently! And the next phase of these armed actions 
had unfolded in Moscow, in August! Were we really to wait meekly, with 
our arms folded again for the next tragedy? No, I would no longer allow 
this.225
He explicitly defended himself against allegations of having been the one who
liquidated the Soviet Union by signing the Belovezha Accords.
And so, this [the Belovezha Accords] was not a “silent coup”, but a legal 
alteration of the existing order of things. It was an alteration of the terms of 
the treaty between three main republics of the [Soviet] Union.
224 BBC SWB, SU/1406 (13 June 1992), B /l.
225 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f  the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 152 (see also 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 114).
226 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 152 (also in 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), 113).
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In other words, Yeltsin relied on a negative legitimation message when he tried to 
justify the Belovezha Accords afterwards. He appealed to his audience’s fear of chaos 
and further disintegration and depicted the alternative to the decision taken in 
Belovezha as anarchy and possible civil war. He used arguments of legality 
maintaining that everything had occurred according to the rules, but found himself 
restrained from alluding to the Accords as a triumph of democracy. He could only do 
so in an indirect manner, by pointing to the chosen (democratic) path as the alternative 
to totalitarianism. In other words, democratic arguments occurred mainly in close 
connection to negative arguments.
It is worth noting that national legitimation was largely absent. Indeed, it would have 
been difficult to rely on national legitimation during the fall of the Soviet Union since, 
for most Russians, it signified a regrettable loss of territory. Russian history was 
closely linked to that of the Soviet Union. The Russian leadership found it difficult to 
free itself of the view that the Soviet Union was a continuation of the Russian Empire 
and thus that the Russian Federation was a continuation of the Soviet Umon. 
Furthermore, ethnic national legitimation would have spelled trouble with non-Russian 
citizens of the Russian Federation. It also involved the risk of inciting the Russian 
population in the former Soviet republics into raising more far-reaching demands than 
before, which would have put the Russian government in a difficult position.
In his memoirs (published in 2000) Yeltsin more or less continued to argue along the 
same lines. He started by deploring the number of ‘accusations that have fallen to my 
lot on account of these decisions!’ He claimed that the Soviet Union had already 
ceased to exist in practice at the time of the signing of the Belovezha Accords. ‘There 
in Belovezhskaia Pushcha we tried not to destroy but to preserve a united political
227 Shevtsova (1999) Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace), pp. 14-15.
228 Daniels (1998) 'Soviet Society and American Sovietologists: A Study in Success?' in: Cox (Ed) 
Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia (London; 
New York, Pinter), p. 122.
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entity.’229 He ended his chapter on the CIS with a hope that one day the CIS would be
compared with the European Union.
I hope very much that Belovezhskaia Pushcha will be remembered one day 
in an entirely different manner, not as it is today. That it will be said that 
this was the beginning of a completely new phase: after the European 
Union we started to build a completely new reality, a new union -  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States.
2.6 Legitimating a Toss-up Agreement
The improvised, coup-like nature of the Belovezha Accords put certain constraints on 
the legitimation strategy at hand for the Russian leadership. There was no referendum 
on the Belovezha Accords. What would have been the point when Ukraine had already 
voted unequivocally for independence and implicitly against a renewed Soviet Union? 
To put the Accords to the test of a referendum would have involved great risks to the 
Russian leadership -  most importantly the risk of losing the initiative in the power 
struggle with the Soviet centre. The Russian leadership seems to have been acutely 
aware of the necessity to quickly secure international support and, eventually, 
recognition for the path it had chosen. The agreement reached on 8 December was 
primarily directed at the international community and external legitimation came to 
play a crucial role in the legitimacy battle inside the Soviet Union between the Soviet 
and republican centres. However, external legitimation became less important after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Russia had been recognised de facto.
The nature of the Belovezha Accords also accounts to a degree for the fact that 
negative and formal democratic legitimation became the most prevalent elements in 
the legitimation message. At the onset, negative legitimation relied on depicting the 
Soviet centre as totalitarian. The alternative to the Belovezha Accords was depicted as 
chaos and possible civil war while bringing forth the threat of further disintegration. As 
time wore on, the negative legitimation message alluded more often to disintegration
229 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 194-195. (Also 
in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 252).
230 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 200. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 248.)
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as a serious threat and less often to the Soviet centre as an enemy. It was also described 
primarily as a fait accompli. This can be explained by the virtual disappearance of the 
Soviet centre as well as by the fact that the Russian leadership never entirely 
disassociated itself from the Soviet legacy. Even though the Soviet era was described 
as totalitarian, the Russian leadership increasingly depicted the Russian Federation as 
having developed out of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. In addition, there 
were tangible gains in being regarded as the heir of the Soviet Union -  not least of 
which was a seat in the Security Council of the UN. As will be evident further on in 
the thesis, the tendency to tone down the negative image of the Soviet centre and 
totalitarianism also followed a general trend in the legitimation formula. During the 
latter half of the 1990s, the Kremlin increasingly avoided deepening the political 
antagonism in Russian society in favour of trying to build consensus.
The Russian leadership was also reluctant to use national legitimation. When national 
legitimation was used (and this was done infrequently), it was always in general terms,
931alluding to Russian history and culture -  never to an outright ethnic identity. Even 
civic national legitimation, stressing Russian independence, carried with it a seed of 
trouble in that certain regions within Russia had already started to demand their 
independence in 1991. Inventing the term ‘nomenklatura separatism’ hardly solved the 
dilemma that the Russian leadership faced. The distinction between nomenklatura 
separatism and the separatism of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia in 1991 would, no 
doubt, have been difficult to explain. Why were the Ukrainian demands for 
independence acceptable, when those of entities even more distant culturally from 
Russia proper, were not? In addition to this, stressing Russian independence from a 
Soviet centre would have involved a clearer disassociation from the role as heir to the 
Soviet Union -  something that the Russian leadership was reluctant to commit itself to.
The difficulty that the Russian leadership experienced in establishing 12 June as 
Russia’s Day of Independence is symptomatic of this dilemma. Many Russians simply 
do not know why 12 June is a day off from work. When asked about how they view
231 See, for example, Pravitelstvennyi vestnik, No. 8 (February), 1992, p. 1, where Burbulis claimed that 
the rebirth of Russia was possible only on the basis of ‘democracy and patriotism’.
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their day of independence they retort “independence from what?”. For citizens of other 
former republics of the Soviet Union, it is even more difficult to fathom why Russia 
should celebrate independence.232 The choice of the twelfth of June, the day when 
Russia declared its sovereignty, rather than a day in December when independence was 
actually achieved, discloses something about the ambivalence that exists with regard to 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The declaration of sovereignty soon was 
celebrated on 12 June as Russia’s Day of Independence. Indeed, it is puzzling that this 
day was chosen as Russia’s Day of Independence. Surely, the defence of democracy in 
August 1991 would have been a better choice by Yeltsin. Probably, the fact that 
Yeltsin was elected the first president of Russia on 12 June 1991 played a role in the 
choice of that date.
Indeed, choosing the day of the Belovezha Accords as the Russian Day of 
Independence would have been tantamount to the Soviet authorities having celebrated 
the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The very name Belovezha contains in it a wretched 
connotation with Brest-Litovsk, since Belovezha is situated not far from Brest- 
Litovsk.234 Therefore, it is not surprising that the Russian leadership seldom or never 
referred to the Belovezha Accords. It preferred to use other names such as the Minsk 
Agreement or the Alma Ata Declaration. The opposition, on the other hand, seldom 
missed an opportunity to denounce the ‘deal in Belovezha’ (belovezhskii sgovor) 
concluded by ‘outright traitors to the Fatherland’.235 With time, the view that Yeltsin 
had signed away Russian territory while on a drinking-bout became increasingly 
widespread, and not only among Yeltsin’s ardent political antagonists.
232 See, for example, Catherine Wanner’s description of how baffled Ukrainians responded to the 
information that the Russian embassy in Kiev was closed on twelfth of June to celebrate Russian 
independence. Wanner (1998) Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine 
(University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 7-8.
233 The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded by Moscow with Berlin in order to buy time in Februaiy 
1918. In concluding the treaty, Moscow gave up considerable territory (Poland, the Ukraine and the 
Baltic).
234 Galeotti (1995) The Age o f Anxiety: Security and Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (London, 
Longman), p. 150, and Keep (1996) Last o f  the Empires: A History o f the Soviet Union 1945-1991 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press)p. 410-411.
235 Programme of the Communist Party adopted in 1995, Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2 February 1995.
236 See for example Remnick (1998) Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia (New York, Vintage 
Books), pp. 24-27 for an account of the meeting and Tolstaya (1997) The Way They Live Now, Last
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Democratic legitimation was used frequently, but most often in its more formal form. It 
occurred especially in messages that were directed at the international community. 
Democratic legitimation struck a discordant note with the way in which the decision to 
form the CIS had come about. In fact, the popular mandate that Yeltsin claimed to 
have had to conclude the agreement in Belovezha, comes closer to charismatic 
legitimation than a democratic one. Furthermore, the Russian leadership never 
discussed a referendum on the Belovezha Accords and the Supreme Soviet, which 
ratified the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was inquorate. The claim that Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus could dissolve the Soviet Union since they had been the founding 
entities of the Soviet Union is open to questioning on legal grounds since the treaty in 
1922 did not provide for its parties to withdraw from it. Neither does it rhyme well 
with the Russian leadership’s early negative legitimation, which relied on depicting the 
Soviet centre as totalitarian and unlawful. Finally, the Russian Federation simply 
followed on where the Soviet Union and the Russian republic of the Soviet Union 
(RSFSR) ceased to be. No new elections were held -  neither to the presidency nor to 
the parliament -  something that might have prevented new problems from emerging.
To build a state is a precarious project. In the Russian case, a number of circumstances 
further complicated the process. A considerable degree of confusion as to whether 
Russia became independent or simply was an heir to the Soviet Union was present 
from the onset and prevented Russia’s leadership from choosing certain legitimation 
strategies. More importantly, however, the general view within the liberal-democratic 
elite at the time was that economic reform was paramount. Had economic reforms been 
successful, the problem of legitimating the new border of the Russian Federation could 
have been as good as solved. However, it soon became obvious that the standard of 
living continued to drop even after the disappearance of the Soviet centre.
accessed: 6 March 2000, Address:
http://www.nybooks.com/nyrevAVWW archdisplay.cgi? 19970424013R.
237 Shevtsova (1999) Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace), p. 12 and White (1998b) 'Rethinking the Transition: 1991 and Beyond', in: Cox 
(Ed.) Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia 
(London; New York, Pinter), p. 135.
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From the start, state building received inadequate attention from the Russian leadership 
when it came to formulating an idea and reaching a consensus on what constituted this 
new Russian state. It would have been difficult to portray the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the birth of the Russian Federation as the result of a well-directed fight for 
independence. There were few heroes involved and their halo faded soon after Russian 
independence. Whereas other former Soviet republics could depict their struggle for 
independence as a struggle against ‘the other’ (the Soviet Union) the Russian 
leadership lacked this opportunity since it could not afford to distance itself entirely 
from the Russian and Soviet legacy. As time wore on, the Belovezha Accords were 
increasingly portrayed by the Russian leadership as the only way to get beyond the 
impasse that the country found itself in at that time. Meanwhile, the view that Yeltsin 
had seen the Belovezha Accords as a convenient way to get rid of Gorbachev gained 
ground, forcing Yeltsin to defend himself against accusations of having signed away 
eternal Russian territory for personal gain.
At the time of the Belovezha Accords, the Russian leadership was mainly concerned 
with quickly establishing legitimacy for their new creation within the world 
community. In its message to the international community, democratic legitimation 
prevailed. However, with time negative legitimation became the primary mode of 
legitimation for the Belovezha Accords. The increasing reliance on negative 
legitimation reflected the fact that the Russian leadership found itself less and less 
compelled to legitimate the formation of the Russian Federation to an international 
audience as the new state became formally recognised. Furthermore, many of the 
arguments used in 1991 did not stand the test of time and complicated Russian policy 
in other areas. Portraying the coming into being of the Russian Federation as a struggle 
for independence became difficult -  not least in light of the conflict in Chechnya. To
238 Brudny (1998) Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press), p. 261.
239 By the time of the ten-year anniversary of the Belovezha Accords an opinion poll indicated that a 
decisive majority (72.0 per cent) regretted the disintegration of the Soviet Union and an almost as 
impressive majority (57.6 per cent) believed that it might have been avoided. Romir (2001) SSSR i 
SNG v rossiiskom obshchestvennom mnenii, Last accessed: 17 December 2001, Address: 
http://www.romir.ru/socpoht/actual/12_2001/cis.htm.
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legitimate the Belovezha Accords as a justified struggle for independence while 
denying the Chechen people the right to choose such a path would have been both 
unwise and hazardous. National legitimation in general, and ethnic national 
legitimation in particular, proved to be riddled with complications.
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Fundamental disagreements between Yeltsin and the legislative branch began to come 
to light when the common enemy, the Soviet centre, disappeared. At first, Yeltsin 
could rely to a considerable degree on his popular mandate and nimbus remaining from 
his central role in quelling the August Coup, which at the time resulted in a potent mix 
of charismatic and democratic arguments. Yeltsin possessed the authority he needed to 
introduce harsh measures in the economic sphere without being attacked outright by 
the rest of the political establishment. In light of this, he chose to continue to combine 
his office of president with that of acting prime minister. His opponents initially set 
about his government instead -  especially his first deputy prime minister, Yegor 
Gaidar. As the conflict between the executive and legislative branches intensified, it 
became increasingly clear that relying on Yeltsin’s largely charismatic authority when 
introducing radical economic reforms was a hazardous path. Yeltsin’s charisma wore 
off as the weeks went by. In March 1992, Yeltsin could still use his authority to quell 
the opposition and keep Gaidar in a key position in the government, but by March 
1993 the conflict had entered a critical phase. That much was clear when Yeltsin 
attempted to impose a ‘special regime of government’ on 20 March 1993.
With hindsight, Yeltsin was of the opinion that he had missed a golden opportunity 
when he did not start by reforming the parliamentary system. In his memoirs, Yeltsin 
claims that he wished to avoid further social turmoil at that point and that he did not 
see, until it was too late, that the deputies of the Congress of People’s Deputies had 
turned into an opposition stronghold.240 In his book, Yeltsin’s first press secretary, 
Viacheslav Kostikov, also points to Yeltsin’s failure to appreciate the potential dangers 
of a radicalised opposition in the Supreme Soviet.241 An additional explanation as to
240 Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), Yeltsin (1994b) 
Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek) p. 165). See also Yeltsin (2000) 
Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential Marathon: 
Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 116 (also in Yeltsin (2001) 
Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 105-106).
241 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
of the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), p. 75. See also Hoffinann (1994) 'Challenges to Viable
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why Yeltsin hesitated to reform the political system at an early point was that Yeltsin’s 
overriding concern was for economic reform -  to achieve a Russian market economy 
as quickly as possible. This much was evident not least from his emphasis on reforms 
in his early statements in 1992. Usually, the word ‘reform’ was used to imply 
democratic and economic reforms in tandem, thus connecting eudaemonic and 
democratic arguments. Either Yeltsin did not contemplate what would happen to the 
reform agenda when his charismatic authority wore off or he assumed that he would be 
able to exercise it indefinitely over both the elites and the general population. It is also 
possible that he believed that the economic reforms would lead to dramatic 
improvements soon enough to avoid serious political difficulties.
It is safe to assume that Yeltsin never envisaged a political system where the president 
occupied a mainly symbolic position -  something that could have saved his August 
1991 nimbus from fading. Quite early, Yeltsin expressed the conviction that during the 
transition period Russia was in dire need of a strong authority -  by this assuming that 
only he as president could fill that role. If Yeltsin initially paid little attention to 
shaping a new political system, it was because he did not foresee the power struggle 
that would ensue. Afterwards he saw the struggle between the legislative branch and 
himself in zero-sum terms and even as a struggle against himself personally.243 He 
would come to demonise his political adversaries in the constitutional battle referring 
to them as both ‘Fascists’ and ‘false pretenders’.244 Up until at least March 1993, and 
possibly even until September 1993, there might have been scope for fruitful 
negotiations between the two branches of government on a new constitution. However, 
after the fateful events in October 1993, the political system that Yeltsin introduced 
bore few marks of a compromise. As Yeltsin sought to legitimise the constitution, he
Constitutionalism in Post-Soviet Russia', Harriman Review, Vol. 41, No. November, pp. 30-31 and 
36-37.
242 See for example his televised speech in the Supreme Soviet on 7 April 1992, BBC SWB, SU/1351 (9 
April 1992), Cl/1.
243 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f  the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), pp. 283-284 (also in 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), pp. 183-184).
244 On the use of ‘negative labels’ see also Lowenhardt (1995) The Reincarnation o f Russia: Struggling 
with the Legacy o f Communism, 1990-1994 (London, Longman), p. 67.
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relied mainly on democratic arguments -  but the October Events compelled him to 
supplement this with strong negative arguments.
3.1 Amendments vs. Decrees
Russia’s independence in December 1991 initiated what has been termed the First 
Russian Republic, which was to last until the fateful shelling of the White House 
(ordered by Yeltsin) in October 1993.245 The unity displayed by Yeltsin and parliament 
in the struggle against the Soviet centre came to a rapid halt during this era. The views 
of the executive and of the legislature on how the power relations between the different 
institutions were to be settled differed radically. As president, Yeltsin had wide powers 
to issue decrees, whereas the parliament, the Congress of People’s Deputies, remained 
the highest decision-making institution with the power to make amendments to the 
constitution. As early as 16 January 1992, Yeltsin delivered a speech in the Supreme 
Soviet that warned against growing antagonism between the executive and the 
parliament. However, at this point Yeltsin did not see the introduction of a new 
constitution as the most important task ahead. The speech was an inflammatoiy call for 
both political and economic reforms as the overarching goal.246
Yeltsin might also have felt at this time that his power to issue decrees, which had the
7 4 7force of law, gave him the full freedom of manoeuvre that he required. Yeltsin’s 
personal authority still seemed secure, owing to his popular mandate and his role in the 
August Coup. This was why the Supreme Soviet had granted him extraordinary 
powers during the autumn of 1991 -  powers which were still there for him to use. 
Another reason for the apparent lull in the constitutional battle might have been that 
challenges from the remnants of the institutions of the Soviet Union still occurred. An 
example of this was a rather droll attempt to convene the Congress of People’s
245 Robert Sharlet was the first to divide the post-Soviet political era in Russia into a first and second 
republic. Sharlet (1993) 'Russian Constitutional Crisis: Law and Politics', Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 9, 
No. 4, p. 316. Incidentally, Sharlet dates the First Russian Republic from 8 December 1991 until 4 
October 1993, which are two key dates in this dissertation.
246 Pravitelstvennyi vestnik, No. 3 (January), 1992, pp. 1,3.
247 Yakovlev (1992) The Bear that Wouldn't Dance: Failed Attempts to Reform the Constitution o f the 
Soviet Union (Winnipeg, Man., Legal Research Institute of the University of Manitoba), pp. 284-285.
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Deputies of the USSR in March 1992.248 At the time, however, the threat of 
revanchism must have seemed real enough to both Yeltsin and Khasbulatov.
On 7 April 1992, the Russian VI Congress of People’s Deputies was due to convene.
On the eve of the Congress, Yeltsin addressed the Assembly of Citizens of Russia. He
took this opportunity to underline the dangers he saw in the introduction of a
parliamentary system and to argue in favour of a presidential one.
Only a presidential republic can be under discussion in the present 
situation, perhaps for the next two or three years. This certainly does not 
mean giving the president unlimited powers. He should fulfil his 
responsibilities [of] defending the constitutional structure, democratic 
order, human rights and the integrity of the country, of Russia. The 
president should have an opportunity to be responsible, in full measure, to 
the people who elected him for the fate of Russia and to implement his
249programme.
In his speech at the opening session of the VI Congress on 7 April 1992, Yeltsin again 
argued for retaining the special powers granted to him. He pointed to the country’s 
critical situation and to the negative consequences that might ensue if a strong 
executive was not at the helm. He also referred to his popular mandate.250 In other
words, Yeltsin did not point to a Russian tradition of strong leaders at the helm. Rather,
he pointed to the pressing circumstances in which Russia found itself. He also 
emphasised that he was not asking for unlimited powers and that the president would 
still be answerable to the electorate.251
On 18 April 1992, the Congress adopted a resolution, by which it approved ‘the overall 
concept for constitutional reforms in the Russian Federation on which the new Russian 
Constitution is based, as well as the basic provisions of the draft approved by the 
Russian Supreme Soviet’.252 This prompted Yeltsin to warn again of the consequences
248 BBC SWB, SU/1329 (14 March 1992), B/2 and BBC SWB, SU/1333 (19 March 1992), B/l-3.
249 BBC SWB, SU/1349 (7 April 1992), B/2.
250 BBC SWB, SU/1351 (9 April 1992), Cl/8.
251 Yeltsin was not unique in arguing this -  neither in Russia or internationally. See, for example, 
Hoflmann (1994) 'Challenges to Viable Constitutionalism in Post-Soviet Russia', Harriman Review, 
Vol. 41, No. November, pp. 28-29.
252 BBC SWB, SU/1373 (6 May 1992), Cl/1.
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of not settling the question of delineation of responsibilities. In a speech to the 
Congress on its last day (21 April 1992), he urged them to reach a compromise on the 
new constitution and painted a dark picture of the alternative.
Yeltsin remained convinced that his authority and his popular mandate were still
strong. In 1992, the twelfth of June had not yet become a national holiday. Instead,
Yeltsin gave an interview to celebrate the first anniversary of his election to the
presidency, which had taken place on the same day in 1991. In the interview Yeltsin
defended himself against criticism, but also emphasised his own popular mandate. He
spoke of 150 million people having taken part in the election, which of course was an
exaggeration since this figure represented the population of Russia, not its electorate
and certainly not the number of voters that actually took part in the election.254 Later in
November of the same year, he made a similar lofty reference to the entire population
of Russia in a speech to the British parliament.
I would like to stress that we are keeping a strict eye on the situation in the 
country, and we will not allow reactionary forces to take revenge. As 
president elected by the whole people of a country with 150 million 
people, I can assure you firmly of this.
In a speech to the American Congress in June 1992, Yeltsin spoke of himself as ‘the 
first ever popularly-elected president for 1,000 years of Russian history’ and stressed 
his own role in quelling the August Coup. The rest of the speech was devoted to 
democracy as the chosen path of Russia and to assuring the members of the US 
Congress that Russia would not diverge from the path of reform257 According to 
Viacheslav Kostikov, the speech made by Yeltsin in the US was the product of a 
painstaking process where Yeltsin personally insisted on the importance of conveying
^ r o
the right message to the US. A few days later, his speech in the Canadian parliament
253 BBC SWB, SU/1362 (23 April 1992), Cl/7.
254 BBC SWB, SU/1406 (13 June 1992), B/4.
255 BBC SWB, SU/1536 (12 November 1992), Cl/2.
256 BBC SWB, SU/1411 (19 June 1992), Cl/1.
257 Ibid., Cl/1-3.
258 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
o f the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 51-52, 55-56.
- 9 8 -
3 T h e  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a  f o r  t h e  1993 C o n st it u t io n
was almost a carbon copy of his speech in the US, and at a G7 meeting in Munich in 
July 1992, Yeltsin continued to assure his audience of both his and Russia’s 
commitment to reforms and democracy. Again Yeltsin portrayed himself as a bulwark 
against attempts to reverse the course that Russia had taken under his leadership. T 
would like all of the areas of reform to have become irreversible when my term as 
president ends in 1996.’260
Meanwhile the strategy of rhetorically coupling political reforms with economic 
reforms was starting to backfire. It was becoming a tool for Yeltsin’s opponents in the 
constitutional battle since the Russian economy had not shown any signs of the earlier 
promised swift recovery. The VII Congress of People’s Deputies was due to convene 
in December 1992 and everything pointed to it taking action to curb the power of the 
executive. In particular, the Congress wished to remove Gaidar from the post of prime 
minister and to deprive Yeltsin of the extraordinary powers he had been granted in 
October 1991. After trying to convince the Congress to postpone its VII session, 
Yeltsin threw himself into the battle. In October 1992, Yeltsin stated that he considered 
himself responsible to the people rather than to the Supreme Soviet. He also mentioned 
the possibility of holding a referendum the coming spring. The proposed referendum 
was to be on the constitution and especially on the ‘land question’.
The Russian leadership became increasingly aware of the weak position that the 
president possessed in the constitution. At this point, the Russian leadership made its 
first attempts to argue that Yeltsin’s popular mandate overrode the stipulations of the 
old RSFSR constitution. As the VII Congress got closer, the political atmosphere in 
Moscow ripened with rumours of impending coups. On 13 November 1992, a deputy 
of the Supreme Soviet claimed that the Kremlin was planning to dissolve parliament 
on 24 or 25 November. This was immediately denied by both the minister of
259 BBC SWB, SU/1413 (22 June 1992), Cl/1-5.
260 BBC SWB, SU/1429 (10 July 1992), Al/3.
261 Rossiiskie vesti, 21 October 1992, p. 1 and 22 October 1992, p. 1.
262 BBC SWB, SU/1526, (31 October 1992), B/2.
263 BBC SWB, SU/1539 (16 November 1992), B/l.
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defence, Pavel Grachev, and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan 
Khasbulatov.264 On 17 November 1992, Yeltsin denied that he was contemplating the 
introduction of presidential rule. However, he did not entirely rule out the possibility 
that the actions of others might force him to take extraordinary measures. Yeltsin 
stated again that he considered himself to have sworn his oath to the people.
At the VII Congress, the idea of a referendum on confidence in Yeltsin’s policies was 
floated for the first time. In his opening statement at the VII Congress, directed 
primarily at the people’s deputies, Yeltsin argued solely in favour of a referendum on a 
new constitution. ‘I am proposing to Russian people’s deputies that they should adopt 
a resolution to hold an all-Russian referendum on the final adoption of a new 
constitution of the Russian Federation.’ However, the antagonism between the 
Congress and the Russian president increased as the VII Congress wore on.
On 10 December 1992, Yeltsin decided to confront the Congress by making a speech, 
which though held at the Congress was, in actuality, directed at the Russian 
population. In his speech Yeltsin appealed to the Russian people to begin gathering 
signatures for a referendum on whom the Russian population trusted: the Congress or 
the president. The speech was relayed live on Russian television, much to the surprise 
of Khasbulatov and other people’s deputies. On the following day the entire speech 
appeared in Russian newspapers. Yeltsin’s address echoed of populist appeals -  the 
will of the people played a central role in it -  and of images of the negative 
consequences that would follow from the Supreme Soviet’s policy.
Citizens of Russia! People’s deputies!
The development of events at the VII Congress of People’s Deputies
impels me to appeal directly to the people.
264 Ibid., B/l-3.
265 BBC SWB, SU/1542 (19 November 1992), B/4.
266 BBC SWB, SU/1553 (2 December 1992), Cl/12.
267 Gaidar (1997) Dni porazhenii i pobed [Days o f Defeats and Victories] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 229- 
231, Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: 
Notes o f  the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 148-149 and Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta 
[Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), pp. 293, 297 (also in Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the 
Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), pp. 194, 197-198).
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All of this is very similar to how it was in the recent past when the 
Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU ruled the country.
We are being led towards a dangerous boundary beyond which waits 
destabilisation and economic chaos, [we are] pushed towards civil war.
In such a situation I believe it essential to appeal directly to the citizens of 
Russia, to all voters. To those who voted for me in the election and thanks 
to whom I became president of Russia.
A responsible and deciding moment has come. Both the Congress and the 
president have one judge -  the people. Therefore I consider a nation-wide 
referendum as the only way out of the deepest power crisis. It is the most
O f . o
democratic, the most legal way of overcoming it.
Yeltsin linked the parliament to the Soviet Union and the country’s communist past 
while pointing to the abyss that might follow were the situation to continue. Negative 
legitimation was thus prominent. By way of democratic arguments Yeltsin pointed to 
his own popular mandate and proposed a referendum as the only way to break the 
deadlock. Significantly, this was one of the occasions when Yeltsin used narodovlastie 
to denote democracy. Towards the end of his address he claimed that his proposal 
rested ‘on the constitutional principle of democracy [narodovlastie], on the 
constitutional right of the President to turn to the people and on the constitutional right 
of the President to initiate legislation’.269 He ended by depicting himself as foremost a 
servant of the people. ‘I, as President, will submit to the will of the people [volia
0“7C\naroda], whatever it will be.’
Throughout his battle with parliament in 1992-1993, Yeltsin emphasised his popular 
mandate and that he was responsible first of all to the people. This was the case when 
he announced that he was introducing ‘a special regime’ in a televised address to the 
nation on 20 March 1993. Again, Yeltsin used narodovlastie to denote democracy 
when he accused the parliament of violating democratic principles. ‘We hear lies in the 
continual oaths to fidelity to the Constitution, from Congress to Congress it is bent and
268 Rossiiskie vesti, 11 December 1992, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1561 (11 December 1992), Cl/13.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
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re-shaped to fit their interests, blow after blow is given against the very foundation of
771the constitutional system of democracy (narodovlastie). He restated that his popular
mandate overrode the formal advantage that the parliament had in the constitution.
Today I signed a decree on special regime until the power crisis has been 
overcome. ... I have taken this step since I was elected not by the 
Congress, not by the Supreme Soviet, but by the people -  it must decide 
whether I should continue to carry out my office and who should rule the 
country: the President and Vice-President or the Congress of People’s 
Deputies.272
In the absence of a strong position in the constitution, emphasising his popular 
mandate was the only viable option available to Yeltsin. His decision to grant himself 
extraordinary powers was condemned as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
The Congress of People’s Deputies swiftly convened for an emergency session and 
threatened to impeach him. On the eve of the Congress, Yeltsin transmitted yet another 
televised address to the Russian population. He stressed the democratic nature of a 
referendum to solve the constitutional crisis and stated that he was determined to 
follow a judicially and constitutionally correct process in order to adopt a new 
constitution. However, the speech also contained warnings of the consequences if the 
constitutional crisis was allowed to continue. ‘This increases further the anarchy in the 
country. This ruinous process must be stopped at any price.’ On the following day, 
Yeltsin gave a speech at the DC Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies. In his 
speech, Yeltsin again stressed the need for a new constitution and portrayed the 
referendum as the only possible way to break the ongoing deadlock. He also pointed to 
the dangers of disintegration of the federation and stated that the new constitution
271 Rossiiskie vesti, 23 March 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1643 (22 March 1993), Cl/1. See also 
the actual decree published later, Rossiiskie vesti, 25 March 1993, p. 1 (and BBC SWB, SU/1647 (26 
March 1993), Cl/4).
272 Rossiiskie vesti, 23 March 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1643 (22 March 1993), B/3. Other 
examples of Yeltsin referring to his popular mandate can be found in an interview in Argumenty i 
fakty, No. 42, October 1992, p. 2, and in BBC SWB, SU/1542 (19 November 1992), B/4, BBC SWB, 
SU/1562 (12 December 1992), Cl/19 and BBC SWB, SU/1536 (13 March 1993), Cl/2. The decree 
that was published later did not talk o f introducing a ‘special regime’. For accounts of why this was 
the case see Filatov (2000) Sovershenno nesekretno: Kuluary rossiiskoi vlasti [Absolutely Non- 
Confidential: The Lobbies o f Russian Power] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 271-272 and Shevtsova (1999) 
Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 
71-72.
273 BBC SWB, SU/1648 (27 March 1993), Cl/1.
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would contain a chapter based on the Federal Treaty. ’To conclude, esteemed people’s 
deputies, I have made my choice to leave my fate to the most just supreme judge -  the 
people.’274
In the end, the IX Extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies did not vote to 
impeach Yeltsin. As a result of Yeltsin’s unexpected move on 20 March, it was agreed 
that a referendum be held in April the same year. The referendum on 25 April 1993 
consisted of four questions put to the Russian electorate: first, whether it supported the 
president; second, whether it supported the social and economic policies pursued by 
Yeltsin; third, whether it was in favour of early presidential elections; fourth, whether
97^it was in favour of early parliamentary elections.
The fact that both Yeltsin’s personal fate and the country’s constitution was the subject 
matter of the referendum might explain why national appeals were present in the 
rhetoric preceding the referendum. In his appeals to the population and to the elites 
before the referendum, Yeltsin used national arguments. In his televised appeal to the 
population on the eve of the referendum, Yeltsin emphasised Russian culture, history
9 7 />and tradition in a general sense. The referendum was not primarily a question of a 
new constitution. It was a test of Yeltsin’s popularity and national arguments might 
have been used to achieve support for Yeltsin as a politician. When emphasis was on 
the constitution, as when Yeltsin presented his draft constitution the day before the 
referendum, democratic legitimation was again most prominent. The word ‘PEOPLE’ 
was written in capital letters to emphasise the supreme position the Russian leadership
9 7 7intended it to have in determining the future of Russia.
The basis of the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation proposed by 
the President, are unshakeable principles, which not one organ, not one
274 Rossiiskie vesti, 27 March 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1649 (29 March 1993), Cl/13.
275 Rossiiskie vesti, 10 April 1993, p. 1.
276 BBC SWB, SU/1672 (26 April 1993), Cl/1. For use of national legitimation before the referendum, 
see also BBC SWB, SU/1662 (14 April 1993), B/l-5, SU/1665 (17 April 1993), B/5, SU/1669 (22 
April 1993), B/4-5 and Rossiiskie vesti, 21 April 1993, pp. 1, 2 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1669 (22 April 
1993), B/l-4).
277 This brings to mind how the words SOVEREIGN EMPEROR (GOSUDAR IMPERATOR) were 
capitalized in tsarist official documents.
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official no matter how high his position will be allowed to infringe upon.
Only the PEOPLE can determine these, only the PEOPLE of Russia has 
the right to once and for all make its historic choice and only the PEOPLE 
of Russia can change them.
In the referendum, a majority expressed their confidence in Yeltsin and his reform
77Qprogram. However, the turnout was lower than expected. After the April 1993 
referendum, remarks where Yeltsin referred to his popular mandate became even more 
frequent, but he based this on the support he had received in the referendum. In his 
assessment of the referendum, Yeltsin stated that he considered the ‘main result of the 
referendum to be the support, which the citizens of Russia showed the President, 
the Government and the policy they pursue.’ However, Yeltsin failed to 
capitalise on the referendum by dealing a final blow to the legislature immediately 
thereafter. Instead, the conflict between him and Khasbulatov continued to escalate.
In the summer of 1993 a Constitutional Conference was organised in Moscow. Any 
chance of arriving at a compromise acceptable to both sides in the conflict was 
destroyed when Khasbulatov walked out early in the process. On 8 June 1993, Yeltsin 
addressed the conference. He stressed democratic and liberal arguments but also made 
a rare attempt at pointing to Russian democratic traditions. The quotation rather 
highlighted the difficulties involved in using Russian history to legitimate democracy. 
Few in Yeltsin’s domestic audience, let alone in an international audience, would 
connect the zemstvo system under Alexandr II with the development of democracy. 
Peter the Great certainly reformed Russia, but could hardly be considered a budding
278 Rossiiskie vesti, 24 April 1993, p. 1 [capital letters in the original]. See also the summary of Yeltsin’s 
preamble in BBC SWB, SU/1671 (24 April 1993), B /l and SU/1673 (27 April 1993), B/l.
279 Ahdieh (1997) Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to 
Democracy, 1985-1996 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press), Shevtsova (1999) 
Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 
71-73 and White (2000) Russia’s New Politics: The Management o f a Postcommunist Society (New 
York, Cambridge University Press), pp. 79-80.
280 Rossiiskie vesti, 7 May 1993, p. 1 [bold letters in the original]. See also BBC SWB, SU/1683 (8 May
1992), Cl/1.
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democrat. The quotation was nevertheless typical in that it did not refer to the Soviet 
legacy.281
We bring [experiences] into Russia’s tomorrow from the present and from 
our contradictory past. We have behind us the proud traditions of free 
Novgorod, the experiences of the unique transformations under Peter the 
Great and Aleksandr II. Russia contributed to the world’s democratic 
treasure the experiences from the zemstvo system and the experiences from 
the most far-reaching judicial reform of its day. I am convinced that 
democratic statehood does not conflict with the traditions of Russia and the'JO')
national traits of its peoples.
On 19 August 1993, the second anniversary of the August Coup, Yeltsin held a press
conference. He used the anniversary to state his case in the battle between him and the
Supreme Soviet. According to Viacheslav Kostikov, he had consciously avoided doing
so the year before. In August 1993, Yeltsin used the outcome of the April
referendum to argue his case. In the referendum, he claimed, the people of Russia had
expressed its support for reforms. The proposals from the Supreme Soviet, which went
against reforms, were therefore to be regarded as against the will of the people.
Furthermore, he warned of the consequences if the present situation were to continue.
The referendum in fact determined the outcome of this struggle. But it has 
not ended. On the contrary, it has worsened dramatically. It is precisely for 
this reason that I, as president, have a choice to make today -  to put into 
effect the will of the people, which has expressed its support for the 
continuation of reform, or, regardless of this will, to allow the Supreme 
Soviet to ignore the opinion of the people and destroy Russian 
statehood.284
Shortly after the anniversary of the August Coup (if not earlier) Yeltsin had decided to 
deal a decisive blow to the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies. In 
his own memoirs, Yeltsin states that by early September he had made his decision.
281 Yeltsin had attempted this legitimation strategy only once before in an appeal published in Rossiiskie 
vesti before the April referendum. In the appeal, he claimed that Russia had both a history of tyranny 
and one of ‘traditions of democracy (narodovlastie)\ He recalled the republics of Pskov and 
Novgorod, the Cossack autonomy and the rich experience of land structures (zemskie struktwry) of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries’, Rossiiskie vesti, 21 April 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1669 (22 
April 1993), B/l). See also how one textbook described the zemstvo system as a Russian stepping- 
stone towards democracy, chapter six, p. 223.
282 Rossiiskie vesti, 8 June 1993, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1708 (7 June 1993), Cl/2-3.
283 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
o f the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), p. 73.
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‘Russia would no longer have such a parliament.’ He claims that not even his closest 
aides were aware of this decision. Viacheslav Kostikov wrote that on 7 September 
1993 he was asked by Yeltsin to orchestrate a controlled ‘leak of information’. 
According to Kostikov, this was a method used regularly to probe the possible 
response to a controversial action. The information that Kostikov was instructed to 
leak hinted at the possibility of radical actions against the parliament. The effect it 
produced in the media led the Presidential Administration to conclude that a strike 
against the legislature would not generate a massive storm of protest.
Meanwhile the rhetorical battle between the Kremlin and the White House continued
to escalate. On 19 September 1993 press secretary Viacheslav Kostikov issued a
statement in which he thoroughly vilified Yeltsin’s main opponent, Khasbulatov. The
statement followed a speech by Khasbulatov, in which he had accused Yeltsin of being
a drunk. Kostikov began by positing Khasbulatov in direct opposition to true national
Russian interests and Russian national character.
The recent statements, actions and gestures of the Supreme Soviet speaker, 
Khasbulatov, demonstrate that he has reached the maximum degree of 
political and moral degradation. It is obvious to millions of Russians 
(rossiiane) that Khasbulatov places above all not the interests of Russia but 
his own political and clan (klanovye) interests. By lies and secret 
manoeuvres he is trying to appropriate for himself the role of the arbiter of 
the country’s fate without having either the legitimate premises or the 
moral qualities of a leader of Russia and being, essentially, the antithesis of 
the Russian national character (antipod russkogo nationalnogo 
kharaktera). His tactics are to falsify the people’s will, his aim is to 
concentrate all power in his hands and his support is an obsolete system of 
communist soviets and extremist pro-fascist forces.287
Kostikov went on to depict Khasbulatov as ‘an impostor’ or ‘pretender’. The reference 
was historic, dating back to the time of troubles in the early 17th century when the first
284 BBC SWB, SU/1773 (21 August 1993), B/6.
285 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 347. In the 
English version Yeltsin says that he had decided to ‘dissolve the parliament’, Yeltsin (1994a) The 
View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 242.
286 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
o f the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 219-220. hi early 1993, Yeltsin probed the reaction of 
the international community. See further, chapter six, p. 209.
287 Ibid., p. 312 and BBC SWB, SU/1799 (21 September 1993), B/10.
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pretender to the throne, the false Dmitrii, with the support of Catholic Poland, claimed 
to be the dead tsarevich Dmitrii. The reference to Khasbulatov as ‘stranger’ in Russia 
and to his ‘clan interests’ hinted at Khasbulatov’s non-Russian, Chechen ethnic
^ o o
origin. It is also worth noting that Kostikov used russkii to denote ‘the Russian
national character’ in the quote above. Kostikov went on to emphasise that only
Russians should decide their own fate. In many ways, this statement comes the closest
to an ethnic national appeal. Nevertheless, Kostikov here talked of the ‘Russlandish
people’ (rossiiskii narod rather than a russkii narod).
The Russian people (rossiiskii narod), who have lived through the era of 
totalitarianism and know all too well the price of pretenders (samozvantsi), 
have suffered too much in obtaining their new democratic destiny to yield 
to false slogans and the promises of a stranger (posuly prisheltsa). The 
destiny of Russia must and will be decided by Russians themselves and 
under the guidance of the leader who reflects the national interests of the 
motherland.289
On 21 September 1993, Yeltsin addressed the Russian population on television and 
informed them of the contents of Decree number 1400, ‘On Gradual Constitutional 
Reform’. The decree in effect suspended the activity of the parliament until a new 
parliament had been elected according to a new constitution to be adopted through a 
referendum in December of the same year. In his speech, Yeltsin stressed the negative 
consequences of a continued political crisis and claimed that the Supreme Soviet had, 
in effect, ceased to follow democratic parliamentary procedures. ‘The security of 
Russia and its peoples is of higher value than formal compliance with the contradictory 
norms created by a legislative power which has finally discredited itself.’290 Based on 
this, Yeltsin described it as his duty to take the measures prescribed in Decree number 
1400.
Esteemed compatriots, the only way of overcoming the paralysis of state 
power in the Russian Federation is by its radical renovation on the basis of 
the principles of people’s power and constitutionality. The existing
288 Ibid., pp. 212-214 and BBC SWB, SU/1799 (21 September 1993), B/10-11. For the connotations that 
‘pretenders’ such as the False Dmitrii has for Russians, see Billington (1970) The Icon and the Axe 
(New York, Vintage Books), pp. 105-106.
289 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
o f the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), p. 213 and BBC SWB, SU/1799 (21 September 1993), 
B/10.
290 BBC SWB, SU/1801 (23 September 1993), C/4.
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constitution does not envisage a procedure for adopting a new constitution 
providing for a dignified exit from the crisis of statehood.
Being the guarantor of the security of our state, I am obliged to propose a 
way out of this deadlock, I am obliged to break this ruinous vicious 
circle.291
In the actual decree, the Russian leadership justified the decision to suspend the
activity of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies, in opposition to
the constitution at the time. The presidential decree stated that ‘very basis of the
constitutional structure ... democracy [narodovlastie], the delimitation of power and
federalism’ had been violated by the Supreme Soviet. It also referred to the results in
the April referendum and ‘the will of the people’.
The direct opposition of the implementation of social-economic reforms, 
the open and daily obstruction in the Supreme Soviet of the policy of the 
President of the Russian Federation, elected by all the people, the attempts 
at immediate realisation of the function of the executive power instead of 
the Council of Ministers, evidently demonstrates that the majority in the 
Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and part of its leadership have 
openly chosen to flout the will of the Russian people, which was expressed 
in the referendum of 25th of April in 1993.293
Immediately after Yeltsin had publicised his decision to suspend the activity of the 
Russian parliamentary structures, the struggle for supreme power between the 
executive and legislature entered its final and most critical phase. Khasbulatov’s camp 
entrenched itself in the White House and called upon vital institutions such as the 
armed forces to rally to its support. Meanwhile, Yeltsin addressed the armed forces in 
Krasnaia Zvezda, where he appealed to their patriotism and, in line with Kostikov’s 
reference to Khasbulatov as a false pretender, warned the military of ‘false 
(samozvanye) commanders’.294 The address bristled with references to the Fatherland 
(Otechestvo). Yeltsin warned of disintegration and civil war while appealing to the 
military and its special role in protecting Russia.
291 Ibid.
292 Rossiiskie vesti, 22 September 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1801 (23 September 1993), C/1.
293 Ibid.
294 Krasnaia zvezda, 24 September 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1803 (25 September 1993), C/4. 
The address to the military is further examined on p. 728.
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Remember that your considered and firm position constitutes the 
guarantee against disintegration (raspad) of the country and civil war 
today, and for the rebirth of a Great Russia (Velikaia Rossiia) in the 
future.295
Although there were attempts to reach a compromise and peaceful way out of the 
situation that had arisen, not least the negotiations in the Sviato-Danilovskii monastery 
under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church, the explosiveness of the 
situation continued to mount. The White House had, in effect, become a fortress for the 
forces of Yeltsin’s opposition.
3.2 The October Events of 1993 and the Role of the White House
During the most critical night of the crisis in October, the need for a speech from the 
president became tangible. However, Yeltsin’s press secretary, Viacheslav Kostikov, 
and Yeltsin’s chief aide, Viktor Iliushin, advised Yeltsin not to appear on television
7 Q 7since he looked extremely tired and wom-out during the night. Instead, Kostikov 
issued a statement where he maintained that it was time to ‘draw conclusions out of the 
bloody tragedy into which the closed ranks of Fascists and Stalinists again brought 
[democracy]’. Apart from the allusion to Yeltsin’s adversaries as ‘Stalinists and 
Fascists’, Kostikov referred to the events of Sunday the third of October as a ‘bloody
7051Sunday’. The reference to Bloody Sunday was hardly successful and was not picked 
up by other representatives of the Russian leadership. For Russians, Bloody Sunday 
evokes the tragedy on 22 January 1905 when tsarist infantry opened fire against 
peaceful demonstrators.299 Chernomyrdin, in his speech just after midnight on 4 
October, spoke of blood having been shed in Moscow but, above all, called for
295 Ibid.
296 See further on the role the Russian Orthodox Church played in chapter six, p. 235.
297 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
of the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 255-260.
298 Rossiiskie vesti, 5 October 1993, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1811 (5 October 1993), C/12.
299 With hindsight, the events on Bloody Sunday were regarded as a grave political error committed by 
the tsarist authorities in 1905. Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski treat the events on 3 October 1993 
under the headline ‘Bloody Sunday’ and claim that the Kremlin’s ‘agent provocateurs’ among the 
crowds that stormed the Moscow City Council and Ostankino were partly responsible for the turn that 
events took. Reddaway (2001) The Tragedy o f Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against 
Democracy (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press), pp. 423-425.
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national unity to stop the ‘gangster ramblings’ that (in his view) were threatening the 
country with civil war. ‘I begin my speech with words that have not been heard in 
many years -  Moscow is in danger! Everyone understands that if Moscow is in danger, 
then the Fatherland (Otechestvo) is in danger as well!’300
Not until the morning of 4 October did Yeltsin address the nation. In his televised
speech, Yeltsin relied exclusively on negative legitimation. His political opponents
were thoroughly demonised as ‘bandits’ with links both to communists and to fascists.
We had hoped that we would reach an agreement and preserve peace in the 
capital.
Those who went against a peaceful town and provoked a bloody battle are 
criminals. But this is not only a crime of isolated bandits (bandity) and 
organisers of pogroms. Everything that has happened and is still happening 
in Moscow is an armed revolt planned ahead. It was organised by 
revanchist communists, fascist ringleaders, certain of the former deputies 
and representatives of the soviets.
In his address to the nation on 6 October 1993, in which he sought to legitimate his
decision to storm the White House, Yeltsin emphasised his storming of the White
House as the only remaining alternative. Negative legitimation was thus dominant. The
rivals in the political battle were again portrayed as simple bandits and as an unholy
coalition of fascists and communists. Above all, Yeltsin claimed that the alternative
to his actions would have been civil war.
The bloody events of that night demanded the introduction of regular army 
units into Moscow. The difficult decision was taken to storm the building 
of the Supreme Soviet, which had turned into a citadel of terrorism with
300 Rossiiskie vesti, 5 October 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1811 (5 October 1993), C/10. See also 
his reference to the ‘motherland’ in a later speech the same day, BBC SWB, SU/1812 (6 October
1993), C/5.
301 Rossiiskie vesti, 5 October 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1811 (5 October 1993), C/6.
302 For references by the Russian leadership to Yeltsin’s enemies as fascists see BBC SWB, SU/1551 (30 
November 1992), Cl/2, Kostikov’s statement in Rossiiskie vesti, 5 October 1993, p. 2 (also in BBC 
SWB, SU/1811 (5 October 1993), C/12), Yeltsin’s speech on 4 October published Rossiiskie vesti, 5 
October 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1811 (5 October 1993), C/6), Yeltsin’s speech on 6 
October, Rossiiskie vesti, 8 October 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1814 (8 October 1993), B/l), 
Kozyrev’s article in Washington Post, Kozyrev (1993) And Now: Partnership with Russia's 
Democrats, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com, Yeltsin’s memoirs, 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), Yeltsin (1994b) 
Zapiski prezidenta [Notes of the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 389.
303 Rossiiskie vesti, 8 October 1993, pp. 1,2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1814 (8 October 1993), B/l-3.
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huge quantities of arms and ammunition and which had become the most 
dangerous factor for igniting a civil war in Russia.304
According to Robert B. Ahdieh, Yeltsin maintained the legitimacy of his decree 
number 1400 by referring to democratic concerns that overrode the actual constitution, 
but he made only lame attempts to legitimise his decision to use tanks against the 
White House. Indeed, whereas democratic legitimation was most prominent in the 
rhetoric involved in the constitutional battle, negative legitimation became the salient 
ingredient in Yeltsin’s explanations of his actions against the White House.
Two years earlier, the Russian White House had become an important symbol of the 
resistance to the August Coup in 1991. In his anniversary speech in August 1992, 
Yeltsin made ample use of the White House in this capacity and even decorated the 
victims of the August Coup with a newly instituted award, ‘For Defence of the White
307House’, posthumously. On the second anniversary of the August Coup in 1993, 
Yeltsin held a press conference and rallies were organised to commemorate the Coup. 
However, in the speeches made that year, there were fewer references to the role of the 
White House. In his opening statement at the press conference, Yeltsin chose to call 
the building ‘the White House’ when referring to its role during August 1991, but ‘the 
Russian House of Soviets’ when referring to it as the home of the Supreme Soviet. At 
one point he even pointed out this difference.
304 Ibid.
305 Ahdieh (1997) Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to 
Democracy, 1985-1996 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 69-71.
306 In spite of this, he decided to move his office from the White House into the Kremlin. Yeltsin claimed 
that he did this in order to make the statement in favour of reforms. ‘The Kremlin is the symbol of 
stability, duration and determination the policy, which is carried out.’ Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski 
prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 162 (also in Yeltsin (1994a) The View from 
the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 124). Yeltsin also claimed that the decision was 
practical since ‘the entire defence of the country and the operative control system is linked to [the 
Kremlin]; coded communication from the entire world are sent here and a security system developed 
in the tiniest details exists here’, Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] 
(Moscow, Ogonek), p. 162.
307 BBC SWB, SU/1465 (21 August 1992), Cl/1.
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One can only regret that the House of Soviets, the White House, at the 
walls of which citizens of Russia stood up for freedom and democracy two
^AO
years ago, has turned into a bulwark of revanchist forces today.
This changed use of the symbol of the White House reflected the fact that, since 
August 1991, the White House was associated more with the Supreme Soviet than with 
Yeltsin. After having made the decision to storm the White House in October 1993, 
Yeltsin rarely referred to its symbolic function. In his televised speech immediately 
after the October Events, Yeltsin touched upon the “new” role of the Russian White 
House.
But the White House had also become the symbol of perfidy and treachery.
All the preparations for the mutiny were taken under the shield of
309negotiations.
With his verbal and military attack on the White House, Yeltsin had, in effect,
i i n
deprived himself of a very potent symbol for the new, democratic, Russian state. 
After the October Events in 1993, Russian newspapers referred to the building as ’’the 
Black House” because of its scorched look.311 The decoration ‘For Defence of the 
White House’ disappeared and, although it was decided that the building should be 
renovated, it was never returned to the Russian legislators.312 On 5 October 1993, 
Yeltsin decided that the White House would be the home of the Russian 
government.313 In December 1993, only days before the referendum, the question of 
where the two new chambers of parliament were to reside had still not been resolved. 
On 9 December, Sergei Filatov announced that the Federation Council was to be 
‘located in the House of the Russian Press, and the State Duma, in the former CMEA 
building’. The CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) building was then the 
Moscow mayor’s office. The buildings of the former Council of Ministers (the 
government) and the State Planning Committee (former Gosplan) of the Soviet Union
308 BBC SWB, SU/1773 (21 August 1993), B/5-6. A summary of the press conference was also printed in 
Rossiiskie vesti, 20 August 1993.
309 Rossiiskie vesti, 8 October 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1814 (8 October 1993), B /l.
310 Urban (1998) 'Remythologising the Russian State', Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6, p. 983.
311 Rossiiskie vesti, 13 October 1993, p. 2.
312 Presidential Administration - Department of State Decorations (2002) Gosudarstvennye nagrady 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Last accessed: 25 April 2002, Address: http://awardadm.gov.ru/.
- 1 1 2 -
3 T h e  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a  f o r  t h e  1993 C o n st itu t io n
on the street Okhotnyi Riad, were also under consideration.314 In the end, the building 
that had formerly housed Gosplan became the home of the State Duma. The White 
House would, however, never regain its role as a symbol of a new democratic Russia.
3.3 Adoption of the Constitution and Celebrating the Constitution
When Yeltsin appeared on television to introduce the draft constitution on 9 November 
1993, he again relied mainly on democratic legitimation. In his speech he stated that: 
‘The Constitution of Russia is a Constitution of a democratic republic.’ He stressed the 
democratic nature of the draft constitution and that, in his view, no one would be able 
to usurp power once the constitution had been adopted. ‘Consequently, the principle of 
delimitation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers is implemented in the 
draft.’ This was another democratic argument that was frequently employed by the 
Russian leadership. It claimed that it was impossible ‘to combine the division of
317powers with the omnipotence of the soviets’. Yeltsin painted a dark picture of his 
opponents in October of the same year and claimed that: ‘The forces that in October
■J1 o
tried to unleash a civil war do not need the Constitution.’ On the very eve of the
referendum, Yeltsin again relied heavily on negative legitimation. In a televised
address to the nation on 9 December 1993, he warned of the consequences if the draft
constitution was not adopted.
The fate of the Russia for which you voted in the presidential election and 
the referendum depends upon your decision. Whether there will be peace 
and calm in Russia depends upon your decision.
313 BBC SWB, SU/1813 (7 October 1993), C/2.
3,4 BBC SWB, SU/1870 (13 December 1993), B/7.
315 See also chapter five (pp. 162-162) on how the White House was decorated with the double-headed 
eagle while the new premises of the State Duma continued to be adorned with the hammer and sickle.
316 Rossiiskie vesti, 11 November 1993, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1843 (11 November 1993), Cl/2.
317 Statement by Yeltsin in a televised interview on 7 March 1993, BBC SWB, SU/1632 (9 March 1993), 
B/4. See also BBC SWB, SU/1556 (5 December 1992), Cl/7 (a short summary of Yeltsin’s speech 
was published in Rossiiskie vesti, 5 December 1992, p. 1), BBC SWB, SU/1610 (11 February 1993), 
B /l, Rossiiskie vesti, 20 February 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1618 (20 February 1993), B/2), 
BBC SWB, SU/1626 (2 March 1993), B /l, BBC SWB, SU/1628 (4 March 1993), B/4, Rossiiskie vesti, 
25 March 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1647 (26 March 1993), Cl/3), BBC SWB, SU/1713 (12 
June 1993), Cl/2, BBC SWB, SU/1815 (9 October 1993), C/2 and Rossiiskie vesti, 3 November 1993, 
p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1837 (4 November 1993), B/l).
318 Rossiiskie vesti, 11 November 1993, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1843 (11 November 1993), Cl/2.
- 1 1 3 -
3 T h e  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a  f o r  t h e  1993 C o n st it u t io n
In the beginning of October, peace in our country was on the verge of 
being lost. Civil war not only knocked on our door; it had already entered 
our house. Extreme measures were needed to overcome this threat.
But today we have to state clearly: while the new Constitution has not been 
adopted, such a threat will continue to hang over the country and over each
-3 1 Q
and every one of us.
In his radio address on 10 December 1993, Viktor Chernomyrdin appealed to the 
population. His speech is interesting not least because it constituted one of the rare 
attempts at national legitimation -  intimately combined with democratic arguments -  
as he pointed to the right of the Russian people to decide their destiny. His emphasis 
was on national legitimation albeit in its most general form.
Dear peoples of Russia!
On the eve of the referendum and elections to the Federal Assembly I 
would like to say a word to you. I regard this expression of free will by the 
people as a very important event in Russian history. On 12th December we, 
the peoples of Russia, and nobody else are to decide our own destiny and 
the destiny of our Motherland.
Apart from this appeal by Chernomyrdin, national legitimation was largely absent. It is 
interesting to note other arguments that were not emphasised during the campaign for 
the constitution. Again, the Russian leadership refrained from referring to Russian 
history or tradition to justify the strong presidential powers the constitutional draft 
prescribed. Undoubtedly, it was well aware of the pitfalls such a strategy would have 
involved. Instead, the emphasis was on negative legitimation -  a constitution was 
needed to avoid chaos. Interestingly, the exact nature of the impending chaos was 
seldom outlined. A statement by Chernomyrdin provides an interesting exception. In 
an interview on 10 December, he pointed to one of the problems that would ensue if 
the constitution was not adopted: ‘let’s say the referendum takes place and that the 
constitution is rejected and that the elections to the as yet non-existent Federal 
Assembly are valid. Then the parliament will find itself outside the legal 
framework.’321 That this worrying prospect was not employed more is hardly 
surprising. The Russian leadership had created this inconsistency itself: the population
319 Rossiiskie vesti, 11 December 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1869 (11 December 1993), B/l.
320 BBC SWB, SU/1870 (13 December 1993), B/8.
321 Ibid. B/9.
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voted for representatives to a new Duma on the same day that it was given the choice 
whether to create such an institution at all.322 External legitimation did not feature in 
the campaign either. This was an indication that the role of the West had changed 
radically. International support could have undermined domestic legitimacy rather than 
strengthened it.
The referendum and election in December 1993 were a mixed victory for Yeltsin. The 
constitution was adopted, albeit by a majority of the voters rather than the electorate. 
At the same time, the politicians who experienced the greatest success in the 
parliamentary election were Yeltsin’s opponents -  most notably Vladimir Zhirinovskii 
and the newly formed Russian Communist Party. In his statement after the referendum 
and election, Yeltsin chose to emphasise that Russia had now truly embarked on the 
road to democracy. ‘Citizens of Russia! For the first time an election and referendum 
have been conducted in Russia in conditions of political pluralism and real democratic 
freedom.’ He also stated that this was a precondition for the rebirth of a great and 
strong Russia and that, as president, he would safeguard the principles outlined in the 
constitution. In his address to the Federal Assembly on the day of its opening m 
early January 1994, Yeltsin again emphasised the democratic basis of the new political 
system.
The new Russian statehood rests on a solid legal base -  on the 
Constitution, which was adopted not by a group of people, of some party, 
but for the first time in the history of Russia, by a nation-wide vote.
He seized the opportunity to emphasise his own presidential role as guarantor of the 
new Constitution by reading a version of the presidential oath prescribed by the new 
constitution.
As president of the Russian Federation, I will in the execution of my 
authority
strictly abide by and protect the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
which was adopted by a nation-wide vote on 12 December 1993;
322 Ahdieh (1997) Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to 
Democracy, 1985-1996 (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press), p. 73.
323 Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1872 (15 December 1993), B/8.
324 Rossiiskie vesti, 12 January 1994, p. 1 [bold letters in the original]. See also BBC SWB, SU/1893 (12 
January 1994), B/l.
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- respect and preserve the rights and freedoms of Russians [rossiiane] 
and faithfully serve their interests;
- protect the sovereignty, independence, security and territorial unity of 
the state;
- conscientiously fulfil the responsibilities that the Constitution imposes
325on me.
However, Yeltsin also appealed to national sentiments in his speech. In his view,
Russia was returning to her roots and was resurrecting lost traditions. He especially
encouraged all people in office to take Russia’s status as a great power into account.
‘We must always remember that we represent a great country (velikaia strana), a
great people of a multinational Russia.’327 Yeltsin only briefly mentioned the
October Events in his speech -  again the alternative was civil war and chaos.
The parliament starts its work in a peaceful country. Voters expect from 
the deputies real efforts in order to strengthen civil peace.
Last year an enormous exertion was required in order to preserve it. In the 
most difficult moment, the majority of those who are here today in this hall 
supported the President and helped to prevent chaos and civil 
confrontation in Russia.
All in all, the speech constituted an attempt to portray the new situation as one of
stability. Later, in his first annual address to the new parliament in February 1994,
Yeltsin stressed the need to strengthen the state (ukreplenie gosudarstva) on the basis
of the new constitution in order to prevent the disintegration of the Russian Federation
and to achieve economic growth. Yeltsin reiterated his view of himself as a personal
guarantor of reforms. Looking back on the previous year, Yeltsin expressed his regret
that so much energy and time had been spent on internal squabbling.
Unfortunately, much energy was wasted on fierce political antagonism in 
1993. We did not succeed in avoiding extreme measures. But we did
. 329prevent civil war.
325 Rossiiskie vesti, 12 January 1994, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1893 (12 January 1994), B/l. For the 
presidential oath, see article 82:2 of the constitution. The presidential oath is further discussed in 
chapter five, p. 185.
326 Rossiiskie vesti, 12 January 1994, p. 1 [bold letters in the original]. See also BBC SWB, SU/1893 (12 
January 1994), B/l.
327 Rossiiskie vesti, 12 January 1994, p. 1 [bold letters in the original]. See also BBC SWB, SU/1893 (12 
January 1994), B/3.
™Ibid.
329 Rossiiskie vesti, 25 February 1994, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1931 (25 February 1994), Sl/1.
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The storming of the White House and the way in which the constitution was adopted 
would have dire consequences for the legitimation rhetoric of the Russian leadership. 
The leadership did attempt to introduce a new holiday, Constitution Day, on 12 
December to celebrate the adoption of the constitution through the referendum. At its 
best, this attempt was only moderately successful and, at its worst, was an outright 
failure. Nevertheless, as Yeltsin was later to point out, the Russian leadership did win a 
victory in that the opposition decided to take part in the elections in December 1993 -  
thereby implicitly accepting the new constitution.
3.4 The Constitution and October Events in the Rear Mirror
Yeltsin published his memoirs shortly after the October Events, before the referendum
on the new constitution had taken place. In the preamble, Yeltsin made a connection
between the August Coup and the events in October 1993.
In September -  October 1993 events occurred in Russia making me sit 
down again before empty sheets of paper and after a few weeks I had 
completed the manuscript. I am convinced that I ought to recount now 
what happened to [our] country -  not in two or three years from now. 
August 1991 and October 1993 have merged into one indissoluble chain; 
the empire collapsed and we became witnesses to an agonising and cruel 
parting with an entire era.
At the end of the chapter that deals with the October Events, Yeltsin described the 
October Events as a mirror of the August Coup -  but a reversed one since, ‘as in a 
mirror, everything reflected seems to be the same, but, in fact, it is just the opposite. A 
mirror image is in reverse, after all.’331 For Yeltsin, the August Coup represented a first 
attack on revanchism and the storming of the White House a second and decisive strike 
against the same dark forces. Yeltsin thoroughly vilified his opponents. He associated 
his adversaries with fascism and used a well-known quote from Alexander Pushkin to 
describe the October Events as a ‘senseless and merciless not’.
330 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 8 (also in Yeltsin 
(1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. xviii.
331 Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 282.
332 The quote was from Alexander Pushkin’s ‘The Captain’s Daughter’ (chapter 13), where the main 
character, a tsarist officer, laments the consequences o f the peasant uprising led by Yemilian Pugachev 
in the 18th century. Pugachev falsely claimed to be the murdered tsar Peter III. See also Shlapentokh
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Nobody forced military officer Rutskoi [and] professor Khasbulatov, who 
considered themselves deeply moral politicians, to take help form the neo- 
nazis (neonatsisty). It was at the walls of the White House that the Russian 
fascists (russkie fashisty), who idolized Hitler and his ideas, underwent 
their baptism of fire (proshli svoe boevoe kreshchenie). It was from the 
White House that the impulses came which pushed people to commit the 
most horrible [deeds] -  to bum, to kill and to destroy. The Russian riot, 
senseless and merciless (Russkii bunt, bessmyslennyi i besposhchadnyi), 
was provoked, prepared and carefully planned here. And they did this 
under cover of the lofty banner (vysokoe zvanie) of “the political 
opposition”.333
It is striking that democratic legitimation played a subordinate role in Yeltsin’s
memoirs compared to the statements made in the constitutional battle before the
October Events. Even compared to some of the statements made during the October
Events, the way in which Yeltsin sought to demonise his adversaries in the memoirs
stands out. However, Yeltsin also displayed an aptitude for recognising the force of
democracy as an instrument for co-opting even his opponents. He made clear his
intention to immediately prepare the country for new parliamentary elections and
expressed his conviction that the deputies would rather retain their privileges as
deputies than continue to fight a hopeless battle.
The deputies sitting in the White House would be faced with two 
alternatives: either to leave their bunker and join into the normal pre­
election battle or to remain there in order to become excluded from 
Russia’s political life forever. They had become so accustomed to the 
word “deputy”, they were so fond of adopting laws, living well and not 
having to answer to anything and travel for free on public transport that 
they would not endure more than two weeks of seclusion. They would flee.
They would register with the electoral commission, collect votes and do 
everything in order to become deputies again and again.334
Indeed, one of the critical decisions (taken during the autumn of 1993) for Russia’s 
new political life was that of the Russian Communist Party, the KPRF, to participate in 
the Duma elections. The decision was by no means an obvious one for the KPRF to
(2000) 'The Illusions and Realities of Russian Nationalism', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 
1, p. 175, who noted the use of the same quote in Russia in 2000,
333 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 389 (see also 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), pp. 285-286).
334 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), pp. 257-258 (also in 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 252).
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make. It was made after a fierce debate in which the party leader, Gennadii Ziuganov, 
represented the strand that wanted to participate in the election in order to change the 
system from within. Throughout the election campaign, the KPRF and Ziuganov 
continued to state that they considered the constitution to be illegal. By deciding to 
take part in the election, the KPRF, in practice, accepted the new political rules of the 
game and lent legitimacy to the new Constitution. At the same time, the party itself 
enhanced its legitimacy vis-a-vis its voters since it gained the status of an established 
party.
Throughout the 1990s, Yeltsin continued to emphasise the democratic qualities of the 
constitution and to depict it as a bulwark against chaos. He cast himself (in his role as 
president) as the main protector of the constitution and opposed any attempts to 
introduce changes into the nearly amendment-proof constitution. For example, in his 
State of the Nation Address in March 1997, Yeltsin claimed that the constitution and 
the strong presidential powers it prescribed was the only possible model in ‘the present
337
transitional situation’. He lauded the democratic qualities of the constituion and the 
democratic manner in which it had been adopted. ‘Only three years ago, for the first 
time in its history stretching over many centuries, did Russia receive a Constitution
33 0
which was adopted through the open and free expression of the people’s will.’ 
Yeltsin also pointed to the fact that both presidential and parliamentary elections had 
taken place as prescribed by the constitution. ‘Once again it has been established: we 
have managed to implement a democratic mechanism for power change and 
succession.’339
Nevertheless, the October Events continued to haunt Yeltsin throughout his term in 
office. In its attempts to impeach him, the Duma accused Yeltsin of conspiring to usurp 
power when he issued decree number 1400. Aleksandr Kotenkov, Yeltsin’s
335 BBC SWB, SU/1870 (13 December 1993), B/13.
336 BBC SWB, SU/1870 (13 December 1993), B /ll.
337 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 March 1997, p. 5.
338 Ibid.
n 9Ibid.
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representative in the Duma, relied mainly on democratic arguments when he refuted
this accusation in May 1999. In his view, it was necessary to take into account the
political events leading up to September 1993. Kotenkov claimed that the constitution
still in force at the time, the RSFSR constitution, contained serious contradictions as a
result of the changes introduced gradually. In particular, Kotenkov singled out the
division of power between the various branches of power as a fundamental principle
that Yeltsin had sought to protect when he issued decree number 1400. Most
importantly, however, Kotenkov stated that the decision to hold a referendum on the
constitution and elections for a new parliament demonstrated that Yeltsin had not
intended to acquire absolute power.
The fact that elections to the State Duma of the Federal Assembly were 
announced and held confirms that there was no intention of the President 
to implement legislative authority on his own.
Furthermore, the holding of a general referendum on 12 December 1993, 
through which the new Constitution of the Russian Federation was 
adopted, fully re-established the activity of all branches and institutions of 
state power. This confirmed that the President of the Russian Federation 
had no intention of usurp power and to appropriate authority belonging to 
other branches of power for himself and that he completely observed the 
principle of division of power as an unshakable principle of the 
constitutional structure.340
Among the negative arguments carried forward by Kotenkov at the same time, were 
the accusations against the leadership of the White House. He claimed that the decision 
to use force on 4 October 1993 was taken because ‘illegal armed units constituted a 
real acute threat to the security of citizens’. Furthermore, he claimed that since the 
vertical of power prescribed by the RSFSR constitution was duplicated in the 
constituent subjects of the federation, confrontation between the executive and 
legislative branches existed in the regions as well.341
In his memoirs published in 2000, Yeltsin also relied on mainly negative arguments to 
justify his decision in October 1993.
340 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 13 May 1999 (1999) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedcmiia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 13 maia 1999, dnevnoe
zasedanie, Last accessed: 14 November 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1999/sl3- 
05_d.htm.
341 Ibid.
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I ended my previous book, which I wrote hot on the heels with the tragic 
events of the autumn of 1993. It seemed to me then that all were through 
with communism in the country once and for all. Nobody wanted to bring 
the affair to mass clashes. But once the Supreme Soviet under the 
leadership of Khasbulatov had foisted the logic of civil war upon the 
president and the country, it was necessary to act most resolutely (ochenA/)zhestko) and quickly. These were terrible days for Moscow.
And still, I consider my main victory to be that we were able to avoid 
bloody confrontations on a mass scale, civil war between the supporters of 
the communist Supreme Soviet and the legal presidential power in all of 
Russia.343
It is worth noting that the virulent description of Yeltsin’s adversaries had become 
markedly softened. This is in line with the overall tendency of the legitimation fomula 
of the second half of the 1990s to foster compromise rather than conflict within 
Russian society. Yeltsin also returned to the theme that a strong man was needed in 
order to overcome Russia’s transition phase when he wrote of the economic crisis in 
August 1998. ‘Exactly now, in times of crisis, nothing will succeed unless there is a 
strong (moshchnaia) political figure, who neutralizes today’s whole catastrophe. That 
is the way our country is. (Takaia u nas strand.)'344 This time, Yeltsin left the reader to 
conjure whether he meant that Russia was such a country because of the transition 
process or whether this was Russia’s eternal heritage.345
342 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marqfon: razmyshleniiq vospominaniiq vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 61. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 52-53.)
343 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 62. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 53.)
344 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marqfon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniiq vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 214 (In the 
English edition ‘In this kind of crisis in a country like Russia, nothing will work without a powerful 
political figure who can stabilize the situation.’ p. 176.) In fact, a substantial part o f Yeltsin’s memoirs 
were written as if to pave the way for his successor, Vladimir Putin. In particular, Yeltsin described 
how he looked for a worthy general, ‘one similar to the ones I had read about in books when I was 
young’ to shoulder the Russian presidency. ‘Time passed, and such a general appeared. ... This 
“general” was called... “colonel Vladimir Putin”.’ Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marqfon: 
razmyshleniia, vospominaniiq vpechatleniia.. [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, 
Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 79. See also Avdeenko and Pinsker (2000) Byloe i 
nadumannoe', Itogi, No. 43 (24 October 2000), p. 12.
345 In an article on 21 April 1993, Yeltsin claimed that Russia needed ‘a strong, efficient president’ and 
that each country had to form its political system according to its cultural and historical traditions. 
However, he also claimed that the transition process made this necessary and emphasised that the 
people must elect the president, Rossiiskie vesti, 21 April 1993, pp. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1669 (22 
April 1993), B/l).
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3.5 The Legitimation Formula for the Constitution
The overwhelming majority of the legitimation messages studied above relied on 
democratic legitimation. It was usually references to democracy in its broadest sense 
and to the will of the people. The ‘PEOPLE’ certainly played a central role in its 
legitimation strategy and there was a tendency for the Russian leadership to use the 
Russian synonym for democracy ‘narodovlastie’ especially in times of crises when it 
appealed to the population.346 The Russian leadership was successful in the way it used 
referendums to legitimise its standpoint in the constitutional conflict. Not only did 
referendums constitute a potent democratic argument -  referendums also offered a way 
out of conflicts between elites without resorting to violence.347 After a referendum had 
taken place, the Russian leadership used it extensively in its legitimation efforts and 
claimed that it was implementing the ‘will of the people’. Not least was this the case in 
the referendum on the constitution in December 1993. Strictly speaking, the Russian 
population probably voted for stability rather than for constitutional intricacies, with 
which few were familiar.348 However, the fact that Yeltsin, in spite of having crushed 
his opponents in October 1993, put the constitution to a referendum is telling. The 
referendum was an important argument in the legitimation efforts of the Russian 
leadership.
Less emphasis was put on liberal-democratic values (such as freedom of thought, 
freedom of the press and human rights). However, it is worth emphasising that human 
rights and freedoms are thoroughly emphasised in the constitution itself. Arguments of 
legality and constitutionality appeared only after the new constitution had been 
adopted. In the constitutional battle that raged between the Kremlin and the White
346 Apart from the instances cited above (pp. 101, 102 and 108) see also Yeltsin’s statements before the 
April referendum, see Rossiiskie vesti, 21 April 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1669 (22 April 
1993), B /l) and Rossiiskie vesti, 24 April 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1673 (27 April 1993), 
B/l)
347 Walker (2000) T)o the People Rule? The Use o f Referenda in Russia', in: Sperling (Ed.) Building the 
Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance (Oxford, Westview 
Press), p. 51.
348 Colton (1998) 'Public Opinion and the Constitutional Referendum', in: Colton and Hough (Eds.) 
Growing Pains: Russian Democracy and the Election o f 1993 (Washington, D.C., Brookings 
Institution Press), pp. 291-310.
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House up to October 1993, the Russian leadership claimed that elections rather than 
constitutional paragraphs were the essence of democracy. In the view of the Kremlin, 
the RSFSR constitution had become irrelevant as a result of political events, and 
Yeltsin’s popular mandate better mirrored the interests of the people. After 1993, 
however, the Russian leadership emphasised constitutionality in its efforts to legitimise 
its state building project. Restoring constitutionality was one of the main arguments 
put forward when it launched its military campaign in Chechnya in 1994. Similarly, 
the liberal-democratic arguments in favour of the constitution appeared more 
frequently after December 1993 when the Russian leadership sought to defend itself 
against criticism and proposed constitutional amendments.349
The messages sent in times of crises, when Yeltsin chose to address the population, 
tended to rely more on negative legitimation than other messages in the constitutional 
battle. Firstly, Yeltsin portrayed the alternative to his actions as civil war, chaos and 
possible disintegration of the Russian state. This was obvious in the propaganda before 
the referendum on the constitution in December 1993. Secondly, Yeltsin vilified his 
political opponents. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union 
communism played the role of enemy image. When the confrontation between the 
executive and parliament grew sharper, the Russian leadership started to demonise the
I fA
opposition by referring to it as a communist-fascist bloc or simple ‘bandits’. As tune 
wore on, the Russian leadership less frequently portrayed the choice in October 1993 
as one between communism and democracy. Instead, an unspecified chaos and 
possible disintegration became central in the legitimation strategy.
In a similar manner, the arguments in favour of a strong presidential power were 
overwhelmingly negative. A strong presidential power was first and foremost a 
bulwark against chaos. To point to a Russian tradition of authoritarian rulers would
349 See, especially, the emphasis that Russian textbooks put on studying the guarantees of human rights 
and freedoms in the constitution, chapter six, p. 222.
350 Still, by 2001 most Russians blamed Yeltsin for the October Events, VTTsIOM (2001) Proshlo sem 
let so vremeni krovavikh stolknovenii storonnikov Eltsina i storonnoikov Verkhovnogo Soveta Rossii, 
Khasbulatova i Rntskogo v Moskve 3-4 oktiabria, Last accessed: 9 January 2002, Address: 
http://www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/pnew/bottom2.asp.
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undoubtedly have involved a risk. Although Yeltsin did not mind bringing Peter the 
Great to mind, other examples from Russian history of authoritarian leaders would 
have included Ivan the Terrible and Stalin surely made him shrink back from such 
arguments. It could be argued that the negative arguments propounded in favour of a 
strong presidency implicitly appealed to a Russian authoritarian tradition. However, 
the fact remains that the Russian leadership refrained from referring to a tradition of 
Russian strong leaders bearing in mind that references to this tradition could backfire. 
Instead, the Russian leadership used negative arguments in favour of a strong 
presidency profusely. This certainly suggests that the Russian leadership considered 
negative legitimation the wiser strategy.
National legitimation was not prominent and was resorted to primarily in times of 
crises. When national legitimation occurred, it was usually in general terms. Yeltsin 
and Chernomyrdin both relied on general references to the history and traditions of 
Russia. There were references to Russia as the ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’ but, apart 
from Kostikov’s branding of Khasbulatov as ‘false pretender’ and a politician 
representing clan interests as opposed to genuine Russian interests, the Russian 
leadership eschewed ethnic national legitimation.
The Russian leadership was unsuccessful in instituting the twelfth of December as a 
new holiday (see also chapter five, esp. pp. 178-182). Meanwhile, it deprived itself of 
one of the most important symbols of Russia’s young democratic statehood when the 
White House was stormed. This is illustrated not least by the lack of references to the 
White House after October 1993 as a democratic symbol. Rather than building on the 
democratic legacy of August 1991, the Russian leadership seems to have opted for a 
more traditional symbolism. As will be evident in chapter five, the Russian leadership 
lacked a potent ‘new Russia’ symbolism to fall back upon and relied mainly on pre- 
Soviet symbols as it constructed, for example, the rituals involved in the presidential 
inauguration ceremony.
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Likewise, external legitimation was largely absent. One of the few examples of 
external legitimation was a reference (by Chernomyrdin) to support for Yeltsin offered 
by CIS leaders on the day of the storming of the White House.351 Kostikov, 
furthermore, issued a statement on 16 October 1993 in which he pointed to the West as 
a role model. ‘Is it possible that not even the blood of October 1993 could teach us 
what was understood in the West long ago; citizens must know the limits of freedom, 
that freedom without limits is called anarchy and leads to destruction and discredit of 
democracy.’ Nevertheless, the absence of external arguments is more striking than 
the few examples of when it did occur. This does not imply that the Russian leadership 
regarded the views of the West as unimportant.353 For example, Kozyrev appealed for 
international support in the Washington Post in October 1993.354 However, the West 
was no longer pointed to as a role model. Apparently, the Russian leadership at the 
time did not consider alluding to external legitimation as a potent strategy at home. 
Russia’s “honey moon” with the West had come to a gradual halt. Undoubtedly, the 
role that Western advisors had played in the Russian economic transition had tainted 
the reputation of the West in Russian eyes. The tendency to use narodovlastie to 
denote democracy rather than the Western import demokratiia, especially in appeals to 
the population at critical junctions, ought to be mentioned in this context as well.
351 BBCSWB, SU/1812 (6 October 1993), C/5.
352 Rossiiskie vesti, 16 October 1993, p. 2.
353 In the view of Glinski and Reddaway, ‘open and implicit support for the Kremlin from key officials 
in major Western governments and financial institutions would turn out to be the decisive factor’ in 
the October Events. Reddaway (2001) The Tragedy o f Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against 
Democracy (Washington D.C., United States Institute o f Peace Press), p. 371.
354 Kozyrev (1993) And Now: Partnership with Russia's Democrats, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, 
Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com.
- 1 2 5 -
4 Chechnya -  Two Rounds
In the case of the Belovezha Accords, the Russian leadership had to legitimate a 
reduction of territory when the former Soviet republics became independent. In the 
case of Chechnya, it had to legitimate its refusal to allow the autonomous republic to 
become independent -  its refusal to retract the borders of the Russian Federation 
further. Yeltsin himself became the target of accusations that he had instigated the 
increasing demands for independence from the republics. His critics remembered 
Yeltsin’s appeal (during his struggle with the Soviet centre) for all republics in 1991 to
'JCC
take as much independence as they could handle. It was difficult for the Russian 
leadership to explain wherein lay the fundamental difference between the demands for 
independence from the Soviet republics in 1991 and those of the Russian republics 
later. As mentioned, Yeltsin sought to make a not entirely successful distinction 
between fair ‘independence claims’ and unjust ‘separatist claims’. From the very 
beginning of the military operation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership bluntly 
refused to discuss the conflict in terms of demands for independence or self- 
determination carried forward by a national minority. Instead, restoration of 
constitutional order and the risk of disintegration of the Russian state became the main 
themes.
The early legitimation efforts for the war in Chechnya that the Russian leadership 
made also suggest that it had seriously misjudged domestic public opinion, the support 
it would receive from the media and the international community. Even more 
damaging was that Moscow misjudged the Chechen resistance. The decision to 
intervene with military force came at a time when the main ingredients of the 
legitimation formula for the state building project were focused on democratic and 
negative arguments. The importance of elections and a popular mandate were firmly 
entrenched as legitimation arguments. This explained why the early legitimation 
rhetoric for the war in Chechnya used a range of democratic arguments. Another
355 This would later be referred to as ‘Yeltsin having played the national card’. See also chapter six, 
p. 225, on how this linkage was made in Russian textbooks.
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salient ingredient used was the threat of disintegration. This form of negative 
legitimation together with attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the Chechen leader, 
Dzhokhar Dudayev, quickly became prominent.
To the Russian leadership the threat of disintegration was probably more than a 
justification device -  it loomed large in the mind of many politicians. Indeed, Oleg 
Soskovets, then deputy prime minister, excluded the possibility of ‘legitimate 
secession’ of a republic from the Russian Federation a few weeks before the 
referendum on the new constitution. In other words, the threat of disintegration had 
already been invoked to legitimise the new constitution and Moscow regarded 
Chechen demands for independence as a serious threat to the integrity of the Russian 
Federation. Ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the unfolding of 
events in the former Yugoslavia, this threat had been uppermost in many politicians’ 
minds. However, the way events unfolded suggests that the Russian leadership was 
unsuccessful in portraying the first war in Chechnya as a paramount threat to Russian 
integrity and democracy. Apparently, the Russian population was less inclined to 
perceive of Chechnya’s demands for independence as a threat to the survival of the 
Russian state -  Groznyi was far away from Moscow. In addition, the first war in 
Chechnya provoked dissenting views, which cut through the Russian leadership. This 
was the case from the very decision to intervene in November 1994, during the entire 
war and right up to the peace agreement reached in August 1996.
4.1 Moscow’s First Chechen Campaign 1994-96
The conflict between Moscow and Chechnya was brought to a head in 1994 and 
became one of the greatest challenges to the Russian leadership. With the intractable 
republic of Tatarstan Moscow managed to negotiate a peaceful solution. There could 
have been a possibility of reaching a similar agreement with Chechnya before the first
356 BBC SWB, SU/1861 (2 December 1993), B/4.
357 Lapidus (1999) 'The Dynamics of Secession in the Russian Federation: Why Chechnya?' in: Alexseev 
(Ed.) Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperiled (New York, St 
Martin's Press), p. 55.
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Russian campaign in Chechnya in 1994. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the threat 
of disintegration might have determined the actual moment when the Russian 
leadership decided to intervene against Chechnya. There were several other grounds on 
which Moscow might have wanted to sharpen its attitude in late 1994. Moscow wanted 
to increase its control over vital routes of transportation in the area and Yeltsin and his 
entourage might also have seen the conflict as a way to improve Yeltsin’s plummeting 
ratings.
Chechnya carried with it a long history of violent resistance against Soviet and Russian 
supremacy. The Chechen demands for independence following the fall of the Soviet 
Union ought not to have caught Moscow off guard. Yeltsin made an attempt to 
introduce a state of emergency in Chechnya in November 1991, but was compelled to 
withdraw his decree when it failed to pass the Supreme Soviet. From 1992 and 
through most of 1994, Groznyi and Moscow essentially tried to ignore each other’s 
demands. Meanwhile, Moscow increasingly lost control of the region. Dudayev 
refused to recognise the elections that were held in December 1993 or the referendum 
on the Constitution as valid in Chechnya. In Februaiy 1994, Dudayev stated that ‘If
elections have been held in Russia, we express our congratulations on their successful
• 1£1completion. As for Chechnya, elections here were held m 1991.’ Meanwhile, the 
seats reserved for representatives of the Chechen Republic gaped empty in both the 
Duma and in the Federation Council.362
358 Dunlop (1998) Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots o f a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 214-220.
359 Sakwa (1996) Russian Politics and Society (London, Routledge), p. 207 and White (2000) Russia's 
New Politics: The Management o f a Postcommunist Society (New York, Cambridge University Press), 
p. 96. See also Grammatikov (1998) 'The Russian Intervention in Chechnya in December 1994: Issues 
and Decision-Making', The Journal o f  Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 124-129.
360 BBC SWB, SU/1227 (12 November 1991), Cl/3. Yeltsin later claimed that the ‘ethnic (natsionalnaia) 
catastrophe in Chechnya’ had been overlooked during the ‘formidable, epoch-making events of 1991’. 
Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 64 (also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 54-55).
361 BBC SWB, SU/1926 (19 Februaiy 1994), B/5.
362 White, et al. (1997) How Russia Votes (Chatham, N.J., Chatham House Publishers), pp. 110,120.
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By November 1994, the conflict had already escalated to the point where it would have 
been difficult for Moscow to back down without losing prestige. The Russian Security 
Council decided to intervene in Chechnya on 29 November 1994. Even within the 
Security Council, where representatives of the so-called power ministries dominate, 
the decision provoked considerable discord.364 On the very same evening Yeltsin 
issued an ultimatum to the warring parties in Chechnya to cease fighting. If not, a state 
of emergency would be introduced to ‘put a stop to bloodshed, to protect the life, rights 
and freedoms of citizens of Russia and to restore constitutional legality, law, order and 
peace in the Chechen republic’. This signalled that ‘restoration of the constitution’ 
would become the leading theme of the legitimation formula.
By December 1994, a staged attempt to take Groznyi with Russian special forces had 
failed and on 11 December Russian forces entered Chechnya -  the prelude of a 
nightmare for Chechnya and Moscow. The war proved to be anything but easy to win 
and soon the question was raised as to whether Yeltsin had acted in accordance with 
the constitution when he started the offensive against Groznyi. The problems that 
Moscow’s campaign in Chechnya encountered were aggravated by its failure to obtain 
favourable media coverage of the war.
That the Russian leadership misjudged the support it would receive from its earlier 
allies, the media and the international community, was obvious from a number of 
statements made in December 1994 -  January 1995. On 13 December 1994, Andrei
363 Smith (1995) Chechnya: The Political Dimension, RMA Sandhurst, Conflict Studies Research 
Centre, May 1995, P14, p. 6.
364 Huskey (1999) Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe), p. 79.
365 BBC SWB, SU/2166 (30 November 1994), B/3. For extracts from Yeltsin’s statement see also 
Rossiiskie vesti, 30 November 1994, p. 1.
366 Staar (1996) The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image (Annapolis, Maryland, 
Naval Institute Press), p. 17 and Petrukhin (1995) The Chechen War Is Unlawful', Moscow News, No. 
2 (13-19 Januaiy 1995), p. 3.
367 Herd (2000) 'The 'Counter-Terrorist Operation' in Chechnya: 'Information Warfare' Aspects', The 
Journal o f Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 58 and Mickiewicz (1995) 'The Political 
Economy of Media Democratisation', in: Lane (Ed) Russia in Transition: Politics Privatisation and 
Inequality (Harlow, Longman), p. 165.
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Kozyrev remained convinced that the surrounding world would react with
understanding to the military operation in Chechnya.
There has been and will be just one reaction to today’s actions and 
tomorrow’s: sympathy for the legal and democratic authorities of the 
Russian Federation acting on the basis of a democratic constitution 
approved by the whole people to -  and I would like to say this once 
again -  to protect the rights and liberties of citizens whether it be in 
Chechnya or any other region of the Russian Federation.
In a statement on the same day, Chernomyrdin echoed the conviction that the Russian 
leadership would receive support because support for its military operation in 
Chechnya was tantamount to support for Russia as a democratic state. ‘The country 
has experienced the first anniversary of the Russian (rossiiskaia) democratic 
Constitution.’ He was convinced that people would understand that this was ‘a
'id Z Q
question of the future of the young Russian (rossiiskaia) democracy’. Similarly, a
‘temporary press centre’ issued a statement on 13 December 1994 warning o f ‘erupting
hysteria’, which might jeopardize Russian democracy.
In recent days political figures on different levels and calibre have made 
statements in the press, on radio and in television programmes regarding 
the events in the Chechen Republic. Some of these contain evaluations that 
are entirely inadmissible, both in tone and in contents, of the actions taken 
by the President and government of the Russian Federation in order to 
regulate the crisis. In a situation of constantly erupting hysteria attempts 
are being made at carrying out a demonstrative burial (pokazatelnye
3 7 0pokhorony) of the young Russian (rossiiskii) democracy.
Notwithstanding these warnings, the Russian leadership failed to achieve positive 
coverage of its war in Chechnya in the media. Both the international and the domestic
371opinion became increasingly critical of the Russian intervention in Chechnya.
368 BBC SWB, SU/2179 (15 December 1994), B/10.
369 Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/2179 (15 December 1994), B/7.
370 Rossiiskie vesti, 15 December 1994, p. 1. See also Kozyrev’s concern that ’Russian and foreign 
media’ had not realised ‘the fact that Chechnya is Russia’, BBC SWB, SU/2207 (21 January 1995), 
B /ll.
371 Wagnsson (2000) Russian Political Language and Public Opinion on the West, NATO and 
Chechnya: Securitisation Theory Reconsidered (Stockholm, University of Stockholm), pp. 145-153.
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Early in the campaign, the Russian leadership took great pains to emphasise that the 
war was in accordance with the constitution and that it was a necessary evil in order to 
be able to hold democratic elections in Chechnya. Typically, Yeltsin’s statement, 
which was broadcast on the first day of the military operation in Chechnya, portrayed 
the war as an action undertaken in accordance with the Russian constitution. ‘As
7^7President I will make sure that the Constitution and Law is adhered to.’ In his 
address to parliament on the same day, he made references to ’human rights and 
freedoms’, but the emphasis was on ’restoring constitutional order on the territory of 
the Chechen republic’. Accordingly, the presidential decree ’On Measures to 
Interrupt the Activity of Unlawful Armed Deployments on the Territory of the 
Chechen Republic’ was dominated by democratic legitimation.374 The emphasis on the 
importance of restoring ‘constitutional order’ continued to echo in the legitimation
37c
formula of the Russian leadership throughout the war in Chechnya.
Depicting Dudayev as a criminal and as having come to power illegitimately became 
another main theme of the legitimation effort for the war in Chechnya. As time wore 
on, Moscow’s adversaries in Chechnya were routinely referred to as ‘bandits’ 
(bcmdity) and ‘units of bandits’ ('bandformirovaniia). This was an effort of the
372 Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2177 (13 December 1994), B/5. In 
line with this, Yeltsin had excluded the possibility of a republic leaving the Russian Federation since 
this would go against the constitution in an interview in Izvestiia, 10 December 1994, p. 2. See also, 
for example, Chernomyrdin’s speech on 13 December in Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994, p. 2 
(also in BBC SWB, SU/2179 (15 December 1994), B/6) and Yeltsin’s address on 27 December 1994, 
Rossiiskie vesti, 28 December 1994, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/2187 (28 December 1994), B/6).
373 BBC SWB, SU/2178 (14 December 1994), B/8. See also Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994, p. 1 for 
a summary of Yeltsin’s address in parliament.
374 Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994. For other examples of statements and decrees where democratic 
legitimation was prevalent, see also Rossiiskie vesti, 15 December 1994, p. 1, BBC SWB, SU/2179 (15 
December 1994), B/7-10, 12, BBC SWB, SU/2181 (17 December 1994), B/8, Rossiiskie vesti, 20, 22, 
27 and 28 December 1994.
375 See, for example, Yeltsin’s speech in the Federal Assembly introducing his State of the Nation 
Address on 16 February 1995, Rossiiskie vesti, 17 Februaiy 1995, p. 2 (also in BBC SWB, SU/2230, 
(17 February 1995), B/7), his State of the Nation Address on 23 February 1996, BBC SWB, SU/2544 
(24 February 1996), B/6 (a summary of Yeltsin’s speech was available in Krasnaia zvezda, 24 
Februaiy 1996, p. 1.). In March 1997, Yeltsin’s State of the Nation Address focused on the necessity 
to hold democratic elections in Chechnya, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 March 1997, p. 5.
376 See, for example, Rossiiskie vesti, 23 September 1995, p. 1, BBC SWB, SU/2207 (21 January 1995), 
B /ll, SU/2510 (16 January 1996), B/7, SU/2576 (2 April 1996), B/4, Krasnaia zvezda, 17 and 20 
June 1995, p. 1 and Yeltsin’s statement in Istanbul, Yeltsin (1999) Statement by Boris N. Yeltsin o f the 
Russian Federation (unofficial translation), Istanbul, OSCE, 18 November 1999, OSCE Summit, 
SUMDEL/27/99.
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Russian leadership to evoke an image of the Chechen adversaries as ravaging bands 
outside the pale of law and modem civilisation. In decree number 2166, Yeltsin 
instructed his government of the need for ‘fighting criminality and for disarming all
7^7illegal units’. Negative legitimation played a subordinate role in the first statements 
made by the Russian leadership, but was certainly the second most important
• 7^0ingredient after democratic legitimation.
Apart from portraying the Chechen leadership as criminals or bandits lacking popular 
support, the Russian leadership evoked the image of impending Russian disintegration
1 7 0
following a Yugoslav pattern. This was evident not least in Yeltsin’s TV address on 
11 December when he stated that the military campaign in Chechnya was ‘prompted 
by the threat posed to Russia’s integrity’. He also claimed that a peaceful solution to 
the conflict had been impossible, though desirable. ‘But right now peaceful 
negotiations and free expression of the will of the Chechen people are hindered by the 
danger of full-scale civil war that hangs over the Chechen Republic.’380 Although the 
implication was a threat of disintegration, the threat of civil war loomed over 
Chechnya primarily. Civil war did not threaten the Russian heartland. Possibly, the 
Russian public did not even consider Chechnya an integral part of Russia.
More damaging was that the Russian leadership was unsuccessful in its efforts to avert 
the threat. The war demanded considerable resources and was evidently going badly. 
By January 1995, Yeltsin claimed that ‘the military phase of restoring the Constitution
• 101of Russia m the Chechen republic was practically completed’. This optimism proved
to be premature. Fighting continued and as the ninth of May 1995 (the fiftieth
377 Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994, p. 1. See also the statement by the ‘temporary press centre’, 
Rossiiskie vesti, 15 December 1994, p. 1.
378 Yeltsin’s also used negative arguments in his speech in the Duma on 13 December 1994, BBC SWB, 
SU/2178 (14 December 1994), B/8-9 (a summary was available in Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 
1994, p. 1). See also statements by the government, Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994, BBC SWB, 
SU/2179 (15 December 1994), B/12 and Rossiiskie vesti, 28 December 1994.
379 See, for example, Rossiiskie vesti, 17 February 1995, p. 2 (also in BBC SWB, SU/2230 (17 February
1995), B/7) and Krasnaia zvezda, 17 June 1995, p. 1. (also in BBC SWB, SU/2332 (17 June 1995), 
B/5).
380 Rossiiskie vesti, 14 December 1994, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2177 (13 December 1994), B/4.
381 Rossiiskie vesti, 20 January 1995, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2207 (21 January 1995), B/5.
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anniversary of the victory in World War II) approached, the Russian leadership made 
attempts to achieve at least a cease-fire. The Kremlin did not want to have a war within 
the borders of the Russian Federation on what should have been an untarnished day of 
victory with dignitaries invited from all over the world. Furthermore, domestic 
opposition against the war remained strong.
In April 1995, Moscow put out several feelers for bringing about a cease-fire, but the 
Chechen leaders remained suspicious of Moscow’s intentions.383 In spite of this, 
Yeltsin issued a decree proclaiming a moratorium on fighting in Chechnya from
'1QAmidnight on 28 April until midnight on 12 May. Fighting continued, however, even 
as Moscow made further attempts to make the one-sided cease-fire into something
“I O Cmore permanent. The Russian leadership soon abandoned this plan. No tangible 
attempts were made to legitimate this tactical attempt to reach a settlement. Neither did 
Yeltsin refer to the war in any of the speeches he made that day.386
In July 1995, a group of deputies of the State Duma and the Federation Council asked 
the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of three decrees on Chechnya
207
issued by Yeltsin in November and December 1994. On 10 July 1995 deputy prime 
minister, Sergei Shakhrai, addressed the Constitutional Court to defend the 
constitutionality of the decrees in question.388 According to Shakhrai, the president had 
the right to independently intervene ‘to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty 
of the state’. According to Shakhrai, ‘in such a situation the President of the Russian 
Federation was obliged to take these measures and give the corresponding instructions
382 See also Lieven (1998) Chechnya: Tombstone o f Russian Power (New Haven, Yale University 
Press), p. 375 for a description of the problems that the leadership in Moscow faced.
383 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 25 April 1995, BBC SWB, SU/2287 (26 April 1995), B/5-6.
384 BBC SWB, SU/2290 (29 April 1995), B/2.
385 BBC SWB, SU/2298 (9 May 1995), B/3, BBC SWB, SU/2302 (13 May 1995), B/4.
386 The anniversary is discussed also in chapter five, pp. 175-176).
387 The three decrees were Decree No. 1833, issued on 2 November 1994, Decree No. 2137, issued on 
30 November 1994 and Decree No. 2166, issued on 9 December 1994. Furthermore, a government 
regulation (No. 1330) issued on 9 December 1994 was under examination.
388 Shakhrai’s address was published in Rossiiskie vesti, 12 July 1995, p. 2 and 13 July 1995, pp. 2-4.
- 1 3 3 -
4 Ch e c h n y a  -  Two R o u n d s
lOQ
to the Government of the Russian Federation.’ It is hardly surprising that Shakhrai, a
lawyer by training, concentrated on defending Yeltsin’s decrees by arguing that they
were fully in line with the constitution and Russia’s laws rather than on general
references to democracy and elections. Even when Shakhrai used the Russian word for
democracy, narodovlastie, the argument was, in essence, one of constitutionality rather
than one of popular mandate.
Our legal analysis starts with the first chapter of the Constitution of Russia, 
since according to article 16 the very stipulations of this chapter have a 
prioritised meaning and have direct consequences.
The fundamental basis of the constitutional system of the Russian 
Federation is democracy (narodovlastie). The carrier of sovereignty and 
only source of power in the Russian Federation is its people. 
Referendums and free elections are the highest direct expression of the 
people’s power.390
Apart from the arguments based on constitutionality and the legality of the decrees in 
question, Shakhrai warned of the alternative -  disintegration of the Russian state and
civil war in the area -  and claimed that the ‘Dudayev regime’ was based on
*>01
criminality. In the end, the Constitutional Court decided in favour of Yeltsin on all 
accounts. This victory was, however, eclipsed by the humiliating defeats that 
Moscow continued to suffer both on the ground in Chechnya and in trying to win over 
public opinion.
Two nation-wide elections, parliamentary and presidential, were approaching: the 
Duma in December 1995 and the presidential in the summer of 1996. There could be 
little doubt that the war in Chechnya would be an impediment for the Russian 
leadership in both elections. Accusations that Yeltsin had gone against the Constitution 
when he started the war continued to be voiced. Furthermore, the international 
community, in general, and the Council of Europe, in particular, were concerned about 
how Moscow was fighting the war in Chechnya. The Council of Europe explicitly
389 Rossiiskie vesti, 13 July 1995, p. 4.
390 Rossiiskie vesti, 12 July 1995, p. 2 [bold letters in the original].
391 Rossiiskie vesti, 12 July 1995, p. 2 and 13 July 1995, pp. 2-4.
392 Rossiiskie vesti, 1 August 1995, p. 1.
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stated that it took its time according Russia membership because of the war in 
Chechnya. In addition, the terrorist operations in Budennovsk in June 1995 and 
January 1996 seriously undermined the authority of the Russian leadership. All these 
challenges made the manifestly unpopular war a serious encumbrance to the Russian 
leadership.
4.2 Terrorism Enters the Legitimation Formula
Terrorism arguments entered the Russian legitimation formula in 1995 after the events 
in Budennovsk and, in 1996, in Kizliar. Terrorism was not a phenomenon new to
•  fhRussians. The Russian empire had experienced terrorist acts in the 19 century with 
groups such as The Will of the People (Narodnaia volia). However, the word 
‘terrorism’ did not feature prominently in the early legitimation messages for the 
Russian military campaign in Chechnya or for Russian state building in general. The 
military doctrine of 1993 mentioned the threat from ‘terrorist acts’ and ‘international 
terrorism’, but this threat was subordinate to the threat to ‘the territorial integrity’ of 
Russia that might arise from local conflicts involving ‘separatists’ and ‘aggressive 
nationalism’. This changed when a group of Chechen fighters (led by Shamil 
Basaev) crossed the border of Chechnya and got as far as the Stavropol region where 
they held several hundred hostages in a hospital in the town Budennovsk. The 
subsequent attack by Chechen fighters on Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe in Dagestan in 
January 1996 further strengthened the anti-terrorist rhetoric of the Russian leadership.
During some of the most intense days of the hostage crisis in Budennovsk, Yeltsin was 
at the G-7 meeting in Nova Scotia. During a press conference on 17 June Yeltsin gave 
free vent to his anger at what had happened. He denounced Chechnya as a ‘center of 
world terrorism, of bribery and corruption and mafia’. In his view, it was imperative 
that Russian forces ‘destroy those terrorists and bandits’.394 Meanwhile, the Group of 
Seven leaders emphasised that -  in their view -  the conflict in Chechnya could only be
393 Most of the text o f the military doctrine was published in Krasnaia zvezda, 19 November 1993, p. 3- 
4. See also Lena Jonson on the use of the term terrorism. Jonson (2001) Russia and Central Asia: 
Terrorism as the Issue, AAASS 33rd National Convention, Arlington, Virginia, 15-18 November 2001, 
pp. 3-5.
394 Washington Post, 18 June 1995, www.nll3.newsbank.com, Retrieved: 6 November 2001.
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solved by political means, although they also condemned the terrorist attack. A
statement by Yeltsin was published in Russia on the same day. It condemned the
terrorist acts in Budennovsk and made a direct connection to Dudayev in Chechnya.
Still, Yeltsin overwhelmingly chose to depict its adversaries as ‘bandits’.
A criminal act, unparalleled in cruelty and cynicism, has been committed 
by the Dudayev fighters in Budennovsk. Devoid of human characteristics, 
the bandits attacked a peaceful city, killed defenceless citizens and took as 
hostages ill people, women and children.
The tragedy in Budennovsk ends discussion of the character of the former 
Dudayev regime. Now it is obvious to all that the slogans of national- 
liberation struggle were only a cover for criminals, who had eagerly taken
397up arms. ...
Together with all Russians (rossiiane) I mourn those who have fallen 
victim at the hands of the bandits. I call upon all the citizens of Russia to 
remain calm and to persevere, to support the actions of the federal 
authorities aimed at checking the actions of the terrorists and at restoring
^QO
constitutional order.
When Yeltsin addressed the Russian population upon his return from Halifax, 
‘terrorism’ was not mentioned although he spoke again of the ‘unparalleled cynicism’ 
of those who had perpetrated the hostage-taking operation. Nevertheless, Yeltsin 
continued to make a distinction between ‘bandits’ and the ‘Chechen people’.399 Two 
ministers, held responsible for the tragedy in Budennovsk and for the failed attempt by 
special forces to storm the hospital, were forced to resign. The resignations were 
announced after a meeting in the Russian Security Council on 29 June 1995. A few 
days earlier, Yeltsin opened a session of the Security Council by declaring: ‘Our main 
task is to decide how to find a solution to the situation in the Chechen Republic.’400 It
395 Ibid.
396 Krasnaia zvezda, 17 June 1995, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2332 (17 June 1995), B/5.
397 Krasnaia zvezda, 17 June 1995, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2332 (17 June 1995), B/5.
398 Ibid. Shakhrai also made a brief reference to ‘terrorist activities against Russian citizens’ in his 
defence to the Constitutional Court of Yeltsin’s decision to intervene in Chechnya, Rossiiskie vesti, 13 
July 1995, p. 3.
399 Krasnaia zvezda, 20 June 1995, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2334 (20 June 1995), B /l for the 
English text and Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 June 1995, p. 1, for a summary. See also Yeltsin’s speech 
during the hostage crisis in January 1996, where he stated that: ‘Terrorism has no nationality. We have 
never considered the Chechen people synonymous with banditry and never will.’ BBC SWB, SU/2514 
(18 January 1996), B/l.
400 Rossiiskie vesti, 31 August 1995, p. 1. The two ministers were the minister of interior, Viktor Yerin, 
and the head of the FSK (Federal Counter Intelligence Service), Sergei Stepashin.
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was clear that the hostage situation in Budennovsk had shaken the Russian leadership.
Yeltsin largely left it to Chernomyrdin to deal with the situation -  something that
resulted in considerable tensions between the Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin.401 The event
had further undermined its authority.402 A statement by the head of the Presidential
Administration, Sergei Filatov, bore testimony to the fact that this was a cause of
concern to the Kremlin:
Actually, in Budennovsk, a terrible incident took place. Not only because 
many people died (this is, of course, the main thing), but it was terrible 
because people saw the impotence of those who were supposed to protect 
them.403
Only months away from the Duma election, the Russian leadership was eager to 
improve its image and this (in conjunction with the traumatic events in Budennovsk) 
induced the Kremlin to try and negotiate a peace settlement in Chechnya. However, the 
peace negotiations soon ground to a halt and, six months after the attack on 
Budennovsk, Chechen fighters under the leadership of Salman Raduev, staged a 
similar attack on the town of Kizliar in Dagestan. After an attack against a military 
airfield outside Kizliar on 9 January 1996, Raduev and his group took two thousand 
hostages. The Raduev group was promised safe passage and left Kizliar together with 
160 of the hostages. When Russian federal forces attacked them, they fled into the 
village of Pervomaiskoe. On 15 January, the Russian leadership decided to use force to 
free the hostages. The number of casualties was staggering on both sides. Raduev and 
his men held out for three days before they fled back into Chechnya.
Remembering how the hostage-taking in Budennovsk had undermined its authority, 
the Russian leadership was eager to display resolve. Yeltsin stated that ‘a country 
where there is authority will not tolerate criminals running wild’.404 Furthermore, he
401 Huskey (1999) Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, New York, ME. Sharpe), pp. 100-101.
402 Anatol Lieven, p. 125. It also provoked a vote of confidence in the government in the Duma. 
Chernomyrdin’s government lost the first vote of confidence, but won the second after Yeltsin had 
thrown his weight behind the government and threatened to dissolve the Duma. Gill and Markwick 
(2000) Russia's Stillborn Democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin (Oxford, Oxford University Press),
p. 186.
403 Rossiiskie vesti, 14 July 1995, p. 1.
404 BBC SWB, SU/2510 (16 January 1996), B/7.
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claimed that there were mercenaries from Iran and Pakistan among the ‘bandits’ in 
Pervomaiskoe.405 Terrorism within the Russian Federation was increasingly 
internationalised by the Russian leadership. A few days later, Yeltsin stated that 
‘Chechen terrorism’ had already spread into Turkey and become ‘international
A C \fiterrorism’. On 16 January 1996 a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry made
a statement about the events in Pervomaiskoe to Russian and foreign journalists, in
which external legitimation featured prominently.
The steps being taken are completely in line with the state’s obligations to 
protect the rights and interests of citizens and to combat terrorism and also 
with the existing international standards and the principles which 
democratic countries have developed through their own experience of 
contact with terrorism. This bitter experience demonstrates that passivity 
with regard to the actions of bandits can lead and, as we can see, does lead 
to the repetition of such actions in other areas and to the spread of the 
plague of terrorism to the whole of the country’s territory....
The international community is united with regard to terrorism. 
Throughout the world the conviction is that this evil should be stopped by 
the most resolute actions.407
The statement signalled a new strategy from the Russian leadership in that it would, 
henceforth, try to obtain international support for the struggle against terrorism. Such 
support would be a useful argument vis-a-vis the domestic audience while at the same 
time improving Moscow’s chances to gain access to the inner circle of the international 
community, in spite of the war in Chechnya. Thus, on 24 January 1996, when Yeltsin’s 
press secretary made a statement on the approaching vote in PACE on Russian 
membership within the Council of Europe, he referred to the ‘terrorist act of 
unprecedented scale’ in Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe. He went on to claim that failure to 
bestow membership on the Russian Federation would show ‘support for the sides 
which are aiming to resolve the Chechen problem by inhumane, terrorist methods’.408 
A couple of months later, Yeltsin took part in a summit in Egypt to discuss the
405 Ibid.,B/&.
406 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 January 1996, p. 7. See also Yeltsin’s speech when visiting Budennovsk in 
April 1996, Rossiiskie vesti, 18 April 1996, p. 1 (for a summary, see BBC SWB, SU/2589 (18 April
1996), B/3).
407 BBC SWB, SU/2512 (18 January 1996), B/9.
408 Rossiiskie vesti, 24 January 1996, p. 1.
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problems of the Middle East and terrorism. He condemned terrorism in the Middle 
East and linked it to the war in Chechnya, asking for understanding for the Russian 
problems there.
Terrorist actions everywhere are aimed against peace, accord and 
democracy. All countries and the world community’s healthy forces 
therefore should join efforts to eradicate this threat hanging over the world.
.. .Dudayev’s criminal forces are subjecting whole towns to terror; they are 
seizing hospitals and accompanying their banditry with burglary, violence 
and undisguised marauding.409
Rhetoric pointing to terrorism became an important ingredient in the Russian 
legitimation formula for the war in Chechnya after Budennovsk and Pervomaiskoe. It 
was destined to remain so even when it created problems for the Russian leadership. 
That was the case when Moscow tried to negotiate a solution to the conflict. The 
Russian leadership sought to solve this rhetorical dilemma by making the distinction 
between ‘terrorists’ and the ‘Chechen people’. However, Moscow still found itself in a 
quandary since the representatives of the Republic of Chechnya with whom it chose to 
negotiate lacked the necessary authority in Chechnya to implement any peace treaty. 
When the Russian leadership finally started negotiations with the very people it had 
designated as terrorists and bandits, Yeltsin underlined that Moscow would ‘not begin 
to tolerate terrorist actions’.410 Nevertheless, since it failed to destroy its adversaries, 
the Russian leadership was forced to negotiate with them. In doing so it recognised 
them -  in practice -  as the representatives of the Chechen side in the conflict.
4.3 Elections and the Quest for Peace
In the summer of 1995, after the hostage crisis in Budennovsk, the election for the 
Duma was only a few months away and the Russian leadership sought to launch a 
solution to the conflict. In early August, Yeltsin hailed the peace talks and claimed 
they had ‘met their first success’. The settlement was legitimated primarily in formal 
democratic terms. Yeltsin defended the decision to use force in Chechnya by stating
409 BBC SWB, SU/2561 (15 March 1996), B/12. See also Rossiiskie vesti, 14 March 1996, p. 1, for a 
summary.
410 Rossiiskie vest, 2 April 1996, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2576 (2 April 1996), B/l and UN 
Document, p. 2.
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that the actions in Chechnya were ‘within the framework of the Russian constitution
and international law’. The peace settlement was also legitimated in democratic terms.
‘The signed agreement paves the way to holding free democratic elections on Chechen
soil. The Chechen republic and its people should have legitimate bodies of power.’411
Of course, this statement pointed to the basic flaw in the proposed settlement since it
was precisely the constitution of the Russian Federation and Moscow’s insistence on it
pertaining to the territory of Chechnya that constituted the source of the conflict in the
first place. The peace negotiations came to a halt when an attempt was made on the life
of the Russian commander in Chechnya, General Anatolyi Romanov.412 In early
December 1995, new efforts were made under the leadership of Viktor Chernomyrdin
to find a solution along the lines of a “Tatarstan model”. On 8 December, an agreement
on power sharing between Moscow and Chechnya was signed, but this did not stop the
fighting. In his address to the Chechen people on 9 December, Yeltsin stressed the
need for elections to be held in Chechnya when the Duma election was held in the rest
of the Russian Federation.
If calm, stability and order is to be returned to Chechnya, a lawfully- 
elected authority is needed. ... The people should elect to the bodies of 
power those people whom they can entrust their fate, those people who 
regard the future of the Chechen republic as their supreme goal413
Elections were held and the Russian authorities hailed the election results as a great 
success for democracy in Chechnya. The head of the Chechen electoral commission 
talked of an ‘exceptional turnout’. He claimed that the reason why the number of votes 
in Groznyi exceeded the city’s population was due to the ‘flood of people’ in 
surrounding villages who had wanted to vote.414 Yeltsin’s envoy in Chechnya used the 
turnout of more than 60 per cent to claim that the population now had demonstrated a 
will to change the situation 415 It is hardly surprising that the election results were 
questioned. Not only did journalists in Chechnya report on irregularities, the fact that
411 BBC SWB, SU/2374 (5 August 1995), B/l-2.
412 Lieven (1998) Chechnya: Tombstone o f Russian Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), pp. 
135-136.
413 BBC SWB, SU/2483 (11 December 1995), B/9.
414 BBC SWB, SU/2490 (19 December 1995), B /l.
415 Ibid.
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Russian troops were instructed to vote at their place of deployment most likely 
explained why the turnout in Groznyi was so high. The reported turnout in Chechnya, 
64.7 per cent matched the overall turnout in the Russian Duma election (64.4 per 
cent).416 Holding elections in Chechnya, in spite of an ongoing war, might have been in 
line with the legitimating rhetoric of the Russian leadership, but it did little to further 
the peace process. Fighting continued in Chechnya and Yeltsin did not mention the 
situation in Chechnya in his New Year Message on 31 December 1995.417
Yeltsin hesitated before the presidential election in 1996. His ratings were at a single­
digit level and Yeltsin perceived the war in Chechnya as one of the main causes. ‘The 
people could not forgive the “shock therapy” or the ignominy in Budennovsk and 
Groznyi. Everything seemed lost.’418 However, another initiative to solve the conflict 
came on 31 March 1996, when Yeltsin issued decree number 435 ‘On a Programme of 
Regulation of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic’. The decree claimed that the process 
of ‘restoring order in the Chechen Republic’ was entering ‘its final phase’. It especially 
emphasised that elections had been held in the republic and one of the main points of 
the programme was to hold further ‘free democratic elections’ to a legislative organ.419 
On the same day, Yeltsin addressed the Russian population on television to explain the 
plan to regulate the conflict. The Russian representative circulated Yeltsin’s address in 
the United Nations. In line with the decree, democratic arguments dominated Yeltsin’s 
address, while emphasising that ‘terrorist actions’ would not be tolerated.420 In a
416 Lieven (1998) Chechnya: Tombstone o f  Russian Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 137, 
Shevtsova (1999) Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace), pp. 145-146 and White, et al. (1997) How Russia Votes (Chatham, N.J., 
Chatham House Publishers), pp. 227-228.
417 BBC SWB, SU/2499 (3 January 1996), B /l.
418 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospomincmiia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 24 (also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 17). After the election, presidential aide 
Georgii Satarov claimed that Yeltsin had named Chechnya as the most serious mistake he had 
committed, Segodnia, 2 August 1996, p. 5 (also in BBC SWB, SU/2681 (3 August 1996), B/2).
419 The presidential decree was published in Rossiiskie vesti, 2 April 1996, p. 2. (The decree was also 
available in BBC SWB, SU/2576 (2 April 1996), B/6 and Rossiiskaia gazeta, 3 April 1996, p. 3.)
420 Rossiiskie vest, 2 April 1996, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2576 (2 April 1996), B/l and UN 
Document, p. 2.
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question and answer session that followed on his televised address, Yeltsin was asked
if he believed that the war in Chechnya could have been averted; he replied:
No. It would have flared up one day in any case, perhaps resulting in even 
more acute and tragic situations and consequences than now. ... 
Unfortunately, during that time Dudayev began his activities in the 
Chechen republic, setting up a real army, larger than the armies of some 
states. He staged unlawful elections there and dismissed the parliament....
So, a danger emerged here for us: how could we find a way to extricate 
ourselves from a situation in which he began to terrorize his own 
people?421
Again, it is worth noting that the danger pertained foremost to the area of the Chechen 
Republic. Yeltsin’s accusation that Dudayev ‘staged unlawful elections’ and 
‘dismissed parliament’ is intriguing. Yeltsin himself had dissolved the Russian 
parliament only a few years earlier and the elections that were administered by the 
federal authorities in Chechnya in 1995 certainly fell short of democratic requirements. 
In his replies to the question and answer session, Yeltsin also resorted to external 
arguments. He stated that the international community had agreed to ‘root out terrorists 
and their bases’. Yeltsin invoked Great Britain and Northern Ireland as an international 
example. ‘Throughout the 20th century, Great Britain has been combating separatists 
who use terrorist methods in Northern Ireland’422
In other words, both negative and external legitimation continued to play a role. 
Nevertheless, the main arguments for peace negotiations belonged to the realm of 
democratic legitimation. Later, during a brief visit in Chechnya in May, Yeltsin 
claimed that the Chechen resistance had been quenched and that now came the time for 
‘restoration of peace and constitutional legality in the Chechen republic’.423 Yeltsin’s 
statement did not correspond to the actual situation in Chechnya where the war 
continued in spite of Moscow’s efforts to reach a settlement. Nevertheless, Yeltsin had
421 BBC SWB, SU/2576 (2 April 1996), B/2. See also Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 April 1996, p. 3, for a 
summary.
422 BBC SWB, SU/2576 (2 April 1996), B/3.
423 BBC SWB, SU/2624 (29 May 1996), B/5. See also Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 April 1996, UN Economic 
and Social Council (1996) Note verbale dated 2 April 1996 from the Permanent Mission o f the 
Russian Federation to the United Nations Office at Geneva, addressed to the Chairman of the 
Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, UN Economic and Social Council, 4 April 1996, 
E/CN.4/1996/147 and Rossiiskaia gazeta, 31 May 1996.
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started to signal a growing willingness to negotiate a settlement -  something that no 
doubt reflected a changed balance of power among his advisors within the Russian 
leadership. By this time, the more liberal minded faction headed by Anatolii Chubais 
had clearly gained the upper hand and was managing Yeltsin’s re-election campaign.
It was not until after the presidential election, when Aleksandr Lebed took charge of 
the peace negotiations, that the stalemate seemed to be broken. On 31 August 1996, the 
Khasaviurt Agreement was signed. It stipulated a complete withdrawal of federal 
troops from Chechnya and a postponement of a final decision on Chechen 
independence for five years. Again, there were new, distinct divisions within the 
Russian leadership. The agreement was immediately criticised by the opposition and 
by such politicians as the interior minister, Anatolii Kulikov. This was due -  at least in 
part -  to the fact that Lebed had made the peace negotiations an integral factor in his 
own campaign to become president.424 The main official objection to the agreement, 
however, was that it went against the Russian constitution. Moscow’s political 
resistance against the agreement made it difficult to implement, and it was not until 23 
November -  when Lebed had already been dismissed from his post as secretary of the 
Security Council -  that an agreement was reached. This agreement signified the 
complete withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya, awaiting elections to be held 
there. In both Yeltsin’s decree and in an interview given by Chernomyrdin on the eve 
of the agreement in November 1996, the main argument in favour of the agreement 
was to ensure that democratic elections could be held in Chechnya 425
The formal peace treaty was signed on 12 May 1997 and built on the progress made 
during the autumn of 1996. In the May 1997 treaty, the two sides stated that the two 
signatories intended to ‘build their relations in accordance with generally recognised
424 Both Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin approved of Lebed’s plan. However, Yeltsin’s approval came with 
the qualification that he thought the promise of a quick Russian troop withdrawal had been rushed, 
BBC SWB, SU/2711 (7 September 1996), B /l. Huskey (1999) Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, 
New York, M.E. Sharpe), pp. 128-131, Lieven (1998) Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New 
Haven, Yale University Press), pp. 142-143 and Shevtsova (1999) Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality 
(Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), p. 199.
425 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 26 November 1996 and BBC SWB, SU/2778 (25 November 1996), B/3-4.
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principles and standards of international law’.426 This formulation was, of course, 
intriguing since it allowed for a mulitude of interpretations. The secretary of the 
Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, who had played a key role in negotiations before the 
treaty was signed, emphasised that the formulation did not contradict the Russian 
constitution.
The wish of the Chechen leadership to be guided by international, 
generally recognised standards and principles of international law in 
relations with the Russian Federation does not contradict the legislation of 
our country. And there is nothing abnormal in the fact that republics today 
wish to build their relations with the Russian Federation on those grounds.
In article 15, part 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, it is said 
that the basic and generally recognised principles and standards of 
international law are the constituent part of the legal system of the Russian 
Federation.427
Chernomyrdin and Maskhadov also signed a document, ‘Agreement between the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Chechen Republic
A'yo
of Ichkeriia’, which described how to proceed with practical implementation. The 
name of the document was in itself interesting since it used ‘Ichkeria’, the name that 
the Chechen side preferred for its republic, the name that Moscow had stubbornly 
refused to accept. With the signing of the peace treaty, however, Yeltsin also referred 
to the Chechen Republic as ‘Ichkeria’ in an interview and did his best to play down the 
importance of this. In the same interview, Yeltsin expressed his conviction that 
Maskhadov would do everything in his power to find the Russian journalists who had 
been kidnapped in Chechnya.429
The Russian leadership, in other words, portrayed its interlocutors in the peace 
negotiations as Chechen representatives who were different to the ‘bandits’ and 
‘terrorists’ with whom Moscow had refused previously to enter into dialogue. 
Likewise, the fact that Yeltsin downplayed the question of the name of the republic
426 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 May 1997, p. 3. See Rybkin (1998) Consent in Chechnya, Consent in Russia 
Lytten Trading & Investment Ltd.), p. 142 for the English version of the treaty.
427 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 May 1997, p. 1.
428 Ibid., p. 3. See Rybkin (1998) Consent in Chechnya, Consent in Russia Lytten Trading & Investment 
Ltd.), pp. 148-149 for the English version of the agreement.
429 BBC SWB, SU/2920 (16 May 1997), B/4.
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(Ichkeria vs. the Chechen Republic) was indicative of the fact that Moscow had 
moderated its stem refusal to discuss the question of Chechen independence. The 
compromise let Moscow claim that Chechnya was still part of the Russian Federation. 
Nevertheless, it was impossible for Moscow to hide the fact that the treaty constituted 
a retreat and a defeat. Even though the Russian leadership emphasised the importance 
of the elections that had been held in the republic, its main strategy following the peace 
treaty was to isolate Chechnya and try to prevent troubles in Chechnya from spreading 
into adjoining republics.430
The war in Chechnya continued to be an open wound for the Russian leadership even 
after the peace agreement. In the attempt by the Duma to impeach Yeltsin in May 
1999, one of the charges against him was that the decision to start the military 
operation in Chechnya had been unlawful431 Kotenkov defended Yeltsin’s decision 
mainly by claiming that the Dudayev regime was illegitimate and that the activities 
undertaken by Dudayev had posed a serious threat to the security and integrity of the 
Russian Federation. He also used democratic arguments and pointed to the pro-Yeltsin 
decision of the Constitutional Court in July 1995. Indeed, many of the arguments used 
by Kotenkov in 1999 were reminiscent of those used by Shakhrai in 1995. Arguments 
of constitutionality and legality dominated both proceedings, as did the spectre of 
disintegration. Furthermore, Kotenkov stated that the Geneva Convention gave states 
the right to intervene using the armed forces against ‘anti-government armed forces or
A‘
other organised armed groups’.
According to Kotenkov, Yeltsin took the decision to intervene in Chechnya when the 
situation there had degenerated to the point where the republic had become a ‘criminal 
enclave on the territory of the Russian Federation’. He claimed that the Dudayev 
regime had been illegitimate from the very start. Dudayev’s ascent to power had in fact
430 Lapidus (2001) 'State Building and State Breakdown in Russia', in: Brown (Ed.) Contemporary 
Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 83.
431 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 13 May 1999 (1999) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gos udarstvennoi Dumy RF: 13 maia 1999, dnevnoe 
zasedcmie, Last accessed: 14 November 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1999/sl3- 
05_d.htm.
432 Ibid.
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been ‘an armed usurpation of power’. Kotenkov furthermore claimed that Dudayev
had sought to carry out genocide on the non-Chechen population.
The Dudayev regime conducted an unbridled nationalistic policy. It sought 
to force non-Chechens out of the republic. As a result of this 250 thousand 
people left Chechnya during the course of five years, 80 per cent of whom 
were Russians (russkie) -  something that actually must be recognised as 
genocide of the non-Chechen population.433
This constituted a rare example of the Russian leadership using ethnic national 
arguments and when the word ‘russkiV was used rather than ‘rossiiskiV. According to 
the civic definition of nationality that the Russian leadership adhered to, Chechens 
would qualify as rossiiskie but not as russkie. In other words, Kotenkov especially 
pointed out that ethnic Russians had become victims in Chechnya -  a statement that 
must be regarded as highly debatable. It is noteworthy that Kotenkov made this 
statement before the bombings of residential buildings in Moscow, after which the 
Kremlin’s rhetoric frequently depicted Russians as victims and the war in Chechnya as 
a threat to Russia proper.
First and foremost, however, Kotenkov’s defence of Yeltsin’s actions was an example 
of negative legitimation. Kotenkov took great pains to demonstrate that Dudyaev had 
created a situation where Yeltsin’s decision to intervene was inevitable. Kotenkov 
claimed that not only had criminality become rampant -  the situation in Chechnya had 
been approaching civil war. Yeltsin’s decision was taken in order to disarm Dudayev’s 
‘illegal armed units’ who, by December 1994, had started to attack federal forces.434 
Kotenkov thus concentrated his defence on the events before and around the time of 
Yeltsin’s decree authorising military intervention in Chechnya. He did not mention the 
terrorist actions in Budennovsk or Pervomaiskoe. It is worth underlining that neither 
the Chechen incursions into Dagestan nor the bombs in residential blocks had occurred 
yet.
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid.
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4.4 Moscow’s Second Chechen Campaign 1999
After the peace treaty had been signed in May 1997, Moscow and Groznyi -  in 
practice -  returned to ignoring each other’s existence. However, the Chechen side was 
frustrated by the fact that it had not achieved its goal, actual state independence, and on 
the Russian side there was widespread resentment of the fact that the treaty had 
signified a defeat. In August 1999, the Russian leadership was faced with an acute 
crisis emanating from Chechnya. Chechen armed groups had attacked villages in the 
neighbouring republic of Dagestan and demanded that Dagestan be united with 
Chechnya. Since this threatened to destabilise the situation in all of Dagestan, the 
Russian leadership decided to act promptly. In August, Yeltsin dismissed his prime 
minister, Sergei Stepashin, and appointed Vladimir Putin in Stepashin’s place. Putin 
immediately expressed his determination to regulate the situation in Dagestan.435
On 31 August 1999, a bomb exploded in a shopping centre close to the Kremlin and -  
only four days later on 4 September -  another bomb exploded in a residential building 
for Russian military personnel and their families in Buinaksk in Dagestan. The 
explosion in Moscow claimed one life while in Buinaksk the death toll rose to forty. In 
the case of Buinaksk, Chechen terrorists were straight away held responsible. Four 
days later, a residential block in Moscow was blown to pieces and about ninety lives 
were claimed. Russia was in a state of utter shock and, on the following day, Putin 
made a statement claiming that the explosion could either be an accident or a case of 
terrorism.
If the latter, it means we face a crafty, insolent, cunning and blood-thirsty 
adversary. There have been numerous attempts throughout history to bring 
Russia to her knees and intimidate her. No one has ever been successful.
Nor have I any doubts whatsoever that it will not succeed this time 
either.436
The Russian leadership now had the opportunity to depict the war in Chechnya as a 
threat to Russia proper. In a speech in the Duma a few days later, Putin made the 
connection between the explosions and Chechnya more explicit. He outlined three
435 BBC SWB, SU/3624 (27 August 1999), B/l.
436 BBC SWB, SU/3637 (11 September 1999), B /l.
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main tasks for the Russian government, the first of which was to ‘protect the 
population against bandits’. The second task was to ‘find and eliminate the hearths 
where conflicts emerge’ and ‘to eliminate the actual bases where terrorists are trained’. 
The third and final task was ‘the treatment of “the war virus” in the northern Caucasus 
by adopting a whole range of measures to stabilise the socio-economic situation in the
• , 437region .
On 13 September 1999, another explosion in a residential building in Moscow claimed 
120 lives and, on 16 September in Volgodonsk, 17 civilians died and 150 were 
wounded in the last major explosion. These incidents prompted Putin to conclude that 
the peace agreement in Khasaviurt had been a mistake. In an interview he claimed that 
the Khasaviurt agreement had been signed against the backdrop of ‘veritable genocide 
of the Russian people (russkii narod) living in Chechnya’. There had been ‘mass 
extermination of Russians (russkie), pogroms, murders and violence’. The majority of 
the victims in the explosions in Moscow were certain to be ‘Russians’ (russkie) and 
this was, no doubt, what Putin had in mind as well. He went on to accuse ‘reactionary 
circles in certain Muslim countries’ for using Chechnya ‘as a Caucasian dagger 
(kinzhal) to slice the Russian (rossiiskii) piece of butter’.438 This was another rare 
example of the Russian leadership referring to ethnic Russians. It is obvious that the 
bombs in Moscow had dispelled the caution with which national legitimation was 
used. Apart from the use of russkii, the choice of words (for example, kinzhal) together 
with the reference to ‘Muslim countries’ evoked a strong image of an alien and, as it 
were, pre-modem threat to Russia and ethnic Russians.439
This statement, resting primarily on negative legitimation, accompanied the beginning 
of Russia’s second Chechen campaign. It established the general way that the Russian
437 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 16 September 1999, p. 2 (also in BBC SWB, SU/3641 (16 September 1999), B/l). 
See also BBC SWB, SU/3643 (18 September 1999), B/7.
438 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 21 September 1999, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/3645 (21 September 1999), 
B /l-4).
439 The name of the dagger, ‘kinzhal’, comes from Arabic. Kinzhals were used, for example, by the 
streltsy (musketeer units) in the sixteenth and seventeenth century and later by the Cossack units in the 
eighteenth century.439 Kinzhals feature in, for example, poems by Pushkin and in Michail 
Lermontov’s classic A Hero of Our Time, which is set in die Caucasus during the nineteenth century.
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campaign in Chechnya was to be legitimated by the Russian leadership this time 
around. Negative legitimation was the primary mode of legitimation and democratic 
legitimation the secondary mode. In the case of negative legitimation, the threat of 
disintegration played a lesser role than in 1994-96. In 1999, the Russian leadership’s 
statements stressed that they were combating international terrorism, not pursuing a 
civil war. The Chechen enemy was portrayed as bandits and terrorists and was 
implicated in the bombings of residential blocs in Russia.440 As indicated above, the 
Russian leadership also portrayed its Chechen adversaries were remnants from a cruel 
historic past. In his speech to celebrate Constitution Day on 12 December 1999, 
Yeltsin mentioned Chechnya as a place ‘where bandits and terrorists had attempted to 
hold a whole people in fear under a false banner of national and religious independence 
and had attempted to revive the savage Middle Ages (dikoe srednevekove) ’ 1
Democratic arguments continued to be present in most statements, but had usually 
been demoted to a secondary role. Democratic legitimation dominated over negative 
legitimation in the Russian government’s declaration on Chechnya, published on 23 
October 1999.442 In most legitimation messages, however, democratic arguments came 
second to negative arguments.443 When addressing an international audience at the 
OSCE summit in November 1999, Yeltsin relied mainly on negative legitimation 
although he also pledged allegiance to international law and the Helsinki Final Act.444 
The Russian foreign minister praised this on the following day, claiming that Russia 
had received international support for its fight against terrorism in Chechnya.445
440 BBC SWB, SU/3651 (28 September 1999), B /l. See also BBC SWB, SU/3669 (19 October 1999), 
B/l-4, BBC SWB, SU/3672 (22 October 1999), B/l-2, Novosti, Vechemii vypusk, Informatsionnaia 
programma, ORT (Russian TV), 27 October 1999, 1800 (Moscow time), BBC SWB, SU/3710 (6 
December 1999), B/-4, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 December 1999 and BBC SWB, SU/3717 (14 December 
1999), B/3-6.
441 Extracts of Yeltsin’s speech were broadcast by the Russian news programme, ORT -  International 
(Russian Television), 12 June 1999,15:00-15:15 (Moscow time).
442 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 23 October 1999.
443 See, for example, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 21 September 1999, p. 2.
444 Yeltsin (1999) Statement by Boris N. Yeltsin o f the Russian Federation (unofficial translation), 
Istanbul, OSCE, 18 November 1999, OSCE Summit, SUMDEL/27/99.
445 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 19 November 1999, BBC SWB, SU/3696 (19 November 1999), S2/1-2 and BBC 
SWB, SU/3698 (22 November 1999), B/13-14.
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4.5 Legitimating the Russian Campaigns in Chechnya
The legitimation rhetoric for the two Russian campaigns in Chechnya highlight a 
number of interesting differences, some of which have already been touched upon. One 
difference is that in 1994-1996, Yeltsin issued most of the statements on Chechnya and 
the decision to start the campaign came in the form of a presidential decree. In 1999, 
Putin made most of the statements and gave most of the interviews. The decision to 
intervene was published as a government resolution even though security policy was 
the president’s domain. This time around, Yeltsin only legitimated Russian actions in 
Chechnya after the decision had been made and announced. No doubt, his failing 
health explained his absence from the scene. Neither were the divisions within the 
Russian leadership as evident as during the first war. Furthermore, when the second 
Russian campaign started, the Russian leadership had the advantage of being able to 
draw lessons from the mistakes made in 1994.
The most important difference between the two campaigns lay in the terror bombings 
of Russian residential blocs in 1999. Although evidence of who was responsible for 
these acts had yet to be produced, the Russian leadership unequivocally connected 
these events to the conflict in Chechnya. This allowed the Russian leadership to 
portray the war as a fight against a threat that concerned Russia itself since the attacks 
constituted a strike against the Russian heartland. The military campaign that followed 
started as an operation to create a ‘sanitary cordon’ around Chechnya. The goal was to 
punish those responsible and to ‘root out the causes of terrorism’. Subsequently, it 
became obvious that the second war in Chechnya was going to be as protracted as the 
previous one, but, in 1999, many still regarded the military campaign as limited and 
feasible.
In 1999, the Russian leadership managed to establish a more rigid control over the 
mass media reporting from Chechnya.446 Attempts were made to control journalists 
reporting on Chechnya in 1994 but in 1999 they were successful, which allowed the 
leadership to portray the campaign in 1999 as an almost unqualified success. This is an
446 Herd (2000) 'The 'Counter-Terrorist Operation' in Chechnya: 'Information Warfare' Aspects', The 
Journal o f  Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 59.
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important explanation for why the war in 1999 received less criticism than that of 
1994-96. In 1999, the impression of military success -  described in the reports of 
Russian military advances in Chechnya dispatched to the Russian public -  reinforced 
the already favourable public opinion of the war. It made legitimation an easier task. 
By contrast, the Russian leadership suffered humiliating defeats early on in the war in 
1994. Instead of strengthening the position of the Russian leadership, the war in 
Chechnya undermined its authority. It became obvious both to the domestic audience 
and to the international community that Russian military ability was decidedly less 
impressive than previously imagined. The weakness of the Russian state had been 
exposed.447 The Russian leadership had failed in its most fundamental task -  protecting 
the state borders. The hostage crises in Pervomaiskoie and Budennovsk further 
strengthened this impression, when the Russian leadership proved unable to protect 
Russia’s citizens.
The legitimation strategies chosen for the two campaigns contain roughly the same 
ingredients, but with an important difference in the emphasis put on each. The 
legitimation message in 1994 relied primarily on democratic legitimation, while 
negative legitimation played a secondary role. In 1999 the situation was the reverse. As 
already discussed, there were also a significant difference in the elements present in the 
negative legitimation message in 1994 and that in 1999. In 1999, the enemy forces in 
Chechnya were depicted as terrorists working in close co-operation with or even 
commissioned by foreign interests, while in 1994 the Chechen adversaries were 
bandits who had seized power illegally. In his ultimatum on 29 November 1994, 
Yeltsin did allude to foreign mercenaries becoming involved in the fighting in 
Chechnya, but this argument was used seldom in 1994-96 compared to its use in 
1999.448 The legitimation formula in 1999 was considerably more forceful than that of 
1994. War, to protect the constitutional rights of the citizens in Chechnya, did not 
resound like the negative formula used in 1999: war to protect peaceful citizens against
447 Lieven (1998) Chechnya: Tombstone o f Russian Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 2.
448 BBC SWB, SU/2166 (30 November 1994), B/3. For extracts from Yeltsin’s statement see also 
Rossiiskie vesti, 30 November 1994, p. 1.
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foreign terrorists and medieval bandits who had already struck against the heart of 
Russia -  Moscow.
In the first war, Moscow refrained from playing the outright ethnic Russian nationalist 
card.449 National legitimation was seldom or hardly used in the 1994-96 campaign. 
When used, it usually took the form of general references to history and to the 
motherland/fatherland. In 1999, some of the few examples of ethnic Russian national 
legitimation occurred. Both Kotenkov and Putin used it to portray ethnic Russians in 
Chechnya as threatened by genocide. Putin’s reaction after the bombs in Moscow 
belongs to the stronger statements made and relied on national and negative arguments 
in tandem. Nevertheless, national arguments were usually more general to history and 
Putin tended to follow Yeltsin’s example when it came to using rossiiskii rather than 
russkii to denote something or someone Russian. Furthermore, in spite of the many 
differences it is important to note that democratic arguments were present in the 
legitimation rhetoric in 1999 as well.
449 See also Petersson and Wagnsson (1998) 'A State of War: Russian Leaders and Citizens Interpret the 
Chechen Conflict1, Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, Vol. 101, No. 2.
5 Invention and Re-Invention of State Symbols and Rituals
State symbols, national holidays and official ceremonies present the state leadership 
with a golden opportunity to transmit its legitimation formula. For example, the 
inauguration of a president is an occasion for glorifying the role of the state leader and 
symbolically demonstrating the bonds between the president and the country’s elites 
and population.450 Celebrations of past victories, like on Victory Day, offer an 
opportunity to generate powerful national emotions. However, in certain circumstances 
state symbols and rituals may also constitute formidable challenges. Yeltsin’s 
inauguration in 1996 had to be drastically shortened because of his rapidly declining 
health -  something that the Kremlin was seeking desperately to hide at the time. 
Certain holidays of the Russian Federation are leftovers from the Soviet era and how to 
deal with these became a challenge to the Russian leadership. Thus, Yeltsin made an 
attempt to rename the Day of the October Revolution (the seventh of November) to the 
possibly more democratic but hopelessly hollow-sounding “Day of Accord and 
Reconciliation”.
Rituals and symbols become all the more important for new states as the national 
leadership seeks to find a potent legitimation formula and an opposition attempts to 
challenge this in an effective manner 451 This will involve creating new traditions as 
well as breaking with old or remodelling them. The leaders of a new state will have to 
come to terms with how to relate to the political history or cultural traditions already 
present. In Hobsbawm and Ranger’s terminology ‘all invented traditions, so far as 
possible, use history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion’.452 There 
are, however, limits to the malleability of traditions. On a continuum between total 
continuity with old traditions (‘perfect preservation’) and discontinuity (‘complete
450 See, for example, Edelman (1971) Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence 
(Chicago, Markham Publishing Company), pp. 174-175, Elder and Cobb (1983) The Political Uses of 
Symbols (New York, Longman), pp. 21, 27 and Kertzer (1988) Rituals, Politics, and Power (New 
Haven, Yale University Press), p. 14.
451 Kertzer (1988) Rituals, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 179.
452 Hobsbawm (1983) 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in: Hobsbawm and Ranger (Eds.) The 
invention o f tradition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 12.
- 1 5 3 -
5 In v e n t io n  a n d  Re -In v e n t io n  o f  Sy m b o l s  a n d  R it u a l s
replacement’), most states’ leaderships will tend to use an intermediate strategy and 
remodel the cultural legacy that they are faced with.453 This strategy is in no way 
unique for modem states. For example, the Church in Europe gradually discovered the 
advantages of ‘expropriating’ old pagan rituals and providing them with a new, 
Christian content.454
Indeed, there are few examples of political regimes that could to afford to dissociate 
themselves entirely from previous traditions and forms of legitimation. The Bolsheviks 
after 1917 constitute a good example of this as they sought to distance themselves from 
the tsarist past, while at the same time adjusting their propaganda to fit a tradition and 
symbolic language with which the Russian public was already familiar 455 The quest 
for a cogent mix of old and new when designing or re-designing the state is a most 
delicate business. That both Yeltsin and his associates attached great importance to 
state symbols and rituals is obvious. In spite of shunning grandiose ceremonies earlier 
in his career, Yeltsin developed a taste for ceremonies and symbols often reminiscent 
of tsarist traditions 456 This keen interest, however, did not always guarantee successful 
solutions to the dilemmas that faced the Kremlin. The fact that the Yeltsin 
administration failed to push legislation through the Duma on a set of state symbols for 
the new Russian state bears evidence to this.
453 Kubik (1994) The Power o f Symbols Against the Symbols o f Power: The Rise o f  Solidarity and the 
Fall o f State Socialism in Poland (University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 258- 
264.
454 Kertzer (1988) Rituals, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 45.
455 Abel (1987) 'Icons and Soviet Art1, in: Arvidsson and Blomqvist (Eds.) Symbols o f Power: The 
Esthetics o f Political Legitimation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Stockholm, Almqvist & 
Wiksell International), Figes and Kolonitskii (1999) Interpreting the Russian Revolution: The 
Language and Symbols o f 1917 (London, Yale University Press), Stites (1987) 'The Origins of Soviet 
Ritual Style: Symbol and Festival in the Russian Revolution', in: Arvidsson and Blomqvist (Eds.) 
Symbols o f Power: The Esthetics o f Political Legitimation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
(Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell International), and White (1998a) 'The Art of the Political Poster1, in: 
Kelly and Shepherd (Eds.) Russian Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Oxford; New York, Oxford 
University Press).
456 Aron (2001) Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (London, HarperCollins), p. 332-333, Kostikov (1997) 
Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes o f the Press 
Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 128-130, Shevchenko (Ed.) (2000) Protokol Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[Protocol o f the Russian Federation] (Moscow, Vagrius), p. 7, Shevtsova (1999) Yeltsin's Russia: 
Myths and Reality (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), p. 99-103 and Yeltsin 
(2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential Marathon: 
Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 140-142, 172-174, 333 
(also in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 159-160,121-123, 304).
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It is in the very nature of the battle over symbols and rituals that it takes place 
primarily within the elites while the symbols and rituals themselves are directed at the 
population and elites. It is also in the nature of symbols and rituals that politicians tend 
to use them especially in times of conflict and uncertainty. For example, the 
Norwegian flag came to play a much more central role in Norway during the Second 
World War.457 The international community is involved to a lesser degree. There is an 
elaborate protocol for state visits etc., but it would be difficult to find Russian rhetoric 
on rituals and symbols directed towards the international community. Certainly, the 
Russian leadership in the 1990s had to adapt itself to international practice. 
Furthermore, certain symbols and rituals might provoke certain countries. For 
example, playing the Soviet national anthem at a Russian state visit to certain former 
Soviet republics or members of the Warsaw Pact might cause unnecessary discord.
The main elites that were targeted in the Russian case after 1991 were the military, the 
Orthodox Church and the country’s political elite. In the case of the Russian Armed 
Forces and the Orthodox Church, these were elites that promised prestige and an image 
of strength for the political leadership if it managed to identify itself strongly with 
them. The Armed Forces were targeted primarily in connection with celebrations of 
anniversaries of military victories. A group closely connected with the Armed Forces -  
the veterans of the Second World War -  was eagerly courted together with the Armed 
Forces on, for example, Victory Day. Although the war veterans possessed little 
political clout in terms of powerful positions in Russian society, portraying itself as a 
leadership that cared about the war veterans was important for the Russian leadership. 
The war veterans possessed political capital in the form of widespread trust and respect 
among the Russian population.
457 Heradstveit and Bjorgo (1992) Politisk kommimikation: Introduktion till semiotik och retorik 
[Political Communication: Introduction to Semiotics and Rhetoric] (Lund, Studentlitteratur), pp. 92- 
93.
458 Vilinbakhov suggested, in his book on the double-headed eagle, an explanation for the decision of the 
Russian tsar to adopt the eagle as a symbol in the 15th century was that it was an adaptation to 
international practice at the time. The Russian tsar had started to come into contact with other princes 
in Europe, most notably with the House of Habsburg and, therefore, wished to use a similar symbol. 
Vilinbakhov (1997) The State Coat o f Arms o f Russia - 500 Years (Sankt Petersburg, Slaviia), pp. 23, 
26.
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As in the case of the war veterans, the Orthodox Church possessed little political 
power but great reserves of trust. Consequently, the presence of the Orthodox Church 
and especially the Patriarch of the Russian Church, Aleksii n, was important to the 
Russian leadership at ceremonies such as the inauguration of the president. The 
presence of Aleksii II implied the support of the Orthodox Church for the Russian 
state. In exchange, the Russian leadership often attended Orthodox rituals and 
conveyed tributes to the Church on its holidays and on Aleksii II’s birthday. This, in 
turn, gave the Orthodox Church a position of strength since it implied that the Russian 
leadership regarded it as the most important religious institution in modem Russia. 
Similarly, the presence of the political opposition at state ceremonies implied its 
support for the political system albeit not for the president in power. For the 
opposition, the invitation to these ceremonies gave them a position of strength vis-a-vis 
other politicians -  they were, in effect, a recognised opposition.
In order to win these elites over, the Russian leadership used a strategy that involved 
both trying to win them over by an appealing legitimation message and attempts at co­
option by way of promising prestige or material advantages. State decorations -  such 
as medals and prestigious orders -  played an important role as did promises of raised 
pensions for war veterans and contributions to building projects such as the Church of 
Christ the Saviour and the war memorial park, Poklonnaia gora. Although co-option 
does not form part of the legitimation formula, it is an important ingredient in 
understanding the strategy used by the Russian leadership. Furthermore, the line is not 
always easy to draw between what constitutes a legitimation message and what 
constitutes a promise or exchange of prestige between an elite and the leadership. For 
example, a statement such as ‘Russia owes enormous gratitude to the valour and 
courage of her veterans of the Great Patriotic War’ is both a statement that grants 
prestige to the war veterans and one that appeals to sentiments of national pride in 
Russia’s history.
5.1 Adopting State Symbols
During his tenure, Yeltsin failed to achieve a law on new state symbols, a flag, a state 
emblem and a national anthem. In spite of sporadic calls for a referendum on state
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symbols, the Russian leadership chose to put the issue to vote in the Duma, where the 
battle over state symbols was fought out. An agreement was finally reached in 
December 2000, resulting in a constitutional federal law on state symbols. In other 
words, the Kremlin turned mainly to a political elite, the Duma, when it sought to 
legitimate its choice of symbols. This immediately developed into rhetoric, where both 
sides employed historical arguments. The Russian leadership championed the 
relationship between the Russian flag and, for example, Peter the Great and great 
military victories, while the opposition claimed that the flag represented tsarist Russia 
and that its colours were connected to hideous crimes committed during the Civil War. 
General patriotic arguments, evoking the Fatherland and Russian unity, came to the 
fore when both the Kremlin and the opposition argued for “their symbols”. Democratic 
arguments played a modest role. Both sides of the conflict used arguments of 
constitutionality or procedure as well as occasional references to external legitimation. 
Nevertheless, historical arguments were, without doubt, the most popular.
The Russian leadership had three main options when choosing which new state 
symbols to champion. Firstly, it could have created a new set of symbols that had not 
been used before. The competition to find the best new Russian state emblem in the 
spring of 1991 was a vague attempt at this strategy. Among the suggestions were a 
birch leaf and a bear.459 A more long-lived attempt was the suggestion to use Glinka’s 
Patriotic Song as a new national anthem. Secondly, the Kremlin could choose the 
Soviet state symbols -  either those of the USSR or those of the RSFSR. This was 
originally rejected completely by the Russian leadership. The state emblems of the 
USSR and the RSFSR both championed the communist hammer and sickle, as did the 
red flags (see Illustration 1 and Illustration 2). The national anthem of the USSR, 
composed by Aleksandr V. Aleksandrov, was adopted in 1945, while the RSFSR 
lacked a national anthem of its own 460
459 Rossiiskie vesti, 24 November 1993, p. 1.
460 Konstitutsiia (osnovnoi zakon) Rossiiskoi Sovetskoi Federativnoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki 
[Constitution (Basic Law) o f the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic] (1989) (Moscow, 
Sovetskaia Rossiia), Article 180-182, pp. 60-61.
- 1 5 7 -
5 In v e n t io n  a n d  Re -In v e n t io n  of  Sy m b o l s  a n d  R it u a l s
☆
Illustration 1 RSFSR Emblem (left) and flag (right) in 1989.
Illustration 2. The state emblem (left) and flag (right) of the USSR.
Finally, there were the pre-Soviet Russian symbols, the double-headed eagle and the 
tricolour (see Illustration 3). These were the state symbols that the Kremlin initially 
tried to push through legislation on. Meanwhile, the Kremlin was careful not to 
associate itself too closely with the tsarist legacy. Thus it tried to emphasise the history 
of the state symbols, in general, and their association with Peter the Great, in 
particular, rather than their tsarist symbolism. The Kremlin also refrained from 
proposing ‘God Save the Tsar’ as the national anthem (although music from Glinka’s 
opera, ‘A Life for the Tsar’, was played at Yeltsin’s inauguration ceremony in 
1996).461 The symbolism of the Provisional Government -  the tricolour, a 
‘domesticated’ double-headed eagle and the Marseillaise -  was never really an option. 
Quite apart from the fact that the Marseillaise already was the French national anthem,
461 See also p. 189.
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the fate of the Kerenskii’s government must have deterred the Russian leadership from 
attempting to adopt the symbols of the Provisional Government462
Illustration 3. The double-headed eagle (left) and the Russian tricolour (right).
In the Russian declaration of sovereignty on 12 June 1990, state symbols were not 
mentioned. During autumn of the same year, however, the leadership of the RSFSR 
started to show an increased interest in symbols and rituals. By November 1990, streets 
in Moscow were recovering their pre-revolutionary names and, on 5 November, the 
RSFSR government decided to create a flag and state emblem. Between December 
1990 and February 1991, a commission worked out a concept for state symbols. The 
re-introduction of the Russian tricolour met with little opposition, while the suggestion 
to use the double-headed eagle provoked more discord 463 The August Coup gave 
momentum to the process of adopting new Russian state symbols. On 21 August 1991, 
the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR decided to consider the tricolour the flag of the 
Russian Federation. On 25 December 1991, Gorbachev announced his resignation and 
handed over the Kremlin to Yeltsin. On the following day, the tricolour had replaced 
the Soviet flag on the Kremlin.464
462 The Provisional Government failed to disassociate itself from the tsarist legacy and, for example, 
made the unfortunate decision to keep the double-headed eagle while stripping it o f its crowns and 
lowering its wings to make it domesticated and less imposing. Stites (1987) 'The Origins o f Soviet 
Ritual Style: Symbol and Festival in the Russian Revolution', in: Arvidsson and Blomqvist (Eds.) 
Symbols o f  Power: The Esthetics o f  Political Legitimation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
(Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell International), p. 28.
463 Vilinbakhov (1997) The State Coat o f  Arms o f  Russia - 500 Years (Sankt Petersburg, Slaviia), p. 52.
464 BBC SWB, SU/1264 (28 December 1991), Cl/8.
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The tricolour flew over the Kremlin but, in fact, the issue of state symbols of the 
Russian Federation had still not been resolved. In a draft constitution by the 
Constitutional Commission published in late March 1992, chapter 24 stated that the 
national flag was to be the Russian tricolour, the national emblem was to be the 
double-headed eagle in black and the national anthem was to be Glinka’s ‘Patriotic 
Song’ -  but the draft was never adopted.465 As the differences between Yeltsin and the 
parliament continued to build up, the latter took an increasingly hostile stand to the 
abolishing of all Soviet symbols. On 18 November 1992, the Supreme Soviet decided 
that the name of the Russian republic of the Soviet era -  the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic, and its abbreviation, RSFSR -  would remain on government 
documents together ‘with the national emblem and official stamps until the adoption of 
the law “On the State Emblem of the Russian Federation’” 466 In the draft constitution 
produced at the Constitutional Congress and published in July 1993, state symbols 
were not mentioned and the question remained unresolved.467
After the storming of the White House in October 1993, Yeltsin decided to adopt new 
state symbols by decree. On 24 November 1993, the commission in charge of finding 
new state symbols for Russia presented its suggestion. It was a golden, double-headed 
eagle on a red banner, with Saint George slaying a dragon in the centre. Apart from a 
few minor changes, the state emblem proposed was the imperial, double-headed eagle, 
which had existed in 1917. Nevertheless, the chairman of the commission, Rudolf 
Pikhoi was reluctant to speak of the proposed state emblem in terms of its tsarist 
heritage. He considered the double-headed eagle to relate to the history of the country
AfJQin general. Likewise, the presidential decree (No. 2050), which was signed on 30 
November 1993, made only a weak reference to national legitimation. The decree was
465 BBC SWB, SU/1347 (4 April 1992), Cl/21.
466 BBC SWB, SU/1544 (21 November 1992), B/2. Earlier the same year, there was apparently more 
consensus on this issue. A resolution by the Supreme Soviet had established that the designations 
“Russia” and “Russian Federation” could be used in the names of state institutions ‘until a law “On 
State Symbols” is adopted and is brought into force’, BBC SWB, SU/1315 (27 February 1992), Cl/2- 
3.
467 Draft constitution, published in Rossiiskie vesti, 15 July 1993, pp. 3-6.
468 Rossiiskie vesti, 24 November 1993, p. 1.
- 1 6 0 -
5 In v e n t io n  a n d  R e -In v e n t io n  o f  S y m b o l s  a n d  R it u a l s
issued in order to ‘resurrect the historical symbols of the Russian state’.469 
Furthermore, the decree claimed that ‘the State Emblem (gerb) of the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic has lost its symbolic meaning’ 470
A few days later, the double-headed eagle appeared on the front page of Rossiiskie 
vesti accompanying an appeal to the Russian population to take part in the approaching 
referendum on a new Constitution. The double-headed eagle had taken on a markedly 
more democratic costume. The eagle looked more like two doves in the process of 
voting {Illustration 4). This was, however, a rare example of trying to vamp the eagle 
into a symbol of democracy. The rhetoric on state symbols that emanated from the 
Kremlin was dominated by historical arguments.
Patcypc
Illustration 4. Russian double-headed eagle as it appeared in Rossiiskie vesti, 10 
December 1993. p. 1.
469 Presidential Decree, No. 2050, with accompanying regulation, published in Rossiiskie vesti, 2 
December 1993, pp. 1,2.
470 Rossiiskie vesti, 2 December 1993, p. 1. See also Vilinbakhov (1997) The State Coat o f  Arms o f  
Russia - 500 Years (Sankt Petersburg, Slaviia), pp. 6-7 for a Russian and English version o f the decree 
and BBC SWB, SU/1861 (2 December 1993), B/2. See also the regulation (No. 1) which accompanied 
the decree in Rossiiskie vesti, 2 December 1993, p. 2.
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Yeltsin issued a decree on 11 December 1993 designating Glinka’s Patriotic Song as 
the national anthem471 And, in February 1994, a decree established a gold-fringed 
square with the double-headed eagle mounted at the centre as the presidential flag 
{Illustration 5) 472 In August 1994, Yeltsin decided to make the 22nd of August the 
‘Day of the State Flag of the Russian Federation’.473 However, this was a day that 
passed almost unnoticed in Russia in the 1990s. On 24 October 1994, the double­
headed eagle was mounted on the White House, where the Russian government 
resided. (However, the five red stars were left on the Kremlin towers where, since 
1936 they had replaced the double-headed eagles.)
Illustration 5. The presidential flag.
The building of the State Duma (former Gosplan), on the other hand, continued to be 
decorated by the hammer and sickle474 and, on 7 December 1994, the State Duma 
refused to adopt a new law on state symbols. The chairman of the Duma, Ivan Rybkin 
proposed to postpone the vote on new state symbols until the following day. However, 
on 9 December 1994 the State Duma voted against the presidential proposal on new 
state symbols. A group of left-wing deputies carried forward a proposal to adopt a red 
flag as national flag, to strip the double-headed eagle of its crowns and to reintroduce 
the national anthem of the Soviet Union. Neither of the proposals was adopted and the
471 Sobrcmie aktov Prezidenta i Pravitelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1993, No. 51. See also Rossiiskie 
vesti, 17 December 1993, p. 1.
472 Rossiiskie vesti, 22 February 1994, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1928 (22 February 1994), B /l.
473 Presidential decree, No. 1714, published in Rossiiskie vesti, 23 August 1994, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, 
SU/2081 (23 August 1994), B/2.
474 Rossiiskie vesti, 25 October 1994, p. 1.
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question was deferred to an unspecified date.475 Meanwhile, Yeltsin’s decrees on state 
symbols continued to be in force as long as the Russian Federation lacked legislation 
on state symbols. Therefore, the Russian tricolour, the double-headed eagle and 
Glinka’s Patriotic Song were all used at Yeltsin’s inauguration ceremony in August 
1996. (For a more detailed description of the ceremony, see below, p. 184ff.)
On 2 April 1997, the issue of state symbols was raised again in the State Duma. The 
chairman of the Committee on Labour and Social Policy, Oleg Shenkarev, claimed that 
the need to adopt a law on state symbols had become urgent. In his view Russia’s flag 
ought to be red since this was the colour most vividly connected to Russian history, not 
least with the victory in the Great Patriotic War. As state symbol, Shenkarev proposed 
that the state symbol of the RSFSR be adopted. This would signify the reintroduction 
of the hammer and sickle although in a slightly different version from that of the Soviet 
Union. Finally, Shenkarev was of the opinion that the Soviet national anthem, 
composed by Aleksandr V. Aleksandrov in the 1940s, ought to be reintroduced as the 
Russian national anthem. He admitted that the text ought to be altered. The presidential 
representative in the State Duma, Aleksandr Kotenkov, rebuffed the charge that the 
present use of state symbols was illegal since there existed no law. He further claimed 
that in the near future, the president was to propose alternative constitutional law 
proposals. Shenkarev’s proposal failed to achieve the necessary majority in the State 
Duma.476
Less than a year later, on 23 January 1998, Yeltsin presented the State Duma with a 
proposal for a law on state symbols, suggesting that they be the tricolour, the double­
headed eagle, and Glinka’s Patriotic Song. This induced deputy Shinkarev to propose a 
bill on the reintroduction of the Soviet national anthem. Neither law was adopted by 
the State Duma 477 The Council of Four -  consisting of the president, prime minister
475 Izvestiia, 10 December 1994 and BBC SWB, SU/2174 (9 December 1994), B/5.
476 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Day Plenary Session 2 April (1997) Plenamye zasedaniia 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 2 aprelia 1997, dnevnoe zasedanie, Last accessed: 30 August 1999, 
Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1997/02-04_d.htm. See also BBC SWB, SU/2883 (3 April 
1997), B/l.
477 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 23 January (1998) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 23 ianvaria 1998, dnevnoe
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and the two chairmen of the Duma and Federation Council respectively -  decided on 
29 January 1998 that the issue of state symbols was too controversial to reach a 
decision at that point. Instead, the question was passed on to a special commission.
The presidential bill was presented and argued for in the State Duma by the head of the
President’s State Heraldry, Georgii Vilinbakhov.479 Like Kotenkov a year earlier,
Vilinbakhov refuted the claim that the use of the tricolour, double-headed eagle and
melody by Glinka, was illegal -  adding that Yeltsin’s decrees of 1993, in fact,
continued the existence of state symbols adopted in 1990 and 1991. In Vilinbakhov’s
view, the RSFSR commission on state symbols had taken a correct decision.
After a detailed study of this question, the commission took the decision to 
recreate the traditional Russian (rossiiskaia) heraldry. The white-blue-red 
flag and double-headed eagle were recognised as historical symbols, 
expressing the idea of sovereignty, unity of statehood and reflecting the 
geopolitical situation of Russia.480
The double-headed eagle again caused controversy. Vilinbakhov reminded his 
audience that the history of the eagle went back 500 years and that even Lenin had 
signed documents ‘with a stamp representing the double-headed eagle’. He invoked 
glorious episodes in Russian history and linked them to the tricolour and eagle. For 
Russian ancestors, ’the double-headed eagle was the symbol under which Russia 
fought at Poltava, captured Paris and Suvorov travelled over the Alps. And it is 
probably also therefore that it is strange and offensive that voices were heard today 
insulting the past history of our coat of arms and flag’.481 Interestingly, Vilinbakhov 
claimed that the reintroduction of the tricolour constituted a return to an international 
pan-Slavic community of flags. ‘There exists a corresponding pan-Arabic system of
zasedanie, Last accessed: 28 November 1998, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1998/s23- 
01_d.htm and Sovetskaia Rossiia, 24 January 1998, p. 1.
478 BBC SWB, SU/3138 (30 January 1998), B/l.
479 For the 500th anniversary of the Russian double-headed eagle, Vilinbakhov authored a book on its 
history in Russia. Vilinbakhov (1997) The State Coat o f Arms o f Russia - 500 Years (Sankt 
Petersburg, Slaviia).
480 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenaiy Session 23 January (1998) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 23 ianvaria 1998, dnevnoe 
zasedanie, Last accessed: 28 November 1998, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1998/s23- 
01_d.htm.
481 Ibid.
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flags, a pan-African, a pan-Slavic and our adoption or return to our traditional flag
AO*)
signifies a return to the pan-Slavic system of flags.’ Notwithstanding Vilinbakhov’s 
expertise in heraldry, the State Duma refused to adopt the law and Russia continued to 
live with its provisional, decreed state symbols.
Only with the ascent of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency did the Russian
Federation receive a law on state symbols. Putin’s suggestion to the Duma was a
compromise where the tricolour and double-headed eagle were retained, but combined
with Aleksandrov’s Soviet national anthem. On 6 December 2000, the presidential
representative in the State Duma, Aleksandr Kotenkov, argued for the issue of state
symbols to be decided in an especially expedient way. In his view, this was in
accordance with Duma regulations. Furthermore, representatives of the Duma had
agreed to this in preliminary negotiations on the issue. The vote on national state
symbols of the Russian Federation finally took place in the Duma on 8 December 2000
-  ironically, as pointed out by Nikolai Gubenko, Duma deputy from the Communist
faction, on the anniversary of the Belovezha Accords. In his speech in the State
Duma, Kotenkov underlined the historic traditions of the proposed symbols and
referred to a statement made by the Russian Orthodox Church.
Actually, as very accurately said in the message from the patriarchy, the 
adoption of these three symbols underlines the fidelity to the historical 
traditions, and will promote our realisation that Russian history is 
indivisible. The State coat of arms was adopted five hundred years ago, I 
will not dwell on this in detail now, but will try to say a few words on the 
history of this coat of arms in the next address. The State flag was 
confirmed as such by Peter the Great, the greatest Russian (rossiiskii) 
reformer. And finally, the national anthem, which embodies the last 
century, the last epoch of the existence of our state, under which -  apart 
from the negative phenomena emphasised here mainly by the opponents to 
this anthem -  great achievements have been made.484
482 Ibid.
483 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Morning Plenary Session 6 December 2000 (2000) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 6 dekabria 2000 goda, utrennee 
zasedanie, Last accessed: 19 January 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/2000/s06- 
12_u.htm.
484 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Morning Plenary Session 8 December 2000 (2000) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 8 dekabria 2000 goda, utrennee 
zasedanie, Last accessed: 22 January 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/2000/s08- 
12 u.htm.
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By his side, Kotenkov had Georgii Vilinbakhov, in his capacity as national heraldist, 
and Aleksandr Tsvetkov, secretary of the Presidential Heraldic Council. Kotenkov’s 
description of the symbolic meanings of the various components of the coat of arms 
was intriguing. In his account, the double-headed eagle was thoroughly stripped of 
tsarist symbolism.
The attributes of the eagle have very concrete heraldic explanations ... 
which are devoid of monarchical contents. The sceptre symbolises the 
executive power vertical. The orb is a symbol of the firmness and legality 
of power, its ability to function in all circumstances. The small crowns on 
the heads of the eagle symbolise the many subjects of Russia and the many 
organs of state power within the frame of the Federation, which are 
situated over the expanses of Europe and Asia. The large crown over the 
crowned heads points to the supremacy of the federal power and federal 
legislation. Thus, the double-headed eagle constitutes the first official and 
internationally recognised coat of arms of the Russian (Rossiiskoe) state, 
having more than 500 years of priority over other variants of state coat of
485arms.
Kotenkov also used the argument that the tricolour had been entered into the 
constitution of the RSFSR already in 1991, after the August Coup. The adoption of the 
constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993 did not ‘cancel’ the earlier decision of 
the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies. ‘Thus, the normative consolidation of this 
flag as state flag was realised constitutionally already in 1991!’486
After the law on state symbols had been adopted by the State Duma, it was approved 
by the Federation Council on 20 December 2000 and signed by president Putin on 25 
December 2000. According to the law, all state television and radio companies were 
obliged to play the national anthem when they started and finished their transmissions. 
If they broadcast around the clock, they were required to play the national anthem at 
twelve midnight. Furthermore, they were obliged to play the national anthem after the 
clock at Spasskaia Tower had struck twelve each New Years Eve. The law also
• 407forbade ‘outrages against the State national anthem of the Russian Federation’. On
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid.
487 The law (No. 3 FKZ) was published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 December 2000, p. 2.
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30 December 2000, Putin signed a decree, which determined that the text of the 
national anthem was to be the version proposed by Sergei Mikhalkov, who had also 
written the lyrics to the Soviet national anthem.488 The new lyrics struck a strong 
patriotic cord 489 The decision by Putin may be interpreted in different ways. Indeed, 
there were charges of a dawning Soviet nostalgia.490 However, it is equally possible to 
interpret Putin’s decision as a pragmatic way of bridging the political divide in society 
rather than as a return to the Soviet past.491
5.2 Abolition and Redesigning of Holidays
In contrast to the struggle over state symbols, the struggle over holidays touched the 
lives of the Russian population in a direct way. In January 1992, the Russian leadership 
found itself confronted with an uneasy legacy of Soviet public holidays. Many of them 
were political, Soviet holidays, but they were -  at the same time -  family holidays and, 
as such, difficult to abolish. The Russian leadership had three main options -  all of 
which could be combined. The first was to abolish the manifestly Soviet holidays 
while keeping those that had a less obvious political connection. The second option 
was to create new holidays and the third to redesign or remould the existing ones. The 
Kremlin chose an amalgam of the three strategies. In September 1992, the Supreme 
Soviet adopted a law, according to which Russia would have nine public holidays:
■ The first and second of January (New Years Day)
■ The seventh of January (Christmas)
■ The eighth of March (Women’s Day)
488 Decree No. 2110, published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 4 January 2001, p. 1.
489 For example, the chorus read: ‘Glory to our free Fatherland (Otechestvo); Fraternal peoples in a 
union streaching over centuries; Popular wisdom handed down by ancestors!; Glory to [our] country! 
We are proud of you!’, Official Russia (2002) Gosudarstvennye simvoly Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Last 
accessed: 25 April 2002, Address: http://www.gov.ru/main/symbols/gsrf4_4.html.
490 It would seem that the issue of state symbols had been resolved, but there were at least attempts to 
keep the question open. In 2001 a book was published, which contained arguments against 
Aleksandrov’s anthem and for Glinka’s anthem. In the preamble, the editors claimed that 
Aleksandrov’s anthem could only be regarded as a temporary solution and that the struggle to abolish 
it would continue. Chudakova, et al. (Eds.) (2000) Za Glinku! Protiv vozvrata k sovetskomu gimnu [In 
Favour o f Glinka! Against a Return to the Soviet Anthem1 (Moscow, Shkola "Yazyki russkoi 
kultury"), p. 10.
491 Compare, for example, Leonid Kuchma’s decision to reintroduce certain Soviet holidays in the 
Ukraine, Wanner (1998) Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (University 
Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 158-159.
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■ The first and second of May (Day of Spring and Labour)
■ The ninth of May (Victory Day)
■ The twelfth of June (Day of State Sovereignty)
■ The seventh of November (Day of the October Revolution)492
The celebration of New Years (on the first and second of January) together with the 
celebration of the Orthodox Christmas provoked little discord since these were 
holidays that were mainly family holidays and without much political content. 
Members of the Russian leadership usually attended a service at a Russian Orthodox 
Church both at Christmas and at Easter, but other politicians, including the opposition, 
did this as well 493 Furthermore, the Russian leadership refrained from claiming these 
holidays for itself. Another example of a holiday that did not provoke legitimation 
statements was Women’s Day on the eighth of March. Although Yeltsin always 
delivered a statement dedicated to the women of the Russian Federation, the statement 
did not contain any tangible links to the state building project. Yeltsin emphasised the 
virtues that women enriched Russian society with and promised to try and make their
rr* • 494life easier.
Of the holidays above, the ones that were the most controversial were the first of May 
(Day of International Workers’ Solidarity) and the seventh of November (Anniversary 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution). These had both been instituted in 1918 and 
were Soviet mass political holidays. They were intimately connected with the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Party and constituted symbols of revolutionary and labour 
tradition. They were usually celebrated on a mass or even ‘gigantic scale’ and were
492 BBC SWB, SU/1499 (30 September 1992), B/3.
493 See more on this in the following chapter, p. 235
494 In a typical message on Women’s Day, Yeltsin claimed that thanks to Russia’s women ‘the elevated, 
sacred notions of warmth, kindness and generosity were alive eternally in society’. He went on to say 
that Russia’s women were experiencing hardships especially difficult. ‘Since you especially bear the 
burden also of caring for the home, the family and the children.’ Rossiiskie vesti, 6 March 1994, p. 1. 
See also BBC SWB, SU/2248 (10 March 1995), B/l and BBC SWB, SU/2863 (10 March 1997), B/2 
for similar addresses. In 1996, Yeltsin addressed Russia’s women in much the same vein. However, 
he also made references to Russia’s history (possibly to boost his electoral campaign): ‘Russia, our 
motherland, is personified for us as a woman, a gentle and demanding mother.’ However, this was a 
rare example of using history on Women’s Day. BBC SWB, SU/2556 (9 March 1996), B/l.
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marked by their ‘state-managed nature’.495 However, these holidays had increasingly 
become family holidays as well496 and were as such difficult to abolish without 
invoking negative reactions. In 1992, the Russian leadership simply chose to ignore the 
first of May and the seventh of November. Demonstrations organised by the 
communist opposition were allowed on a modest scale and under strong security 
measures. The Kremlin also renamed the first of May. Its Soviet era name, ‘Day of 
International Workers’ Solidarity’, was exchanged for ‘Day of Spring and Labour’.497
In 1993, tension between Yeltsin and parliament was mounting and, on 1 May, there
were violent clashes between demonstrators and the police in Moscow. The Supreme
Soviet and the Kremlin accused each other of deliberately provoking bloodshed.
Yeltsin’s press secretary, Viacheslav Kostikov, first issued a statement in which he
blamed only the demonstrators. ’It has become known that the organizers of the attack
regard today’s action as the beginning of a campaign of “resistance” to the lawful
democratic authorities.’498 The head of the presidential administration, Sergei Filatov,
went a step further and linked the bloodshed to the defeat suffered by the Supreme
Soviet in the referendum in April.
I heard from the organizers of yesterday’s actions that it had been all 
planned with a view to getting a state of emergency introduced in Moscow 
or in the country. ... After all it is precisely from the Supreme Soviet that 
this madness is coming.499 ... This link is obvious. See for yourself. On the 
first day that people were already celebrating victory at the referendum, on 
that same day, first day, the Monday, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
held a sitting and gave its first assessment of its results.500
Similarly, the presidential press service issued a statement in which it, like Filatov in 
the interview, linked the violence on 1 May to the defeat of the opposition in the
495 Lane (1981) The Rites o f Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press), p. 188.
496 Binns (1980) 'The Changing Face of Power: Revolution and Accommodation in the Development of 
the Soviet Ceremonial System, part 2', Man, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 170-187.
497 BBC SWB, SU/1371 (4 May 1992), B/l, SU/1517 (21 October 1992), B/4 and SU/1531 (6 November 
1992), B/6-7.
498 BBC SWB, SU/1678 (3 May 1993), B/22. See also Rossiiskie vesti, 4 May 1993, p. 1.
499 BBC SWB, SU/1679 (4 May 1993), B/9.
500 Ibid.
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referendum and to the Supreme Soviet.501 In a televised address to the nation on 7 May
Yeltsin made the connection again.
The tragedy in Moscow on 1 May again demonstrated that the 
irreconcilable opposition, with the support of the Supreme Soviet, will stop 
at nothing. It is ready to break any laws, commit crimes, to allow people to 
die only to hinder us from the common cause of Russian transformation.
The neo-Bolsheviks are prepared to again sacrifice the people, to return the 
country into the abyss of violence and arbitrary rule, only to seize power
• 502agam.
After the October Events in 1993, the Russian government decided that the eighth of 
November would not be a day off (it was customary to make Monday a day off if a 
holiday occurred on a Saturday or Sunday). Meanwhile, the Moscow authorities 
banned rallies and demonstrations by communist parties and organisations on the 
seventh of November. According to the resolution, the decision had been taken in 
order to prevent disruption of public order. On 7 November 1993 the police 
controlled all the places in Moscow where rallies and demonstration usually occurred 
on the anniversary of the October Revolution.504 This, however, was the last time that 
the Kremlin was so restrictive. After 1993, a period of normalisation followed. On 1 
May 1994, it was obvious that street politics had lost some of its attraction. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that the communists had decided to take part in the election in 
December 1993 played a role. Before 1 May 1994, Gennadii Ziuganov appealed for 
peaceful celebrations of the day, as did Aleksii II.505 The opposition held their marches 
and rallies every year on both 1 May and 7 November, but the first tumultuous years 
had passed.
501 Ibid, B/10.
502 Rossiiskie vesti, 7 May 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1683 (8 May 1993), Cl/1. On 13 May 
1998, when Kotenkov defended Yeltsin against the accusations in the impeachment proceedings 
brought forward by the Duma, he linked the ‘unsanctioned demonstration on Leninskii Prospekt in 
which force was used’ on 1 May 1993 to the growing tensions between the executive and legislative
authorities at the time. State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 13 May
1999 (1999) Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 13 maia 1999, 
dnevnoe zasedanie, Last accessed: 14 November 2001, Address:
http://www.akdi.ni/gd/PLEN_Z/l999/s 13-05_d.htm.
503 BBC SWB, SU/1836 (3 November 1992), B/2.
504 BBC SWB, SU/1841 (9 November 1992), B /l.
505 BBC SWB, SU/1987 (3 May 1994), B/l.
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The Kremlin showed little interest for the first of May after 1993. On 1 May 1996, 
Yeltsin addressed a May Day rally organised by the trade unions at Tverskaia Square. 
Yeltsin was in an intense phase of his re-election campaign and used the occasion to 
call for national accord. He referred to the first of May as a holiday with a century-long 
tradition of celebrating spring and labour. He also spoke of the importance of the 
population making a choice for democracy in the upcoming election.506 On the 
morning of 1 May 1997, Yeltsin addressed the Russian population via radio. He played 
down the importance of the day. Some, he said, would use the day for gardening or an 
excursion in the countryside, others would use it to demonstrate and ’curse the 
president’.507
They have the right to do this. This is what we fought for: for the right of 
the citizens themselves to define what they should do, on an everyday 
basis, or on holidays. The main thing is that they should not all march in 
line, but that they freely and independently make their own choice.508
Yeltsin was more active on the seventh of November -  especially after 1996, the year 
that he renamed the Day of the October Revolution. On 10 November 1996, Yeltsin’s 
decree renaming the seventh of November ‘Day of Accord and Reconciliation’ (Den 
soglasiia i primireniia) was published. At the time, Yeltsin was struggling to recover 
from his heart surgery. ‘The October Revolution in 1917 influenced the fate of our 
country in a profound way. Striving not to allow conflicts and to unite and consolidate 
Russian society I decree: (1) To pronounce the holiday on the seventh of November to 
be the Day of Accord and Reconciliation. (2) To pronounce the year of 1997 -  the 
eightieth anniversary of the October Revolution -  the Year of Accord and 
Reconciliation.’509 According to Yeltsin’s press secretary, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, this 
was a statement of strength from the president.
506 BBC SWB, SU/2601 (2 May 1996), B/l.
507 BBC SWB, SU/2908 (2 May 1997), B/l. See also the short summary in Rossiiskie vesti, 6 May 1997,
p. 1.
508 Ibid.
509 Presidential decree, No. 1537 (7 November 1996) published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 November 
1996, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/2764 (8 November 1996), B/4.
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This is undoubtedly the move of a strong president who, while recognizing 
his own strength, proposes that his opponents should build relations solely 
in the spirit of dialogue, tolerance, democracy and law, and in the interest 
of the revival of the great Russia.510
In his address on 7 November 1996, Yeltsin pointed to the negative consequences of 
the October Revolution. However, the overall message was also an appeal for unity 
and accord. According to Yeltsin, the October Revolution was ‘the day when our 
country took a sharp turning’. ‘The sincere desires and hopes of those times had tragic 
consequences. Millions of people fell victim to that tragedy. Society was split. The 
people are still being divided into reds and whites, into us and them. It is time to draw 
a line here. We all belong to one Russia and we must stick together.’511 Meanwhile, the 
communist opposition continued to celebrate the October Revolution and to use the 
day to demand Yeltsin’s resignation (Illustration 6).
Illustration 6. The opposition’s demonstration on 7 November 1999. The Banner 
reads: ’Yeltsin, resign! No to NATO Fascism! ’
On 7 November 1997 Yeltsin held a special televised address to commemorate the 
eightieth anniversary. While, he stressed the need for accord in Russia, he relied 
mainly on negative legitimation and emphasised the isolation of the Soviet Union in
510 BBC SWB, SU/2764 (8 November 1996), B/5.
511 Ibid., B/4.
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the international community. The following year, Yeltsin again warned against 
revolutions and directed attention to the fact that the communists were allowed to ’take 
advantage of all the fruits of democracy, including the market and freedom of 
assembly and, especially, freedom of the press’. In Yeltsin’s view, a reason for 
celebration was that ’The values which we defended and fought for have become 
common for all sound and responsible political forces.’514 All in all, however, Yeltsin’s 
attempt to revamp the seventh of November failed. The efforts of the Russian 
leadership to build accord across the political scene, most notably by inviting political 
parties and other societal leaders and organisation to sign an agreement on accord and 
reconciliation, petered out after 1996.
Victory Day, celebrated on the ninth of May in memory of the end of the Second 
World War, did not constitute a challenge to the Kremlin in the way that the first of 
May and the seventh of November did. Victory Day had always been marked by a 
greater degree of public spontaneity and was in essence a patriotic holiday.515 The day 
was intimately connected with the personal fate of Russian families -  most had lost 
family members in the war. To eschew this holiday would have been a grave mistake 
by the Russian leadership since no other day could stir emotions as effectively.516 
Victory Day also presented the Kremlin with a golden opportunity to co-opt the 
military and war veterans. On this day, increased resources were usually promised to 
the Armed Forces. Officers, their families and war veterans were all promised 
increased benefits and the official speeches abounded with assurances of eternal 
gratitude for the courage and selfless sacrifices rendered to Russia.
512 BBC SWB, SU/3071 (8 November 1997), B/l.
513 BBC SWB, SU/3379 (9 November 1998), B/l.
514 Ibid.
515 Lane (1981) The Rites o f Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press), p. 143-144.
516 See Petersson (2001) National Self-Images and Regional Identities in Russia (Aldershot, Ashgate), 
pp. 59-60, on the Great Patriotic War as a source of national pride among Russian elites. Victory Day 
was the only Soviet holiday that most Ukrainians wished to retain after Ukraine’s independence. 
Wanner (1998) Burden o f Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (University Park, 
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press), pp. 159-162.
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That the Russian leadership had no intention to grant the opposition this day as “their” 
day became obvious in 1992 when Yeltsin chose to create the Russian Armed Forces 
on the eve of victory day.517 In his Victory Day Message on 9 May 1992, Yeltsin -  in 
military rhetoric -  encouraged his audience not to stray from the road of reform. ‘If, as 
in wartime, we do not swerve from this difficult path, victory will fall to our and
SIRRussia’s lot.’ In all the speeches made by Yeltsin or his prime minister or minister of 
defence on Victory Day, national legitimation featured prominently. The Armed 
Forces and the war veterans were greeted especially and patriotic references to the 
Fatherland (Otechestvo or Otchizna) and the Motherland (.Rodina) were multiplied as 
on no other day of the year.519 Generally, the day posed few problems to the Kremlin. 
In spite of the rival marches and demonstrations organised by the opposition, the 
Russian leadership had the advantage of being able to organise parades, hand out state 
decorations and build national monuments. Most importantly, the Kremlin continued 
funding of the Soviet era project Poklonnaia gora (Hill of Prostrations) outside of 
Moscow, which is a memorial park dedicated to the memory of the Great Patriotic War 
(see Illustration 7).520
517 BBC SWB, SU/1379 (13 May 1992), C3/1. The nationalist and communist opposition sought to 
appropriate Victory Day for itself by staging their own celebrations on the 9th May -  especially during 
the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union (see, for example, BBC SWB, SU/1683 (8 May 1992), 
B/l, Rossiiskie vesti, 8 May 1993, p. 1, BBC SWB, SU/1685 (11 May 1993), C2/1-2 and BBC SWB, 
SU/2300 (11 May 1995), Sl/11). See also Slater (1998) 'Russia's Imagined History: Visions of the 
Soviet Past and the 'New Russian Idea", The Journal o f Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 
Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 77-83.
518 BBC SWB, SU/1379 (13 May 1992), C3/1.
519 Rossiiskie vesti, 7 May 1993, p. 1 (see also BBC SWB, SU/1683 (8 May 1993), Cl/3), BBC SWB, 
SU/1684 (10 May 1993), Cl/1, BBC SWB, SU/1993 (10 May 1994), S2/1-2, Presidential decree, No. 
446, Krasnaia zvezda, 1 May 1995, p. 1, Krasnaia zvezda, 11 May 1995, p. 3 (see also BBC SWB, 
SU/2299 (10 May 1995), Sl/2-5), Krasnaia zvezda, 11 May 1995, p. 1 (see also BBC SWB, SU/2299 
(10 May 1995), Sl/7 and BBC SWB, SU/2300 (11 May 1995), Sl/4), Krasnaia zvezda, 8 May 1996, 
p. 1 (see also BBC SWB, SU/2807 (9 May 1996), B/2), BBC SWB, SU/2806 (10 May 1996), B/2, BBC 
SWB, SU/2808 (10 May 1996), B /l, Krasnaia zvezda, 8 May 1997, p. 1, BBC SWB, SU/2915 (10 May 
1997), B/l-2, Krasnaia zvezda, 8 May 1998, BBC SWB, SU/3223 (11 May 1998), B/l-3 and 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 12 May 1999, pp. 1, 2 (see also BBC SWB, SU/3530 (10 May 1999), B/6).
520 Tumarkin (1994) The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall o f the Cult o f World War II in Russia 
(New York, HarperCollins Publishers), pp. 220-221.
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Illustration 7. Poklonnaia gora -  the museum and the main memorial.
Nevertheless, the fiftieth anniversary of the victory in the Second World War turned 
into a challenge to the Russian leadership because of its ill-fated war in Chechnya. 
Indeed, the war in Chechnya, threatened to overshadow the Russian anniversary of the 
end of World War II on 9 May 1995. Not only was a war going on within the borders 
of the Russian Federation on a day that ought to have been a glorious day of victory -  
the war was going badly and domestic opinion against it was strong.521 Moscow put 
out several feelers in order to bring about a cease-fire during the anniversary, but the 
Chechen leaders were, at best, reluctant towards these proposals.522 Nevertheless, 
Yeltsin issued a decree proclaiming a moratorium on fighting in Chechnya from 
midnight on 28 April until midnight on 12 May.523 Fighting continued, however. 
Moscow made further attempts at making the one-sided cease-fire into something more 
permanent, but was soon forced to abandon this plan.524
521 See also Lieven (1998) Chechnya: Tombstone o f  Russian Power (New Haven, Yale University 
Press), p. 375 for a description of the problems the leadership in Moscow was faced with.
522 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 25 April 1995, BBC SWB, SU/2287 (26 April 1995), B/5-6.
523 BBC SWB, SU/2290 (29 April 1995), B/2.
524 BBC SWB, SU/2298 (9 May 1995), B/3, BBC SWB, SU/2302 (13 May 1995), B/4.
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On 9 May 1995, Yeltsin made no reference to the ongoing war in Chechnya and 
among the foreign leaders who had gathered in Moscow to take part in the 
celebrations, only Francis Mitterrand touched upon Chechnya -  but only in veiled 
terms -  in an official speech. ‘Freedom and peace can only be safeguarded -  let me 
express my own conviction to you -  by democracy, in other words by peoples, by all 
people being able to choose their own destiny. If there is any attempt to impose a 
system on them internally by interest groups or minorities, or from outside, out of a 
desire for conquest, then we shall slip back into the tragedies experienced in previous 
centuries. So, I have come to hail peace.’ Eight Buddhist monks were also arrested 
later the same day for a non-violent protest against the war in Chechnya. As the foreign 
guests left the Kremlin reception, the monks held placards with the words “Remember 
the genocide in Chechnya”.526 Yeltsin did not mention the Chechen war, but the 
minister of defence, Pavel Grachev, did so in his traditional order in celebration of the 
victory.
The Russian (rossiiskaia) army has always been and remains [united] with 
the people. In this lies the might of Russia’s Armed Forces, their military 
soul and invincibility. And today our warriors display courage and heroism 
as they fulfil their tasks in re-establishing constitutional order and legality 
on the territory of the Chechen Republic, as they guarantee the security 
and territorial integrity of our state.
Yeltsin’s speeches and issued greetings on the eve of Victory Day and on Victory 
Day all revolved around national legitimation and conferred honour and prestige on 
the military and on the war veterans. Aleksii II took part in the celebrations and 
his speech at the reception on the eve of Victory Day echoed Yeltsin’s appeal for 
unity and peace without any references to the ongoing war in Chechnya. 
Nevertheless, the silence on the war in Chechnya spoke volumes. The Chechen war 
was a manifest failure not to be connected to historic great victories.
525 BBC SWB, SU/2300 (11 May 1995), Sl/7.
526 BBC SWB, SU/2301 (12 May 1995), B/3.
527 Krasnaia zvezda, 7 May 1995, p. 1.
528 Presidential decree, No. 446, Krasnaia zvezda, 7 May 1995, p. 1, Krasnaia zvezda, 11 May 1995, p. 
3. See also BBC SWB, SU/2299 (10 May 1995), Sl/2-5, Krasnaia zvezda, 11 May 1995, p. 1. See also 
BBC SWB, SU/2299 (10 May 1995), Sl/7 and BBC SWB, SU/2300 (11 May 1995), Sl/4.
529 BBC SWB, SU/2299 (10 May 1995), Sl/5.
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The Russian leadership also used the historic legacy of the Great Patriotic war when 
it decided to introduce a ‘Victory Banner’ for the Armed Forces. On 15 April 1996, 
Yeltsin issued a decree, in which he proclaimed a red flag with a yellow star in the 
top left comer to be a Victory Banner {Illustration 8). It was claimed to have been 
the flag hoisted on the German Reichstag on 9 May 1945. When the decree was 
published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, the well-known picture of a Soviet soldier waving 
the flag on the Reichstag accompanied it {Illustration 9). However, on the picture in 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, the hammer and sickle below the yellow star had vanished. On 
the original picture, it is a traditional Soviet flag (with hammer and sickle).530 This 
evokes the memory of how, for example, Trotsky, was erased from pictures after he 
had been banished from the Soviet Union and suggests that connecting to the Soviet 
legacy -  even the Great Patriotic War -  involved difficulties as well as benefits.
★
Illustration 8. Victory Banner of the Russian Federation according to presidential 
decree No. 561.
530 Presidential decree No. 561, published in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 April 1996, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, 
SU/2588 (17 April 1996), B/4 and Flags of the World (2001) Russian WWII Commemorative Flag, 
Last accessed: 12 June 2001, Address: http://www.ace.unsw.edu.au/fotw/flags/ru_wwii.htnil.
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Illustration 9. Decree No. 561 with accompanying modified picture published in 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 April 1996, p. 1 (left) and the original picture with the 
hammer and sickle clearly visible on the flag (right).
5.3 “New Russia Holidays”
The Kremlin introduced two new holidays, which were connected to the new Russian 
state: ‘Day of Sovereignty’ on the twelfth of June and ‘Constitution Day’ on twelfth of 
December. Of these, the twelfth of December was the most ill-fated. The introduction 
of Constitution Day as a state holiday was fraught with difficulties. This, no doubt, 
reflected the problems that were created by the way in which the constitution was 
introduced. However, to further complicate the establishment of Constitution Day, 
Yeltsin was often ill as the day approached. On the days before the first anniversary of 
the referendum on the constitution, Yeltsin was in hospital for a nose operation. At the 
same time, the situation in Chechnya was worsening and Yeltsin probably had other 
things on his mind. On 8 December 1994, the State Duma rejected a proposal from 
Yeltsin to make the twelfth of December into an official holiday, Constitution Day, in 
memory of the adoption of the constitution. The Duma, where Yeltsin’s opponents 
constituted a strong force, considered that there was ‘no cause for celebration’.531
531 BBC SWB, SU/2175 (10 December 1994), B /l.
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However, on 9 December 1994, Yeltsin decreed the twelfth of December to be a day 
off to celebrate the adoption of the constitution.
In 1995, Yeltsin was again ill on Constitution Day. This time he had come down with 
flu. That might be why there were hardly any speeches or state events to mark the 
occasion. However, the main opposition leader, Gennadii Ziuganov, seized the 
opportunity to state that the constitution was illegitimate. ‘Today is not Constitution 
Day, it is a day of national tragedy, when the constitution was pushed through with the 
help of gunfire.’533 Similarly, on 12 December 1996, Yeltsin was in hospital. This time 
he was recovering from his heart operation. Nevertheless, he issued an address on 
Constitution day, which was received by Russian media from Yeltsin’s press office. In 
his address, Yeltsin claimed that the significance of Constitution Day was increasing 
from year to year. He outlined what he considered to be the main tenets of the 
constitution.
The most important thing in our constitution is that, for the first time, the 
state is being built on the solid foundation of individual rights and 
freedoms and the real sovereignty of the people. ... I, as president, will 
make all efforts to translate into life the ideas embodied in the
534constitution.
Yeltsin also pointed to the events that had taken place, most notably the elections to the
State Duma in 1995 and the presidential election in 1996, as indicators of how the
constitution was becoming consolidated. In his view the constitution had ‘triumphed’.
A strong argument in favour of the constitution was that even the adversaries of the
constitution had agreed to play the political game within its framework.
Even most of those who do not like the constitution, now propose changes 
to it strictly in keeping with constitutional rules. The supremacy of the 
constitution acknowledged even by its critics and adversaries is a 
guarantee of the irreversibility of the changes that have begun in the 
country. This is the most important sign of the fact that we are on the right
C ' l C
track towards the achievement of concord among all Russian people.
532 BBC SWB, SU/2178 (14 December 1994), B/l.
533 BBC SWB, SU/2486 (14 December 1995), B/3.
534 BBC SWB, SU/2794 (13 December 1996), B/l.
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The following year, 1997, Yeltsin was again in hospital. This time he had come down
with an ‘acute respiratory viral infection’ and his doctors advised him not to record his
radio address on Constitution Day. As Constitution Day was approaching m 1998,
Yeltsin was convalescing from pneumonia. Nevertheless, on 12 December 1998, a
recorded address to the nation by Yeltsin was broadcast. In his address, Yeltsin
underlined that all future presidents of Russia would have to take their oath as
prescribed by the constitution and thereby promise to serve the people. Yeltsin also
maintained that everyone ought to read and be familiar with the constitution.
This should be done not out of curiosity, but in order to understand how 
the state where they live is organized and, most important, to know their 
rights. It is precisely thanks to the constitution that Russia is currently 
moving along the path of freedom and democracy.
In December 1998, the constitution had come under heavy criticism and there were a
number of suggestions as to how to change it. Yeltsin used the opportunity of his
address on Constitution Day to warn against radical revisions of the constitution and
pointed to how the constitution had been successful in preserving Russia from the
return of revanchist forces. Russia had recently plunged into a severe economic crisis
following an financial crisis in August 1998 and Yeltsin stated that ‘a strong power at
the top’ was a requirement for Russia to get through the difficult times that the country
was experiencing. Once again the alternative image invoked was one of chaos and
possible disintegration of the country. Yeltsin also hinted at the how in the past
‘persecution of the church’ and ‘censorship’ had been features of the Soviet system.
This was a broad hint of the possible consequences if Yeltsin’s main opponents -  the
KPRF as self-appointed heirs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union -  were
allowed to gain the upper hand.
It has proved a reliable barrier against people who wanted a return to the 
omnipotence of the party apparatus, to the persecution of the church and 
believers, to unwarranted levelling and a system based on administrative 
distribution of resources. That is precisely why people who feel nostalgic 
for the old rules have now launched a discussion about changing the
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 BBC SWB, SU/3409 (14 December 1998), B/l. See also summary in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 15 
December 1998, p. 1.
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constitution. They are arguing for all power to be given to parliament. In 
fact, they are proposing a return to a republic of soviets.
I strongly disagree with it. I believe this will ruin the country. A huge state 
like Russia must always have strong power at the top. Without it, we 
cannot deal with the acute problems that Russia is facing now.... Only the 
constitution can protect the free press from censorship, provide reliable 
protection against extremism, prevent the collapse of the market and
C*7 0
preserve the unity of Russia.
In December 1999, the country was deeply involved in the upcoming Duma election 
and the celebrations on Constitution Day came to play a somewhat subordinate role. 
The reception held in the Great Kremlin Palace and the speech that Yeltsin delivered 
was only summarised in the media. On Constitution Day (a Sunday this year which 
meant that Monday became a day of!) the state channels, ORT and RTR, did not show 
any programmes which dwelled on the importance of this day. The speech that 
Yeltsin held at the reception in the Kremlin was directed mainly at the elites gathered 
there to mark the occasion. Yeltsin emphasised many of the same aspects of the 
constitution that he had in previous years. Yeltsin stated that the constitution, adopted 
on 12 December 1993, was ‘not just the most important legal document. In those days 
were founded the principles of a new statehood; the new framework of the whole legal 
construction was created.’ He stressed that ‘nobody was allowed to bend or damage 
wilfully’ this construction and mentioned Chechnya as a glaring example of what 
might happen if law and order did not prevail.540 Yeltsin ended with a toast: ‘For the 
Russian Constitution Day! For peace and order in our land” For the prestige and 
dignity of our great country!,541
The Day of Sovereignty, the twelfth of June, proved only slightly less problematic to 
institute. In 1992, the twelfth of June had still not become established as the Russian 
Day of Independence. Instead, the anniversary of Yeltsin’s election to the Russian 
presidency was noticed and an interview with him was broadcast by Russian television 
to celebrate the occasion. Yeltsin took the opportunity to deny responsibility for the
538 Ibid.
539 Television schedule in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 11 December 1999.
540 ORT- International (Russian Television), 12 June 1999,15:00-15:15 (Moscow time).
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break-up of the Soviet Union and laid it at the door of the perpetrators of the August 
Coup.542 On 11 June 1993 Yeltsin held his anniversary speech of the Russian 
declaration of sovereignty. Already, the anniversary had moved to being ‘day of 
independence’ rather than of sovereignty.543 Only four years later Yeltsin proposed 
that the day be renamed ‘Russia Day’ (Den Rossii).544 Indeed, the name of the day did 
tend to cause confusion. In words of Nikolai Ryzhkov, Duma deputy of the opposition, 
‘This could not be independence from the former USSR republics which are now 
involved in the process of integration, could it?’545 Nevertheless, the question of the 
name of the day continued to haunt the Kremlin even after Yeltsin had resigned. In 
2001, the Duma voted against a proposal from Vladimir Putin to formally rename the 
day “Russia Day”.546
On the twelfth of June, the Russian leadership tended to rely on a mix of liberal 
democratic values and national legitimation. In 1993 and 1994, Yeltsin used the 
twelfth of June to deny his responsibility in the break-up of the Soviet Union and to 
vilify his political opponents and the Soviet communist era.547 Occasionally, references 
were made to a prosperous future.548 The main thrust, however, was liberal democratic 
and national legitimation. Typically, in his address on the twelfth of June, Yeltsin 
would emphasise that Russia won freedom on 12 June 1990.549 The patriotic rhetoric 
and references to Russian history would be general to a ‘glorious past’ dating
541 BBC SWB, SU/3717 (14 December 1999), B/2.
542 BBC SWB, SU/1406 (13 June 1992), B/l.
543 BBC SWB, SU/1714 (14 June 1993), B/l.
544 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 14 June 1997, p. 1 and Rossiiskie vesti, 14 June 1997, p. 3. See also BBC SWB, 
SU/2944 (13 June 1997), B/l.
545 BBC SWB, SU/2944 (13 June 1997), B/2.
546 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 17 January (2001) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 17 ianvaria 2001, dnevnoe 
zasedanie, Last accessed: 1 March 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/2001/01/sl7- 
01_d.htm.
547 BBC SWB, SU/1714 (14 June 1993), B/3. See also Rossiiskie vesti, 15 June 1993, p. 1, for a summary 
of the press conference and BBC SWB, SU/2020 (13 June 1994), B/l.
548 BBC SWB, SU/1714 (14 June 1993), B/l-4 and BBC SWB, SU/3560 (14 June 1999), B/8.
549 BBC SWB, SU/1714 (14 June 1993), B/l and B/3, BBC SWB, SU/2638 (14 June 1996), A/1, BBC 
SWB, SU/2944 (13 June 1997), B /l, BBC SWB, SU/3252 (13 June 1998), B /l and BBC SWB, 
SU/3560 (14 June 1999), B/8-9.
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‘thousand years back’.550 In his address on 12 June 1995, Yeltsin used the occasion of
ththe 775 anniversary of Aleksandr Nevskii’s birth to reinforce the national legitimation 
message. ‘The glorious name of Aleksandr Nevskiy brightens the history of the 
Russian state with a living light and links many generations with grateful memory.’ 
Yeltsin went on to state that ’At a time of great upheavals for Russia, Prince 
Aleksandr, by means of a series of brilliant victories and skilful policies, solved the 
most important task and created the conditions for the consolidation of the Russian 
lands.’551
On 12 June 1997 Yeltsin made use of external legitimation mixed with national and
negative legitimation. He emphasised Russia’s new role in the international
community and contrasted it with that of the Soviet Union. He also made use of the
fact that Russia was to join the “big eight” (G8).
The world has recognised Russia’s authority. But, for the first time in 80 
years, this recognition is based not on terror, as it was in the era of Stalin, 
Brezhnev or others. Not out of fear to become buried under the fragments 
of empire. No! Russia is stable, open to the world and does not threaten 
anyone. Because of this, 16 Nato states will today sit down at the 
negotiating table. They have to take account of our interests. Because of 
this, the “big seven” of developed countries will in Denver a week from 
now take a great step towards the “big eight”.
In a comparison with the speeches and greetings made on Victory Day, both the 
twelfth of June and twelfth of December stand out for the frequent references to liberal 
democratic legitimation. This is interesting since on Victory Day the speeches were 
directed mainly to the military elite, while the speeches held on the twelfth of June and 
twelfth of December were directed at the Russian population.
550 BBC SWB, SU/3252 (13 June 1999), B /l. See also BBC SWB, SU/1714 (14 June 1993), B/2 and 
BBC SWB, SU/2638 (14 June 1996), A/1.
551 BBC SWB, SU/2328 (13 June 1995), B/l.
552 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 14 June 1997, p. 1 and Rossiiskie vesti, 14 June 1997, p. 3. See also BBC SWB, 
SU/2944 (13 June 1997), B /l.
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5.4 The Presidential Inauguration Ceremony
The design of state ceremonies is, to a considerable degree, dependent upon the 
symbols used and the physical place. They may be considered as rituals and, as such, 
are powerful moments for co-opting elites and fomenting a bond between the 
leadership and the elites.553 The elites, which take part in these rituals, both grant and 
receive legitimacy by their mere participation. In other words, it is important that the 
opposition takes part in the presidential inauguration ceremony, for example. The 
population is mainly a spectator to such ceremonies as is the bulk of the international 
community. However, it is interesting to note that most of the heads of states of the 
CIS member states were present at Yeltsin’s inauguration ceremony in 1996.
The presence of former presidents at state ceremonies marks an element of tradition 
and continuity. Thus, Gorbachev was invited to ceremonies in the Kremlin after 1996 
in spite of Yeltsin’s strong antipathy towards him. ‘After 1996, when my associates 
came to me with an invitation to Mikhail Sergeevich for signature for another grand 
function in the Kremlin, I suddenly felt for the first time that the ordinary protest in my 
soul had disappeared. On the contrary, I felt a sense of relief and thought that we will 
have things to talk about.’554 However, Gorbachev declined the invitation and did not 
attend any functions in the Kremlin before the inauguration of Vladimir Putin in May 
2000.
In 1991 when Yeltsin swore the presidential oath for the first time, the flag in the 
background was still the red flag of RSFSR and the constitution that lay in front of him 
was that of the RSFSR -  both with Soviet emblems. The ceremony contained many of 
the elements that were to be part of the inauguration ceremony of the Russian 
Federation. For example, Aleksii II was present and made a speech after Yeltsin had
553 Interestingly, installation ceremonies were largely absent during the Soviet era. Christopher A. P. 
Binns has suggested that this was because being installed in a new office was simply ‘a routine phase 
in a career-structure requiring no ceremonial “mystification”.’ Binns (1980) 'The Changing Face of 
Power: Revolution and Accommodation in the Development of the Soviet Ceremonial System, part 2', 
Man, Vol. 15, No. 1, p. 184.
554 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia... [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 396. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 363.)
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sworn the oath and held his speech.555 Among the guests at the ceremony was a
delegation from Lithuania. Even the presidential oath contained the main ingredients of
what was to become the presidential oath in the Russian constitution.
Citizens of the Russian Federation! I swear, in carrying out the powers of 
the president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, to 
observe the constitution and laws of the RSFSR, to defend its sovereignty, 
to defend the liberties and rights of the individual and of the citizen, the 
rights of the peoples of the RSFSR, and conscientiously to carry out the 
obligations laid on me by the people.556
After taking the presidential oath, Yeltsin emphasised that this was the first time in 
Russian history that the people had elected their leader. In Yeltsin’s view, the 
population had not only elected a president but had also made a choice for reform and 
democracy. ‘They have chosen not only an individual, not only a president, but above 
all, the path our home is to follow. This is the path of democracy, the path of reforms, 
the path of revival of human worth.’557 Furthermore, Yeltsin emphasised human rights 
and freedom.558 Gorbachev was present at Yeltsin’s inauguration ceremony in 1991. 
Gorbachev’s speech that followed also emphasised democracy and the revival of 
Russia. In addition, Gorbachev underlined the importance of reaching a new union 
treaty and welcomed the decision of the parliament of the RSFSR to ‘come out firmly 
in favour of the preservation and renewal of our Union’.559
Yeltsin’s second inauguration ceremony ought to have become an occasion for
establishing a new tradition. Certain elements of the ceremony were laid down in the
constitution of 1993 and in the official protocol. Most importantly the presidential oath
was specified in Article 82 of the constitution.
When exercising my powers as President of the Russian Federation, I 
swear to respect and preserve the rights and freedoms of the individual and 
citizen, to observe and protect the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
555 BBC SWB, SU/1122 (12 July 1991), C2/1.
556 BBC SWB, SU/1121 (11 July 1991), C2/2.
551 Ibid., C2/1.
558 Ibid., C2/1.
559 Ibid., C2/3.
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to protect the sovereignty and independence, security and integrity of the 
state and to faithfully serve the people.
However, Yeltsin’s second inauguration did not become the occasion he had 
envisaged. During the election campaign Yeltsin’s health had deteriorated badly -  
something that the Kremlin sought to hide from the outside world.560 Only a small 
circle was informed of Yeltsin’s health condition. Yeltsin suffered a heart attack on 26 
June 1996, but decided to go through with a meeting with Lebed on 28 June -  a 
meeting that was televised. Every effort was made to conceal the fact that Yeltsin was 
seriously ill. Lebed was told that Yeltsin suffered from a cold. Only Yeltsin’s family, 
the doctors and a few of his bodyguards and staff knew of the heart attack he had 
suffered. Yeltsin even went to vote at a public voting station located at a sanatorium 
near his dacha in Barvikha, where he was resting. This was covered by Russian 
television.561 It soon became clear that Yeltsin would have to undergo an operation. 
First, however, Yeltsin, had to go through the inauguration ceremony. In spite of the 
efforts of the doctors and the radicial shortening of the ceremony, Yeltsin suffered 
badly during the ceremony.
560 See for example an interview with presidential aide Georgii Satarov in Segodnia, 2 August 1996, p. 5 
(also in BBC SWB, SU/2681 (3 August 1996), B/2). Satarov explicitly denied that Yeltsin was 
suffering from a serious disease ‘ [affecting] the heart or anything such like, demanding that he is put 
in hospital’. Instead Satarov claimed that Yeltsin suffered from ‘great fatigue’.
561 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 44-47. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 35-38.)
562 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 50-51. Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 40-41.
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Illustration 10. State Kremlin Palace (former Kremlin Palace of Congresses)
The inauguration ceremony was broadcast live. It was held on the stage of the State 
Kremlin Palace, built in the 1960s (Illustration 10). The stage was adorned with 
flowers in the colours of the Russian tricolour. The Russian flag and coat of arms hung 
over the stage and at the back of the stage there was a choir and orchestra visible 
through a transparent white curtain. Seated at the front row were Naina Yeltsina and 
the heads of CIS states563 After the curtain was raised, the Russian flag and Russian 
presidential standard were carried onto the stage by Russian servicemen in old-style 
uniforms. Another group of uniformed servicemen then brought in the Russian 
constitution and the symbol of presidential authority, a chain ornamented with the 
Russian double-headed eagle (.Illustration l l ) 564
563 BBC SWB, SU/2687 (10 August 1996), B/l.
564 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 August 1996, p. 1 and BBC SWB, SU/2687 (10 August 1996), B/l.
- 1 8 7 -
5 In v e n t io n  a n d  R e -In v e n t io n  of  S y m b o l s  a n d  R itu a ls
Illustration 11. The Symbol of the President of the Russian Federation.
The chairman of the Constitutional Court, Vladimir Tumanov, placed the constitution
and the symbol of presidential power on special stands. Then, the other participants in
the inauguration ceremony entered: the prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin; the
speakers of the Federation Council and the State Duma, Yegor Stroev and Gennadii
Seleznev; the chairman of the Electoral Commission, Nikolai Riabov and the Patriarch
of the Russian Orthodox Church, Aleksii II. At twelve, the clock of Spasskaia Tower
tolled and Yeltsin came on stage to take his place between Chernomyrdin and Stroev.
Riabov then addressed the ceremony and handed Yeltsin a certificate confirming that
he had been elected president.565
On this festive day, the Central Electoral Commission declares that, in 
accordance with the will of the people of Russia, Boris Nikolaevich 
Yeltsin, has been elected president of the Russian Federation for a second 
term, (applause in the hall).566
It was a truly nationwide vote, in which 94 million people took part. The 
voters took a responsible decision in casting their votes for Boris 
Nikolaevich Yeltsin in conditions of free and democratic elections. The 
elections reaffirmed the traditions of democratic continuity of state power 
based on the will of Russia’s citizens.567
The chairman of the Constitutional Court, Vladimir Tumanov, then invited Yeltsin to 
swear the presidential oath. ‘Boris Nikolaevich, here is the text of the constitution. You 
know that the oath is in Article 82 of the constitution. You must say its text and as
565 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 August 1996, p. 1 and BBC SWB, SU/2687 (10 August 19%), B/l.
566 BBC SWB, SU/2687 (10 August 1996), B/l.
561 Ibid.
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C /T O
soon as you give the oath you take office as president of the Russian Federation.’ 
Yeltsin then placed his right hand on the constitution and pronounced the oath. Yeltsin 
later recalled this moment in his memoirs, ‘The solemn and elevated words of the oath. 
For me they had become a hundred times more heavier and precious.’569
After Yeltsin had taken the oath, the national anthem (Glinka’s Patriotic Song) was 
played for the first time during an official ceremony inside while outside the 
presidential banner was raised on the cupola of the presidential residence in the 
Kremlin. The audience rose to its feet and applauded. Stroev then placed the symbol of 
presidential power on Yeltsin’s shoulders. The Symbol of the President was to be 
handed over from the resigning president to the president taking office at the 
inauguration of the president. After this, the Russian Patriarch delivered a speech.571 
He was the only person to deliver an address of any length at the ceremony. He 
emphasised tradition and history. ‘Modem Russia is a successor to the historical Rus. 
It must grow, strengthen and continue to rise from its difficult but glorious past.’572 
After Aleksii II had delivered his address, thirty artillery salvos sounded. Meanwhile, 
music from Glinka’s opera ‘A Life for the Tsar’ was played. Originally, the ceremony 
was planned to take an hour. However, in 1996 the entire ceremony took just under 
twenty to thirty minutes and Yeltsin appeared on stage for slightly more than fifteen 
minutes. In spite of the efforts to hide Yeltsin’s illness, Russian newspapers were 
quick to note his ‘lack of verbosity’ and frail appearance during the ceremony.574
Afterwards, there was a reception at the Kremlin for Russian politicians, other 
prominent Russians and invited foreign guests. Yeltsin delivered a short address. He
568 Ibid.
569 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 50. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 41.)
570 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 August 1996, p. 1 and BBC SWB, SU/2687 (10 August 1996), B/l.
571 BBC SWB, SU/2687 (10 August 1996), B/l.
572 Ibid., B/2.
573 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 August 1996, p. 1 and BBC SWB, SU/2687 (10 August 1996), B /l. See also 
Aron (2001) Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (London, HarperCollins), p. 650.
574 Segodnia, 10 August 1996, p. 1. See also Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 August 1996, pp. 1,2.
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greeted those present -  especially the heads of the CIS states -  and went on to wish
that Russia would be able to provide prosperity for its citizens.
On 3 July the Russians (rossiiane) made their choice. By the will of the 
people I will continue the work that I started five years ago. The people’s 
support gives me the right to act resolutely and firmly. I will use this 
supreme right in the interest of all Russians (rossiiane). In all their interest.
We have one country. For its sake we have to unite our efforts. And then
c n c
Russia will raise itself in all its height.
On 20 August 1996, more than ten days after the inauguration ceremony, Rossiiskaia 
gazeta complained about the ‘unhealthy interest in the President’s health’. ‘The latest 
sensation, supported by the journal “Time”, is that the President of Russia is to 
undergo heart surgery and that it will be done abroad.’ According to Yeltsin’s new 
press secretary, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, ‘these insinuations were completely 
groundless’. The president was in good health and ‘devoted much interest to work with
c n c .
documents’. Only by early September did the Kremlin acknowledge that Yeltsin had 
suffered a heart attack and that he would undergo surgery. The efforts to hide this from 
the public until after Yeltsin was firmly installed as president again are indicative of 
the symbolical importance that the Russian leadership attached to the inauguration 
ceremony -  even in a drastically shortened version.
By contrast, Putin’s inauguration ceremony followed official protocol to the letter. The 
date chosen for the ceremony was the seventh of May 2000. This allowed Putin to 
execute his office on Victory Day only two days later. Putin’s inauguration ceremony 
took place in the Great Kremlin Palace instead of the State Kremlin Palace as in 1996 
{Illustration 12). Around 1 500 people were invited to the ceremony in the Kremlin. 
Among the guests present was Mikhail Gorbachev, who this time accepted the 
invitation to attend the presidential inauguration. Of the guests, 448 were Duma 
deputies, 175 were members of the Federation Council and 19 were judges of the 
Constitutional Court. The ministers of the government were also present. Furthermore,
575 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 August 1996, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/2688 (12 August 1996), B/5.
576 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 20 August 1996, p. 1.
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representatives of business and culture had been invited, as were representatives of 
foreign embassies in Moscow.577
Illustration 12. The Great Kremlin Palace.
The ceremony began at noon. Before that the state flag and presidential standard had 
been carried through the Georgii and Aleksandr Halls of the Great Kremlin Palace. 
These were then placed on the podium in the Aleksandr Hall. The chairman of the 
Constitutional Court, Marat Baglai, took the podium and, at the same time, a special 
edition of the Russian constitution and the Symbol of the President were carried onto 
the scene. After this, the ‘first president of Russia’, Boris Yeltsin, entered the stage. 
Next, Vladimir Putin entered the Great Kremlin Palace through the parade entrance, 
marched past the invited guests through the Georgii and Aleksandr Halls and entered 
the podium at exactly noon as the bells of the Kremlin started tolling {Illustration 13). 
The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, Aleksandr Vishniakov, read a 
statement announcing the election of Vladimir Putin as president of the Russian
c n o
Federation before it was time for Putin to pronounce the presidential oath.
577 ORT (Russian Television), 7 May 2000, 11:45-13:00 (Moscow time).
™Ibid.
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Illustration 13. Putin marches past the invited elites in the Great Kremlin Palace.
The chairman of the Constitutional Court invited Putin to take the presidential oath, 
after which the national anthem was played and the presidential banner was hoisted on 
the Presidential Residence in the Kremlin.579 Putin made a speech in which he 
emphasised continuity. ‘I consider it important to underline today that the history and 
fate of the country does not begin with the election of a new state leader and does not 
end with his resignation.’580 He singled out ‘the President of the Soviet Union and the 
first President of the Russian Federation’ as the best examples of people who served
c m
Russia. The ceremony in the Great Kremlin Palace ended at 13:35 after which Putin 
again marched past the invited guests through the Aleksandr and Georgii Halls. 
Together with Boris Yeltsin, he entered the Kremlin Square to accept the report from 
the commander of the Presidential Regiment. The whole ceremony ended with an 
artillery salute. That evening, there was a formal reception in the Kremlin.582 All in all, 
Putin’s inauguration ceremony exuded strength and confidence.
579 The national anthem was still Glinka’s Patriotic Song at this time.
580 Presidential Administration (2000) Vystuplenie na tseremonii vstupleniia v dolzhnost Prezidenta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Last accessed: 16 May 2000, Address: 
http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/30.html.
m Ibid
582 ORT (Russian Television), 7 May 2000, 11:45-13:00 (Moscow time).
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5.5 Political Burials and Non-Burials
The Russian leadership was not only faced by having to choose state symbols and 
holidays in 1991. During the 1990s the politically charged issue of how to treat the 
remains of Nicholas II and Lenin came to the fore. Whether to remove Lenin’s body 
from the mausoleum on the Red Square and inter it had been debated before, but after 
the August Coup in 1991 it became a question for the Russian leadership to decide. 
The remains of Nicholas n, together with those of his family, personal physician and 
three servants, had been discovered in a forest outside Yekaterinburg in 1979 and were 
exhumed in July 1991. The debate over the remains of both Lenin and Nicholas II 
threatened to divide Russian society even further and were often discussed in tandem. 
Possibly for this reason, the debate focused on technical questions, such as whether 
Lenin’s body was on the verge of disintegrating and whether the remains of 
Nicholas II were authentic. In fact, most of the participants in the debate eschewed 
discussing the political symbolism that these burials inevitably involved.
Had the Russian leadership decided to bury Lenin in the immediate aftermath of the 
August Coup in 1991 or even in early 1992, the issue would probably have been less 
politically charged. Immediately after the August Coup, Anatolii Sobchak, at the 
extraordinary USSR Congress of People’s Deputies on 5 September 1991, suggested 
that the Congress should adopt a resolution about the burial of Lenin’s body ‘in 
accordance with the religious and national traditions of our people and in accordance
• co^with his will, at the Volkovo cemetery in Leningrad, with all the fitting honours.’ 
However, Gorbachev called for more thought on the issue. Neither did Yeltsin decide 
to remove Lenin’s body from the mausoleum. Possibly, both the Soviet and the 
Russian leadership were held back the fact that removing Lenin from the Red Square 
could spark a debate on what to do with other remains buried behind the mausoleum. 
Not only controversial persons -  Feliks Derzhinskii (the founder of the notorious 
secret police, the Cheka), for example -  were buried there but also popular heroes like
583 Izvestiia, 18 January 1995, p. 5.
584 BBC SWB, SU/1171 (7 September 1991), Cl/2.
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Yurii Gagarin. Probably, Yeltsin erroneously assumed that the question would 
become less controversial as time wore on. Instead, the political divide grew between 
the Russian leadership and the opposition and Lenin’s remains in the mausoleum 
became one of the symbols of this divide.
After the October Events of 1993, rumours circulated that Yeltsin had prepared a
f O f
decree on moving Lenin’s remains. On 6 October 1993, Yeltsin decreed that there
would no longer be a guard of honour at Lenin’s Mausoleum, but Lenin’s body would
remain in the mausoleum. Yeltsin simply moved the guard of honour to the Tomb of
the Unknown Solider instead.587 In his memoirs Yeltsin reflected on this decision,
emphasising that the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier represented Russian traditions
whereas Lenin had represented the international socialist movement.
To lay a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is an old Kremlin 
ritual. It was here that guard number one was moved by order of one of my 
decrees. Earlier, it was at the Mausoleum on the Red Square. Before a 
tomb with the mummy of the leader of the world proletariat paced the step 
of the Kremlin guards, changing each hour. Today they are here, at the
coo
symbolic tomb of all our soldiers, who have died for Russia.
Referring to Lenin as ‘a mummy’ and ‘leader of the world proletariat’, Yeltsin made 
it clear that he regarded the mausoleum and Lenin’s body as symbols of a Soviet past, 
even of something archaic, that the Russian state ought to leave behind. Nevertheless, 
it was more common that the Russian leadership sought to make the question of 
Lenin’s remains into a question of what was a ‘Christian’ or morally correct way to 
treat the remains. In this, the Russian leadership received support from the Patriarch of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, Aleksii II.589
585 See Rossiiskie vesti, 4 November 1993 for a discussion on the Red Square as a traditional burying 
ground and BBC SWB, SU/1825 (21 October 1993), B/4 for mayor Yurii Luzkhov’s proposal that all 
people buried outside the Kremlin walls be reburied.
586 BBC SWB, SU/1825 (21 October 1993), B/4.
587 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9 October 1993, p. 2.
588 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 82. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 73.)
589 See, for example, BBC SWB, SU/2939 (7 June 1997), B/3 and Argumenty i fakty, No. 33, 1995, p. 3.
- 1 9 4 -
5 In v e n t io n  a n d  R e -In v e n t io n  o f  Sy m b o l s  a n d  R it u a l s
In other words, the Russian leadership only rarely made the question of Lenin’s burial 
into a question of burying a totalitarian past. Instead, the favoured strategy of the 
Kremlin was to deprive Lenin’s remains of symbolic political contents.590 In 1997, 
Yeltsin made a lame attempt at proposing a referendum on the issue, but was eager to 
point out that ‘the graveyard from the Red Square’ must be removed ‘in a civilized and 
very careful manner’.591 In 1998, deputy prime minister, Boris Nemtsov, stated that 
although he believed that Lenin ought to be buried, he regarded it as unnecessary to 
‘create new problems and conflicts’. The prime concern of Yeltsin was to bridge 
political divides in Russian society and ensure stability. Thus in July 1999, he 
acknowledged that Lenin’s body in the mausoleum was a ‘historical symbol’ of 
Russia’s past and restated his conviction that Lenin ought to be interred, but did not 
want to discuss a date for a possible funeral. In spite of the persistent rumours to the 
contrary, Yeltsin did not hurry to have Lenin buried in 1999 and to become the ‘man 
who buried communism’, before he left the Kremlin. His successor, Vladimir Putin, 
made it clear that his first priority was stability and consensus in the Russian society 
and that he, therefore, had no plans to bury Lenin.594
In the same manner, the Russian leadership emphasised stability and reconciliation as 
the funeral of Nicholas II was approaching. The funeral of the last Russian tsar 
presented the Russian leadership with ample opportunities of making statements on 
Russia’s imperial past and, more specifically, on the role of Nicholas II in the fall of 
the Russian empire. Furthermore, it constituted an opportunity to point to the country’s 
totalitarian past. Russian newspapers often described the killing of the Romanov
590 On Lenin’s burial as political, see Verdery (1999) The Political Lives o f Dead Bodies: Reburial and 
Postsocialist Change (New York, Columbia University Press), pp. 18-19. On the symbolism of the 
Lenin mausoleum and its role as ‘a national shrine’ and ‘a place of pilgrimage’, see Binns (1979) The 
Changing Face o f Power: Revolution and Accommodation in the Development of the Soviet 
Ceremonial System, part 1', Man, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 601. For Russian communists, Lenin’s body 
continued to be charged with symbolic meaning, On the 70th anniversary of his death 1500 people 
gathered for a rally in Moscow, Izvestiia, 18 January 1995, p. 5. See also Ziuganov’s statements, BBC 
SWB, SU/2299 (10 May 1995), Sl/14 and BBC SWB, SU/3595 (24 July 1999), B/4.
591 BBC SWB, SU/2939 (7 June 1997), B/3.
592 BBC SWB, SU/3283 (20 July 1998), B/6.
593 Izvestiia, 6 July 1999, p. 2.
594 President o f Russia (2001) Press-konferentsiia Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. V Putina, Last 
accessed: 20 February 2002, Address: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/264.html.
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family as a vile act and as a prelude of the terror of the civil war and the Stalin era. 
However, these themes were touched upon only in passing in the political debate. 
Instead, the debate over the remains of the imperial family, and those of Nicholas II in 
particular, came to centre around, firstly, in which city the family ought to be buried 
and, secondly, whether the remains were indeed those of the tsar and his family.
The first debate concerned the authenticity of the remains discovered in the woods 
outside Yekaterinburg. Although the remains were exhumed in 1991, the decision to 
bury the tsar was repeatedly delayed. A painstaking process to identify the remains 
was initiated already in 1992. Russian and American osteologists agreed that the 
remains were those of the tsar and his family. However, the Russian Orthodox Church 
continued to demand convincing evidence. Both DNA analysis performed in Great 
Britain in 1992 and in the United States in 1994 provided compelling evidence that the 
remains were authentic.595 In January 1998, a government commission charged with 
studying the question of the tsar’s burial concluded that the remains were, indeed, 
those of the tsar and his family and recommended that the family be buried.596 Boris 
Yeltsin took the final decision to hold the funeral in Saint Petersburg. The Russian 
Orthodox Church, however, still did not accept the DNA evidence and Aleksii II 
declined to be present at the funeral.597 During the funeral, Archpriest Glebov did not 
mention the names of the members of the royal family in the prayer. Instead he 
referred to ‘the peace of the souls of the departed servants of God, for all those 
martyred and killed for their faith in Christ during a time of cruel persecution. Their
595 Ivanov, et al. (1996) Mitochondrial DNA sequence heteroplasmy in the Grand Duke of Russia 
Georgij Romanov establishes the authenticity o f the remains of Tsar Nicholas IT, Nature Genetics, 
Vol. 12, No. 4, 'Romanovs Find Closure in DNA', (1996) Nature Genetics, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 339- 
340.
596 BBC SWB, SU/3140 (2 February 1998), B/2. See also the government instruction (No. 456-r) on the 
composition of the commission, Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997, No. 14, 7 
April 1997, p. 2835.
597 BBC SWB, SU/3250 (11 June 1998), B/3, BBC SWB, SU/3280 (16 July 1998), B/7-8 and BBC SWB, 
SU/3282 (18 July 1998), B/2. The Russian Orthodox Church was faced with a dilemma since a 
possible canonisation of the tsar would demand a specific funeral ceremony (furthermore, there were 
different degrees of canonisation which demanded different funeral ceremonies) and, therefore, 
preferred a symbolic grave until a decision had been reached on this issue. The question was further 
compounded by the fact that there was a rivalry between it and the Russian emigrant Orthodox Church 
abroad, which had already canonised the tsar. The Russian Orthodox Church took the decision to 
canonise Nicholas II in August 2000, Rossiiskaia gazeta, 16 August 2000, p. 3.
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names are known to You, Lord’. The position of the church was seized upon by a 
number of politicians who for various reasons were opposed to the funeral.599
The second debate revolved around where the tsar ought to be buried. A small tug-of- 
war started between the governor of Sverdlovsk oblast, Eduard Rossel, the governor of 
Saint Petersburg, Vladimir Yakovlev, and the mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov. Each 
proposed his own regional capital as the most appropriate resting place for the 
Romanovs. In Eduard Rossel’s view, Yekaterinburg was suitable since this was where 
the execution of the Romanovs had taken place. In the end, the delegation from 
Yekaterinburg to the funeral in Saint Petersburg was notably small. Rossel did not take 
part in the funeral and neither did the then chairman of the regional government of 
Ural oblast, Aleksei Vorobev.600 The mayor of Moscow, Yurii Luzhkov, in his turn, 
first demanded that the imperial family be buried in the reconstructed Church of Christ 
the Saviour in Moscow. When it became evident that the funeral would take place in 
Saint Petersburg, Luzhkov supported the decision of the Russian Patriarch. He stated 
that he also wished to see the remains buried in a symbolic grave until the authenticity 
was beyond doubt. Like Eduard Rossel, Luzkhov did not take part in the funeral in 
Saint Petersburg.601
The resolve of the Russian leadership to avoid making the funeral of Nicholas II into a 
political event, which might have divided Russian society even further, was evident 
from both the decisions made and from Yeltsin’s own account of the funeral. The 
official status of the funeral remained rather unclear. Yeltsin emphasised that the
598 BBC SWB, SU/3282 (18 July 1998), B/2.
599 Thus, Gennadii Seleznev refused to attend the funeral, State Duma of the Russian Federation - 
Minutes Morning Plenary Session 16 July (1998) Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia 
Gosudarstvennoi Dumy RF: 16 iiulia 1998, utrennoe zasedcmie, Last accessed: 13 February 2001, 
Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1998/sl6-07_u.htm, as did Eduard Rossel, BBC SWB, 
SU/3280 (16 July 1998), B/7 and the chairman of the Federation Council, Yegor Stroev, BBC SWB, 
SU/3281 (17 July 1998), B/l.
600 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 January 1998, p. 2 and BBC SWB, SU/3279 (15 July 1998), B/9.
601 BBC SWB, SU/3250 (20 July 1998), B/3. See also Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: 
razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, 
Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 328-329 (also in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries 
(London, Phoenix), p. 300). See also Rossiiskie vesti, 16 July 1998, p. 1, BBC SWB, SU/3281 (17 July 
1998), B/l and SU/3282 (18 July 1998), B/l-2, for an account of who took part in the funeral in Saint 
Petersburg.
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interment of the imperial family constituted a ‘family, not state funeral’. He 
vacillated to the very last moment on whether he would attend the ceremony in Saint 
Petersburg or not. He decided to attend on the eve of the funeral after a telephone 
conversation with the academician, Dmitrii Likhachev. ‘I understood the burial of the 
Tsar not only as my civic, political [duty], but also as my personal duty to memory.’ 
However, the very grand ceremony in itself suggested an official ceremony and the 
presidential press service denied that Yeltsin went to Saint Petersburg in a private 
capacity.604 In his speech at the funeral, Yeltsin emphasised that he had felt it 
necessary to be present both in his capacity ‘a human being, and as President’.605
In a similar manner, the very decision to bury the tsar in Saint Petersburg mirrored the 
ambivalent nature of the position of the Russian leadership. This again emphasised that 
the funeral was foremost a family affair. In Yeltsin’s view, the Romanov family ought 
to rest in Saint Petersburg with its ancestors. ‘For me, it was obvious: the family crypt 
of the Romanovs was in Saint Petersburg, in the Peter Paul Fortress, in the Cathedral 
of Saint Peter and Paul. There could not be two opinions on this: the graves of the 
ancestors must be sacred for every family.’606 Incidentally, this line of reasoning was 
resonant of how the Russian leadership motivated its wish to bury Lenin.
The Russian leadership spared no effort when it came to determining the authenticity 
of the remains. This was done not least in order to win over the Russian Orthodox 
Church. Its refusal to accept the authenticity of the remains made it more difficult to 
reach a consensus on the burial of the tsar and to put the issue to rest once and for all.
602 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 333. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 304.)
603 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 331.
604 BBC SWB, SU/3281 (17 July 1998), B/l.
605 Rossiiskie vesti, 18 July 1998, p. 1. For an English version of the speech, see BBC SWB, SU/3282 (18 
July 1998), B/l.
606 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 328. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 300.)
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However, as the Russian Orthodox Church refused to change its position, Yeltsin
decided that the burial was not foremost an ecclesiastical matter.
But it was not a deep church issue. It was a civil issue. Russia had to pay 
her last respects to Nicholas the Second, to Aleksandra Fedorovna and to 
their unfortunate children. Our memory, our conscience demanded this.
This was a matter of the international prestige of Russia. And from an 
ordinary human point of view, they had to finally find peace next to their 
ancestors. For how long could this go on.. ,607
Finally, the statements made by Yeltsin at the funeral and later in his memoirs 
constitute ample evidence that the primary concern of the Russian leadership was to 
achieve consensus. Although Yeltsin pointed to the execution of the Romanovs as ‘one 
of the most shameful pages in our history’, he did not make the occasion into an act of
Z A O
vilifying the opposition or the Soviet communist leadership. Instead he claimed that
the execution ‘was the result of irreconcilable schism in Russian (rossiiskoe) society
[the division] into us and strangers; the consequences of this affect us even today’.609
He seized on the opportunity to call for reconciliation.
As we build the new Russia, we have to lean against her historic 
experience. Many glorious pages in the history of the Fatherland are 
connected to the Romanov name. But with this name is connected one of 
its most bitter lessons: any attempts to change life through violence are 
doomed.
We have to end the century, which for Russia became a century of blood 
and lawlessness, with repentance and reconciliation; regardless of our 
political opinions, religious and ethnic origin.610
In a similar vein, Yeltsin described the funeral in his memoirs. He described how, 
when he exited from the cathedral in Saint Petersburg, ‘it seemed to me that accord and 
reconciliation would really come to us at some point’.611 He combined this observation
607 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia... [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 329. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 300.)
608 Rossiiskie vesti, 18 July 1998, p. 1. For an English version of the speech, see BBC SWB, SU/3282 (18 
July 1998), B/l.
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid.
611 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia... [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 333. (Also in 
Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 304.)
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with a reflection on the role that the country’s history played in achieving accord in 
society. ‘How truly sad it is that we lost the feeling of wholeness (tselostnost), the 
continuity of our history. And how I wish that these would soon be re-established in 
our [country].’612
On the whole, however, it is the absence of historical symbolism and the ambivalent 
nature of the position of the Russian leadership that is striking in its statements, rather 
than the linkages that were made. In the case of the remains of Nicholas II and those of 
Lenin, the statements could have been considerably more political. Possibly, they 
would have been so had the funerals taken place in 1991-1993. However, by the 
second half of the 1990s, an important concern of the Russian leadership had become 
to create stability and consensus. In the case of Lenin, Yeltsin probably eschewed 
interment immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union in the errant conviction that 
the issue would become less controversial later. However, the political tension over 
Lenin’s burial grew rather than abated. In the case of Nicholas II, the first concern was 
to ascertain the authenticity of the remains -  not least in order to win over the Russian 
Orthodox Church. When there could no longer be any doubt over the fact that the 
remains exhumed in 1991 were those of the tsar and the imperial family, the need to 
achieve accord and conciliation again overrode any desire there might have been to 
score political points by associating political opponents with the decision to execute 
the family.
5.6 The Symbols and Rituals of the New Russian State
The examination of the battle over symbols together with the use that the Kremlin 
made of holidays and state ceremonies yields interesting insights into the dilemmas 
with which the Russian leadership was confronted. Initially, the Kremlin sought to 
distance itself from the Soviet era. As time wore on, however, it became more 
important to achieve unity and an impression of continuity -  something that was 
mirrored in the development of rituals and symbols for the Russian Federation. 
Confrontation gave way to pragmatism and inclusion. For example, the Russian
612 Ibid.
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leadership discovered that it was valuable to retain elements of the Soviet legacy -  
most importantly the Soviet victory in the Second World War. Letting the nationalist- 
communist opposition monopolise the Great Patriotic War as a national symbol would 
have spelled a significant symbolic loss to the Russian leadership. Thus, elements of 
the Soviet legacy, for example the victory banner, were included in the symbolism of 
the new Russian state even before Aleksandrov’s melody of the Soviet national anthem 
was reintroduced with new lyrics. In the final analysis, the Kremlin relied on elements 
of both the tsarist and the Soviet legacy. However, the Russian leadership carefully 
selected which elements of these historic legacies that it wished to emphasise.
Similarly, the Russian leadership frequently employed national arguments, but based 
foremost in general references to Russian history and tradition. The debate on state 
symbols revolved around the legacy of empire: the double-headed eagle and the 
tricolour, as well as the hammer and sickle and Soviet flag. This was hardly surprising 
since the Russian history was intimately connected with empire. It would have been 
difficult for the Russian leadership to introduce entirely new symbols such as a birch 
leaf or bear. Even the attempt to introduce Glinka’s Patriotic Song failed. The double­
headed eagle suggested a certain degree of continuity as a symbol of Russia’s historic 
past as did the tricolour, the melody of the Soviet anthem and the celebration of 
Victory Day. Although national arguments, often reminiscent of empire, were 
invoked frequently, it is again worth pointing out that these were not ethnic Russian 
arguments. The Russian leadership chose to emphasise the national arguments that 
promoted unity and emphasised continuity rather than exclusion and discontinuity.
The presidential inauguration ceremony and the celebration of certain holidays also 
provided the state leadership with an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to 
democracy and liberal democratic values. Interestingly, the Russian presidential oath is 
more specific than the American with explicit references to democracy, human rights
613 Hellberg-Him (1998) Soil and Soul: The Symbolic World o f Russianness (Aldershot, Ashgate), p. 33.
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and freedom.614 This did not necessarily mean that the Russian state building project 
was democratic. Indeed, such democratic exhortations could just as well indicate that 
the Russian leadership wished to gloss over democratic shortcomings. However, it did 
signify that the Russian leadership considered it an essential ingredient in its 
legitimation formula. The two “new Russian holidays” were also occasions when the 
Russian leadership poured more democratic commitment into its legitimation formula. 
Overall, however, democratic arguments were less prominent in the battle over rituals 
and symbols than in other debates.
Neither were negative arguments overly prominent in the legitimation efforts 
concerning symbols and rituals. The negative arguments that occurred pointed to the 
danger of chaos, while images of enemies were invoked increasingly seldom. An initial 
phase when the Russian leadership sought to hinder the opposition from celebrating 
Soviet holidays and vilified its political adversaries gave way to legitimation 
statements that emphasised unity. Indicative of this was the attempt in 1996 to change 
name of the Day of the October Revolution to the Day of Accord and Reconciliation. 
Although this initiative failed to become established among the public, it demonstrated 
how the focus of the Kremlin had become stability rather than confrontation. Neither 
did the Russian leadership politicise the burials of Lenin and Nicholas and the negative 
Soviet legacy involved, to the extent that would have been possible. Again, the 
arguments revolved around the importance of achieving unity and accord.
State holidays and ceremonies also offered the Russian leadership the opportunity to 
bond with certain elites. Especially the Russian Armed Forces were targeted on 
Victory Day. The Russian leadership regarded it as crucial to bond with groups and 
institutions in society that enjoyed the trust of the population such as the Orthodox 
Church and war veterans. The Kremlin was careful to invite these groups to its 
ceremonies. Aleksii II, for example, was present at all the presidential inauguration
614 The American presidential oath according to the American constitution, Article n, Section 1: ‘I do 
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, 
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’
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ceremonies. However, the opposition was also invited and Yeltsin’s realisation of the 
value of Gorbachev’s presence at state ceremonies offers an insight into the importance 
of this. The presence of the political opposition at the presidential inauguration 
ceremony implied that it recognised the political system in spite of its criticism of the 
state leadership -  in other words, it conveyed an impression of stability. Political 
battles were no longer fought in the streets. Yeltsin himself mentioned this as an 
achievement in its own right in a number of speeches. Likewise, the presence of 
Gorbachev at Putin’s inauguration ceremony conveyed an impression of continuity. In 
another effort to underline continuity, Putin awarded Yeltsin with Russia’s most 
distinguished order, For Services to the Fatherland, First Degree on 12 June 2000, the 
tenth anniversary of the Russian declaration of sovereignty.615
615 A summary of the celebration in the Kremlin on 12 June was broadcast in the Russian main news 
programme Vremia, ORT -  International (Russian Television), 12 June 2000, 21:00-21:30 (Moscow 
time).
6 Adjusting to Different Audiences
The Russian leadership in the 1990s had few tangible successes to point to and 
limited resources available for co-option. Thus, when it formulated its legitimation 
formula, the Russian leadership toed a fine line between seeking to adjust to the 
norms of the community at hand and seeking to influence the same community in a 
certain direction. The legitimation formula reflected this balancing act. The 
possibility to restrict a legitimation message to a specific audience varied. Often the 
only way of achieving this was to deliver the message behind closed doors. Such 
legitimation messages would have been inherently difficult to investigate. The 
legitimation messages examined here were readily accessible. The Russian 
leadership was well aware that statements made abroad were likely to be available to 
the domestic audience in newspapers on the following day and that statements made 
at home could be translated by foreign journalists and embassies for an international 
audience. Nevertheless, it is likely that a politician making a speech in the UN 
General Assembly directed and adjusted his message primarily to an international 
audience. Likewise, a politician was concerned primarily with the impression made 
on the military personnel when addressing them on Victory Day. I, therefore, 
considered it possible to divide the material according to primary audience. How the 
Russian leadership sought to adjust this message according to audience is the focus 
of this chapter.
Ideally, the material for comparisons should be similar in nature and volume. 
However, it is in the very nature of messages adjusted to suit a particular audience that 
the way the legitimation message is conveyed and structured will differ radically. For 
example, a speech delivered in the Russian Duma will differ in length from one 
delivered on television on New Year’s Eve. In the Duma, the speaker is relatively sure 
that his audience will stay in their seats, whereas on television the address must be 
swift and to the point. Textbooks also enjoy the privilege of being able to control the 
attention of their audiences while a rallying speech during, for example, the August 
Coup must focus on arousing the right emotions and prompting the desired actions.
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The consequences of this must certainly be weighed into the inferences drawn from the 
material. However, the differences in style and length will reflect the message as sent 
and received by the different audiences.
6.1 Legitimation and the International Community
Each state is compelled to try and gain at least a minimum degree of recognition within 
the international community. Failure to do so might result in loss in trade, lack of allies 
and, in the worst scenario, in armed intervention. Recognised states and states that 
enjoy respect in the international community, on the other hand, gain a number of 
advantages such as favourable trade and access to international fora. In order to gain 
legitimacy internationally, a state leadership must seek to convince the international 
community that it has control over its own territory, that it intends to follow 
international rules of conduct and that it shares dominant values of the international 
community. Recognition from some states and organisations increase the likelihood 
from more states and organisations. Furthermore, a quid pro quo relationship is 
involved in the process when states bestow recognition upon the international 
community as such while gaining recognition for themselves. A state leadership, which 
gains recognition internationally, also acquires a potent weapon in its quest for 
domestic legitimacy. The international community, in its turn, has a vested interest in 
stability and will accept the state leadership that is the best guarantor of stability. 616
The Russian leadership gained international recognition quite easily during the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union. The reigning values in the international community at 
the fall of the Soviet Union were undoubtedly those of liberal democracy -  a model
• A1 7that promised prosperity and success. Consequently, the Russian leadership argued
616 On presence of ‘ideological similarities, shared nationalities, cohesion, and international interest or 
recognition’ as important factors for achieving international legitimacy, see Lopez (1999) 'Russia and 
the Democratic Peace: The Decision to Use Military Force in Ethnic Disputes', in: Hopf (Ed.) 
Understandings o f Russian Foreign Policy (University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State 
University Press), pp. 181-184. See also Franck (1990) The Power o f Legitimacy Among Nations 
(New York, Oxford University Press) on why states obey international rules.
617 On liberal values as dominating values, see Barnett (1997) 'Bringing in the New World Order: 
Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations', World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4, Fukuyama (1992) 
The End o f History and the Last Man (London, Hamish Hamilton) and Watson (1997) The Limits o f 
Independence: Relations Between States in the Modem World (London, Routledge).
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that it was the best guarantor of stability and pledged allegiance to the reigning 
paradigms of democracy, human rights and market economy in the international 
community. The possibility that the Russian leadership could adjust the international 
scene to its own liking was significantly smaller than it had been for the Soviet Union. 
Rather, the Russian leadership had to adjust to the values of the community and to 
portray itself as a champion of those values. After the fall of the Soviet Union, even the 
simple recognition of the Russian Federation internationally was an important prize for 
the Russian leadership to secure in its quest for domestic legitimacy. Demands for 
prestige and further influence came later.
The legitimation formula sent internationally was, for example, available in speeches
made by Russian representatives to international organisations and during state visits 
61 £abroad. Especially relevant were the speeches made during times of crisis such as 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the October Events of 1993 and the war in Chechnya. The 
very nature of the material, not least the speeches made in international organisations, 
followed a quite predictable pattern. Allegiance was pledged to international law, to 
the rules of the international organisation at hand etc. However, this was not 
necessarily less interesting. The failure to breach these unwritten rules said something 
in itself. Furthermore, crises prompted the Russian leadership to use other forms of 
appeal for support and to change the nature of their formal addresses (in the UN 
General Assembly, for example).
The Russian leadership was at its most vulnerable as it sought to gain international 
recognition during the fall of the Soviet Union; that is, during the August Coup and up 
to the Belovezha Accords and the ensuing official end of the Soviet Union. It was 
important for the Russian leadership to appear to have the support of the West and to 
portray itself as a leadership that the West could trust to carry though democratic and
618 On the UN’s role as a legitimating institution within the international community, see Claude (1966) 
'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', International Organization, 
Vol. 20, pp. 367-379.
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economic reforms.619 Democratic and liberal-democratic legitimation dominated the 
appeals directed to the audience outside Russia. The Russian leadership made it clear 
that it considered Russia as part of an international community of democratic states. 
For example, the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, issued an appeal for 
‘moral and political assistance from the democracies’ in the Washington Post during 
the August Coup in 1991.620 Similarly, after the signing of the Belovezha Accords, the 
legitimation messages referred to the ‘democratic, law-govemed states’, which were 
seeking access to the international arena and pledged adherence to international law 
and human rights.621
During 1992, as Yeltsin made his first state visits abroad, the reliance on democratic
and liberal-democratic legitimation was evident as he sought international respect for
the new Russian state.622 In his speech in the British parliament in November 1992,
Yeltsin combined democratic legitimation with external legitimation.
Here in the British parliament, which has a history many centuries old, I 
represent one of the youngest democracies in the world, democratic and 
free Russia.
I regard this symbolic fact as clear evidence that the community of states 
has taken into its family the reborn Russian state.
Negative legitimation occurred when the Russian leadership described the demise of 
the Soviet Union as inevitable. The formation of an independent Russia was described
619 See Yeltsin’s memoirs on early relations with Western leaders, Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta 
[Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), pp.171-716 (also in Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the 
Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers) pp, 131-134).
620 Kozyrev (1991) Stand By Us, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com.
621 BBC SWB, SU/1252 (11 December 1991), Cl/1-2. See also, for example, Yeltsin’s interview for 
Italian television, BBC SWB, SU/1260 (20 December 1991), B/2-3, his letter to the UN General 
Secretary, BBC SWB, SU/1293 (1 February 1992), Al/2-5 and Kozyrev’s article, Kozyrev (1992) 
Russia: A Chance for Survival', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 1-16.
622 See, especially, his speeches in the US Congress and in the Canadian parliament in June 1992, 
Yeltsin (1992) Address by His Excellency, Boris Yeltsin, President o f the Russian Federation, Before 
the Joint Meeting o f the United States Congress, Washington, United States Congress, 17 June 1992, 
Congressional Record - House, 138 Cong Rec H 4762 (see also BBC SWB, SU/1411 (19 June 1992), 
Cl/1-3) and BBC SWB, SU/1413 (22 June 1992), Cl/3-6. See also Yeltsin’s visit to France, BBC 
SWB, SU/1298 (7 February 1992), Cl/1-3, his attendance at a G7 meeting in Munich, BBC SWB, 
SU/1429 (10 July 1992), Al/2-5 and his speech in the British parliament, BBC SWB, SU/1536 (12 
November 1992), Cl/1-7. (The latter was summarised in Rossiiskie vesti, 12 November 1992, p. 1.)
623 BBC SWB, SU/1536 (12 November 1992), Cl/1. See also Rossiiskie vesti, 12 November 1992, p. 1, 
for a summary in Russian.
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as the only viable alternative to chaos and the Russian leadership dissociated itself
firmly from the Soviet totalitarian system. Thus, in his article in the Washington Post,
Kozyrev maintained that the most important thing was to ‘avoid bloodshed’ in August
1991.624 It was also important to the Russian leadership to reduce any lingering Gorby-
mania in the West and portray itself as a reliable alternative to Gorbachev, whose
authority was undermined by the August Coup. Yeltsin, in his speech to the British
parliament, repudiated ‘everything that formed the essence of the former regime, its
lies and violence, its hypocritical and aggressive policy towards other countries, mental
and physical terror towards its own people, when millions of people died’. When
Kozyrev delivered Russia’s first speech at the opening session of the UN General
Assembly on 22 September 1992, he repudiated totalitarianism, which had ‘robbed
Russia both of its unique identity and of the possibility of self-fulfilment in its relations
with other states’. This statement also echoed of the conviction Russia had in fact
borne the brunt of the burden within the Soviet Union and that were only Russia
stripped of the weight of having to support the Soviet centre and the other republics, it
was bound to blossom. This kind of national legitimation was rare and disappeared
more or less altogether after 1992. Kozyrev’s main emphasis, however, was on
democratic legitimation.
Russia, which has rejected communism, has, perhaps more than any other 
country, learned from its own experience that there can be no alternative to 
democratic development; our country voted for democracy during the first 
nation-wide presidential election in its history, and defended it at theff) 7barricades around the Moscow White House.
The leadership’s stance in the constitutional battle was legitimised in a similar manner 
abroad by the Russian leadership. In early 1993, Yeltsin met with Helmut Kohl and 
sounded his attitude to a possible limitation of the powers of the Russian parliament.
624 Kozyrev (1991) Stand By Us, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com.
625 BBC SWB, SU/1536 (12 November 1992), Cl/2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1251 (10 December 1991), 
Cl/2. See also Kozyrev in early 1992 in Foreign Affairs, where he denounced Soviet communism as 
‘doomed to failure from the start’, Kozyrev (1992) ’Russia: A Chance for Survival’, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 71, No. 2, p. 4.
626 UN General Assembly (1992) General Assembly 47th session, provisional verbatim record o f the 6th 
meeting, 22 September 1992, 10 am.. New York, UN General Assembly, 29 September 1992, 
A/47/PV.6, p. 57.
627 Ibid p. 57.
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As Yeltsin was later to write in his memoirs, he was aware that ‘certain basic 
democratic values existed in the West’.628 According to Yeltsin, Kohl assured him that 
he and the other leaders of G-7 would be sympathetic to such ‘severe but necessary 
measures to stabilise the situation in Russia’.629 Before the April referendum, Yeltsin 
addressed diplomats in Moscow displaying Russia’s future as a choice between 
democracy, on the one hand, and ‘chaos’ or return to a ‘totalitarian past’ on the 
other.630 A few days later, Kozyrev warned that if the opposition were to win the
A31referendum ‘there will be no more regular or early elections’. In July 1993 at the G7 
Summit in Tokyo, Yeltsin stated that Russia had ‘moved along toward a democratic 
and free market economy’. He also stressed that Russia must constitute itself ‘in
A39keeping with the democratic practice of the G-7’.
In September of the same year, Andrei Kozyrev, who was in New York for the 
opening of the UN General Assembly when Yeltsin issued Decree number 1400, 
appealed to the international audience for support. He relied on a mix of democratic 
and negative legitimation. He gave an interview for NBC on 26 September 1993 and, 
in his speech before the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1993, Kozyrev again 
appealed for international support with a mix of democratic and negative legitimation. 
He especially emphasised Yeltsin’s popular mandate and indirectly equated his
A33adversaries in the Supreme Soviet with ‘the old totalitarian system’.
Russia is peacefully transforming itself in accordance with the 
fundamental principle of democracy: free elections. In 1991, the people of 
Russia elected their country’s first democratic President, and they 
confirmed their confidence in his policies at the April referendum this 
year. On the basis of this twofold mandate, the President has taken decisive
628 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 176. (Also in 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 135.)
629 Ibid, p. 176 (p. 135 in the English edition).
630 BBC SWB, SU/1660 (12 April 1993), Al/1-2.
631 BBC SWB, SU/1668 (21 April 1993), B /ll.
632 G8 Information Centre (1993) Press Conference by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and President 
Boris Yeltsin o f the Russian Federation at the 1993 G-7 Economic Summit - Tokyo Summit III, Last 
accessed: 7 November 2001, Address: http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1993tokyo/russia/5.html.
633 UN General Assembly (1993) General Assembly 48th session, provisional verbatim record o f the 6th 
meeting, 28 September 1993,10 a.m., New York, UN General Assembly, 5 October 1993, A/48/PV.6, 
p. 17.
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measures to ensure democratic elections to the Parliament in December of 
this year. Thus, the old totalitarian system of power will be definitively 
dismantled and replaced by a new system of power elected by the people 
and responsible only to the people. We invite international observers to 
monitor the elections to the Parliament.634
After the White House had been stormed in October, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
issued a comment on the events. The main arguments referred to the fact that Yeltsin 
had been elected president in June 1991 and to the result of the April referendum. The 
‘will of the people’ and ‘people’s power’ were invoked as were human rights and 
freedoms. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry referred to practices of international law, 
the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1966) and to similar events when democratic countries had used 
‘emergency measures’. On 10 October, after the storming of the White House, an 
article by Andrei Kozyrev was published in the Washington Post. Again the word 
‘democracy’ featured prominently. However, negative legitimation was evident. 
Kozyrev called the opposition in the White House ‘communist and fascists’. 
Furthermore, he warned the readers of the Washington Post of the risk that the 
‘parliamentary mutiny’ would ‘trigger a disintegration of Russia’, which would be ‘a 
recipe for new Chemobyls and other calamities’.636
Yeltsin relied entirely on democratic and external legitimation in a statement intended 
for an international audience on 9 October 1993, in which he expressed his gratitude to 
the ‘friendly states and international organisations’ that had supported the Russian 
leadership ‘during the difficult days, deciding the fate of democracy’.637 Almost a year 
later, Yeltsin addressed the opening session of the UN General Assembly in New 
York. Yeltsin started by firmly establishing Russia’s reputation internationally as a 
democratic state committed to international law, human rights and democracy. ‘The 
new Russia was bom in 1991 as a democratic State. Its birth was witnessed by the
6U Ibid, p. 17.
635 BBC SWB, SU/1815 (9 October 1993), C/2-3.
636 Kozyrev (1993) And Now: Partnership with Russia's Democrats, Last accessed: 21 August 2001, 
Address: http://nl4.newsbank.com.
637 Rossiiskie vesti, 9 October 1993, p. 1.
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entire world.’ He then went on to claim a role for Russia on the international arena, 
but based the claim on international agreements and charters and on the equality of 
sovereign states within the world community. However, Yeltsin also stressed Russia’s 
role within the CIS and the special relations that existed between the CIS states: 
‘Russia’s ties with them are closer than the traditional relations of good- 
neighbourliness; we have, rather, an extraordinary blood relationship.’ On other 
occasions, the Russian leadership based its claim for a special role within the CIS by 
declaring its willingness to take upon itself the task of peacekeeping and protection of 
human rights.640
The war in Chechnya developed into a difficult question for the Russian leadership to 
tackle internationally. The Kremlin seriously misjudged the readiness of its traditional 
allies, the international community and the media, to support the military operation. 
Instead, the Chechen war proved an obstacle, especially when it came to the Russian 
application for membership in the Council of Europe.641 The Russian Federation 
became a member of the Council of Europe in February 1996, although it applied as 
early as May 1992. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) temporarily suspended the Russian delegation’s right to vote during the 
second Russian campaign in Chechnya. In arguing for membership in January 1996, 
the Russian leadership stressed its adherence to principles of democracy and human
638 UN General Assembly (1994) General Assembly 49th session, provisional verbatim record o f the 5th 
meeting, 26 September 1994, 3 p.m., New York, UN General Assembly, 26 September 1994, 
A/49/PV.5, p. 1.
639 Ibid, p. 2. See also a detailed resume in Rossiiskie vesti, 28 September 1994, pp. 1,3.
640 See, for example, UN General Assembly (1995) General Assembly 50th session, provisional 
verbatim record o f the 6th meeting, 26 September 1995, 10 am., New York, UN General Assembly, 
26 September 1995, A/50/PV.6, p. 8 and UN General Assembly (1998) General Assembly 53rd 
session, provisional verbatim record of the 9th meeting, 22 September 1998, 10 am., New York, UN  
General Assembly, 22 September 1998, A/52/PV.9, p. 22.
641 Neither the Russian side nor the European Council hid the fact that the war in Chechnya was the main 
obstacle for a Russian membership in 1995. See, for example, Daniel Tarschys’ statement in 
Rossiiskie vesti, 12 July 1995, p. 3, die meeting between Tarschys and Filatov in Moscow in July 1995 
(Rossiiskie vesti, 19 July 1995, p. 1) and the visit that a group of PACE parliamentarians made to 
Chechnya in August 1995, Rossiiskie vesti, 25 August 1995, p. 1. Relations with the European Union 
were also affected, which was recognised by Russian authorities. See, for example, Rossiiskie vesti, 18 
July 1995, p. 2 and BBC SWB, SU/2357 (17 July 1995), B/13.
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rights and the fact that elections had been held in Russia.642 Failure to accept Russia 
might, furthermore, favour undemocratic forces within Russia. On the issue of 
Chechnya, Moscow’s adversaries in Chechnya were designated ‘terrorists’, but this 
really started only after the events in Budennovsk, Kizliar and Pervomaiskoe.643 
During the second campaign, the arguments in favour of Russia being admitted as a 
full-fledged member of PACE relied on arguments of negative character, where 
Moscow’s adversaries in Chechnya were again called ‘terrorists’. The alternative to 
Moscow’s policy in Chechnya was portrayed as chaos and the possible disintegration 
of Russia.644
Overall, the speeches made by either the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs or by 
Yeltsin at the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly in New York emphasised 
democratic legitimation. Primakov’s speech in September 1996 (after the presidential 
election) was the last indication that Russia considered it necessary to stress its own 
transition process to democracy in this forum.645 However, Yeltsin returned to this 
theme when he addressed the summit of heads of state and government of the Council 
of Europe in Strasbourg in October 1997. He underlined that Russia had gone from 
being a totalitarian state to becoming ‘a market economy open to the world, a country
f c A f .
with free elections and an independent press’ in only a few years.
642 Ushakov (1996) 'The 39th Member of the Council of Europe', International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2, 
pp. 30-37, BBC SWB, SU/2200 (13 January 1995), B/18, BBC SWB, SU/2210 (25 January 1995), 
B/17 and Rossiiskie vesti, 24 January 1996, p. 1.
643 Rossiiskie vesti, 24 January 1996, p. 1. See also Yeltsin’s statement at the summit in Sharm al-Shaykh 
in Egypt, BBC SWB, SU/2561 (15 March 1996), B /ll-12 (a summary in Russian was available in 
Rossiiskie vesti, 14 March 1996, p. 1). Furthermore, the text of the televised address made by Yeltsin 
on 31 March 1996 to present a plan for regulating the crisis, was circulated in the UN Human Rights 
Commission by the Russian Permanent Mission, United Nations Economic and Social Council (1996) 
Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-Second Session, Agenda Item 3, 4 April 1996 (New York, United 
Nations) E/CN.4/1996/147.
644 See for example, Yeltsin (1999) Statement by Boris N. Yeltsin o f the Russian Federation (unofficial 
translation), Istanbul, OSCE, 18 November 1999, OSCE Summit, SUMDEL/27/99.
645 UN General Assembly (1996) General Assembly 51st session, provisional verbatim record o f the 6th 
meeting, 24 September 1996, 10 am., New York, UN General Assembly, 24 September 1996, 
A/51/PV.6.
646 Yeltsin (1997b) Statement o f M. Yeltsin, President o f the Russian Federation. Second Summit of 
Heads o f State and Government o f the Council o f Europe, Last accessed: 6 August 2001, Address: 
http://cm.coe.int/sessions/97summit2/russia.htm. See also Yeltsin (1997a) Rech prezidenta Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii Borisa Nikolaevicha Eltsina na vstreche glav gosudarstv Soveta Evropy, Last accessed: 8 
August 2001, Address: http://www.coe.ru/07.htm for the Russian version.
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Our country is becoming a part of a system of democratic security on the 
continent.
We shall do our best to make the principles of democracy a norm of life for
. . . 547Russia s citizens.
Early on, the Russian leadership delivered a potent legitimation message for Russia as 
a new, stable democratic state. Russia took over most of the obligations and privileges 
of the Soviet Union more or less automatically at the turn of 1991-1992. In fact, one 
writer has called Russia’s assumption of the Soviet Union’s seat in the UN Security 
Council something of a diplomatic coup.648 The most important reason for Russia’s 
success in claiming the seat in the UN Security Council was, no doubt, the stability 
that the Yeltsin leadership seemed to offer compared to the alternatives. This was a 
card that the Russian leadership played quite often internationally. In order to convince 
the international community to disregard insufficiencies in Russian democracy, the 
Russian leadership pointed out that the alternative would be chaos or a return to the 
totalitarian past. This was certainly the case during the October Events and when 
Russia was accepted as a member of the Council of Europe, in spite of the ongoing war 
in Chechnya. On both occasions, during the power struggle up to October 1993 and 
before the Russian presidential election in 1996, the international community was 
asked to consider ominous alternatives.
The Russian leadership failed, however, to achieve a formal recognition for a special 
role for Russia and the CIS in the sphere of former Soviet dominance. The Russian 
legitimation formula that was sent externally grappled with a number of 
inconsistencies and, at times, even contradictions. Russia asked the UN to recognise 
the CIS in each address at the annual opening sessions of the UN General Assembly 
from 1992 onwards.649 The reasons for Russia’s claim for a special role in international
647 Ibid. In the Russian version, the words ‘system’ (sistema) and ‘norm of life’ (norma zhizni) are in 
bold face.
648 Unser (2000) Russland und die Vereinten Nationen [Russia and the United Nations], Koln, 
Bundesinstitut fur ostvissenschaftliche und intemationale Studien, 11 April 2000, Berichte des 
Bundesinstituts fur ostvissenschaftliche und intemationale Studien, 8-2000, p. 7-9.
649 To start with, the formulation was one of “integration of and strengthening the Commonwealth of 
Independent States”, UN General Assembly (1992) General Assembly 47th session, provisional 
verbatim record o f the 6th meeting, 22 September 1992, 10 a.m., New York, UN General Assembly, 
29 September 1992, A/47/PV.6, p. 58, UN General Assembly (1993) General Assembly 48th session,
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affairs might be found in its history and ingrained practices. The Soviet leadership had 
consistently used its power to influence international affairs in its domestic propaganda 
‘to demonstrate the viability and dynamism of the Soviet system and its historical 
legitimacy’. These practices died hard and Russian foreign policy continued to call 
for special attention to its views. At the same time it was obvious to everyone that 
Russia’s power had diminished considerably. The military failure in Chechnya 
certainly bore witness to this. The Russian leadership, furthermore, ran into difficulties 
when, on the one hand, it claimed to be distancing itself from the Soviet totalitarian 
past and imperialist practices and, on the other, wished to reclaim some the role that 
the Soviet Union had had vis-a-vis the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe.
Another contradiction was that between Russia’s demands for respect of the human 
rights of ‘Russian compatriots’ living in the Baltic republics and its demands for 
respect for state sovereignty. This was a dilemma that was in no way unique. For 
Russia, the dilemma took on an acute character since the Russian leadership, on the 
one hand, wanted to present itself to its domestic audience as a government that cared 
for Russians living in the ‘near abroad’. On the other hand, it demanded respect for the 
view that the conflict in Chechnya was an internal Russian affair. Likewise, on the 
question of NATO intervention in the war in the former Yugoslavia, Russia’s view 
was that NATO’s actions were an infringement on the principle of state sovereignty.
provisional verbatim record o f the 6th meeting, 28 September 1993, 10 am., New York, UN General 
Assembly, 5 October 1993, A/48/PV.6, p. 15, UN General Assembly (1994) General Assembly 49th 
session, provisional verbatim record o f the 5th meeting, 26 September 1994, 3 p.m., New York, UN 
General Assembly, 26 September 1994, A/49/PV.5 and UN General Assembly (1996) General 
Assembly 51st session, provisioned verbatim record o f the 6th meeting, 24 September 1996, 10 am., 
New York, UN General Assembly, 24 September 1996, A/51/PV.6, pp. 13-14, whereas later on, the 
Russian minister of foreign affairs tended to concentrate on the Russian effort to contain or solve 
conflicts within the CIS, UN General Assembly (1995) General Assembly 50th session, provisional 
verbatim record o f the 6th meeting, 26 September 1995, 10 am.. New York, UN General Assembly, 
26 September 1995, A/50/PV.6, pp. 8-9, UN General Assembly (1998) General Assembly 53rd 
session, provisional verbatim record o f the 9th meeting, 22 September 1998, 10 am ., New York, UN 
General Assembly, 22 September 1998, A/52/PV.9, p. 22, UN General Assembly (1999) General 
Assembly 54th session, provisional verbatim record o f the 6th meeting, 21 September 1999, 10 am., 
New York, UN General Assembly, 21 September 1999, A/54/PV.6, p. 15 and UN General Assembly 
(2000) General Assembly 55 th session, provisioned verbatim record o f the 20th meeting, 18 September 
2000, 10 a.m., New York, UN General Assembly, 18 September 2000, A/55/PV.20, p. 7. See also 
Unser (2000) Russland urtd die Vereinten Nationen [Russia and the United Nations], Koln, 
Bundesinstitut fiir ostvissenschaftliche und intemationale Studien, 11 April 2000, Berichte des 
Bundesinstituts fur ostvissenschaftliche und intemationale Studien, 8-2000, pp. 30-31.
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This ambivalence about where human rights concerns overrode the principle of state 
sovereignty could, at times, be found in the very same address. Usually, the Russian 
leadership made a distinction by designating the conflict in Chechnya as one of 
‘separatism’ and ‘terrorism’.651
All these were contradictions in the Russian legitimation formula that the Russian 
leadership had to overcome. The gravest dilemma for the Russian leadership, however, 
was the different expectations on its legitimation formula that it came to face externally 
and internally. While the domestic audience became increasingly disillusioned with 
both economic and democratic reforms, the international community continued to 
expect a democratic legitimation formula and commitment to the introduction of a 
market economy. The domestic audience was still deemed susceptible to arguments of 
a popular mandate and elections but the West was no longer mentioned as a role 
model. Neither could the Russian leadership depict the surrounding world as its enemy 
in order to achieve cohesion internally if it wished to continue to be a respected 
member of the international community. As will be obvious from the legitimation 
formula sent internally, the Russian leadership sought to overcome these difficulties by 
further fine-tuning its legitimation messages.
6.2 Legitimation and the Domestic Audiences
A number of alternative ways of breaking down the domestic audience might be 
considered (e.g., by social group, age group, gender). The manner in which the Russian 
leadership constructed and directed its legitimation messages guided my selection of 
categories. The domestic audience has been divided into two main categories: the elites 
and the Russian population. In the case of the population, the Russian leadership, on 
certain occasions, found itself compelled to address the entire Russian population. 
Typical examples are elections, holidays such as New Year’s Eve and at times of crisis
650 Ulam (1975) 'Anatomy of Policymaking', in: Laird and Hoffinann (Eds.) Soviet Foreign Policy in a 
Changing World (New York, Aldine Publishing Company), p. 113.
651 See for example UN General Assembly (1999) General Assembly 54th session, provisional verbatim 
record o f the 6th meeting, 21 September 1999, 10 a.m., New York, UN General Assembly, 21 
September 1999, A/54/PV.6, pp. 22, 23, where Igor Ivanov claimed on the one hand that ‘separatism’ 
must be contained, but that the human rights of ‘Russian-speaking citizens subjected to harsh 
repressive measures in Latvia and Estonia’ must be protected.
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(e.g., the October Events). Furthermore, the Russian leadership had the privilege of 
being able to reach the entire younger part of population through the school system. In 
this chapter, special emphasis will be put on the legitimation formula in Russian 
textbooks. In the case of the elites, the Russian leadership had the opportunity to direct 
legitimation messages and combine these with efforts at co-option; for example, 
through promising material benefits or bestowing prestige on specific groups. Certain 
holidays are, furthermore, directed at certain elites and consent from key elites is 
crucial at critical moments (such as important votes in the Duma etc.).
6.2.1 Legitimation and the Young Russian Population
The Russian population is a catch all-category, since the domestic elites certainly form 
part of the Russian population and will at some point have gone through or have 
children who are going though the Russian school system. Nevertheless, the Russian 
population is a useful category since it imposed specific demands and constraints on 
the legitimation messages that the Russian leadership transmitted. It was, for example, 
most difficult for the Russian leadership to co-opt the entire Russian population 
through material benefits. Neither was it possible to favour the interests of specific 
groups -  for example, Russians versus non-Russians -  when addressing the entire 
population. In doing this, the Russian leadership would have run the risk of 
antagonising large segments of the population. Especially in times of crisis, the 
Russian leadership constructed their legitimation messages in a manner that attracted 
as large a portion of the population as possible.
There are two stages in the lives of the population when the state leadership possesses 
strong possibilities to influence it: firstly, during the school years and, secondly, during 
conscription when -  at least during the late 1990s -  ‘patriotic schooling’ was part of 
the education received by men doing military service. In Russia, only men were 
conscripted and increasingly smaller segments of the male population actually did their
652 See section IH, article 11, of the law ‘On military duty and military service’, published in Rossiiskaia 
gcceta, 2 April 1998. Also available on INFOBASE - INFORIS Internet Center (1998) On Military 
Duty and Military Service (with changes from 19 July 2001), Last accessed: 8 October 2001, Address: 
http://black.inforis.nnov.su/infobase/www.exe/a/90.new/?doc=3157.
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/TOmilitary service. This was one of the reasons for not examining the legitimation 
message that Russian conscripts received. The other reason was the difficulty of 
obtaining the material. New textbooks on Russian history and social science, however, 
were printed at an impressive rate especially from 1993 onwards since the old ones had 
become outdated. These are available and mirror Russia’s turbulent political 
development during the 1990s. Even a cursory glance in the textbooks revealed an 
attitude towards Yeltsin and his reforms that changed from one of approval in books 
written in the mid-1990s to a more negative appraisal in books published later.654
While most textbooks do point to the signing of the Belovezha Accords as the formal 
end of the Soviet Union, they all point to other events as the causes for its dismantling. 
Few textbooks describe the Russian declaration of sovereignty as a striving towards 
Russian independence. Only one book stresses the democratic nature of the adoption of 
the declaration. ‘On 12 June 1990, expressing the will of their voters, the deputies of 
the Congress with an unanimity that was rare for them, adopted the Declaration on 
State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation. ’655 This is described as a ‘boundary in the 
development of the Russian Federation as for the whole Soviet Union, which could 
exist only as long as Russia existed as a uniting base’.656 However, the same authors 
stress that the Russian declaration was prompted by developments in other union 
republics. One book points to it as a necessary condition for the ‘economic and 
cultural rebirth of the peoples of Russia’ and emphasises that the declaration talked of 
‘the determination to create a democratic, law-govemed state’.658 Another book on
653 Neither did the conscripts of the Russian armed forces represent the best and brightest of the young 
male population. Many avoided enrolment altogether by procuring medical certificates or were 
granted exemption to fulfil their university studies.
654 In the earliest textbooks after 1991, the Soviet system was designated as totalitarian and considerable 
attention was devoted to explaining this term. See Karlsson (1999) Historia som vapen [History as a 
Weapon] (Stockholm, Natur och Kultur), pp. 265-266. Only later in the 1990s did textbooks on 
history start treating Russian history after 1991.
655 Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia otechestva XX vek, 11 klass [History o f the Fatherland in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 580.
656 Ibid., p. 580.
657 Ibid, pp. 580-581.
658 Ostrovskii and Utkin (1999) Istoriia Rossii XX vek, 11 Mass [The History of Russia in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 431.
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social science describes the declaration of sovereignty as ‘the Declaration of Russia’s 
State Independence’.659
More common, however, is that textbook authors point to Yeltsin as one (if not the 
main) culprit in the demise of the USSR. Several books describe the fall of the Soviet 
Union as a result of personal ambitions of the leaders of the union republics and, in one 
book, Yeltsin is explicitly blamed for having ‘played the national card’ -  to have 
encouraged the regional leaders within the RSFSR to take as much sovereignty as they 
could get -  during his election campaign in 1991.660 Many authors regard the August 
Coup as the factor that played the most important role in bringing about the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Thus, one book concludes that the August Coup ‘accelerated the final 
disintegration (raspad) of the Soviet Union’661 while another states that: ‘The attempt 
by the members of the State Committee of Emergency to save the Soviet Union led to 
the absolutely opposite result -  the disintegration of the unified state (raspad edinogo
(\fOgosudarstva) accelerated.’
Common for all textbooks is that they tend to appraise the dismantling of the Soviet 
Union as a predominantly negative turn of events. One book refers to ‘the ill- 
considered decision to dismantle the Soviet Union’ and encourages its readers to unite 
in a spirit of patriotism in order for Russia to find ‘its way back towards the main road
659 Nikitin (2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 10-11 klassy [The Basis o f  State and Law, 10th to 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 122-123.
660 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 Mass [History of the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 400-401. This 
theme was also frequent in the discussions on the war in Chechnya, see below. For a discussion on 
‘personal ambitions’ of the regional leaders, see Dolutskii (1997) Otechestvennaia istoriia XX vek, 10- 
11 Massy [Patriotic History in the 20th Century, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Mnemozina), p. 365.
661 Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia otechestva XX vek, 11 Mass [History o f the Fatherland in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 591.
662 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 Mass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 402. See also 
Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 Massy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 322, where Yeltsin’s suspension o f the CPSU 
following the August Coup is pointed to. ‘After this, the break-down process of the Soviet Union 
became inevitable.’ In an article published the same year, Andrei Levandovskii accused Yeltsin of 
having destroyed the Soviet Union ‘to a considerable extent in order to finally protect himself against 
the competition from its president’, Levandovskii (2001) 'Oruzhie mifa: Mif kak sredstvo legitimatsii 
vlasti v Rossii [The Weapon of the Myth: Myth as a Means of Legitimation of Power in Russia]', 
Svobodnaia mysl, No. 2, p. 117.
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of human development and simultaneously to its own national sources and 
traditions’. Another states that the Belovezha Accords lacked ‘sufficient legitimate 
grounds’.664 Finally, one book describes the new borders of the Russian Federation in 
the following regretful terms:
NOTE. Russia, in which you live, found itself in the west within itstHborders of the early 17 century, in the south, south-east and east within its 
borders of the early 18th century. Furthermore, four new nuclear states 
appeared on the map: Belorussia [Belorussiia], Kazakhstan, Russia and the 
Ukraine.665
When it comes to the description of the Belovezha Accords, most textbooks describe it 
as inevitable or as the only alternative to chaos and civil war.666 In a supplementary 
book, covering recent events in Russia the KPRF’s abrogation of the Belovezha 
Accords is assessed as having played a negative role in the election campaign for the 
KPRF. The author reaches this conclusion since ’the restoration of the Soviet Union on 
paper ... demonstrated to the Russian voters the real price of the pre-election promises 
of the communists’.667
Yeltsin always directed his attention to the schools -  not least when it came to 
legitimating his version of the Russian constitution. In a speech on Knowledge Day, 
which is celebrated to mark the first day of the academic and school year, Yeltsin 
addressed the students. ‘I am confident that you, the citizens of our new Russia, will
AARcarry on the democratic changes in a fitting manner.’ On 29 November 1994,
663 Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 352-353
664 Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia otechestva XX vek, 11 Mass [History o f the Fatherland in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 592.
665 Dolutskii (1997) Otechestvennaia istoriia XX vek, 10-11 klassy [Patriotic History in the 20th 
Century, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Mnemozina), p. 365 [capitals in the original].
666 Ostrovskii and Utkin (1999) Istoriia Rossii XX vek, 11 Mass [The History o f  Russia in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 438, Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia otechestva XX vek, 
11 Mass [History o f  the Fatherland in the 20th Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 592, 
Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 352.
667 Shestakov (2000) Dopolnitelnye matericdy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 Mass 
[Supplementary Material for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 130.
668 BBC SWB, SU/1783 (2 September 1993), B/2.
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Yeltsin issued a decree mandating the study of the constitution in Russian education. 
The aim of the decree was described as ‘forming a culture of law and civic 
education’.669 Most textbooks have taken Yeltsin’s recommendations to heart and 
examine the constitution in detail. One textbook in social science even proclaims that: 
‘Each Russian (rossiiskii) citizen ought to be familiar with the Constitution of the
A7HRussian Federation. Each family should have the document.’ Another goes as far as 
to claim that studying the constitution will ‘convince you that the Constitution of one’s 
Fatherland (Otechestvo) ought to be deeply esteemed’.671
The Russian constitution and the battle over it are described in most textbooks, but the 
evaluation of the documents and the events that surrounded its adoption vary 
considerably. A number of textbooks subscribe to the same account of the events 
leading up to the adoption of the constitution as the Yeltsin leadership did. It is stressed 
that the constitution was adopted ‘through a nation-wide referendum -  the first
A77democratic Constitution in the history of Russia’. Generally, the same books tend to 
describe Yeltsin’s adversaries in dark colours. Thus, the terms, ‘the irreconcilable 
opposition’ and the ‘old nomenklatura’, are used to refer to Yeltsin’s opponents.673 
Some books, furthermore, concentrate on the contrasts between the two alternatives 
offered by the rival sides in the conflict. The Supreme Soviet’s alternative, on the one 
hand, is described in one book as a system of ‘all-powerful Soviets’ and the alternative
669 Presidential Decree No. 2131, published in Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1994, 
No. 32, p. 4802. See also Rossiiskie vesti, 15 September 1995, p. 2. As already noted in chapter five, 
Yeltsin used his speech on Constitution Day in 1998 to encourage everyone to acquaint themselves 
with the constitution, BBC SWB, SU/3409 (14 December 1998), B /l and summary in Rossiiskaia 
gazeta, 15 December 1998, p. 1. See also his conviction that Russian citizens were increasingly 
learning how to protect their rights by becoming familiar with the constitution, expressed in his State 
of the Nation Address in 1997, Rossiiskie vesti, 7 March 1997, p. 5.
670 Kashanina and Kashanin (2001) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 9 klass [ The Basis o f State and Law] 
(Moscow, Vita Press), p. 108.
671 Bogoliubov, et al. (1997) Vvedenie v obshchestvoznanie, 8-9 klassy [Introduction in Social Science, 
8th-9th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 168.
672 Ibid., p. 167. See also, Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia otechestva XX vek, 11 klass [History o f the 
Fatherland in the 20th Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 613 and its supplementary, 
Shestakov (2000) Dopolnitelnye materialy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass 
[Supplementary Material for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 8 and Nikitin (2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 10-11 klassy [The 
Basis o f State and Law, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 115.
673 Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia otechestva XX vek, 11 Mass [History o f the Fatherland in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 603.
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offered by Yeltsin, on the other, as one of ‘division of power’.674 Another book states 
that a ‘constitutional and political crisis’ had developed and that the reasons for this lay 
in the ‘contradictions between the practice of creating a market economy, building a 
law-governed democratic state, establishment of a new democratic regime and the
fin e
contents of the RSFSR Constitution’. The latter book also points to ‘civil war’ as the
A7Aalternative to the new constitution. Interestingly, one book states that the Russian
parliament is too immature to take upon itself the responsibility of governance.
The Constitution in place, in contrast to the preceding ones, declares the 
principle o f division o f power. Furthermore, in it the strong role of the 
President is established. And this is not by chance. Our parliament, which 
constitutes a representative organ of the people, is still very young and still 
does not have the necessary experience in order to take upon itself the
A77main obligation of governing the state.
Just as many of the textbooks, however, are openly or implicitly critical of the way in 
which the constitution was adopted. Specifically, the low level of participation in the
£  70
referendum is pointed to and the interpretation of the April referendum differs from
yr 70
that made by the Russian leadership. More than one book mentions the fact that the 
Constitutional Court took a majority decision to declare Yeltsin’s actions 
unconstitutional and one book states that Rutskoi took upon himself the office of
674 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 421.
675 Nikitin (2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 10-11 klassy [The Basis o f State and Law, 10th to 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 113.
616 Ibid.,?. 116.
677 Kashanina and Kashanin (2001) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 9 Mass [The Basis o f State and Law] 
(Moscow, Vita Press), pp. 108-109 [italics in the original]. See also Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia 
otechestva XX vek, 11 Mass [History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, 
Drofa), p. 613 and Shestakov (2000) Dopolnitelnye material)’ k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX  
vek", 11 Mass [Supplementary Material for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th 
Century", 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 8, where the view that certain compromises in the 
constitution, such as ‘the notable imbalance of power between the President and the parliament’, are 
conditioned by die ‘transitional period’ that Russia is going through.
678 Ostrovskii and Utkin (1999) Istoriia Rossii XX vek, 11 klass [The History o f Russia in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 452-453.
679 Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 Massy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 340.
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president ‘in accordance with the constitution’. However, no textbook conies down 
unequivocally on the side of Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in the power struggle.
More damaging to the legitimation message of the Russian leadership were the 
negative evaluations of the 1993 constitution that a number of books contained. For 
example, one textbook on political science (politologiia) states that it is still ‘too early 
to speak of a completion of the process of building a democratic political system in 
Russia’.681 The book goes on to state that ‘the characteristics o f the distribution o f 
power ... in Russia, makes it possible to classify it as an authoritarian rather than 
pluralistic system’ and later concludes that ‘an authoritarian regime in the form o f a 
presidential republic has been established in Russia’. A textbook on history 
concludes that the fact that free elections took place in 1993 ’did in no way signify that 
a genuinely democratic state had been formed’. Rather, the book stated, the system 
‘might be characterised as an elite (autocratic) democracy, in which democratic 
institutions are used only to carry forward and strengthen the new elite in power’. 
The theme that the democratic principles are a veneer used by elites in power is echoed 
in another book, which states that ‘the old nomenklatura workers gained a firm hold, 
while adopting democratic principles with a varying degree of sincerity or hardly
f.OAhiding their pro-Communist views’.
Still, the overwhelming majority of the textbooks characterises the constitution as
rot
democratic and emphasises the role that human rights and freedoms play in it. Even
680 Ibid., p. 340. See also Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 
klass [History o f the State and Peoples of Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 
420.
681 Mukhaev (1997) Politologiia, 10-11 klassy (Moscow, Drofa), p. 198.
682 Ibid., pp. 199,227 [italics in the original].
683 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 423. The book paints 
a dark picture of the political system created by Yeltsin. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes on a 
more positive note when it describes Putin’s election to the presidency. ‘On 7 May, he became 
president. A new future opened before Russia.’ (p. 424)
684 Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 332.
685 Bogoliubov, et al. (1997) Vvedenie v obshchestvoznanie, 8-9 klassy [Introduction in Social Science, 
8th-9th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), pp. 167-169, Dmitrenko, et al. (1998) Istoriia otechestva
-222-
6 A d ju s t in g  t h e  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a  t o  D iff e r e n t  A u d ie n c e s
books generally critical of the constitution state that ‘political and civic rights and 
freedoms were strengthened in the constitution’. Certain books choose to refer to the
f jQ H
Russian constitution as a mix of ‘democratic and authoritarian elements’. On the 
other hand, two books on social science go as far as to give the impression that Russia 
had a democratic history to fall back upon. The reforms of Alexander n, especially in 
the judicial sphere, are described as steps which ‘significantly speeded up the
• 688 » 689democratic processes’ and as having ‘democratised legal processes’. The 
assassination of Alexander II carried out by ‘revolutionaries -  political extremists’ -  
is depicted as an act which ‘drastically slowed down the judicial transformation’ in 
Russia.690 Even the institution of zemstvos is invoked as an example of ‘great steps 
towards the establishment of a constitutional order’ during the reign of Alexander n.691 
Yeltsin tried to make this connection earlier in an article before the April referendum
fr\y
in 1993 and in a speech at the Constitutional Conference on 8 June 1993.
XX vek, 11 Mass [History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 
613, Kashanina and Kashanin (2001) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 9 Mass [The Basis o f State and 
Law] (Moscow, Vita Press), pp. 108-109, Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10- 
11 Massy [Russia in the 20th Century, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 342, Nikitin 
(2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 10-11 Massy [The Basis o f State and Law, 10th to 11th grade] 
(Moscow, Drofa), pp. 115-120, Ostrovskii and Utkin (1999) Istoriia Rossii XX vek, 11 Mass [The 
History o f Russia in the 20th Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 452-453 and Shestakov 
(2000) Dopolnitelnye materialy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 Mass [Supplementary 
Material for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th grade] (Moscow, 
Drofa), p. 8-11.
686 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 Mass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 422.
687 Gadzhiev, et cd. (1998) Vvedenie v politologiiu, 10-11 Massy [Introduction to Political Science, 10th 
to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 183. See also Dolutskii (1997) Otechestvennaia istoriia 
XX vek, 10-11 Massy [Patriotic History in the 20th Century, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, 
Mnemozina), p. 378.
688 Bogoliubov, et cd. (1997) Vvedenie v obshchestvoznanie, 8-9 Massy [Introduction in Social Science, 
8th-9th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 166.
689 Nikitin (2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 10-11 Massy [The Basis o f State and Law, 10th to 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 109.
690 Bogoliubov, et al. (1997) Vvedenie v obshchestvoznanie, 8-9 Massy [Introduction in Social Science, 
8th-9th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 166. The murdering of the ‘tsar-liberator’ was carried 
out by ‘terrorists of the group People’s Will’ (terroristy-narodovoltsi), according to Nikitin (2000) 
Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 10-11 klassy [The Basis o f State and Law, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, 
Drofa), p. 109.
691 Bogoliubov, et al. (1997) Vvedenie v obshchestvoznanie, 8-9 Massy [Introduction in Social Science, 
8th-9th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 166. See also Nikitin (2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i 
prava, 10-11 Massy [The Basis o f State and Law, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 109.
692 See chapter three, p. 105.
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The legitimation formula on the conflict in Chechnya is more in unison in Russian
textbooks. Books published before and during 1998 tend not to mention the conflict at
all or to treat the problem in a more general framework -  that of Russian federalism.
For example, a textbook on political science treats the complex problems in Chechnya
indirectly. The legitimation message here is that the republics in the Caucasus ought to
belong to Russia since the only alternative is bloodshed. The Russian Federation is
simply the best alternative for the peoples of the Caucasus. ‘A strong and flourishing
Russia may serve as a guarantor of political and economic stability while providing
security for these peoples and republics.’ Similarly, in a textbook on social science
published in 2000, Chechnya is not mentioned explicitly in the section on the federal
system. However, the last paragraph discusses ‘separatism’.
Unfortunately, in Russia, as in other multinational countries, there are 
separatist tendencies. It is important to keep in mind that separatism is a 
most dangerous phenomenon for any state. Separatists seek to break up a 
unified state into a row of pseudo-state formations, which do not have the 
capacity to survive. As a result of this, peoples suffer and the state is 
weakened. Only the representatives of national elites, few in number and 
corrupted, gain from this. For them, separatism is a means to ensure 
personal power and personal prosperity.694
The theme that the war in Chechnya was a war waged to prevent the disintegration of 
the Russian Federation is echoed in a number of books. In one book, the heading of the 
section that treats the war in Chechnya is ‘Preserving the Territorial Integrity of 
Russia’.695 Interestingly, Yeltsin is implicitly blamed in two books for having started a 
process that threatened the integrity of the Russian Federation. His appeal for the 
regions to take as much independence as they could from the centre is linked to the
693 Gadzhiev, et al. (1998) Vvedenie v politologiiu, 10-11 klassy [Introduction to Political Science, 10th 
to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 189.
694 Nikitin (2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i prava, 10-11 klassy [The Basis o f State and Law, 10th to 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 126.
695 Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 343. See also Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia 
gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th 
Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 429, 442 and Shestakov (2000) Dopolnitelnye materialy k 
uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass [Supplementary Material for the Textbook "History 
of the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 25. See also the discussion 
on the role of regional elites in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, p. 218.
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problems in Chechnya.696 Related to this is the view that the personal ambitions of
regional elites were the driving force behind the threat of Russian territorial
disintegration (and behind the disintegration of the Soviet Union).
At the base of this process lay the same reason, which predetermined the 
collapse of the Soviet Union -  the far-reaching regional break up of the 
nomenklatura, this time on the Russian level, the wish of local ruling elites 
to get out from under the centre, which constrained their independence.697
Nevertheless, the description in textbooks of events that led to the conflict in Chechnya 
is similar to that given by the Russian leadership in that it mentions re-introduction of 
‘constitutional order’ as one of the main causes for the Russian leadership to intervene
Z Q O
in December 1994. Furthermore, the way in which the Chechen adversaries are 
described is very much in line with the rhetoric of the Russian leadership. Firstly, 
words such as ‘bandits’,699 ‘separatists’,700 ‘illegal armed deployments’701 and 
‘terrorists’ are used to describe the Chechen side in the war. One book mentions the 
hostage taking in Budennovsk and Kizliar and unequivocally links the explosions in 
residential buildings in Moscow and other cities to the Chechen side in the war.
696 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 425 and 
Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 343.
697 Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 343.
698 Ibid., p. 344. See also Ostrovskii and Utkin (1999) Istoriia Rossii XX vek, 11 klass [The History of 
Russia in the 20th Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 457-458. In Shestakov (2000) 
Dopolnitelnye materialy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass [Supplementary Material 
for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 
21-25, the section “The Chechen Crisis” is found under the heading ‘Stabilisation of the Constitutional 
System of Russia’.
699 Shestakov (2000) Dopolnitelnye materialy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass 
[Supplementary Material for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 25.
700 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f  Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 427 and 
Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 344. See also Nikitin (2000) Osnovy gosudarstva i 
prava, 10-11 klassy [The Basis o f  State and Law, 10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 126.
701 Ostrovskii and Utkin (1999) Istoriia Rossii XX vek, 11 klass [The History o f Russia in the 20th 
Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 458.
702 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History of the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 427-428.
703 Ibid., p. 427-428.
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Secondly, the illegal manner in which Dudayev came to power is pointed to.704 Finally, 
the point is made that the Chechen side was not really interested in negotiations to
70Sreach a peace settlement.
The majority of the books describe the war as bloody and as having inflicted great loss 
and suffering on both sides. One book concludes that ‘the war in Chechnya became the 
largest armed conflict on the territory of the former Soviet Union since the days of the 
Great Patriotic War. It cost Russians (rossiiane) milliards of dollars and took the lives
706of more than 150 thousand people’. The number of people cited as killed m the 
conflict (150 000) was an exaggeration. Interestingly, only two books mention the 
agreement Lebed brokered with the Chechens on 31 August 1996 -  and only one of 
these refer to it as the Khasaviurt Agreement and mentions Lebed’s role in negotiating
7H7 • •it. One book stands out as it draws the conclusion that the ‘failure of the military 
operation of the Russian troops was explained by the fact that the task before them
708could not be solved by military means’. The same book blames the war on the ’party
704 The expression ‘coup d’etat’ (perevorot) is used in Ostrovskii and Utkin (1999) Istoriia Rossii XX  
vek, 11 klass [The History o f Russia in the 20th Century, 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 457. 
Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 427, designates 
Dudayev a ‘self-proclaimed president’ (prezident samoprovozglashennyi). In Shestakov (2000) 
Dopolnitelnye materialy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass [Supplementary Material 
for the Textbook "History o f  the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 
21-22, the words ‘national-radicals headed by D. Dudayev came to power in the self-proclaimed 
Chechen republic o f Ichkeriya’ describe the Chechen side of the war in 1994.
705 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 428 and Shestakov 
(2000) Dopolnitelnye materialy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass [Supplementary 
Material for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th grade] (Moscow, 
Drofa), p. 22.
706 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 428. See also p. 427, 
Levandovskii and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 
10th to 11th grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), p. 344 and Shestakov (2000) Dopolnitelnye materialy 
k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass [Supplementary Material for the Textbook "History 
o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), pp. 24-25.
707 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 428. Levandovskii 
and Shchetinov (2001) Rossiia v XX veke, 10-11 klassy [Russia in the 20th Century, 10th to 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Prosveshchenie), pp. 344-345 only mentions the date of the agreement and the 
terms it included.
708 Shestakov (2000) Dopolnitelnye materialy k uchebniku "Istoriia otechestva XX vek", 11 klass 
[Supplementary Material for the Textbook "History o f the Fatherland in the 20th Century", 11th 
grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 24.
- 2 2 6 -
6 A d ju s t in g  t h e  L e g it im a t io n  F o r m u l a  t o  D if f e r e n t  A u d ie n c e s
of war’ which gained the upper hand in the Russian leadership and quotes Grachev’s
ill-fated comment that ‘two hours and one paratrooper regiment’ would be enough.709
It also points to the negative consequences of the war to Russian society.
In the end, the operation to reinstate legal order, maintain the integrity of 
Russia and disarm the bandits turned into a protracted bloody war for 
Russian society, influencing all sides of life and most of all the
710economy.
The variation in how critical events in Russia’s history are described in the different 
textbooks is striking. The accounts of the war in Chechnya differ only slightly and on 
the whole, this question is covered most similarly in the textbooks. The constitution is 
described as everything from a giant step on Russia’s road towards democracy to an 
authoritarian system. The evaluations of the events that led to the storming of the 
White House differ even more. All books deplore the end of the Soviet Union, but to a 
varying degree. It would seem that the Russian leadership shrank from exercising too 
close control over the textbooks. This might have stemmed from a fear of being 
accused of exercising the same kind of control as during the Soviet era. Furthermore, it 
is important to remember that Russian ministries are relatively independent. In fact, a 
Russian minister (who usually made his career within that ministry) tends to be more 
loyal to his ministry than to the prime minister. This ‘ministerial feudalism’ is one of 
the legacies from the Soviet era that the Russian leadership was faced with.711
Although some books follow the legitimation formula quite closely, this probably was 
not an explicit demand from the Russian Ministry of Education. The sense of regret for 
the Soviet Union is probably an example of how many authors still felt nostalgia for 
times gone by and of the fact that deeply ingrained notions have remained within the 
entire school system.712 Furthermore, it is noteworthy how the evaluations of events 
change over time in the books. The verdict on Yeltsin grew increasingly critical the 
later the year of publication. The book that is most critical about Yeltsin ends its dark
709 Ibid., p. 23-24.
710 Ibid., p. 25.
711 Huskey (1999) Presidential Power in Russia (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe), p. 103.
712 The same was true for how teaching continued along Soviet practices. See also chapter one, p. 29.
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description of the Yeltsin’s political system by contrasting it to Russia’s new bright 
future with Putin. ‘V. V. Putin prevailed already in the first round, gathering almost 
53% of the votes... He entered office on 7 May. A new future opened before
71 ^  # t
Russia.’ Evidently, the sensitivity of textbook authors to changes on the political 
scene explains many of the differences between the books.
6.2.2 Legitimation and Russian Elites
The elites are a section of the domestic audience that deserves special attention since 
they are in a unique position when it comes to influencing the political scene. They are, 
furthermore, in possession of strategic resources when legitimation is concerned. Elites 
may choose not to take part in meetings, events, holidays or elections and thereby 
undermine the system since this would be a sign that they do not recognise it. Another 
property that makes elites stand out from the rest of the domestic audience is the fact 
that they are usually involved in a quid pro quo relationship with the state leadership. 
In common with the state leadership, the elites are usually involved in the battle for a 
mandate from the population. They seek to be recognised as representatives of a 
specific group and may do so by appealing to that group, but also by acquiring 
recognition from the state leadership as representatives of that group.714 In this, as well 
as through granting other advantages, elites are targets for co-option by the state 
leadership.
Four elites have been singled out as especially interesting for the purpose of studying 
the legitimation formula sent to Russian elites. These are (a) the political elite, in 
which regional politicians are included, (b) the Russian Orthodox Church and 
especially its Patriarch Aleksii II, (c) the Russian military and (d) the media and 
cultural establishment. Each of these groups constituted important audiences for
713 Danilov and Kosulina (2000) Istoriia gosudartstva i narodov Rossii XX vek, 9 klass [History o f the 
State and Peoples o f Russia in the 20th Century, 9th grade] (Moscow, Drofa), p. 424.
714 It is worth emphasising again that a distinction is made between leadership and elites. Often the term 
‘elites’ includes the political leadership since they constitute part of the political elite. See, for 
example, Kullberg and Zimmerman (1999) Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian 
Democracy1, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 323-358. Here, ‘political elite’ refers mainly to the 
deputies of the Russian parliament and to regional elites, whereas the ‘state leadership’ is defined as 
the Russian president, his staff and the Russian government.
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legitimation messages from the Russian leadership. That much is obvious from the fact 
that they were targeted in times of crisis as well as on certain holidays and from the 
fact that they are present at important ceremonies. One elite that has not been included, 
but which is probably equally important to the Russian leadership is the burgeoning 
Russian business elite. However, few legitimation messages primarily targeted at this 
elite were available. Most likely, many of the legitimation messages that this elite 
received were delivered away from the public eye. The same went for attempts at co­
option of this elite. The list of elites above does not exhaust the number of important 
elites. However, the legitimation messages that these four elites received together 
reflected the way that the legitimation formula was nuanced to fit the different Russian 
elites.
The legitimation messages directed at the political elite were mainly speeches made by 
Yeltsin or members of the government in the parliament. Other examples include 
speeches before assemblies such as the Constitutional Conference and meetings of 
regional leaders. Up to September 1993, Yeltsin addressed the Supreme Soviet and 
Congress of People’s Deputies quite frequently. He eagerly sought to influence the 
deputies of the Supreme Soviet especially in order to win more leeway for his own 
policies. After he won the political battle with the parliament, his need for its consent 
diminished considerably. Soon, Yeltsin refused to set foot in the Duma and delivered 
his annual State of the Nation addresses at a joint sitting of the two houses of the 
Federal Assembly. During the rest of the year, Yeltsin’s representative in the Duma 
delivered the presidential point of view to the Duma deputies.
In spite of the fierce antagonism between Yeltsin and the parliament, it is important to 
remember that elections became the accepted method for appointing the country’s 
leadership. Most importantly, few politicians demanded any other way of appointing 
the Russian leadership. This demonstrated an essential strength of the democratic 
system and elections. Elections were certainly more than a ‘ritual of legitimation found 
in modem nations’.715 Not only did elections lessen the stakes in the political battle.
715 Kertzer (1988) Rituals, Politics, and Power (New Haven, Yale University Press), p. 49.
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The loser did not have to flee the country or fear for his life. On the contrary,
democracy provided even the loser with a sphere of influence. He remained the
representative of his own electorate and was guaranteed a political role by joining the
opposition. Kotenkov’s closing statement in his defence of Yeltsin against
impeachment in the Duma indicated that the Russian leadership considered this to be a
goal that the political elite shared.
Dear deputies, I would here like to close my argumentation on the points 
of accusation. Of, course, behind each legal document, behind each law or 
decree, behind each shorthand report lie not only dry decisions -  behind 
them there are indeed historical events and destinies of specific people, our 
citizens, behind them lies the history of our young democratic state. For 
the first time in the twentieth century it [the Russian state] stands before 
the possibility of a legal and open change of state leadership (up to now 
they were either displaced or died on their post) and you stand before a 
choice: either to bring the country into a political crisis again and fight for 
power in a situation of crisis, or instead to conduct a calm transfer of 
power in our state by way of legal general elections in accordance with the 
time schedule established by the Constitution. It is up to you, esteemed 
deputies.716
Indeed, the Russian political elite accepted elections as the rule of the game. Not only 
did it ardently participate in elections, it took part in official ceremonies such as the 
presidential inauguration. It was hardly surprising that the legitimation messages sent 
to the political elite frequently relied on democratic arguments. Under these 
circumstances, a popular mandate became a powerful argument. Yeltsin found himself 
in a formally weak position vis-a-vis the parliament up to September 1993 since the 
RSFSR constitution still in force prescribed that the Congress of People’s Deputies 
was the highest authority. Only by a decision in the Congress could the constitution be 
altered. This made Yeltsin use the most important weapon at his disposal -  elections 
and referendums. The use that Yeltsin made of the result in the April referendum was 
ample evidence of this tactic, but he also referred to the popular mandate that he 
received in the RSFSR presidential election in June 1991.
716 State Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 13 May 1999 (1999) 
Stennogramma plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Ditmy RF: 13 maia 1999, dnevnoe 
zasedanie, Last accessed: 14 November 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_571999/sl3- 
05 d.htm.
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As mentioned above, Yeltsin made an attempt to use Russian history to argue his case 
before the Constitutional assembly in June 1993.717 This attempt to refer to Russian 
democratic tradition was nevertheless an exception -  the deputies who were familiar 
with zemstvo system of the nineteenth century probably felt that it was a weak 
traditional argument for democracy. Instead, democratic and negative legitimation was 
dominant. The legitimation strategy vis-a-vis the political elite when it came to the 
Belovezha Accords was mainly negative. In his speech on 12 December 1991 -  before 
the Supreme Soviet was to vote on whether to ratify the agreement reached by Yeltsin, 
Kravchuk and Shushkevich in Belovezha -  Yeltsin invoked images of ‘chaos’ and 
‘civil war’ as the alternative to the agreement. These were arguments that probably 
struck a cord with the parliamentarians in a way that references to the zemstvo system 
never could. Yeltsin claimed that USSR’s disintegration had started after the August 
Coup when ‘its death throes began’ and that the country had ‘been experiencing a
71 o
profound crisis of statehood’ for several years.
Most striking, when it came to the legitimation formula for the Belovezha Accords 
directed at the political elite, was the absence of national legitimation. ‘Russian 
independence’ was not used as an argument. The legitimation formula for the first war 
in Chechnya relied mainly on arguments of re-introducing ‘constitutional order’. Only 
in 1999, when Putin addressed the Duma on ‘anti-terrorist measures’, did negative 
legitimation become the dominating argument. In connection with this, he was careful 
to avoid future accusations of having acted outside the legislation (as Yeltsin had been 
accused of having done during the first war in Chechnya). Putin, therefore, stressed 
that the recently adopted law ‘On Combating Terrorism’ provided the necessary 
grounds for a military intervention in Chechnya.719
717 Rossiiskie vesti, 8 June 1993, p. 2. See also BBC SWB, SU/1708 (7 June 1993), Cl/2-3.
718 BBC SWB, SU/1254 (13 December 1991), Cl/1-3. See also Kozyrev’s answer to the deputies’ 
questions where he invoked the ‘Yugoslav option’ alternative, BBC SWB, SU/1255 (14 December 
1991), C l/6, Yeltsin’s address in parliament on 25 December 1991, BBC SWB, SU/1264 (28 
December 1991), C3/2-5 and on 21 April 1992, BBC SWB, SU/1362 (23 April 1992), Cl/9.
719 Rossiiskaia gazeta, 16 September 1999, p. 2.
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An interesting sub-category of the political elite was the regional elite. Yeltsin 
especially targeted this elite for support in his battle with the Supreme Soviet and 
Congress in 1992-1993. Yeltsin’s most potent means of persuasion was the Federation 
Treaty. From March 1992, when the treaty was signed, up to the moment when Yeltsin 
dissolved the Supreme Soviet and Congress on 21 September 1993, the Yeltsin camp 
claimed that the Federation Treaty would constitute ‘an integral part of the new
7 7 0
Constitution of the Russian Federation’. In the end, the Federation Treaty was not 
included in the presidential draft published on 10 November 1993. On 3 November 
1993, Yeltsin met with regional leaders to present his draft for a new constitution. It 
was, however, obvious that the Federation Treaty had receded into the background by 
then. Yeltsin urged the regional leaders to support the draft ‘in favour of a powerful 
democratic state -  an integral Russian Federation, a single Russia, namely for the 
sovereignty of the entire Russia’.721
Yeltsin had used democratic legitimation arguments earlier as well, but always in 
combination with the promise that the Federation Treaty would be included in the 
constitution. Yeltsin furthermore warned of the chaos that the failure to adopt a new
771
constitution would entail and stressed the need for a strong authority.
Russia needs a genuinely strong authority. Without it reforms cannot be 
implemented, normal life cannot be organised nor can the country be put
720 Yeltsin’s speech at the signing ceremony, BBC SWB, SU/1345 (2 April 1992), B/l. See also Yeltsin’s 
presentation of his draft constitution to the Council of Heads of Republics on 29 April 1993, BBC 
SWB, SU/1677 (1 May 1993), B/3, his address to the Council of Heads of Republics on 26 May 1993, 
Rossiskie vesti, 27 May 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1700 (28 May 1993), B/3.), his address to 
heads of administrations of krais, oblasts and autonomous okrugs on 28 May 1993, BBC SWB, 
SU/1701 (29 May 1993), B /l, his address to the Council of Heads of Republics on 13 August 1993, 
BBC SWB, SU/1768 (16 August 1993), B/l and finally his address to the first session o f the 
Federation Council on 18 September 1993, only days before he dissolved the Supreme Soviet and 
Congress, Rossiiskie vesti, 21 September 1993, pp. 1-2 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1799 (21 September 
1993), B/l-2).
721 BBC SWB, SU/1838 (5 November 1993), B/l.
722 See, especially, his references to the April referendum, Rossiskie vesti, 27 May 1993, p. 1 (and BBC 
SWB, SU/1700 (28 May 1993), B/3) and BBC SWB, SU/1701 (29 May 1993), B/l. On more general 
references to democracy etc., see, BBC SWB, SU/1485 (14 September 1992), B/4-6 and Rossiiskie 
vesti, 21 September 1993, pp. 1-2 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1799 (21 September 1993), B/l-2).
723 He claimed that ‘unitarists’; that is, those who were not in favour of a federal Russia, were favoured 
by the constitutional crisis, Rossiiskie vesti, 27 May 1993, p. 1 (and BBC SWB, SU/1700 (28 May 
1993), B/3). See also BBC SWB, SU/1701 (29 May 1993), B/l.
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back on its feet. There will be no prosperous Russia without strong 
authority.724
Again, it is noteworthy that Yeltsin did not point to Russian history or tradition to 
argue in favour of a strong presidential authority. Instead, he warned of the alternative 
and held out strong authority as something necessary during the transition phase. After 
the new constitution had been adopted, the Russian leadership less frequently 
addressed the regional elite. The regional elite had already acquired a forum on the 
federal level where it could influence federal policy, the Federation Council. Although, 
Yeltsin appealed to the Federation Council for support on specific issues and laws, 
many negotiations with the regional elite took place behind closed doors when the 
centre and the individual subjects of the federation signed separate treaties.
The Russian military was addressed mainly in times of crisis and on certain holidays 
such as the Day of Defenders of the Fatherland (23 February) and on Victory Day (9 
May) each year. On these days war veterans were particularly mentioned in most 
speeches made by the Russian leadership. The legitimation messages sent to the 
military and war veterans stood out in that they were dominated by national 
legitimation and in how similar they were year after year. Negative legitimation was 
less frequent and democratic arguments manifestly absent compared to legitimation 
messages sent to other audiences. The addresses to the armed forces and war veterans 
on 23 February and 9 May were inundated with references to the Fatherland 
(Otechestvo or Otchizna) and the Motherland (Rodina) -  always capitalised in Russian 
newspapers. By way of co-option, the legitimation messages contained promises of 
material benefits for both servicemen and war veterans, promises of increased 
spending on militaiy equipment and efforts to increase the prestige of the military 
profession. The speeches, as a rule, bestowed prestige and glory on the armed forces
724 BBC SWB, SU/1701 (29 May 1993), B/l.
725 See, for example, Yeltsin’s address on 23 February 1995, Krasnaia zvezda, 23 February 1995, p. 1 
(also in BBC SWB, SU/2236 (24 February 1995), Sl/1), Pavel Grachev’s (minister of defence 1992- 
1996) address on 9 May 1995, Krasnaia zvezda, 11 May 1995, pp. 1,4 (also BBC SWB, SU/2299 (10 
May 1995), Sl/8-9) and Igor Rodionov’s (minister of defence 1996-1997) address, Krasnaia zvezda, 
22 February 1997, p. 1.
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and its historic traditions.726 Furthermore, the members of this elite were often awarded 
military decorations.
In times of crisis, the military stands out as the group that has received the national 
legitimation messages. When Yeltsin appealed for their support in August 1991, he 
chose to disavow the legitimacy of the plotters (by enumerating the articles in laws and 
constitutions that they had violated) and to appeal to the servicemen’s sense of Russian 
patriotism. ‘Soldiers, I believe that at this tragic hour, you will be able to make the 
correct choice. The honour and glory of Russian weapons will not be stained with the
777people’s blood. ’ In other words, Yeltsin appealed to a military patriotism and loyalty 
with the Russian people as opposed to the military’s loyalty with the Emergency 
Committee, which consisted of the Minister of Defence and the Head of the KGB, 
among others. On 24 September 1993 Yeltsin appealed in a similar manner to the 
armed forces for support. However, the use of nuances is again intriguing. This time 
the emphasis was on patriotism for the Russian state.
Servicemen -  sons of the Fatherland (Otechestvo)\
I turn to you as patriots and statists (patrioty-gosudarstvenniki)\ preserve 
[your] calm, strictly and rigorously fulfil the decrees and orders of [your] 
lawful commanders, and not those of false (samozvany) commanders; 
concentrate all your strength and energy on solving the tasks of military 
training on safeguarding the security of the state. Do not yield to any kind 
of provocations by the pseudo-patriotic forces, which try to drag you into 
adventurous politics and use [you] for narrow group and individual 
goals.728
Again, the reference to ‘false commanders’ invoked the Time of Troubles. The 
statement above was typical since it contained the word Otechestvo to appeal to
726 See, for example, Yeltsin’s address at a festive reception for veterans and foreign guests in the 
Kremlin on the evening o f Victory Day in 1995, Krasnaia zvezda, 11 May 1995, p. 3 (also in BBC 
SWB, SU/2299 (10 May 1995), Sl/2-4). See also Rossiiskie vesti, 7 May 1993, p. 1 (also in BBC SWB, 
SU/1683 (8 May 1993), Cl/3), BBC SWB, SU/1684 (10 May 1993), Cl/1, BBC SWB, SU/1930 (24 
February 1994), Sl/1, BBC SWB, SU/1993 (10 May 1994), S2/2, Krasnaia zvezda, 23 February 1995, 
p. 1, Krasnaia zvezda, 7 May 1995, p. 1, Krasnaia zvezda, 11 May 1995, p. 3, Krasnaia zvezda, 23 
February 1996, p. 1, Krasnaia zvezda, 22 February 1997, p. 1, Krasnaia zvezda, 25 February 1997, p. 
1 and BBC SWB, SU/3467 (24 Februaiy 1999), B/l.
727 BBC SWB, SU/1156 (21 August 1991), C l/8.
728 Krasnaia zvezda, 24 September 1993, p. 1. See also BBC SWB, SU/1803 (25 September 1993), C/4. 
See also p. 294.
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patriotic military sentiments. The word was closely connected to the military 
patriotic tradition of the Soviet era. In a Soviet military encyclopaedia issued in 
1986, neither otchizna nor rodina appeared with their own entries. They were given 
as synonyms to otechestvo, which did receive its own entry and was explained at 
length. Furthermore, the encyclopaedia encouraged the reader to look at ‘Defence of
7 7  Qthe socialist Fatherland, International duty’. ‘Defence of the socialist fatherland’ 
also had its own extensive entry and was, among other things, described as ‘one of
7 3 0  •the most important functions of the socialist state’. Evidently, the Russian 
leadership had concluded that appealing to the patriotism of the military personnel 
and its sense of duty to the ‘Fatherland’ was a more useful strategy than emphasising 
democratic arguements.
The Russian Orthodox Church shared with the military the advantage of enjoying the 
people’s trust. Even more important in this context is the fact that these elites were
731perceived to enjoy trust. This strengthened the position of the Church and the 
military since it made their support a prize that the leadership was eager to win. To 
have representatives of the military and Church present at ceremonies was an 
important way of boosting legitimacy claims. The position of the Church vis-a-vis the 
state was, of course, more independent than that of the military. Whereas the military
737could be ordered to attend ceremonies, the Church could, theoretically, have refused.
In reality, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church was present at Yeltsin’s 
presidential inauguration in 1991 and in 1996 and at Putin’s in 2000. The high level 
trust vested in the Church also explained why politicians of many persuasions made an
729 Akhromeev (Ed.) (1986) Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar [Military Encyclopaedic Dictionary] 
(Moscow, Voennoe izdatelstvo), p. 527.
730 Ibid, p. 271.
731 This is evidenced in opinion polls. See, for example, Gvosdev (2000) The New Party Card? 
Orthodoxy and the Search for Post-Soviet Russian Identity’, Problems o f Post-Communism, Vol. 47, 
No. 6, p. 32 and Steen (2001) The Question of Legitimacy: Elites and Political Support in Russia', 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 702, 709, 712.
732 In August 1991 and in September-October 1993, however, the Russian leadership could not take it 
for granted that its orders to the military would be obeyed. In certain cases it was up to the individual 
serviceman to make up his mind about which side of the conflict to support. This was a situation that 
representatives of the Russian Armed Forces did not wish to see repeated. See, for example, an 
interview with the head of the Soviet General Staff, army general Vladimir Lobov, after the August 
Coup. He stated that ‘the military must be spared such trials once for all’. Krasnaia zvezda, 7 
September 1991, p. 2.
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effort to be seen visiting the Church during important Orthodox festivals -  politicians 
doing this are sometimes popularly referred to as podsvechniki (“candlesticks” from
7^3the ritual of lighting a candle when visiting the Church). Neither is a politician’s 
autobiography complete without pictures of the author together with Aleksii II.734 
Although Yeltsin denied that he was ‘deeply religious’ in November 1993, he claimed 
to have ‘great respect for religion’.735 Furthermore, there is much evidence of his 
respect for the Patriarch, Aleksii II, personally.
During the August Coup 1991, Yeltsin issued an appeal to the Patriarch for support. 
He pointed to breaches of the constitution and warned of the consequences if the Coup 
were to succeed. ‘The church, which suffered in the years of totalitarianism, could 
again experience the burden of tyranny and lawlessness. Believers, all Russian people,
7^ 7 • •  •the whole of Russia await your words.’ On the following day Aleksii II issued a 
statement where he questioned the legality of the State Committee of Emergency and
750
especially turned to the armed forces to ask them to prevent bloodshed. A few days 
after the Coup, the Patriarch claimed that the Russian Orthodox Church ‘denied the
733 Gvosdev (2000) The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and the Search for Post-Soviet Russian Identity', 
Problems o f Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 6, p. 36. See also Slater (1993b) 'The Russian Orthodox 
Church', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 20, p. 93 and Tolz (2001) Russia (London, Arnold), p. 
256.
734 This is evident in Yeltsin’s memoirs, Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper 
Collins Publishers), Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes of the President] (Moscow, Ogonek) 
and Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. 
[Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST). See 
also, for example, Filatov (2000) Sovershenno nesekretno: Kuluary rossiiskoi vlasti [Absolutely Non- 
Confldential: The Lobbies o f Russian Power] (Moscow, Vagrius), Primakov (1999) Gody v bolshoi 
politike [Years in High Politics] (Moscow, "Sovershenno sekretno") and Stroev (1999) Gorzhus m od  
rodinoi [I Am Proud o f My Motherland] (Moscow, Fond sodeistviia razvitiiu sotsialnykh i 
politicheskikh nauk).
735 BBC SWB, SU/1850 (19 November 1993), B/6.
736 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
o f the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), pp. 239-241 and Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: 
razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia... [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, 
Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 84 (also in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, 
Phoenix), p. 75). See also Yeltsin’s attendance at religious festivals etc., BBC SWB, SU/2286 (25 
April 1995), B /l, Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1996, p. 1, Rossiiskie vesti, 16 April 1996, p. 1 and 
Rossiskie vesti, 25 February 1997, p. 1.
737 BBC SWB, SU/1156 (21 August 1991), Cl/8-9.
738 Antic (1991) 'Church Reaction to the Coup', Report on the USSR, Vol. 3, No. 38, p. 15.
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73Qlegitimacy of the Committee of State Emergency from the very beginning’. With 
time, however, the Russian Orthodox Church declared itself above political conflicts 
and sought to avoid becoming associated with a particular party or politician.740 
Nevertheless, the Church did give implicit support to the state leadership.
According to Kostikov, the Patriarch refrained from taking sides in the conflict
between Yeltsin and parliament until 25 March 1993. ‘Not mentioning the very word
“referendum”, Aleksii II in practice supported the formula suggested by Yeltsin for
getting out of the political crisis by way of popular consultation.’741 The Church
distinctly refused to endorse either side in the referendum, but it did favour the
referendum, as such.742 In his televised appeal, Aleksii II asked the military ‘not to be
susceptible to the influence of political extremists’.743 He went on to state that
elections constituted the only way out of the crisis.
I think that by holding a vote the president has suggested that you express 
confidence or no confidence in him a second time. This is the only way: 
election of a new parliament and election of the president. This is the way 
of compromise, which will allow the country to be led out of the crisis in 
which it finds itself today.744
In the October Events in 1993, the Russian Orthodox Church played a role as mediator 
-  most notably in the attempts to reach a compromise during negotiations in the 
Sviato-Danilovskii Monastery. Aleksii II did his utmost to remain impartial in the 
conflict both in private talks with Yeltsin and in his statements during the conflict. He 
urged both sides to avoid bloodshed and civil war while appealing for everyone to
739 Seide (1993) D ie Russische Orthodoxe Kirche in Russland [The Russian Orthodox Church in 
Russia]', Osteuropa, Vol. 43, No. 11, p. 1041.
740 Gvosdev (2000) 'The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and the Search for Post-Soviet Russian Identity', 
Problems o f Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 6, p. 32 and Slater (1993a) 'The Church's Attempts to 
Mediate in the Russian Crisis', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 43, p. 10.
741 Kostikov (1997) Roman s prezidentom: zapiski press-sekretaria [A Novel with the President: Notes 
of the Press Secretary] (Moscow, Vagrius), p. 174
742 Seide (1993) D ie Russische Orthodoxe Kirche in Russland [The Russian Orthodox Church in 
Russia]', Osteuropa, Vol. 43, No. 11, p. 1042 and Slater (1993b) 'The Russian Orthodox Church', 
RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 20, p. 92.
743 BBC SWB, SU/1648 (27 March 1993), Cl/6.
w Ibid.
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‘proceed along the democratic path’.745 The talks in Sviato-Danilovskii did not result 
in a compromise and both sides in the conflict sought to blame the other side for 
sabotaging the talks. Yeltsin claimed that the White House leadership refused all 
suggestions that were put forward and insisted instead on issuing its own ultimatums. 
‘The most radical group in the parliamentary leadership had completely taken power 
into its own hands and, evidently, gambled on an armed battle with the [executive] 
authorities.’746 (During the most critical days in October 1993, Aleksii II experienced 
heart problems and largely disappeared from the political scene.)
Although the Church did not support a specific party in the elections on 12 December 
1993 or express a preference on how people should vote in the referendum, it did 
encourage the population to vote. This was certainly an implicit support for the new 
political system just as boycotting the referendum would have been an act of not 
recognising its legitimacy. On 10 December 1993, Aleksii II, patriarch of Moscow and 
Russia, urged the Russian population to take part in the referendum ‘because everyone 
should feel being part of Russia’s future and its system. Russia’s future and its state 
system depends on each of us.’747 Furthermore, on 20 June 1996, Aleksii II stated that 
the future of Russia depended on the second round in the presidential election. ‘It is 
desirable that Russians (rossiiane) take active part in the election.’ Without naming a 
candidate of his own, Aleksii II gave the impression that he had a specific choice in
745 Statement by Aleksii II on 22 September 1993, BBC SWB, SU/1804 (27 September 1993), C/13. See 
also BBC SWB, SU/1810 (4 October 1993), C/7-8 and Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f 
the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), pp. 376-377 (also in Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin 
(London, Harper Collins Publishers), pp. 269-270).
746 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f  the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 377 (also in 
Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins Publishers), p. 270). See also 
Kostikov’s statement on the eve of the storming of the White House, Rossiiskie vesti, 5 October 1993, 
p. 2 (also in BBC SWB, SU/1811 (5 October 1993), C/12) and Chernomyrdin’s speech on 4 October 
1993, BBC SWB, SU/1812 (6 October 1993), C/5. Kotenkov spoke in the Duma in 1998 o f how the 
negotiations in Sviato-Danilovskii were ‘spoiled by the representatives of the Supreme Soviet’. State 
Duma of the Russian Federation - Minutes Day Plenary Session 13 May 1999 (1999) Stennogramma 
plenamogo zasedaniia Gosudarstvennoi Diony RF: 13 maia 1999, dnevnoe zasedanie, Last accessed: 
14 November 2001, Address: http://www.akdi.ru/gd/PLEN_Z/1999/sl3-05_dhtm.
747 BBC SWB, SU/1870 (13 December 1993), B/15. See also Gvosdev (2000) 'The New Party Card? 
Orthodoxy and the Search for Post-Soviet Russian Identity', Problems o f Post-Communism, Vol. 47, 
No. 6, p. 32 and Slater (1993b) 'The Russian Orthodox Church', RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 
20, p. 92.
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mind. ‘I hope that you will make the right choice. Nobody should turn away from his
"JAOresponsibility for the fate of the country.’
The Russian leadership had eagerly taken advantage of this implicit support while the 
Church in return demanded a special position for itself as guardians of traditions and 
morality within Russian society.749 The law ‘On freedom of Conscience and religious 
Associations’ was indicative of this, but also the efforts the Russian leadership made to 
establish the authenticity of the remains of Nicholas II in order to win over the support 
of the Church.750 On 2 March 1994 Aleksii II and the Minister of Defence, Pavel 
Grachev, signed an agreement to co-operate in ‘the interest of the Fatherland and
•J C  1
peoples of Russia’. The agreement gave the Russian Orthodox Church a unique 
position of influence within the Armed Forces. Furthermore, the state returned 
churches to the Russian Orthodox Church and spent considerable sums on rebuilding 
and renovating churches that were earlier in ruins. All in all, the Orthodox Church 
was targeted with a legitimation forumula that emphasised the need for unity. The 
Orthodox Church, in turn, gave implicit support to the state building project of the 
Russian leadership by being present at state ceremonies and in its statements, the 
Orthodox Church usually called for unity and accord.
748 Rossiiskie vesti, 20 June 1996, p. 1. The last quotation was repeated with a picture o f Aleksii II in 
Rossiiskie vesti on the following day.
749 Gvosdev (2000) 'The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and the Search for Post-Soviet Russian Identity', 
Problems o f Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 6, p. 32.
750 Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, vospominaniia, vpechatleniia.. [Presidential 
Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] (Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), pp. 168-170. (Also 
in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), pp. 117-119.)
751 Krasnaia zvezda, 4 March 1994, p. 1. On the relations between the Armed Forces and the Russian 
Orthodox Church, see Seide (1996) 'Orthodoxie, Staatsmacht und Armee: Die neue Rolle der 
Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche [Orthodoxy, State Power and Army: The New Role of the Russian 
Orthodox Church]', Osteuropa, Vol. 46, No. 10, pp. 1013-1019.
752 The most notable example of this is, of course, the reconstructed Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, see 
BBC SWB, SU/2286 (25 April 1995), B/l and Rossiiskie vesti, 10 January 1996, p. 1. Although the 
reconstruction of this church was mainly an achievement connected to Moscow mayor, Yurii 
Luzhkov, Yeltsin also invested considerable prestige in the project. On 7 January 1996, he attended a 
Christmas blessing at the Church of Christ the Saviour and stated that the reconstruction was reviving 
‘people’s faith in the fact that Russia will revive, like this church.’ BBC SWB, SU/2504 (9 January 
1996), B/2. See also Yeltsin’s promise to all religious leaders, BBC SWB, SU1669 (22 April 1993), 
B/4-5.
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The last elite singled out here for a closer examination is the media and cultural 
workers such as artists, writers and performers. This is an elite that traditionally 
enjoyed a high level of confidence in Soviet society. In 1992 and 1993, Yeltsin often 
addressed this group specifically, although these occasions became fewer later in the 
1990s. The direct political impact of this group diminished considerably during the 
1990s. Furthermore, the group became less homogenous over time. Thus, during the 
political struggle between Yeltsin and the parliament in 1992-1993, the media and 
intelligentsia were addressed more often than after 1993. Yeltsin also made efforts to 
co-opt this group through promises of increased spending on culture, guarantees for the 
freedom of the media and by bestowing prestige on the intelligentsia’s traditional 
role.753 Representatives of this group were often decorated at holidays such as Russia’s 
Day of Sovereignty.754
In spite of the decreasing influence of this group, the legitimation formula directed at it 
was interesting since it differed markedly from the one sent to other elites. The 
legitimation formula was, in fact, similar to the one sent to the international 
community. Democratic legitimation and references to human rights and freedoms 
were the most important components. For example, in his appeal for support to the 
‘intelligentsia and scientific community’, Yeltsin claimed that their votes in the April 
referendum would ‘represent the path to a democratic, civilised and prospering 
country, to a law-govemed state, where rights and freedoms are protected, among 
which is the right to free scientific creativity’.755 Furthermore, the decline in the
753 See, for example, Yeltsin’s speech at the first Congress of the Intelligentsia, BBC SWB, SU/1551 (30 
November 1992), Cl/1-3, his meeting with heads o f the media in April 1993, BBC SWB, SU/1660 (12 
April 1993), B/l and the references in the footnote above.
754 See also Yeltsin’s description of how he enjoyed signing documents on who was to be awarded a 
decoration. ‘My favourite documents...’ Yeltsin (2000) Prezidentskii marafon: razmyshleniia, 
vospominaniia, vpechatleniia... [Presidential Marathon: Reflections, Recollections, Impressions...] 
(Moscow, Izdatelstvo AST), p. 172 (also in Yeltsin (2001) Midnight Diaries (London, Phoenix), p. 
121), and how he relished awarding the director, actors and others involved in the popular Soviet 
movie White Desert Sun (Beloe solntse pustini). In Yeltsin’s view, he corrected a mistake of the 
Soviet authorities, who had refused to give the film a ‘state award’ because of its ‘’’superficial” 
attitude to the revolutionary theme’. Yeltsin resolved to award the film in spite of advice to the 
contrary. ‘Probably this was that rare occasion when I thought to myself: it is good that I am 
president.’ Ibid., p. 173 (pp. 121-122 in the English edition).
755 Rossiiskie vesti, 23 April 1993, p. 1. See also Yeltsin’s meeting with the ‘creative intelligentsia’ at the 
Bolshoi Theatre, BBC SWB, SU/1665 (17 April 1993), B/5, his speech at a meeting for media 
representatives, BBC SWB, SU/1767 (14 August 1993), Cl/2-4 (detailed summary available in
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Russian leadership’s interest in the media and cultural workers coincided roughly with 
the decline of the decline of references to the West as an external role model. The loose 
legitimation alliance between the Russian leadership and the West and the cultural elite 
was damaged in the autumn of 1993 and, ultimately, severed by the war in Chechnya 
in 1994.
6.3 The Fine-Tuning Imperative
A comparison between the different legitimation formulas sent to different audiences 
further illustrates how the Russian leadership has engaged in careful fine-tuning of 
its legitimation messages. In the case of the international community, the Russian 
leadership was at its most vulnerable during and shortly after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. It was pivotal to achieve recognition of the new Russian state and the 
legitimation messages sent externally were entirely adapted to the norms and 
expectations of the international community. Later on, Russian attempts were made 
to influence the international community in order to acquire a greater degree of 
prestige internationally, not least by trying to gain international recognition of the 
CIS as a regional organisation. Here, the Russian leadership became less 
unequivocal when it came to whether or not Russia was a successor of the Soviet 
Union. Whereas earlier legitimation messages had contained sharp distancing from 
the Soviet Union, legitimation messages of the late 1990s pointed to Russia’s special 
responsibility within the sphere of the former Soviet Union. Russia was, however, 
less successful in this quest.
The fine-tuning that the Russian leadership engaged in vis-a-vis different sections of 
the domestic audience was even more evident since there were sharp contrasts in the 
messages sent to different elites. The military stood out as the elite that received the 
legitimation message that relied most on arguments of national glory and patriotism. 
Christel Lane referred to this as a ‘military-patriotic tradition’, which developed in
Rossiiskie vesti, 13 August 1993, p. 1 and his address at the Democratic Press Forum, Rossiiskie vesti, 
2 September 1995, pp. 1, 3.
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the Soviet Union.756 Interestingly, the few legitimation messages directed at the 
Church that were available consisted overwhelmingly of formal arguments on 
legality and constitutionality. Yeltsin’s appeal during the August Coup, when he 
reminded them of the trials of the Church during the Soviet era, was an exception. 
Towards the political elite, the Russian leadership used the popular mandate as its 
most potent argument. The exception was, of course, the regional elite to whom the 
Federation Treaty was held out as a prize. Finally, the media and intelligentsia are an 
interesting elite interesting since they received the legitimation formula that most 
resembled the one sent to the international community.
Russian schoolchildren, finally, constituted the group that received the most urgent 
exhortation to study the constitution of 1993. The textbooks put extra emphasis on 
the wording in, especially, the preamble of the constitution. The statement that all 
power in Russia emanates from the people together with the guarantees of human 
rights and freedoms was examined at length. In spite of this, the message conveyed 
in Russian textbooks was not in harmony when it came to the evaluation of the 
October Events of 1993. There was also a sharp tendency for the evaluation of 
Yeltsin’s leadership to grow increasingly critical the later the textbook in question 
was published. Furthermore, most Russian textbooks seem to regret the fall of the 
Soviet Union and a considerable number of them directly or indirectly point to 
Yeltsin as the one to blame for the fact that it happened. All in all, the Russian 
leadership seems to have exercised little control over the content in Russian 
textbooks. Either the Russian leadership was reluctant in reviving Soviet traditions 
of textbook censure, or it tried but was unsuccessful in achieving such control.
756 Lane (1981) The Rites o f Riders: Ritual in Industrial Society - The Soviet Case (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press), p. 140.
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In the early 1990s the Russian leadership rode on a wave of popular support and 
optimism. Soon, however, this sentiment gave way to pessimism. By 1993, the Russian 
leadership had few successes with which to boost its state building project. The 
legitimation formula, therefore, was composed in adverse circumstances. In many 
ways, the legitimation formula became a minimalist formula. The fidelity to 
democratic arguments, however, remained strong throughout the period. In particular, 
elections and popular mandate formed a democratic core in the formula and were never 
abandoned. The Russian leadership made sure that it fulfilled the minimum 
requirements that such a legitimation formula put on action -  elections were held even 
when Yeltsin faced a single-digit rating in the early stages of the presidential race in 
1996.
Instead of changing the main thrust of its legitimation formula, the Russian leadership 
used nuances and historical references to fine-tune its rhetoric to changing 
circumstances and to the expectations of the audience it addressed. Even more 
importantly, the Russian leadership made skilful use of fears of chaos and 
disintegration since the domestic audience was keenly aware of the upheavals and civil 
war that Russia had lived through during the twentieth century. Negative legitimation, 
thus, became the second most important legitimation device. A recurrent theme in the 
legitimation formula after 1993 was to focus increasingly on the need to build 
consensus and accord in Russian society. The threat of civil war and disintegration 
remained at the core of negative legitimation throughout the 1990s. However, the 
tendency to demonise the domestic opposition and the Soviet past decreased radically 
after 1993 in the material above (as opposed to the tendency to vilify political 
opponents during elections). In the last years of the 1990s, the negative arguments 
instead referred to a vaguely defined external enemy, ‘international terrorism’ and 
‘external attempts at undermining Russian statehood’.
The borders of the Russian Federation became identical with those of the RSFSR. It 
was a decision that came about gradually as a consequence of political developments at
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the Soviet level rather than as a consequence of the Russian struggle for independence. 
When Yeltsin, together with Kravchuk and Shushkevich, decided to declare the Soviet 
Union dissolved, the main concern was to rapidly gain international recognition. They 
did not at once direct attention to how the Belovezha Accords was to be legitimated at 
home. In the case of Russia, it was indeed difficult to claim that Russian independence 
was an unqualified success. Democratic arguments were prominent, but even at the 
time of signing the Accords, Yeltsin used negative arguments as well. The sheer size of 
the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union has traditionally been an important 
basis for legitimation. The new borders, which many perceived as a ‘territorial 
amputation’ of historical Russian territory, constituted a legitimation challenge for the
n c n
Russian leadership. By the tenth anniversary of the Belovezha Accords, the twelfth 
of June, which was heralded by the Russian leadership as Russia’s Day of 
Independence, was one of the least popular holidays. The connection between 
Russia’s new borders and Russia as a democratic state remained in the legitimation 
formula, but it gradually receded into the background. Instead, negative arguments 
became prominent.
As in the case of Russia’s borders, the battle over how Russia was to be governed 
emerged as a constitutional battle only gradually. At the onset, the debate was 
shrouded in a language that closely connected political and economic reforms. As it 
became increasingly clear to Yeltsin that the RSFSR constitution worked against him, 
he started to insist on his popular mandate as a democratic argument that overrode 
arguments of legality and constitutionality. Although the Russian leadership was 
successful in using the popular mandate argument on a number of occasions, it failed 
to avoid a violent confrontation in the streets of Moscow in October 1993. As a result 
of the storming of the White House, the Russian leadership lost one of the most potent 
symbols of the new democratic Russia. The decision to resort to force in October 1993 
was legitimated mainly in negative terms. Only after the new constitution had been
757 Theen (1999) 'Quo Vadis, Russia? The Problem of National Identity and State-Building', in: Smith 
(Ed.) State-Building in Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge o f  the Future (Armonk, New 
York, M.E. Sharpe), p. 43.
758 Romir (2001) SSSR i SNG v rossiiskom obshchestvennom mnenii, Last accessed: 17 December 2001, 
Address: http://www.romir.ru/socpolit/actual/12_2001/cis.htm.
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adopted did the Russian leadership start to use formal democratic arguments of legality 
and constitutionality again.
In the case of the wars in Chechnya, formal democratic arguments again formed the 
legitimation core. However, at the very start of the military operation in December 
1994, the statements made by the Russian leadership suggested that it grossly 
miscalculated the reaction of its traditional allies: the international community and the 
liberal elites (i.e., the media and intelligentsia). The attempts that the Kremlin made to 
portray the operation in Chechnya as a battle between forces hostile to Russia’s 
struggle for reforms on the one side and new democratic Russia on the other failed 
instantly. Instead, it became clear that the war in Chechnya delayed Russia’s 
membership in the Council of Europe. Likewise, the Russian media was deeply critical 
of the war from the very start. The Kremlin’s main arguments for the war became that 
it was necessary to ‘restore constitutional order’ and to stop Russia from following a 
‘Yugoslav or Soviet scenario’. The terrorist acts in Budennovsk and Pervomaiskoe 
established the way in which the second war in Chechnya would be legitimised. Only 
then did the Russian leadership start to refer to its adversaries in Chechnya as 
‘terrorists’. By 1999, this strategy had become more elaborated. In order to legitimise 
the war in Chechnya, the Russian leadership claimed in 1999 that the war was a 
struggle against ‘international terrorism’ and thus an international concern. More 
importantly, the bombings of residential buildings in Moscow made the second war in 
Chechnya a general Russian concern to a degree that the first Chechen war never was.
The most striking feature of the way in which the Russian leadership handled the 
question of symbols and rituals is the almost complete absence of invention of new 
symbols, symbols without a Soviet or tsarist connection. As already mentioned, the 
Russian leadership deprived itself of one such symbol when it stormed the White 
House. The few attempts that were made to invent rituals or symbols were largely 
unsuccessful. The attempts to find a new symbol of state (such as a birch leaf) were 
abandoned early on. Both the twelfth of June and the twelfth of December proved 
difficult to institutionalise as holidays. Neither could the Russian leadership afford to 
distance itself entirely from the Soviet legacy -  the celebrations of the victory in the 
Second World War is a vivid example of this as is the decision to let the Russian army
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retain some of the Soviet symbolism. In the case of state symbols and the presidential 
inauguration ceremony, the Russian leadership adopted both Soviet and tsarist 
symbols, but it was careful in restricting itself to specific features of these legacies. In 
the case of tsarist symbols, the Russian leadership sought to downplay the general 
tsarist element while at the same time making connections to specific tsars -  most 
notably to Peter the Great as a symbol of Russia as a great power and to Alexander II 
for his reform efforts. Similarly, the features of the Soviet legacy that were emphasised 
were those connected with the Soviet Union as a great power.
All in all, democratic arguments dominated the rhetorical agenda for the Russian 
leadership even at times when attempts at finding national arguments could have been 
expected. Not least was this the case when Russia achieved independence and during 
the war in Chechnya. Throughout its first decade at state building, the Russian 
leadership in essence remained faithful to democratic arguments as the main ingredient 
in the legitimation formula. With the exception of the military, the different audiences 
targeted by the Russian leadership all received a legitimation formula dominated by 
democratic rhetoric. This suggests that the Russian leadership’s strategy was to change 
nuances rather than the core legitimation message. It also suggests that the Russian 
leadership considered it too risky to send legitimation formulas that were radically 
different to different audiences. The nuances it used were nuances of historic 
references, of choice of words and choice of emphasis on different ingredients of the 
different legitimation modes.
Democratic rhetoric was by no means entirely new to Russia in the 1990s. The Soviet 
leadership frequently used democratic arguments to shore up its legitimacy. Stalin 
claimed to have created the ‘most democratic country in history’ with his constitution 
of 1936 and elections were organised throughout the Soviet era although there was 
only one candidate for each seat.759 Nevertheless, there was a substantial difference in 
the way in which the post-Soviet Russian leadership used democratic arguments from
759 Shlapentokh (2001) 'Putin's First Year in Office: The New Regime's Uniqueness in Russian History', 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 380-381. See also Hoffmann (1994) 
'Challenges to Viable Constitutionalism in Post-Soviet Russia', Harriman Review, Vol. 41, No. 
November, pp. 24-25 on Soviet constitutions.
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that employed by the Soviet leadership. While the Soviet leadership stated that it had 
created conditions for ‘true democracy’ -  as opposed to the bourgeois democracy 
found in the West -  the Russian leadership explicitly linked its democratic system to 
that found in Western countries and, especially during the first year, pointed to the 
West as a role model for Russia to emulate. This changed as the Russian love affair 
with the West petered out. Nevertheless, the Russian leadership continued to adhere to 
minimum requirements of democracy. An example of when the Russian leadership 
tried to use democratic rhetoric, while not following its own prescription, was when it 
staged rigged elections in the republic of Chechnya in 1995. However, this tactic 
backfired and the Russian leadership did not use the fact that elections had been held in 
Chechnya very often its effort to legitimise the war.
The use of referendums stands out. The Russian leadership made frequent and skilful 
use of referendums as an argument in the constitutional battle in 1992-1993. Likewise, 
the fact that elections were held constituted an integral part of the legitimation formula 
throughout the period. The popular mandate proved to be used especially in statements 
directed at the political elite. Arguments of legality and constitutionality were used 
more frequently after the new constitution had been adopted but only rarely played a 
prominent role -  one exception is the insistence with which the Russian leadership 
stated that it intended to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. Furthermore, formal 
arguments were invoked when the Russian Orthodox Church was the audience of the 
legitimation message. This could possibly mirror that the Russian leadership 
understood the need for the Church to remain neutral in political battles. Thus, formal 
arguments of legality and constitutionality were arguments that the Church might be 
inclined to incorporate in its own messages rather than arguments bordering on 
political statements. Liberal democratic arguments emphasising human rights and 
freedoms were used especially vis a vis the international community and the liberal 
elites throughout the period and played a less prominent role overall. Human rights and 
freedoms, however, occupied a central role in the constitution of 1993 and in the 
textbooks discussing the 1993 constitution.
Overall, eudeamonic and charismatic arguments did not play significant roles during 
the period. Eudaemonic arguments occurred mainly in 1992 when the Russian
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leadership was still convinced of a connection between political and economic 
reforms. However, the promises of future economic prosperity were always connected 
with democracy and with holding up the West as a role model. As it became 
increasingly evident that the economy would not recover as quickly as first expected, 
eudaemonic arguments faded from the scene almost altogether. In much the same way, 
charismatic arguments petered out as Yeltsin’s popularity diminished. Immediately 
before and after the Russian Federation came into existence, Yeltsin was pointed to 
as a guarantor of Russia as a new, democratic state. That charismatic legitimation 
fades away goes well in hand with the nature of charismatic authority. That Yeltsin 
himself perceived his role as such was evident not least from his memoirs written in 
1994 where he stated that ‘a new -  as the spiteful critics would say -  “Yeltsinite”
760Russia’ had taken the place of the Soviet Union in 1991. Furthermore, the Russian 
leadership claimed that there was a manifest need for a ‘strong authority’ in the 
situation Russia found itself in. However, this emphasis on the need for strong 
authority gradually became centred on the need of a strong presidential office rather 
than on Yeltsin personally during the period.
In line with the discussion in the first chapter on the nature of external legitimation, it 
was natural that such arguments occurred most frequently during the first phase of 
state building. As Russia became recognised, the need to emphasise this fact became 
less important and less potent as a legitimation argument. Already by the time of the 
storming of the White House in 1993, external arguments were largely absent in 
legitimation messages directed at the Russian population. In the case of the war in 
Chechnya, Moscow did initially try to invoke external support for the military 
operation but failed. It is evident that the attractiveness of arguments of Western 
support diminished over the period. The perception that ‘external agents’ were trying 
to meddle in Russian affairs had gained ground. In fact, the Russian leadership was
760 Yeltsin (1994b) Zapiski prezidenta [Notes o f the President] (Moscow, Ogonek), p. 171. (In the 
English version: ‘Overnight, a new Russia -  “Boris Yeltsin’s Russia,” -  took the place of the Soviet 
Union in international politics.’ Yeltsin (1994a) The View from the Kremlin (London, Harper Collins 
Publishers), p. 131).
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probably wiser in de-emphasising external support by this time than the reverse. 
Nevertheless, the Russian leadership did emphasise that it considered Russia to belong 
to an international community of ‘civilised states’ throughout the period and especially 
in messages directed at an international audience.
National legitimation was conspicuous rather by its relative absence than by playing an 
increasing role over the period. This belied the fears in 1993 that the Russian 
leadership would become a champion of nationalism. Although politicians like the 
notorious Vladimir Zhirinovskii expressed highly unpleasant nationalistic views and 
enjoyed notable success in the 1993 parliamentary election, the Russian leadership 
chose not to compete on this nationalist scene. No doubt, the Kremlin sincerely balked 
at bringing this kind of nationalist rhetoric into the main arena. Furthermore, the 
Russian leadership probably realised that other politicians, e.g. KPRF’s Gennadii 
Ziuganov, would be quick to outbid the Kremlin’s nationalist rhetoric. In my view, the 
slight increase in nationalist arguments that was visible in the legitimation formula 
over the period is less noteworthy than the fact that the Russian leadership withstood 
the temptation to jump the nationalist bandwagon.
When the Russian leadership did employ national arguments, it was in a general form 
where it pointed to Russian history and tradition. The military was the favoured 
audience for national arguments of legitimation. Ethnic national arguments were 
almost entirely absent. The Russian leadership did seek to portray Russia as a great 
power -  something that probably mirrors the fact that Russian nation building 
throughout history has had to stand back in favour of Russian state or empire 
building. To certain states, such as Poland and the Baltic states, the choice of the 
Soviet national anthem was a sign of neo-imperial ambitions of the Russian 
Federation. However, it is important to remember that for these states, the choice of the
761 Di Palma (1990) To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Oxford, University of 
California Press), pp. 190-191.
762 This point had been bom out by numerous authors. See for example, Theen (1999) 'Quo Vadis, 
Russia? The Problem of National Identity and State-Building', in: Smith (Ed.) State-Building in 
Russia: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge o f the Future (Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe), p. 58 
and Tolz (2001) Russia (London, Arnold), p. 15.
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tricolour and double-headed eagle constituted imperial symbols as well. It would have 
been most difficult for the Russian leadership to come up with entirely new symbols, 
to entirely denounce its history. This would have undermined its legitimacy at home.
One of the more interesting findings is the prominent role played by negative 
arguments. The most common theme was that of the threat of disintegration and the 
neighbouring arguments of threats of civil war and chaos. The use of the spectre of 
disintegration is probably best explained by the fact that the Russian leadership itself 
regarded it as a potent threat. The fall of communism had already engendered the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia and the division of Czechoslovakia. 
Likewise, the spectre of civil war must have been a real enough threat in a country that 
had experienced revolutions and civil war in the not too distant past. This threat was 
invoked especially at times of crises and vis a vis the domestic population. This 
explains why calls from a Russian president, like Putin, to strengthen the state, 
resounded in Russia in a way that would be unthinkable in the West. However, the 
Russian leadership considered the threat of civil war and disintegration a relevant 
threat when it addressed the international community as well. The war in Yugoslavia 
had already indicated what might be the undesirable consequences on the international 
scene of further disintegration within the sphere of the former Soviet Union.
Immediately before and after Russian independence the Soviet centre was invoked as 
an enemy at the same time as the Russian leadership sought to distance itself from the 
Soviet system by referring to it as ‘totalitarian’ and ‘authoritarian’. This became less 
frequent over the period, though. The practice of demonising adversaries remained, but 
the Russian leadership increasingly used other methods of doing so. For example, the 
opposition in the White House during the October Events were portrayed as fascists 
and the Russian leadership on several occasions used historical references to paint its 
antagonists in black colours (notable was the references to them as ‘false pretenders’). 
In the case of Chechnya, the adversaries of the Russian leadership were at first 
portrayed as bandits and criminals. After the events in Budennovsk and Pervomaiskoe, 
they became referred to as terrorists. However, this practice gained ground on a large 
scale only in the second military campaign in Chechnya in 1999 and after the terror 
bombings of Russian residential blocks. By then terrorist rhetoric had become fortified
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by referring to it as ‘international terrorism’ and Moscow claimed that foreign states 
were using the war in Chechnya in order to achieve the disintegration of the Russian 
state. In other words, a foreign threat was evoked only in the late 1990s and then only 
in relatively vague terms. However, the covert references to ‘foreign states’ that used 
Chechnya and fanatics were carefully chosen to invoke fear of Islamic 
fundamentalism.
The reliance on negative legitimation is worrying since it requires a threat to be present 
or plausible to the audience at which the legitimation message is directed. It has also 
been suggested that the ratio between negative and positive legitimation is indicative of
n f / i
when ‘serious problems abound’. On the other hand, the frequent use of democratic 
legitimation, even if most often in its formal form, indicated that the view that 
democratic authority is legitimate was firmly rooted in Russia. Indeed, there were no 
official suggestions from the Russian leadership to solve the transfer of power after 
Yeltsin by any other means than election.764 As demonstrated by the Soviet experience, 
democratic rhetoric does not automatically lead to democracy. However, in the new 
circumstances that the Russian leadership found itself in after 1991, the need to adhere 
to basic tenets of democratic arguments, such as holding elections, became of essence 
in order to avoid legitimation crisis. Also in accordance with the Soviet experience, 
there is every reason to assume that the legitimation formula did not simply fill the 
function of justifying ex post facto. The Russian legitimation formula also mirrored 
how Yeltsin and the circle around him legitimated their power to themselves. Just as 
framing policy in Marxist-Leninist parlance to a certain extent formed the view of 
Soviet politicians of the world around them, framing policy in the democratic-negative 
parlance must have shaped Yeltsin’s view of the Russian state building project.765
763 Shlapentokh (1986) Soviet Public Opinion and Ideology: Mythology and Pragmatism in Interaction 
(New York, Praeger), p. 16.
764 Yeltsin did, on Aleksandr Korzhakov’s suggestion, contemplate cancelling the presidential elections 
in 1996. In the end, however, he decided to go face the electorate instead. It is also worth noting that 
Yeltsin decided to cancel the presidential election he had promised to hold after he dissolved the 
Supreme Soviet in 1993. Nevertheless, the elections scheduled by the constitution were held on time 
during the 1990s.
765 Compare how the Soviet theory of international relations functioned as a ‘cohesive device’. Light 
(1988) The Soviet Theory o f International Relations, 1917-1982 (Brighton, Wheatsheaf), p. 329 See
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The dominant position of democratic arguments point to the strength that the Russian 
leadership perceived these arguments had. There are a number of possible explanations 
for why this was so. The Russian leadership chose democratic legitimation as its 
main strategy because it regarded democratic arguments to be the international 
norm. Furthermore, democracy possessed the ‘capacity to co-opt reluctant
•  7 6 7political actors’. In spite of the strong presidential powers that the Russian 
constitution envisaged, the majority of the political elite found it more expedient to 
comply with the democratic system. Even when defeated, the political opposition 
was still guaranteed a role in a democratic system and still retained the opportunity 
to use the same system at the next election to try and come to power.768 Democracy 
held out the possibility to solve power struggles in a non-violent manner. Possibly, 
this was why the emphasis on elections and referendums was prominent in 
legitimation messages directed at the political elite. For religious and national 
minorities democracy provided ‘mutual security in diversity’ as well. Finally, 
there was a glaring shortage of attractive alternatives to democracy.770
Democratic legitimation has dominated the period of investigation. However, there 
have been signs that the nuances of the legitimation formula might change. For 
example, the initiative coming from the Kremlin in order to increase the patriotic 
awareness in society points to a new way of approaching the problem. In its state 
programme ‘Patriotic Education of citizens of the Russian Federation in 2001-2005’, 
the Russian government maintains that: ‘The gradual loss of the traditional Russian 
(rossiiskoe) patriotic consciousness in our society has become increasingly noticeable..’
also Kenez (1985) The Birth o f the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917- 
1929 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 255-256.
766 Di Palma (1990) To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Oxford, University of 
California Press), pp. 183-199.
767 Ibid., p. 144.
768 Przeworski (1995) Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 26.
769 Di Palma (1990) To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Oxford, University of 
California Press), p. 151.
770 Ibid., p. 150.
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771In order to change this a program of ‘patriotic education’ was devised. Likewise, the
rhetoric in the second Russian military campaign in Chechnya has been sharper than it 
was in 1994-96. And although the Russian presidential oath still contains the promise 
to protect human rights and freedoms, there have been certain glaring examples to the 
contrary, not least the Kremlin’s policy on media. A glaring discrepancy between the 
legitimation formula and the actual actions taken could seriously undermine the 
position of a state leadership -  something that Yeltsin experienced during his time in 
office.
Not withstanding these late changes of the legitimation strategy, nothing suggests that 
the Russian leadership would abandon elections as the method of appointing political 
leaders of the Russian Federation. Much has been written about the Russian political 
culture as inherently authoritarian (as opposed to a democratic political culture). 
However, the evidence presented above suggest that fear of chaos is a more prominent 
feature of Russian political culture than a pull towards authoritarianism. When the first 
multi-candidate elections occurred in the Soviet Union in 1989-1990, there was 
widespread scepticism as to whether the Soviet electorate possessed an adequate 
knowledge of democracy to use its vote. In the event, the Soviet electorate knew very 
well how to use its newly won opportunity to get rid of its leaders. In some of the 
constituencies where the electorate was offered only one candidate, a majority of the 
voters crossed out that candidate’s name thus forcing the authorities to come up with 
new candidates for a new election.
The Russian leadership appears to have been keenly aware of this experience. 
Although there were some references to strong political leaders in Russian history -  
most notably to Peter the Great -  the Russian leadership more often claimed that a 
strong presidency was needed to avoid the abyss of chaos, civil war and further 
disintegration during Russia’s transition. Meanwhile, the elections prescribed by the
771 The program was adopted on 16 February 2001 (government resolution No. 122) and published in 
Rossiiskaia gazeta, 12 March 2001, p. 5. See also command No. 2761, (‘Instruction on How to 
Organise the Education of Citizens of the Russian Federation in Basic Learning in the Field of 
Defence and Their Preparation on the Bases of Military Service’) issued by the Ministry of Defence 
and Ministry o f Education of the Russian Federation on 21 June 2001, published in Rossiiskaia 
gazeta, 10 July 2001, pp. 4-5.
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1993 constitution have all been held. The opposition certainly was not provided with 
equal opportunities when it came to media coverage etc. and there were allegations of 
electoral rigging in all of the elections. The Russian leadership gambled that the 
Russian population as well as the international community would be prepared to 
overlook certain deficiencies as long as it adhered to the minimum democratic 
requirements (most importantly -  that elections were held) and appeared to be the best 
guarantee against a new Russian Time of Troubles.
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